Abstract
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his central work, the Ethics, is to lead man to beatitude as if taking him by the hand, then he should define what this beatitude consists of and he should also delineate the basic content lent to the moral principles of good and bad. Yet what kind of content can these terms acquire in a philosophy according to which a) both God as well as each and every singular thing comply with the law of causal necessity, b) where will, be it God’s or man’s, is not free but is always determined causally and c) perfection is induced to reality?This thesis focuses attention on the study of the notions of good and bad. More specifically, it attempts to elucidate the way in which three different views are articulated within Spinoza’s system of philosophy and to see the outcome of their correlation. The philosopher discards any ontological status regarding the notions in question and considers them to be modes of thought and more specifica ...
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his central work, the Ethics, is to lead man to beatitude as if taking him by the hand, then he should define what this beatitude consists of and he should also delineate the basic content lent to the moral principles of good and bad. Yet what kind of content can these terms acquire in a philosophy according to which a) both God as well as each and every singular thing comply with the law of causal necessity, b) where will, be it God’s or man’s, is not free but is always determined causally and c) perfection is induced to reality?This thesis focuses attention on the study of the notions of good and bad. More specifically, it attempts to elucidate the way in which three different views are articulated within Spinoza’s system of philosophy and to see the outcome of their correlation. The philosopher discards any ontological status regarding the notions in question and considers them to be modes of thought and more specifically beings of reason, relevant notions that are created by man in an effort to comprehend things through their interrelation. Nevertheless, people act aiming at the achievement of goals and deem things as good or bad, even though the philosopher insists that “we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because ……we desire it”. Why is it then that he believes that “despite this, still we must retain these phonemes (vocabula)”? “Because we desire to form an idea of man as an exemplar of human nature, which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same phonemes, in the sense mentioned above. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by the term good what we certainly know to be a means to our further approaching the exemplar of human nature that we set before ourselves. And by the term bad what we certainly know prevents us for reproducing this very exemplar model”. And furthermore why does he proceed to genetic definitions of the notions of good and bad defining as good “what we certainly know to be useful to us” and as bad “what we certainly know prevents us from acquiring something good”?The chapters of our thesis follow the train of thought indicated by our questions. In the first chapter we are attempting to define and determine the real by studying beings and their distinctions. In the second chapter we are analysing the epistemological principles by which man approaches the real, one’s ability for knowledge and the limits to this knowledge, the mechanisms through which knowledge is gained, as well as further distinctions related to the kinds of knowledge laid out in Spinoza’s philosophy. A fundamental axiom in Spinoza’s system is the principle of absolute comprehensibility of all that is real, based on which man can know things in the same way God does, through intellect, so that man’s truth is God’s truth. In the third chapter, in the light of our familiarisation with the basic principles governing Spinoza’s philosophy, we attempt an analysis of the ontological status of good and bad. In the fourth chapter we highlight that these notions have a meaning viewed in the light of man, perceived as good and bad for man as expressions of desire. We define the notion of affect (affectus) and then go on to the basic distinction between active and passive affects, a distinction based on the knowledge they comprise, which alludes to the distinctions touched upon in chapter two. The definition of good and bad refered on desire, integrates these notions in the very human nature, which is expressed as a desire and is oriented towards things according to the other two fundamental human emotions; joy and sorrow. The fifth chapter elaborates on the definition of notions based on the distinction between good and bad and truly good and bad, as perceived by Reason. It then goes on to explore the notion of an exemplary human nature and elucidate on the definitions of truly good given according to that exemplar, aiming at finding the reason that leads the philosopher to the preservation of the phonemes and allows him to proceed to genetic definitions. The ability of Reason to grasp what is common is bound to lead to the true knowledge of human nature, so that by this yardstick the content of the terms in question can be defined. The knowledge of the nature of soul leads to the realisation that knowledge itself constitutes what is truly good and the knowledge of God is the supreme good. Furthermore, the knowledge of Reason dictates that the virtue of man consists in acting according to the laws of man’s nature. It is again desire then that defines what is truly good for man, but it is the rational desire that constitutes an active affect. The functionalism of the knowledge of good and bad, which is now also true, is examined in relation to action in the sixth and last chapter. In what way is the true knowledge of good and bad related to human action? And to what kind of ethics is the philosopher finally led to, judging by the way in which he deals with the notions of good and bad? The cause that leads to the formation of an exemplar is related to the mechanisms of desire and its functionalism is determined by the very nature of rational knowledge, which is abstract and is projected in the future, highlighting the main weakness of Reason to lead to action. Drawing on that we then proceed to the exploration of the conditions necessary for the development of an initially immature Reason and examine to what extent the same mechanism related to the formation of an exemplar can be exploited in conjunction with knowledge and through knowledge, which now has the drive of imagination to its benefit. The tail–piece seeks to find to what extent and in what mode the road indicated by Spinoza’s philosophy can meet with an empirical route, in which man is not equipped with the deductions of philosophical knowledge. We underline the notion of attention that is a direction to further investigation.After summarising the basic views highlighted by our analysis we conclude wondering about the character of Spinoza’s ethics. We ascertain the grades of ethics, which are nevertheless established from beginning to end within the same ontological principle, the nature of man viewed as desire, a desire which goes through different stages of self-consciousness, to wonder in the end if the philosopher finally proves to be consistent in his dismissal of teleology.
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