Essays in the formation of coalitions in the presence of multilateral externalities
Abstract
Τhis dissertation considers a set of economic agents (districts, regions or countries) that choose whether to cooperate or not when the motivation behind the formation of coalitions comes from the exploitation of externalities.The first chapter focuses on the coalition formation when non-negative externalities arise from discrete regional projects, such as infrastructure facilities. In the spirit of Burbidge et al. (1997), we suppose that the regions share the benefits that emerge from their cooperation by adopting the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. We find that a coalition might subsidize the participation of some of its members and we show that in order for the grand coalition to emerge in equilibrium, the gains from the full cooperation should be sufficiently high. We further find that the set of the projects that are undertaken when the regions cooperate depends partially on their local benefits. To some extent, this is consistent with the idea that when the regions coordinate ...
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