Ontology and semantics of colour in contemporary analytic philosophy
Abstract
As opposed to the naive realist view that colour is a property of objects and/or their surfaces, the 'traditional' philosophical view has been that colour is a subjective quality and a simple sensation. In my Introduction I trace what I believe to be the reasons for this widely held view which I qualify as "Mentalist Subjectivism", usually connected to an empirical and/or logical atomism and a 'traditional theory of meaning'. Emphasis is placed on two problems which arise within this tradition: the difficulty of providing a basis for colour complexity and the issues related to the meaning of colour terms. My thesis' aim is to take colour out of the sphere of the mental and the simple, and to give a satisfactory answer to the above problems. This is done by examining four different sets of views in recent analytical philosophy which challenge mentalist subjectivism. Each is evaluated separately with the aim of reaching a more comprehensive conclusion. It is also suggested that Kripke an ...
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