The Constantinopolitan Greeks in an era of secular nationalism, mid-19th century to 1930

Name of candidate: Dimitris Kamouzis
Registered College: King’s College London
Degree: PhD
Signed Declaration:

All of the work presented in this thesis is the candidate’s own.

Signed:

Date:
Acknowledgements

This thesis is the result of research in three different countries. Therefore, I apologize in advance in case I forget someone from the numerous people who helped me in the process.

First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr Philip Carabott for sharing with me his knowledge and experience and honouring me with his friendship.

I would also like to thank Dr. Renée Hirschon and Sir Michael Llewellyn-Smith for their useful comments.

A special thanks to Professor Kostas Gavroglou. His academic guidance, moral support and friendly advice are mostly appreciated.

I am grateful to His All Holiness the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and everyone at the Ecumenical Patriarchate for their cooperation and hospitality.

I am indebted to the Alexander S. Onassis Foundation in Athens for their consistent financial support that made the writing and completion of this thesis possible. I would especially like to thank Mrs Evgenia Pavlopoulou for her professionalism and also her patience with the reports.

I would also like to thank:
Professor Roderick Beaton and Dr. David Ricks at King’s College London for providing me with the opportunity to participate in several activities organized by the Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies.
The Director of the Benaki Museum Aggelos Delivorias, Professor Konstantinos Svolopoulos and Dr. Evangelos Kofos for their trust and support during the initial stages of my research.
Professor Paschalis Kitromilides, Professor Paraskevas Konortas and Professor Sia Anagnostopoulou for their suggestions on issues of theoretical approach.
Dr Stavros Anestidis for his encouragement and help, especially before my field trip to Istanbul.
Yiannis Begos for helping me deal with the vast material at the Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dimitris Kamouzis
Thanos Zaragkalis and Savvas Tsilenis, who kindly introduced me to the Constantinopolitan Greek community in Athens.

The Greek consul in Istanbul Alexis Alexandris for an interesting discussion and for helping me track down Konstantinoupolis.

Nicolas Philippakis for his suggestions with regards to the style and language of the text.

My discussions with several people allowed me to understand the Constantinopolitan Greek community better. Among them were Dimitrios Frangopoulos, Adamantios Anestidis, Fragko Karaoglan, Dr. Penelope Stathi, Dr. Elçin Macar, Dr. Vangelis Kechriotis and Fotis Benlisoy. I thank all of them.

Also many thanks go to the directors, librarians and staff of the Library and the Archive of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, King’s College Library, the School of Oriental and African Studies Library, the London School of Economics Library, the Library of St Anthony’s College, the British Library, the National Archives, the Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Anthemion Archive of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Athens, the Gennadius Library, the National Library of Greece, the Library of the Greek Parliament, the Centre of Asia Minor Studies, Enosis Konstantinoupoliton and Sylogos Konstantinoupoliton. A special mention should be made to Mrs Panagiota Moschona at the National Library of Greece for allowing me to photograph Konstantinoupolis, a very important source for the purposes of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Father Meletios Sakoulidis, as well as Orhan Türker and Katerina Prokos for permitting me to photograph their private collections of publications.

For their solidarity during long hours of research I would like to thank Ms Lena Korma and Ms Athina Spanaki. For her hospitality, I would like to express my gratitude to Gülrü Tanman, because she made Istanbul feel like home. Also for the countless debates on the topics of our theses, I need to thank my friends Billy Davies and Jeffrey Bibbee.

Babis Sotiropoulos, Mari Kaltsa and Theodoros Mavroyiannis have been sources of inspiration for me. Thank you.
My friends Nikos Kaltsas, Tasos Avgeris, Aris Kaplanidis, Argyris Alafakis, Christos Chatzopoulos, Stelios Frantzeskakis, Giorgos Anagnostopoulos and Iliada Kournoutsi provided me with love and support and each one has played a role during this long process. I appreciate it.

The El-Hawa family has always been there for me. Thank you so much.

I cannot find words to describe the unconditional love and support I have received from my mother Eleni all these years. This is for you.

Last but not least, to my wife Aude. She has been the motivation for all of this. Her love, patience and faith that everything is possible were the things that kept me going. Thank you is not enough to express my gratitude to her.
To my parents Dinos and Eleni, with all my love
Abstract

The thesis examines in detail the transformation of the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul from a religious community to a national minority from the mid-19th century until 1930. Emphasis is given to the involvement of the lay and religious elites in this evolutionary process and the role they played in the construction of the group’s identity. This process was conditioned by the secularization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire/Republic of Turkey and Greek and Turkish nationalism.

The transition from a religious/Rum to a national/Greek community (mid-nineteenth century to 1918) was the result of the ethnic segmentation of Ottoman society that took place during the Tanzimat reforms and the politicization of the Rum milleti along national lines under the Young Turk regime. The identification of the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Greek irredentism and Venizelist expansionism between 1918 and 1922 showed that the dissemination of national ideas by the ethnocentric factions had been successful. National consciousness was no longer restricted to the elites, but had become the concern of the majority of the population.

The failure of the Megali Idea forced these nationalist elites to abandon Constantinople and flee to Athens. Constituting a displaced community, this group assumed the role of a leadership in exile for the minority. However, their uncompromising policies endangered the livelihood of their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul and the geographical separation between the two groups gradually assumed a political character. The signing of the Ankara accord of 1930 put an end officially to their role as a leadership in exile.

The remaining minority faced a double challenge: Deal with the consequences of the political choices of its former leadership for the period 1918-1930; and adjust to the new conditions created after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The treaty officially recognized the community as a non-Muslim minority and set the legal framework for the protection of its rights. However, the Greeks of Istanbul had
to face policies that curtailed their rights as an officially recognized minority, the consequence of the nationalizing and secularizing policies employed by the Turkish state. From the examination of the internal dynamics and the policies of the minority’s leadership and their interaction with Ankara and Athens it becomes apparent that their status as a national minority was consolidated during 1923–30 – a process parallel to the construction of the secular Republic of Turkey.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed Declaration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1: Introduction</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: From Rum to ‘Greek’, mid-nineteenth century to 1918</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The emergence of new social strata and the formation of a Greek ethnic</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community (1839-1908)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The politicization of the millet: ‘Nationalists’ and ‘Anti-national’</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1908-1912)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Turks and Ottoman Greeks (1912-1918)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3: Constantinople and Greater Greece, 1918 – 1922</strong></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The return of the nationalists (1918-1920)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venizelist Constantinople against royalist Athens (1920 – 1922)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4: The establishment of an authority in exile, 1923 – 1930</strong></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From fugitives to political exiles</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘absent’ Constantinoipolitan Greeks and Greek-Turkish negotiations</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1925 – 1928)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture 1, <em>Konstantinopolis</em>, 15 April 1928</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From ‘saviour of the nation’ to benefactor of the Turks</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 5: Being a minority in secular Turkey, 1923 – 1930</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Treaty of Lausanne: Setting the framework for the protection of the</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with and responding to Turkish nation-building</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 6: Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Sources</strong></td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Archives</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Newspapers</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix 1: Original Extracts</strong></td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Abbreviations

AEK: Athlitiki Enosi Konstantinoupoleos (Αθλητική Ένωση Κωνσταντινουπόλεως)
AEP: Archive of Ecumenical Patriarchate
APGL: Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters (Σύλλογος προς Διάδοσιν των Ελληνικών Γραμμάτων)
CCBS: Central Church Board of Stavrodromi (Κεντρική Εφορεία Σταυροδρομίου)
CCC: Central Committee of Constantinople (Κεντρική Επιτροπή Κωνσταντινουπόλεως)
CCUG: Central Committee of Unredeemed Greeks (Κεντρική Επιτροπή των Αλυτρώτων Ελλήνων)
CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CNDC: Committee of National Defence of Constantinople (Επιτροπή Εθνικής Άμυνας Κωνσταντινουπόλεως)
CUP: Committee of Union and Progress
DBFP: Documents on British Foreign Policy
EC: Executive Committee (La Commission exécutive plénipotentiaire soussignée, chargée de la défense des Grecs, sujets turcs, établis à Constantinople et séjournant provisoirement en Grèce)
EFAA: Educational Fraternity ‘Agapate Allilous’ (Φιλεκπαιδευτική Αδελφότης ‘Αγαπάτε Αλλήλους’)
EIEA: Ekgolpion Imerologion tis Ekklisiastikis Alitheas (Εγκόλπιον Ημερολόγιον της Έκκλησιαστικής Αληθείας)
GLAC: Greek Literary Association of Constantinople (Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως)
GMFA: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
GNA: Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi)
GP: Greek Party (Ελληνική Ομάδα)
GPLC: Greek Political League of Constantinople (Ελληνικός Πολιτικός Σύνδεσμος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως)
GUC: General Union of Constantinopolitans (Γενική Ένωση Κωνσταντινουπολιτών)
**SCK**: Society of Constantinopolitans of Kallithea (Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπολίτων Καλλιθέας)

**SLoN**: Secretariat of the League of Nations
Chapter One:

Introduction
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a solid and critical understanding of the mechanisms and processes that led to the transformation of the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul from a religious community to a national minority from the mid-nineteenth century until 1930. The focus is on the involvement of the elites in this evolutionary process and the role they played in the construction of the group’s identity. The term ‘elites’ refers to the lay and religious leaderships of the community/minority.

The current bibliography depicts a fragmented image of the formation and consolidation of a Greek national minority in Istanbul. The studies on this subject can be divided into two main categories defined by their approach: Those focusing on the internal dynamics and policies of different factions within the community’s leadership; and a second category examining Greek-Turkish relations and the policies of the two states towards the Constantinopolitan Greeks. In the first category the works of Sia Anagnostopoulou and Dimitrios Stamatopoulos\textsuperscript{1} have been quite influential in determining the focus of this thesis. Anagnostopoulou introduced in her analysis the involvement of the upper and middle classes in the development of communal institutions and the secularization of the Orthodox millet. However, the focus of her work is Asia Minor, not specifically the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, and chronologically her analysis ends in 1919. Stamatopoulos examined the role of the communal leadership even further and convincingly showed that these elites were also internally divided into different factions. He maintained that from the Tanzimat reforms onwards they also assumed an official mixed lay/clerical (κληρικολαϊκός) character, due to the administration system of the Rum millet. He also established specific patterns with regards to the responses and policies of these elites, which prepared the ground for the analysis in this thesis. However, his study is limited to the nineteenth century, which leads him to the erroneous conclusion that the efforts of the middle class did not result in a popular nationalist movement in Constantinople. This study will attempt to challenge this view. Haris Exertzoglou’s\textsuperscript{2} contribution on the involvement of the upper and middle class elites in the educational activities of the community covers the cultural aspect of this period. To

\textsuperscript{1} Anagnostopoulou 1997; Stamatopoulos 2003, 2006.
this end the articles of Richard Clogg and Paschalis Kitromilides\textsuperscript{3} should also be mentioned. With regards to the significance of religion and especially the consequences of the Bulgarian Schism on the formation of national identity, the studies of Paraskevas Konortas, Paraskevas Matalas and Elli Skopetea\textsuperscript{4} stand out for their insightful analysis. Once again though, all of these studies mainly cover the nineteenth century.

For the twentieth century, Thanos Veremis and Katerina Boura in their articles\textsuperscript{5} examine in detail the politicization of the Rums in the period 1908-1912, but fail to relate it to the evolution of the community during the previous period. Vangelis Kechriotis’ work covers the same period, but he focuses more on the ideologies of the nationalist circles and their political activities in Izmir rather than in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{6} The issue of the internal dynamics and policies of the communal leaderships during the period 1914-1922 remains largely unexplored. For the World War I period there is scattered information, especially in the memoirs of Emmanouil Emmanouilidis and Dimitris Mavropoulos.\textsuperscript{7} However, these cannot be considered scholarly works, but rather primary sources. For the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922 the only exceptions are an article of Sia Anagnostopoulou on the endorsement of Greek irredentism by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Sir Michael Llewellyn Smith’s partial examination of the involvement of the community’s lay strata in the separatist movement of 1921-22.\textsuperscript{8} The former offers a good analysis on the policies of the Patriarchate, but does not address in depth the influence of the nationalist lay leadership on the decision making process. The latter presents in detail the specific events of the period, but the topic of his study and the focal point of his analysis is the issue of Asia Minor and not the Constantinopolitan Greeks.

The most renowned and complete study in thematic terms belonging to the category of works which mainly examine the Constantinopolitan Greeks in the context of Greek-Turkish relations is Alexis Alexandris’ \textit{The Greek Minority of

\textsuperscript{3} Clogg 1982; Kitromilides 1990.
\textsuperscript{4} Konortas 1998; Matalas 2003; Skopetea 1988.
\textsuperscript{5} Boura 1983; Boura 1999; Veremis 1999.
\textsuperscript{6} Kechriotis 2002, 2005.
\textsuperscript{7} Emmanouilidis 1924; Mavropoulos 1960.
\textsuperscript{8} Anagnostopoulou 2007; Llewellyn-Smith: 1999.
Alexandris provides an extensive and thorough account of the Turkish minority policy and the reaction of the Greek state. In most of the cases examined, however, the minority plays a secondary and supplementary role and does not seem to interact with the governments of the two states or influence their policies. It is rather represented as a one-dimensional entity and there is little information on the different stances within its lay and religious leaderships, on the process of decision making and on their responses vis-à-vis the policy of Turkey and Greece. Irene Sarioglou follows the same methodology, while examining the issue of Greek education in Istanbul. Other scholars like Baskin Oran, Samim Akgönül, Çağlar Keyder, Ayhan Aktar and Soner Cagaptay have a more theoretical approach regarding the policy of the Turkish state towards the Greeks of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, as in Alexandris’ case, they leave out of the equation the responses of the communal leaderships and the interaction between Greece, Turkey and the minority.

Therefore, the analysis of the internal dynamics within the minority’s leaderships, their responses to the policies of the Greek and Turkish states and their role in the construction of Greek national identity is largely restricted to the nineteenth century and is nearly non-existent in the post-Lausanne period. Which were the different political stances that developed within the minority after 1923? How did these elites influence the policies of the minority and its interaction with the Greek and Turkish government? In what way do the policies and responses of the lay and religious leaderships after 1923 relate to the pre-1923 period? These questions have remained unanswered.

This thesis will attempt to provide answers and compose a synthesis of the role these elites played in the transition of the community from religious to national throughout this period. It will examine the emergence of different leaderships within the community and their policies, tracing their development and involvement in communal affairs until 1930. Special emphasis will be given to the mixed lay/clerical character of these elites and the inter- and intra-communal antagonisms their policies

---

10 Sarioglou 2004.
brought to the foreground. It will also highlight the continuity of specific political practices and trends, taking into account whether and how these changed under the specific social and political conditions of each period. With regards to the lay element of these elites the thesis focuses on the upper and middle class Constantinopolitan Greeks. The lower classes are not included in the analysis since they did not participate in the decision making process and were unable to influence the policies of the leadership. Furthermore, the existing sources pose a practical restriction on the in-depth examination of their role.

The closing date of the chronological framework represents the end of an era. With the signing of the Ankara accord, all the outstanding issues deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne were settled and the status of the Greeks of Istanbul as a minority was consolidated. At the same time, it was the beginning of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, which created better conditions for the minority.

Some clarifications should also be made with regards to the terminology employed in the thesis. For the period prior to 1923, the terms ‘Rums’, ‘Rum milleti’, ‘Orthodox millet’, ‘Ottoman Greeks’, ‘Constantinopolitan Greeks’ and ‘Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul’ will be employed to refer to the group of people who form the focus of this thesis. These will be replaced by the terms ‘Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul’ and ‘Rums’ for the post-1923 period. The term ‘Hellenes’ will refer to the people holding the Greek citizenship. The term ‘Ottoman’ will refer to the state and its policies, whereas the term ‘Turkish’ will refer to issues related to the ideology of the Young Turks and the Turkish nationalists. The latter term will be retained for the post-1923 period when referring to the Republic of Turkey and its policies.

The analysis is based on empirical historical research. Theoretical models of nationalism have also been employed, but in an eclectic manner, since there is not one ‘general’ or ‘grand’ theory that can explain nationalism. The main criterion was whether some aspects of these theoretical models could provide the historical argument with a theoretical validation and elucidate our understanding of the evolutionary process from a religious community to a national minority. Therefore, an inductive instead of a deductive approach was followed for the assimilation and
integration of theory into the narrative. As a result, these theoretical models are introduced throughout the narrative depending on the theme of each chapter.

Why use some specific theoretical models and not others? To begin with, all three major schools of thought (modernism, ethnosymbolism and constructivism) agree on the role of elites in the construction and evolution of a national community.\(^\text{12}\) Therefore, the role of elites could not be the criterion for selecting the appropriate theoretical model, due to the wide variety which stress the importance of agency in inventing and re-inventing nations.

The importance of the past is also an essential element of most theoretical models, whether it is perceived as choosing cultural markers as Paul Brass maintains\(^\text{13}\), or naming them as pre-existing ethnic ties according to Anthony Smith\(^\text{14}\) or, in Andersonian parlance, as different types of imagined communities.\(^\text{15}\) Therefore, the past alone could not again determine whether some aspects of one theoretical model would be more useful for the purposes of this analysis than others.

The solution to the issue of making the right selection brings us back to the inductive approach of analysis. The historical facts determined which theoretical models were employed in this thesis and not the other way around. In this context this thesis attempted to answer the following questions: What elements did the elites use from the past for the construction of group identity and why? What were their criteria and under which conditions and influences did they select these? What means did they use? What were their aims?

In order to respond to these questions, the thesis did not adopt the typical categorization of theoretical models, but selected and used specific aspects of them according to the following criteria: Those analyzing the method and means for the construction and consolidation of a national minority; those explaining why specific elements from the past were used for the construction of national identity; and those allowing for the understanding of the post-1923 interaction between Greece, Turkey and the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul.

\(^{12}\text{For a discussion on these major schools of thought see Özkırımlı 2000. Specifically for the way the elites are treated in these theoretical models see Kornprobst 2005.}\)
\(^{13}\text{Brass 1991.}\)
\(^{14}\text{Smith 1988.}\)
\(^{15}\text{Anderson 1991.}\)
In the first category, the work of Paul Brass on the role of elites in the creation of ethnic communities and the establishment of effective nationalist political organizations proved useful for the analysis of similar phenomena within the Rum milleti. Miroslan Hroch’s three structural phases between the beginning of a national movement and its successful completion with regards to non-dominant ethnic groups in multi-ethnic empires elucidated the development of a national movement in Constantinople.\footnote{Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000.} Regarding the political aims of this movement and the methods of disseminating national ideas, John Breuilly’s theoretical model was also consulted.\footnote{Breuilly 1996; Breuilly in Özkırımlı 2000.}\footnote{Brass 1991; Smith 1991.}

In the second category the consensus between Paul Brass and Anthony Smith\footnote{Brass 1991; Smith 1991.} with regards to the restrictions placed on the elites and educated strata by the specific ethnic past of a community for the construction of group identity, provided the basis to explore which elements from the Greek ethnic past were used for the construction of Greek national identity. To this end the studies of Matalas and Özkırımlı & Sofos\footnote{Özkırımlı-Sofos 2008.} proved essential for the understanding of the ideological context behind the definition of this identity.

In the final category, Roger Brubaker’s analysis\footnote{Brubaker 1996.} of the formation of national minorities in post-war Central and Eastern Europe, the consequence of the disintegration of multi-ethnic empires and the establishment of new states within completely new borders, and especially the concept of the ‘triadic nexus’, provided a schematic way of presenting the dynamics and complexities of relations between the Greek Orthodox minority, Greece and Turkey.

Apart from this general categorization, a number of studies were consulted in an attempt to highlight specific facets of this multi-dimensional process. The works of Adrian Hastings, Fatma Müge Göçek, Anne Kane, Liisa H. Malkki\footnote{Hastings 1997; Göçek 1993; Kane 2000; Malkki 1992.} as well as the two edited volumes on nationalism by John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith and by Umut Özkırımlı\footnote{Özkırımlı 2000; Hutchinson & Smith 1994.} should also be mentioned.
The thesis takes into consideration two more parameters in order to provide a complete analysis of the transition from a religious community to a national minority. The first one is the specific historical, political and ideological context during every different stage of this process. The secularization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire/Republic of Turkey on the one hand, and Greek and Turkish nationalism on the other, set the conditions and the framework for the actions and the responses of the lay and religious elites. In addition, Greek-Turkish relations in every period affected the decisions and political orientations of the different factions within the communal leadership. The Greek Orthodox community/minority is placed also in a comparative context. The thesis will try to briefly examine the development of the other non-Muslim communities, namely the Jews and Armenians, and show that the Constantinopolitan Greeks did not constitute a unique case, but formed part of the general ethnic segmentation and politicization along national lines that Ottoman society underwent during this period.

This thesis is based on extensive research into a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Three of them particularly stand out for the invaluable and rich information they offer regarding the different stances within the minority and their responses to the policies of Greece and Turkey:

1. The documents held at the Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provide a very useful insight into the relations between the Greek state and the leadership of the minority.

2. The archives of the communal councils and church boards of the parishes of Constantinople held at the Anthemion Archive of the Department of Methodology, History and Theory of Science at the University of Athens. These archives, used for scholarly purposes for the first time, contain a vast number of documents on the internal mechanisms, policies and structure of the minority.

3. The Constantinopolitan Greek newspapers of this period that allowed the assessment of the role of the press in the construction of the group’s identity and offered an idea of the way Greek public opinion handled the political and social situation at every different stage of this evolutionary process. These
newspapers also printed translated articles, interviews and official state decisions from the Turkish dailies, which provided the thesis with a mediated understanding of Turkish public opinion towards the minority. The Constantinopolitan newspapers used in the thesis are *Imerisia Nea, Chronos and Apogevmatini*, held at the Library of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and *Konstantinoupolis* held at the Greek National Library and the Library of the Greek Parliament.

The thesis is divided into four main chapters along chronological and thematic lines. Chapter Two examines the transformation of the Constantinopolitan Greeks from an ethnic to a national community in the period preceding the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. First of all, the formation of a Greek ethnic community during the Tanzimat reforms (mid-nineteenth century to 1876) and the reign of Abdülhamid II (August 1876-July 1908) will be presented. Emphasis will be given to the intracommunal antagonism between different elites that developed within the context of the reform programme for the secularization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire. It will be argued that this antagonism paved the way for the politicization of the millet along national lines under the Young Turk regime. The last stage of the transformation process will be seen in the context of the nationalist policies of the CUP during the Balkan Wars and World War I.

Chapter Three will trace the political and national identification of the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Venizelos and Greek irredentist expansionism. Their actions could be divided into two major stages: The return of the nationalists to power and their effort to sever the community’s ties with the Ottoman establishment and manifest their desire for union; and the politicization of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, expressed by their support for Venizelos in his dispute with King Constantine and the anti-Venizelists. The term ‘nationalists’ refers to the faction of the millet’s leadership that had ethnocentric political orientations and made claims on the basis of the community’s Greek ethnic identity. Most of them were organized under the Committee of National Defence of Constantinople (*Επιτροπή Εθνικής Άμυνας Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, CNDC). In this context, the activities of the
nationalists will be examined in an attempt to explain how and why Constantinople became the centre of Venizelist opposition to royalist Athens.

Chapter Four will examine the policies of the nationalists after they left Constantinople for Greece. It will be argued that these ‘absent’ Greeks gradually formed an authority in exile. The term ‘absent’ is used to describe the non-exchangeable Greeks of Istanbul, who had openly supported Venizelos and had left Turkey before the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Although, according to the terms of the treaty, they had every right to return to Istanbul, the Turkish authorities did not allow them to exercise this right. As a result, they assumed the role of a leadership in exile for the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. The focal point of this chapter will be the activities of ‘La Commission exécutive plénipotentiaire soussignée, chargée de la défense des Grecs, sujets turcs, établis à Constantinople et séjournant provisoirement en Grèce’ (Executive Committee, EC). The protests of the committee to the Greek state and the League of Nations (LoN) and the consequences of their actions on Greek-Turkish relations, as well as on their co-nationals in Istanbul, will be explored.

The final chapter will focus on the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul in the period following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. It will present the international legal framework set by the clauses of the treaty for the protection of the rights of the minority. Emphasis will be given to the responses of the Constantinopolitan Greeks to the secular nationalism of the Turkish state and to its relations with Greece. The chapter will examine the effort to improve communal self-administration in relation to the patriarchal issue and the renunciation of Article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne. The power struggle between the different stances within the minority’s leadership with regards to these two issues, and their responses to Ankara and Athens, will also be explored in an effort to evaluate the post-war relations between the minority, its national homeland and the host state.
Chapter Two:
From Rum to ‘Greek’, mid-nineteenth century to 1918
Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the role played by the lay and religious leaderships of the Rum milleti in the transformation of the community from religious to national during the period preceding the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. Emphasis will be given to the intra-communal antagonism between different elites that developed within the context of the reform programme for the secularization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire. It will be argued that this antagonism led to the formation of a Greek ethnic community from the mid-nineteenth century until 1908 and paved the way for the politicization of the millet along national lines under the Young Turk regime. The last stage of the transformation process will be seen in the context of the nationalist policies of the CUP during the Balkan Wars and World War I. The involvement of the Greek state in communal affairs and its influence with regards to the cultural and political Hellenization of the Orthodox millet will also be assessed. In addition, the chapter will examine the Greek Orthodox community in relation to the other non-Muslim ethnic groups, in an attempt to show that the Rums were not a unique case, but formed part of the general ethnic segmentation of Ottoman society that took place during the transition of the empire from a multi-religious to a multi-ethnic state.
The emergence of new social strata and the formation of a Greek ethnic community (1839 – 1908)

In order to trace all the stages of the transition of the Constantinopolitan Greeks from a religious to a national community, it is necessary to examine the importance of religion in a multi-religious state entity like the Ottoman Empire. Religion was the main criterion of social differentiation in Ottoman society, since it ‘provided a man’s label’ as Roderic Davison puts it.23 The primary division of the population was between Muslims and non-Muslims and within the latter, between Orthodox Christians, Gregorian Armenians, Jews and Catholics.24 In the nineteenth century this religious communal system was officially recognized as the millet system. At the time, the term millet meant ‘a religious community, which was under the spiritual jurisdiction of a religious leader and officially recognized by the state’.25

Contrary to conventional wisdom, several studies have convincingly maintained that the official recognition of the Rum millet, the Orthodox millet, by the Porte took place in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century.26 After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Sultan Mehmed II and his successors, aiming to secure a normal transition to the new political situation, followed the policy of istimalet, which had as its main goal to preserve as much as possible the status quo from before the conquest.27 They acknowledged the Orthodox Church and its institutions and attributed special privileges to the Ecumenical Patriarch, who extended and consolidated his authority over his flock. The fact that the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was at Constantinople, capital of the state, residence of the sultan and decision-making centre for the whole empire, facilitated its gradual incorporation into the Ottoman administrative network. By recognizing it as the authority of the Rum millet and attributing specific privileges to the patriarch, the Ottoman state was able to control a large number of its subjects.28 The legitimization of the patriarch’s authority over the

23 Davison 1990: 112.
28 Kostis 1991: 64.
Orthodox population came in the form of *berats*, official documents describing the privileges attributed to him by the Sultan. In all the *berats* the Ottoman state retained its right to appoint and relieve the patriarch of his duties, demonstrating that the power of the Patriarchate emanated from Ottoman rule. In addition, the Ottoman authorities assisted the patriarch and the higher clergy in imposing taxes over the flock and lower clergy, which allowed the Patriarchate to respond effectively to its financial obligations towards the Sultan. By the end of the eighteenth century the Ecumenical Patriarch and the higher clergy were considered state officials.

The lay element also played a significant role in the administration of the millet. Already by the mid-seventeenth century the Phanariots (Φαναριώτες) had been involved in ecclesiastical matters in order to achieve their own economic and political goals. These powerful Greek-speaking Orthodox aristocrats, named after the district of Phanar where the Patriarchate was seated, gradually assumed significant posts in the ecclesiastical hierarchy as well as in the Ottoman administration. With the patriarch’s permission they received revenues from territories that were under his jurisdiction and controlled the promotion of rulers in the Danubian principalities. Furthermore, they participated unofficially in the election of the patriarch and the selection of Metropolitans, financed members of the higher clergy and mediated between the Church and the Ottoman authorities on issues regarding the Orthodox millet. The guilds (*esnaf*) of Constantinople constituted the other important economic and social feature of the community. They were involved in the administration of the Patriarchate’s finances and their leaders also played a significant role in the selection of the candidate for the patriarchal throne.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Ecumenical Patriarchate managed to expand its territorial jurisdiction by officially absorbing the independent archbishoprics of Achris (Ohrid) and Ipekion (Peč) and placing under its control the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem as well as the autocephalous archbishoprics of Cyprus and Sinai. *Primus inter pares* both by tradition and practice,

---

29 Konortas 1998: 45.
30 Ibid., 162, 166, 344.
the patriarch became a milletbaşi, the head of the Greek, Slavic, Albanian, Romanian and Arab Orthodox populations of the Balkans and most of Anatolia. Assisted by the Holy Synod, he controlled the religious and ecclesiastical affairs of the Orthodox millet and had legal authority on issues of family law.

The ecclesiastical hegemony of Constantinople over the other Orthodox churches was also translated into cultural hegemony. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the Ecumenical Patriarchate maintained the Byzantine tradition and became the vehicle of Greek culture. Its official sacred language was Greek and the higher clergy, - the patriarchs, the members of the Holy Synod and the provincial metropolitans -, were Greeks or Hellenized Orthodox. They had received Greek education and as Richard Clogg points out, ‘showed scant respect for the linguistic and cultural susceptibilities of their non-Greek flocks’. During the late eighteenth century the higher clergy and the Phanariot elite tried to impose Greek culture on the other Orthodox populations of the Balkans. The financial and social conditions of the time provided a fertile ground for such an effort. The effort of Russia to assume the role of the protector of the Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century allowed the emergence of a Greek mercantile bourgeoisie and made Greek the lingua franca of commerce in the Balkan Peninsula. The adoption of Greek culture from the upper social strata of the non Greek-speaking Orthodox was considered as a means for social ascent within the millet.

Greek printing also enhanced the importance of Greek language in comparison with the languages of the other non-Greek Orthodox populations, because ‘to the monopoly of the established authority [of the Ecumenical Patriarchate], the semi-monopoly of the “technique” of the written word was added’. This resulted in a widespread admiration for Greek culture and a

---

37 Matalas 2003:27.
38 Tsoukalas 1992: 35.
subsequent desire to acquire it, which lasted until the period of Greek independence.\textsuperscript{39}

According to Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros Sofos, the Ottomans facilitated this cultural predominance of the Greek-speaking ecclesiastical elites over the other Balkan peoples, since ‘key aspects of the reproduction of the \textit{Rum millet}, such as juridical functions, education, storage and reproduction of knowledge and cultural guidance, were the domain of the ‘‘Greek’’ Patriarchate as far as the Ottoman administration was concerned’.\textsuperscript{40} In return the Patriarchate was functioning as a state institution by emphasizing its ecumenical role and its loyalty to Ottoman authority. As a result, although in cultural terms it had sustained its predominant Greek character, it very rarely used the term ‘Greek’ in official ecclesiastical documents.\textsuperscript{41} Similarly, while the Greek-speaking elites favoured Greek culture as a means to consolidate their social status and safeguard their political and economic interests, by and large they did not offer their support to the project of Greek national liberation, which they perceived as a threat to their monopoly of power.\textsuperscript{42}

The outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 was the ultimate challenge for the religious and lay leaderships of the Orthodox millet. The ideological foundations of the movement had been laid by the Greek nationalist intelligentsia of the diaspora of Central and Western Europe in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century. Influenced by western national ideas, they criticized the Orthodox elites for becoming part of the Ottoman establishment and acquiring so much power and economic benefits from this policy of cooperation. They described this attitude as \textit{ethelodouleia}, an unforced submission of the elites to the Ottoman authorities, and especially accused the higher clergy of corruption and of presenting Ottoman rule as part of divine dispensation. Ironically, the people considered responsible for the Greek revolt and victimized by the Porte belonged to the same religious and lay leadership of the \textit{Rum milleti} criticized by the Greek intellectuals. This consequence can be explained, because as far as the Ottoman authorities were concerned, Patriarch

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} Clogg 1982:188.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Özkırımlı-Sofos 2008: 52.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Konortas 1999: 172.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Özkırımlı-Sofos 2008: 53.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Gregory V had failed in preserving and safeguarding the obedience of his flock to the Sultan. Therefore, despite his sincere efforts to denounce the revolution, Gregory was finally executed as a reprisal.\footnote{Clogg 1982: 191-3.} The Phanariot aristocracy was also severely damaged. Its members either completely lost their wealth and power or were forced to abandon the Empire.\footnote{Stamatopoulos 2003: 37; Stamatopoulos 2006: 256; Alexandris 1980: 370.}

The failure of the elites to ensure the loyalty of a significant part of the Orthodox population to the sultan had further implications for the \textit{Rum milleti}. The collapse of the Phanariot aristocracy created a void in its lay leadership and the Greek revolt forced the Ottoman authorities to doubt the loyalty of the Rums and reconsider their privileged position vis-à-vis the other non-Muslims. This resulted in an improvement of the position of the other millets and especially the Armenians. The suspicion of government officials towards the Rums, combined with the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826, which resulted in the physical extermination of the Jewish \textit{sarrafis} (moneychangers), (the lay leadership of the Jewish community), benefited the Armenian \textit{sarrafis}, who gained power by cooperating with Muslim officials and became involved in the process of tax sub-contracting.\footnote{Stamatopoulos 2006: 256; Rodrigue 1990: 26-8; Rozen 2005: 54-60.} Furthermore, the success of the Greek revolution manifested by the foundation of an independent Greek state in 1830 and the establishment of an autocephalous Church of Greece in 1833, coupled with the continuous oppression of the Patriarchate over the non-Greek Orthodox populations of the Balkans, prepared the ground for future independence movements in the region. This was an additional problem that the Ecumenical Patriarchate would have to face. All these issues became apparent during the period of the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876).\footnote{For the \textit{Tanzimat} reforms see: Lewis 1961: 73-170; Shaw & Shaw 1997: 55-171; Berkes 1998: 137-200.}

There were several reasons that forced the Ottoman state to proceed to a reform programme of westernization and modernization. The infiltration of the ideas of liberty and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire had a major influence especially on its Christian subjects, who expressed more frequently their complaints about the lack of equality. This provided the Great Powers with the opportunity to assume a role of

\footnote{Clogg 1982: 191-3.}
protector for each one of the Christian millets and put pressure on the state to take measures for improving their living conditions.\(^{47}\) In many cases however, this right of intervention was used as a pretext by both the traditional enemy of the empire Russia and naval and commercial powers like Britain and France to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman state in order to promote their own political and financial interests in the region.\(^{48}\) In addition, the revolutionary movements in Serbia and Greece were an indication to the Ottoman statesmen that the secession of territories and the possible dismemberment of the empire was a threat they had to face before it was too late.\(^{49}\) In an effort to reduce the dependence of their state on the West, and avert further Great Power intervention and the outbreak of more revolutions, the reformers, influenced by the ideas of European liberalism, committed themselves to the principle of egalitarianism.\(^{50}\)

The principles of the Tanzimat were proclaimed in 1839 with the decree of Gülhane (Gülhane Hattı şerif), and were reaffirmed with the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı or Hattı Hümayun) of 1856.\(^{51}\) They declared the protection and respect of the life, honour and property of all the subjects of the Sultan and guaranteed their equality in the eyes of the law, regardless of their religion. The main goal of these two imperial reforms was the creation of a centralized administration system and the secularization and modernization of the Empire on the western model. The political expression of the whole reform programme was named Ottomanism (Osmanlılık) and aimed at creating a common Ottoman citizenship for all the peoples of the empire without distinction. The element of egalitarian citizenship was employed as a means to achieve the homogenization of the society and to bring about a sense of fraternity and solidarity among its members, a concept of Ottoman patriotism.\(^{52}\) The official recognition of the millets’ privileges and cultural and religious rights had a similar goal; to present and establish the millet system as part of a shared Ottoman culture. In

\(^{47}\) Davison 1990: 113.
\(^{49}\) Karal 1982: 388; Stamatopoulos 2006: 256.
\(^{51}\) Hurewitz 1987: 113-6, 149-153.
other words, ‘the Ottomanism of the “Ottomans” was to be guaranteed by their incorporation into their millet’. With the reforms, the state initiated an effort to create a civic-territorial nation based on institutionalized law, common citizenship and culture and a sense of defined territory.

The Hatt-ı Hümayun introduced significant changes to the administration of all the non-Muslim communities, including the Orthodox. Article II officially recognized the privileges that had been attributed to the patriarch in the past and provided for the formation of a mixed council comprising both clerical and lay members that would manage the affairs of the millet. In other words it officially recognized and established the role of the lay element in the administration of communal affairs. However, the Greek Revolution of 1821, and the favourable financial conditions created by the expansion of European capitalism in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, had altered the demography and the social stratification of the lay strata residing in the capital and had brought new forces to the foreground.

An accurate demographic estimate of the Greek Orthodox population residing in Constantinople has not been possible, due to the different numbers provided in various sources. One reason for this was the reluctance of non-Muslims to register with the civil authorities, in order to avoid taxation. Another reason was the difficulty of recording in the official statistics Greeks living in Constantinople on a temporary basis, Greek nationals (Hellenes) that had migrated to the Ottoman Empire and former Ottoman Greeks, who had acquired Greek nationality or in some cases the nationality of other foreign powers. All these people came under the provisions of the regime of Capitulations and demanded to be treated accordingly. Greeks with foreign citizenship were unofficially estimated at 60,000 in 1878. The regime of the Capitulations gave the opportunity to Greece to intervene on behalf of Greek

---

56 The Capitulations were agreements between the Ottoman Empire and several countries that allowed the latter to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals and granted them personal, juridical and economic privileges. The members of the non-Muslim communities took advantage of these privileges in order to improve their position in the empire and promote their own economic interests. See Svolopoulos 2003: 38-40; Issawi 1982: 273-4; Thayer 1923: 211-2, 215.
nationals, who constituted a significant part of the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul. The grant of citizenship to Ottoman Greeks by the Greek Kingdom made the differentiation between Rum and Hellene very difficult and became an issue of friction between the Ottoman and Greek state, which was finally solved with the 1930 Greek-Turkish Accord of Ankara. Therefore, the Greek Orthodox population of Constantinople for the period 1850s to mid 1910s was as follows:

Table 1: Greek Orthodox population of Constantinople 1844-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>213,992</td>
<td>45,780</td>
<td>21.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>236,096</td>
<td>58,516</td>
<td>24.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>382,376</td>
<td>68,006</td>
<td>17.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>873,575</td>
<td>152,741</td>
<td>17.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>873,565</td>
<td>156,741</td>
<td>17.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>864,576</td>
<td>176,442</td>
<td>20.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906 / 1907</td>
<td>864,662</td>
<td>176,442</td>
<td>20.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>846,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>30.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>841,000</td>
<td>235,200</td>
<td>27.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>841,108</td>
<td>235,215</td>
<td>27.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>909,978</td>
<td>205,375</td>
<td>22.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>909,978</td>
<td>205,375</td>
<td>22.57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both the official Ottoman statistics provided by Shaw and Karpat and the Greek sources lead to the conclusion that the Constantinopolitan Greeks had a strong and continuous demographic presence in the area, which partly justifies the Greek cultural persistence of the community.

The majority of these people resided at the wider area of Pera, the European part of the Ottoman capital, principally at the districts of Stavrodromi, Galata and Tatavla. This was the result of population movements during the eighteenth century from the quarters of the old city to Pera, which gradually became the financial and social centre of the capital. The Greek presence was also strong along the European coast of the Bosphorus and continuous up to the Black Sea, at the district of Chalkidon, the Princes Islands and in several suburbs along the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. In the old part of the city, Ottoman Greeks lived mostly around the Phanar, the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and along the Marmara Sea coast in the districts of Vlanga, Kontoskali and Ypsomathia.\(^59\)

As already mentioned, the Greek War of Independence severely damaged the Phanariot aristocracy. Only a few of the expelled Phanariot families managed to return to Constantinople in the years following the revolution. These joined the Christian Orthodox state officials who had emerged during the post revolution period and formed a new ‘aristocracy’, the Neo-Phanariots (Νεοφαναριώτες).\(^60\) Their members held significant positions in the Ottoman state, the higher bureaucracy and the diplomatic service.\(^61\) They supported the reform programme of the state for two reasons. The more obvious one is that as members of the Ottoman establishment they abided by the official state policy. At the same time however, they had realized that the application of the reforms equated with an official recognition of their role in the political and cultural affairs of the Orthodox millet and challenged the absolute power of the higher clergy.\(^62\) They were joined in their efforts by the bankers and wealthy merchants, the other social group that emerged after the Greek revolution.

This group was firstly formed in the 1840s, when its members pulled out of the guilds of Constantinople and took advantage of the trade opportunities created in the Ottoman Empire after the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of 1838. Using their connections in Russia and Western Europe, they became wealthy from the international commerce of raw materials and food. Furthermore, the immediate financial needs of the Ottoman state to cover its public debt after the Crimean War allowed them to shift their business interests from commerce to banking and challenge the monopoly of the Armenian bankers.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, by the end of the 1860s Constantinople had become an important financial centre as a result of the rapid incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into western capitalism. The major private banking establishments belonged to members of this group.\textsuperscript{64} During the 1870s the bankers of Galata, as they came to be known, took part in the borrowing of the Ottoman state and after the arrangement of Ottoman public debt in 1881 they limited their activities strictly to banking and commercial business.\textsuperscript{65} The bankers fortified their social and political position in the empire through marriages between members of their families and members of well known Neo-Phanariot families.\textsuperscript{66} Bankers like Zarifis and Zografos managed to form a significant political coalition with the Neo-Phanariots, which aimed at acquiring a more influential role in communal affairs through the promotion of the state’s reform programme.\textsuperscript{67}

Their ideology was named Helleno-Ottomanism (Ελληνοθωµανισµός), which is the interpretation of Ottoman patriotism by these upper class elites according to their own political and cultural criteria. On a political level the main aim of Helleno-Ottomanism was the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, an essential precondition for the success of the reform programme. This policy would serve their financial and political interests because it would allow them to exploit the opportunities provided by the reforms made for the non-Muslim subjects of the empire.\textsuperscript{68} But the protection of the territorial integrity of the empire was also a political choice dictated by the

\textsuperscript{63} Exertzoglou 1997: 160; Stamatopoulos 2003: 66.
\textsuperscript{64} Exertzoglou 1989: 19; Exertzoglou 1996: 18.
\textsuperscript{65} Exertzoglou 1997: 160. For the activities of the Greek bankers during 1871-1881 see: Exertzoglou 1989.
\textsuperscript{66} Exertzoglou 1996: 57-9.
\textsuperscript{67} Stamatopoulos 2003: 62-3.
\textsuperscript{68} Anagnostopoulou 1997: 303-4; Skopetea 1988: 311.
state of international affairs, especially after the Crimean War. The interests of the other Great Powers in the region were threatened by Russia always interfering in the affairs of the empire under the pretext of protecting the Christian populations. For that reason, Britain and France also supported the reforms, which could be employed as a way to limit Russian intervention.\footnote{Anagnostopoulou 1997:304; Stamatopoulos 2006: 258-9.}

On a cultural level, these Constantinopolitan Greek elites had realized that religion was becoming less and less the element legitimizing the incorporation of the Orthodox into the millet and subsequently ensuring the uncontested acceptance of its leadership. The pre-revolutionary supranational role of the Greek-speaking leadership of the millet and its predominance over the other non-Greek Orthodox populations was gradually fading. The principle of equality introduced with the Tanzimat reforms was rapidly changing the dynamics not only within the Ottoman society, but also within the Rum millet. As Skopetea has argued, ‘the Tanzimat was not indulging any specific ethnicity, and despite their financial power the Greeks ceased to be the evident masters of the Balkans’.\footnote{Skopetea 1988: 314.} According to the instrumentalist viewpoint on the nature of ethnicity, ‘ethnic and national attachments are continually redefined and reconstructed in response to changing conditions and the manipulations of political elites’.\footnote{Özkırımlı 2000: 109-110.} During this period, Greek education replaced religion as the basic ethnic attachment employed for the homogenization of the millet. The group that controlled education would be able to affirm its political and social hegemony over the Orthodox population. As a result, the supporters of Helleno-Ottomanism promoted the Hellenization of the Orthodox millet through education. By claiming a leading role in communal education the powerful Rum upper class would be able to legitimize its authority over the millet.\footnote{Anagnostopoulou 1997: 305; Stamatopoulos 2003:218.} In addition, they gave significant sums of money towards charities and philanthropic initiatives focusing on the larger masses of the population.\footnote{With regards to the practices of philanthropy in Istanbul during this period see Kanner 2004.} To paraphrase Brass and Smith, this was a politically induced cultural change, which served purposes other than the cultural goals which its
spokesmen proclaimed to be its raison d’être, but it did so by combining economic and political interests with cultural ‘affect’.  

Helleno-Ottomanism should also be seen in the context of the antagonistic relations between Constantinople and Athens. According to Sia Anagnostopoulou, it was perhaps Constantinople’s final attempt to produce its own ideology and contest with Athens the role of the centre of the Greek Orthodox populations. The time was ripe for such an effort. The incomparable prosperity of Constantinople had provided the leading elites with significant financial power. This was coupled with equal political power, the result of their proximity to the higher echelons of Ottoman government that had allowed them to assume important positions in the state mechanism. With regards to the cultural mission of Hellenism, the activities of a considerable Constantinopolitan Greek intelligentsia further enhanced the effort to establish Constantinople as the centre of Greek education of the Rums and achieve the Hellenization of the millet independently of the Greek Kingdom. Although the cultural affinity of these intellectuals with the ones in Greece was very close, their physical presence at the decision-making centre of the empire permitted them a higher degree of influence over the Rums. Once again the success of this educational effort depended on the survival of a reformed Ottoman empire. Constantinople adopted the cultural mission of Hellenism, originally conceived and determined in Athens, but adjusted it to the Ottoman reality and legitimized it as an element of Ottomanism.

The supporters of Helleno-Ottomanism had a dual attachment, which could be described by the term ‘dual loyalties’. They showed public and political loyalty to the Ottoman state and its policies of reform and private loyalty to their Greek ethnic identity. Therefore, Helleno-Ottomanism had two dimensions, one ethnic, Helleno/Greek, and one political, Ottomanism. The ethnic dimension of this ideology did not negate the political one, since the upper class adopted, adjusted, reproduced and finally incorporated Greek culture into its policy of Ottomanism in order to

---

75 Anagnostopoulou 1997: 303.
establish its social hegemony over the Greek Orthodox. As a result, during the Tanzimat era, Hellenism was not identified with the Greek state, but with the leadership of the millet. Likewise, the political dimension did not negate the ethnic one. The new political prospect was a Greek-Turkish condominium, which meant the incorporation of these powerful Rums into the Ottoman state and their transformation from significant members of the Orthodox millet to privileged Ottoman citizens. In other words, it meant the establishment of their political hegemony over the millet. Thus, these modernizing elites were using the community as a base for the exercise of influence in wider Ottoman society. In Skopetea’s words, ‘the dogma of Helleno-Ottomanism was the response of the outside Greeks to the Hellenic Megali Idea’. They preferred the Greek state to exercise a policy of prudence and abandon any possible expansionist plans. Until the rise of the Young Turks to power in 1908, this upper class was the undisputed leadership of the Greek Orthodox community. At the same time however, the financial and educational circumstances created by the reforms allowed the development of another faction within the millet with a more ethnocentric political orientation. Its members belonged mostly to the middle class of Constantinopolitan Greeks.

The middle class was composed of the leaders of the traditional guilds of Constantinople; professionals such as doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers who emerged from the increasing demand for western educated and skilled people in specific fields during the reforms; and employees in banks, railways, public utilities and industries. The main reason behind the development of an ethnocentric proclivity among the middle class was that the political framework formed during the reforms did not allow its members to participate substantially in the administration of the Orthodox millet. Furthermore, a significant part of this group was educated either in Europe or Greece and was the vehicle of national ideologies that were reproduced at the time in these academic circles. As a result, they played a more

---

80 See Brass 1991: 90.
81 Ibid., 311.
82 Ibid., 316.
83 Issawi 1982: 261.
active role in the cultural life of the community and especially in the establishment and activities of institutions, associations and schools, where Greek culture and education became dominant. A considerable number of them also had dual citizenship, Ottoman and Greek, due to the frequent movement of populations between the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom during this period. As a result, they were in a very privileged position, because as Ottoman citizens they were able to get involved in financial activities not usually practiced by foreign citizens and as Greek citizens they were exempted from the taxation imposed on Ottoman citizens. The fact that their financial interests were protected by the Greek state, owing to the system of capitulations, pushed them into progressively identifying with it also in political terms.

Therefore, as opposed to the upper class, the middle class did not have ‘dual loyalties’. In their case, there was congruence between the ethnic and political facet of their identity. They identified with Greece both in ethnic and political terms. The importance of this point lies in the fact that the middle class transferred these values to the large masses of the Orthodox population in Constantinople. The small traders, craftsmen and skilled workers, who represented the lower strata of the community, were deeply influenced by the cultural and political choices of the middle class. Activities aiming at their ‘moral formation and intellectual development’ like the ones organized by the Greek Literary Association of Constantinople (Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, GLAC) should be seen in the context of an effort to shape the identity of these people according to the criteria of the middle class. In addition, the ethnocentric views of the leaders of the guilds were also adopted by their members, including people from the lower classes.

In his study on ethnicity and nationalism, Brass makes a critical point on the role of elites in the creation of ethnic communities:

Ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites in modernizing […] societies undergoing dramatic social change. This process

89 Brass 1991: 25.
invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between competing elite, class, and leadership groups both within and among different ethnic categories.

In some cases, the terms elite and class coincide, especially when they refer to subgroups within one ethnic group. A closer examination of the policies of the upper and middle class of the Rum milleti during this period will show that the process described above by Brass is quite accurate in this specific case. The Tanzimat reforms put Ottoman society on the path of modernization and set the framework for an ongoing competition between and within these two elites. According to the French historian and journalist of the time Abdolonomye Ubicini, by the middle of the nineteenth century there were two basic parties within the Rum milleti. The first one led by the upper class – the Neo-Phanariots, the wealthy bankers and merchants and the higher clergy – was firmly attached to the Ottoman Empire and the maintenance of the status quo, since their interests were closely bound to the interests of the Porte. This could be described as the ‘Helleno-Ottoman’ party. The second one was composed of members of the middle class, who were ‘partisans of change, desiring or rather dreaming, of the emancipation of the Greek people’. This ‘Hellenocentric’ party opposed Turkish domination, but did not have a clear idea about the right time or object of a revolutionary movement. Their aspirations varied from the establishment of an independent Romaic (Rum) state to their annexation by Greece. The latter view was basically supported by the more radical ethnocentric circles within this group, the so called ‘party of Hellenism’.

The competition between and within these two parties, as well as between the elites of different ethnic groups – namely the Greeks and the Bulgarians – would eventually result in the transformation of the Orthodox millet from a religious to an ethnic community. The different approaches of each elite were demonstrated both on a political and on a cultural level. There were two main issues that brought these differences to the

90 Ibid., 16.
91 Ubicini 1856: 235, 237
93 Ibid.
94 Ubicini 1856: 235, 237
surface: The application of the reforms to the Orthodox millet that led to the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate; and the education of the millet.

The reforms proclaimed in the Hattı-Humayûn met with the reaction of the Church. The main argument of the ecclesiastical side was that the patriarch should retain his spiritual and political authority over the Orthodox millet.\(^{95}\) It had become apparent to the Holy Synod that the official acknowledgement of the participation of the lay element in the millet’s administration challenged its absolute control over communal affairs. The reaction of the Church was expressed in the words of Manouil Gedeon\(^{96}\), who argued that the new legislation introduced by the Ottoman state would lead to ‘the dissolution of the (Holy) Synod, the violation and abolition of the privileges and rights of the Church and the overthrow of its formerly established administrative order’.\(^{97}\)

The upper class elites chose not to enter into a direct confrontation with the higher clergy. On the contrary they invested politically in specific prelates and tried to promote their interests through them. Two main factions formed within the ‘Helleno-Ottoman’ party, one ecclesiastical or conservative and one reformist. The former was supporting the predominance of the clergy over the laymen, especially on issues related to the organizational structure of the church. The latter was promoting the programme for the reform and modernization of the millet. These elite groups, or ‘power networks’ as Stamatopoulos calls them, were not purely lay or purely clerical but lay/clerical due to the administration system of the millet. Naturally, the presence of the clergy was stronger in the ecclesiastical faction.\(^{98}\)

An inner upheaval, similar to the one created in the Rum milleti by the reforms, also took place within the Armenian and Jewish millets.\(^{99}\) The clash between conservatives and reformists played a significant role in the transformation of these two religious communities into an Armenian and Jewish ethnic group respectively. In

\(^{95}\) Stamatopoulos 2003: 69.
\(^{96}\) Manouil Gedeon was the Chronographer (Χρονογράφος) and Great Chartophylax (Μέγας Χαρτοφύλαξ) of the Patriarchate since 1897 and chief editor of its official periodical Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια (Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια). See: [http://www.lib.uoc.gr/info/absrv/rare/ab/ag/extrab1182419675-4360-3698.tkl](http://www.lib.uoc.gr/info/absrv/rare/ab/ag/extrab1182419675-4360-3698.tkl) last accessed 04/07/2009.
\(^{97}\) Cited in Anagnostopoulou 1997: 281; See Appendix 1.
the first case, the *amiras*, the Armenian upper class which had absolute control over the Patriarchate and communal institutions until 1846, was also internally divided into two factions: the *sarraf-amiras* composed of the bankers, the great merchants and the moneylenders; and the technocrat-amiras, who held official Ottoman posts.\textsuperscript{100} The former represented the conservative coalition which wanted to safeguard the interests of the ruling *amira*-clergy coalition. The latter supported the reform programme in an effort to restrain and even reduce the power of the *sarrafs* within the millet. The middle class were also supporters of the reforms and were comprised of the constitutionalists, a young modernizing bourgeois educated in Europe known as *lusavoreal* or *loussavorial* (the enlightened), and the traditional *esnafs*. These allied themselves with the technocrat-amiras, since the reform programme provided them with the opportunity to get more actively involved with communal affairs.\textsuperscript{101} The division within the Armenian millet began in the late 1830s\textsuperscript{102}, earlier than in the Greek case. In 1844 this dichotomy resulted in the establishment of two councils, one civil and one ecclesiastical, which would run the affairs of the millet. Patriarch Mattheos was forced to adopt the modernizing positions of the middle class and create the two councils as a response to the domineering attitude of the *sarrafs*, who wanted to continue their direct intervention in the election of provincial bishops. Therefore, it seems that the reform movement appeared faster in the Armenian community and was more self-generating compared to the one that developed within the *Rum milleti*.\textsuperscript{103}

The leadership of the Jewish millet was also split into a conservative and a reformist faction, the result of the official creation of the position of *hahambaşı* (Chief Rabbi) in 1835.\textsuperscript{104} Whether the Chief Rabbi was appointed by the Porte as part of its policy of centralization or it was the response of the state to a relevant request made by the Jews in an effort to improve their status as a community vis-à-vis the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{102} The split between the two groups was over the control of the newly-founded (1838) Armenian college established in the Istanbul suburb of Üsküdar. See Stamatopoulos 2006: 262-3; Davison 1963: 120-1.
\textsuperscript{103} Davison 1963: 120-1, 126-7; Stamatopoulos 2006: 263.
\textsuperscript{104} Levy 1994: 106.
\end{footnotesize}
Rums and the Armenians is not clear. Academic views on this issue differ. In any case, this act introduced the Jewish millet to the reform programme of the Tanzimat. The ensuing clash was between the religious conservatives, who opposed any reform that could threaten their traditional prerogatives and economic benefits, and the reformers, who supported the Tanzimat reforms and promoted modern education. As in the case of the Rum millet, these factions were mixed lay/clerical. A second similarity was that the leading elite within the reformist group was composed of the Constantinopolitan Jewish bankers and merchants. The majority of them were Francos, foreign Jews mostly of Italian origin, who enjoyed the protection of foreign powers under the regime of the capitulations. They were the pioneers of the spirit of reform and westernization, due to their close contact with the West European Jewish elite. The most prominent figure among them was the wealthy banker Abraham Camondo, who assumed the leading role in the reform movement in Istanbul.

The competition between the two leadership groups within the Rum millet became apparent for the first time during the proceedings of the mixed ‘National Assembly’ (‘Εθνοσυνέλευση’) or ‘National Provisional Council’ (‘Εθνικό Προσωρινό Συμβούλιο’, NPC). The NPC was formed in October 1858 and included both ecclesiastical and lay members. According to the instructions (‘Οδηγίες’) sent by the Porte to the leaderships of the millets in April 1857, the aim of this special temporary council was the application of the reform programme. The majority of the council’s lay members were supporters of the reforms. Seven out of ten representatives from Constantinople were members of the upper class; five Neo-Phanariots and two bankers. It should be pointed out that although Constantinople should have elected five lay representatives among the notables of the millet and five who would represent the guilds, when the assembly was finally constituted the latter were clearly underrepresented. The reason was that the Porte considered the guilds too unmanageable to become the official representatives of the millet and was

---

106 Rozen 2005: 77.  
suspicious of their tendency towards political autonomy, which meant that they could potentially become channels of national ideology. Instead, it entrusted the upper class with the application of the reforms, since they belonged to the Ottoman establishment.\textsuperscript{110}

The reformers immediately showed their intentions to gain significant access to the administration of communal affairs. During the discussion about the election of the patriarch they argued that laymen should participate in the electoral process and opposed the position of the ecclesiastical faction, which claimed that the patriarch should be elected exclusively by the clergy. The reformers stressed the political dimension of the role of the patriarch as the intermediary between the Sultan and his Orthodox subjects and argued that since his authority was legitimized by the Porte, the participation of lay Ottoman citizens in his election was imperative. On the other hand, the clergy emphasized the spiritual dimension of the patriarchal throne in an effort to safeguard their own rights and privileges with regards to the exercise of the political and religious responsibilities of the patriarch. Finally, the two sides reached a compromise where the laymen would be able to participate, but the Holy Synod would be responsible for the final stage of the election.\textsuperscript{111}

The agreement between the two factions was the result of the intervention of the Greek embassy, which was in close contact with clerical members of the ecclesiastic group. The Greek ambassador A.G. Kountouriotis believed that the election of the patriarch by an assembly composed either completely or partly of lay members would provide the Porte with the institutional right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Orthodox millet. Since the laymen were also Ottoman subjects, the issue of the election would not be purely religious anymore but it would also become political. Thus, the embassy put pressure on the NPC to maintain the existing system of elections. However, despite its efforts, the final solution of the mixed assembly was the best the NPC could produce.\textsuperscript{112}

Kountouriotis’ assessment of the situation was accurate. He even made the prediction that one of the ways the state could interfere with the affairs of the millet

\textsuperscript{110} Stamatopoulos 2003:81-3.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 86-91.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 91-93.
would be to cancel the election of a patriarch. As a matter of fact in the summer of 1860 the Porte officially claimed the right to exempt candidates for the patriarchal throne if it did not approve of them. This issue caused a division both between the two main factions and within the reformist group. The ecclesiastic side showed an attitude of non-cooperation and reacted to the demand of the government, but was unable to prevent it. As a result, the NPC affirmed the right of the Porte to intervene in the electoral process. The catalogue of the candidates would be submitted to the authorities and they would be allowed to exclude the prelates they considered unsuitable for the position. The main disagreement within the reformist group was the number of candidates that would be exempted from the catalogue. Some of the reformers followed an approach of complete subordination to the orders of the state and argued that the authorities could exempt as many candidates as they wished. Another group of reformers promoting a certain degree of autonomy regarding the self-administration of the community suggested the exemption of one or two individuals regardless of the total number of candidates. This solution was finally approved by the Porte.\textsuperscript{113} The issue of the exemption is quite important in order to understand the way the leadership of the community responded to the policies of the state. These three different political trends of non-cooperation, full subordination and the middle way of a higher degree of autonomy would resurface on several occasions. Furthermore, the participation of the lay element in the election of the patriarch and the recognition of the state’s right to exempt candidates would have serious implications for the Constantinopolitan Greeks even after 1923.

In any case, during this period the reformers were gaining ground in their competition with the conservative faction for political power and social status within the leadership of the millet. Their strong presence in the proceedings of the NPC\textsuperscript{114} was reflected in the final text of regulations ratified by the Porte in 1862 and named ‘National’ (‘Εθνικοί’) or ‘General Regulations’ (‘Γενικοί Κανονισµοί’).\textsuperscript{115} According to these regulations, the communal affairs of the Rum milleti would be administered by two bodies: the Holy Synod and the ‘Permanent National Mixed Council’

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 92, 139-144.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 77-109.
(‘Διαρκές Εθνικό Μικτό Συμβούλιο’, PNMC), composed of twelve members, four bishops and eight lay representatives. The PNMC would be responsible for the supervision of schools, hospitals and all public welfare institutions, including their finances. It would also have financial control over the churches and monasteries attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as well as legal jurisdiction on specific financial cases.\textsuperscript{116}

A year later the Azgayin Sahmanadrut’iwun Hayoc (‘Armenian National Constitution’) or Ermeni patrikliği nizamati (‘The Regulation of the Armenian Patriarchate’– the Armenian ‘constitution’ – was officially approved and was the outcome of a fierce ten year struggle between the conservatives and the reformers. The constitution was a triumph for the reformist faction. The patriarch retained his role as the mediator between the millet and the Porte, but had to account to a National Assembly for his actions and was paid a fixed stipend. The assembly was a lay-dominated body. Out of its hundred and forty members, a hundred and twenty were laymen, with the representatives of the Constantinopolitan Armenian middle class holding a leading position. The provinces were clearly underrepresented having only two sevenths of the total representation for more than nine tenths of the population. The assembly elected the patriarch and two councils firstly established during Mattheos’ patriarchate, one civil and one ecclesiastical. The former operated through standing committees responsible for issues related to education, millet properties, hospitals, finance and justice, whereas the latter dealt with the religious affairs of the millet.\textsuperscript{117} Compared to the Rum milleti the clergy in the Armenian millet was in a much weaker position. As Davison points out, ‘perhaps the small degree of popular participation allowed by the Greek organic laws was more in keeping with the mentality of the period than the more extensive lay participation and suffrage of the Armenian constitution’.\textsuperscript{118} The Armenian laity had managed to apply the principles

\textsuperscript{116} Stamatopoulos 2003: 121.
\textsuperscript{117} Davison 1963: 123-4; Stamatopoulos 2006: 264; Krikorian 1978: 3-5.
\textsuperscript{118} Davison 1963: 129.
of secularism and westernization in such an effective manner that their constitution served as an example for the Ottoman constitution of 1876.\textsuperscript{119}

In the 1860s the Jewish reformist elite, led by Camondo, managed to curb the resistance of the conservatives with the support of the Porte and elect two renowned scholars to the office of hahambaşı, Chief Rabbi Ya’akov Avigdor (1860-63) and Acting Chief Rabbi (kaymakam) Yakir Geron (1863-71). Both rabbis were Camondo’s close associates and favoured the reform programme.\textsuperscript{120} Having established their control over the office of the hahambaşı, the reformers proceeded with the preparation of a constitution for the Jewish millet, which was approved in 1865. According to the Hahamhane Nizamnamesi (‘General Regulations of the Rabbinate’) the Chief Rabbi remained the civil head of the millet and the spiritual head of the region of Istanbul. However, he could not act without the approval of two councils, one spiritual and one civil, elected by a mixed assembly composed of sixty laymen and twenty rabbis from Istanbul. The same assembly with the addition of forty lay representatives from the provinces would elect the Chief Rabbi, who from now on would receive a fixed salary.\textsuperscript{121}

Momentarily it seemed that the reformist faction had prevailed, since the regulations gave increased power to the lay element while limiting at the same time the influence of the clergy. However, it was just a nominal victory. The conservative elite managed to regain its power and continued to obstruct the application of the clauses of the constitution.\textsuperscript{122} Although in 1863 the Porte had intervened and crushed a demonstration organized by the conservative faction against Geron’s appointment, this time it did not offer its support to the reformers. According to Rodrigue, reforming the Jewish community was very low in the priorities of the government, since it was the smallest of the main non-Muslim millets and did not have any serious nationalist aspirations. Therefore, even though the government favoured the reformist

\textsuperscript{119} A member of the Ottoman constitution drafting committee was Krikor Odian, one of the authors of the Armenian constitution and a close friend of Midhat Paşa, the chairman of the constitution committee. See Davison 1963: 134-5; Davison 1982: 330.
\textsuperscript{122} Rodrigue 1994: 452; Karmi 1996: 44.
elite, it was willing to take action only in extreme cases of communal unrest.\textsuperscript{123} Without the backing of the official circles, and tired by the constant disagreements with the conservatives, Camondo left for Paris in 1870. Two years later Rabbi Geron also resigned and left Istanbul. As a result, the community’s statute remained a dead letter and the conservative leadership ruled over the community until 1908.\textsuperscript{124} In contrast with the Greek and Armenian case, the Jewish reformers had failed to implement the reform programme with regards to the administration of the millet.

In all three millets the Constantinopolitan element dominated. However, the absolute control of the Constantinopolitan Greeks over both the NPC and the PNMC, combined with the under-representation of the provinces, would provoke the Bulgarian element and create the conditions for a competition between different ethnic groups to develop.\textsuperscript{125} In his account of the situation of the Ottoman Empire Ubicini had referred to the differences between the Greeks and the Bulgarians writing characteristically that ‘there is no possibility of a combined action (of the Greek populations) with the Bulgarians and the other Slavonic populations, the antipathy between the races being such that they would rather perish separately than be saved together’.\textsuperscript{126} This antipathy had started to build up after the Greek revolution of 1821, a turning point in the consciousness of the non-Greek Orthodox populations. From this moment on, being Greek and adopting Greek culture lost its importance as an attribute for professional success and upward social mobility and meant instead the political support of Greece. This was a severe blow to the pre-revolutionary supranational role of the Greek-speaking leadership of the millet.\textsuperscript{127} The emerging Bulgarian intelligentsia and the clergy began to demand the use of Church Slavonic in the liturgy and the creation of schools that would teach Bulgarian.\textsuperscript{128} Although Bulgarian nationalism was based on the Bulgarian ‘language of the people’ it could not ignore the element of religion, since the efforts of the nationalists were taking place within the religious context of the Orthodox millet. After all, religion had been

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Rodrigue 1990: 42-3; Rodrigue 1994: 451-2.}
\footnote{Davison 1963: 130-1; Levy 1994: 107; Rodrigue 1990: 43; Karmi 1996: 44; Rozen 2005: 87.}
\footnote{Konortas 1998: 159-160, 163; Stamatopoulos 2003: 84-5.}
\footnote{Ubicini 1856: 238.}
\footnote{Matalas 2003: 34; Skopetea 1988: 314-5.}
\footnote{Clogg 1982: 189; Stamatopoulos 2006: 261.}
\end{footnotes}
one of the most significant cultural markers of identity of the Orthodox Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore they would eventually demand the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian church congruent with the language of the Bulgarian ethnic community. Through the creation of their own separate millet they would be able to nationalize the traditional religious identity of the Slav-speaking Orthodox populations.\textsuperscript{129} The reforms provided the Bulgarians with the opportunity to protest against the domination of the Orthodox millet by the Greeks (Γραικοί) and claim their own church. Their argument was that since they were not allowed to participate equally in the formation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, they could not remain under the authority of the Patriarchate. To this end they had the encouragement of Russia, which after the Crimean War became the main supporter of Pan-Slavism and began to interfere in the affairs of the Ottoman state as the protector of the Slavs of the Balkans.\textsuperscript{130}

Once again the leadership of the millet was divided between the Russophile ecclesiastical wing and the pro-western reformist wing.\textsuperscript{131} The higher clergy and the pro-clerical laymen decided to follow a moderating policy and tried several times to appease the Bulgarians in an effort to keep them under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. Prominent Neo-Phanariots like the under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alexandros Karatheodoris and the Grand Deputy (Μέγας Λογοθέτης) of the Patriarchate Stavrakis Aristarchis supported the policy of compromise with the Bulgarians. By defending the unity of the Orthodox millet, they were defending the ecumenical role of the Patriarchate and the unity of the state while at the same time safeguarding their own political power. They promoted the establishment of a Bulgarian ecclesiastic authority with specific geographical boundaries that would be under some form of dependence on the Patriarchate. Their policy was the expression of a Pan-Orthodox model of ecumenism, which favoured an understanding with the more moderate Bulgarian elites.\textsuperscript{132} The Greek embassy in Constantinople as well as the Porte encouraged these negotiations. The former aimed at keeping some disputed

\textsuperscript{129} Matalas 2003: 18, 20; Brass 1991: 30, 63; Özkırmlı-Sofos 2008: 46.
\textsuperscript{131} Matalas 2003: 209.
territories under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate and to prevent their annexation in a future Bulgarian state; the latter exercised pressure on the lay and religious leaderships of the Rum milleti to reach an agreement with the Bulgarians in order to avert a possible revolt that would threaten the territorial integrity of the empire.\footnote{Stamatopoulos 2003: 288-290.}

The reformist elite, and especially the bankers Christakis Zografos and Georgios Zarifis, promoted a policy of resistance to Bulgarian demands because they believed that the claim for an independent church had as its final goal the political secession of the Bulgarians that would endanger areas with either Greek or mixed populations. They gradually pursued a no-concessions policy incorporating into their arguments views expressed mainly by the representatives of the Hellenocentric party. They offered their support to the guilds and the ethnocentric Greek press and pushed for the convocation of the Local Synod that would denounce the Bulgarians as schismatic.\footnote{Ibid., 313, 341-2}

Finally, the intransigence of the nationalist Greek and Bulgarian circles and the refusal of the Patriarchate to provide the Bulgarian side with excessive concessions resulted in the Sultan’s firman of 27 February 1870, which recognized an independent Bulgarian Church, the Bulgarian Exarchate. Two years later, in September 1872, a Synod held in Constantinople renounced ‘ethnophyletism’ (‘εθνοφυλετισµός’) and condemned the followers of the Bulgarian Exarchate as schismatic.\footnote{Konortas 1998: 308-9; Stamatopoulos 2003: 316, 334, 342; Stamatopoulos 2006: 261-2.} The schism of 1872 created a new millet within the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarian millet (Bulgar milleti), which was followed by the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian state under nominal Ottoman sovereignty in 1878. The formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate combined with the declaration of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Greece in 1833 and Romania in 1865 considerably changed the ethnological composition of the Rum milleti. It assumed a more ‘Greek’ ethnic character, since the majority of the flock remaining under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was composed of Greek-speaking populations.\footnote{Konortas 1998: 305, 307, 309-10.} But it also provided the basis for a protracted and fierce conflict.
between Greeks and Bulgarians regarding contested Ottoman territories, where the main criterion was whether the populations in question were supporters of the Patriarchate or the Exarchate. Thus, Greek irredentism coincided with the effort of the Patriarchate to retain or regain part of its flock.  

The ethnocentric circles would not have achieved the condemnation of the Bulgarians without the support of the bankers. The latter had realized that in order to fortify their political role and increase their social status they had to transform their political hegemony into social hegemony. Therefore, they manipulated the ethnocentric circles of the community and used them as means to marginalize the political influence of the Neo-Phanariots and become the dominating leadership group within the Helleno-Ottoman party and the whole millet. Referring to the demonstrations of the guilds in favour of the convocation of the Local Synod that took place in July 1872, the anonymous author of a pro-clerical brochure published after the schism wrote:  

The so-called national policy prevailed over any other peaceful plan. The great patriots and supposed defenders of Hellenism had prepared everything, even the threatening and indecent demonstrations of the mob of Constantinople.  

At the same time however, by adopting ethnocentric views and incorporating them into their policy of reforms the bankers acted as a ‘buffer’ between the adherents of Greek nationalism and the leadership of the millet. In other words they prevented a more extreme expression of ethnocentrism that could impose on the millet the ideas of Greek irredentism and threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the empire. This was the only policy that could ensure the political domination of the Helleno-Ottoman over the Hellenocentric party. As Matalas points out, ‘the proclamation of the schism is the symbolic act that redefines the character and the boundaries of Hellenism’. The Patriarchate had to make clear to all the other ethnic groups who had plans of seceding that all the Orthodox populations of the empire were potential Greeks. According to this line of argument, anyone who did not consider himself  

\[\text{KITROMILIDES 1990: 57; STAMATOPoulos 2006: 262; MATALAS 2003: 337.}\]

\[\text{STAMATOPoulos 2003: 342, 364-5.}\]

\[\text{IBID., 341.}\]

\[\text{CITED IN MATALAS 2003: 335; SEE APPENDIX 1.}\]

\[\text{MATALAS 2003: 346.}\]
Greek or did not accept Greek ecclesiastical, financial and cultural predominance would be perceived as phyletist (φυλετιστής) and schismatic. In the case of the Bulgarians, a schismatic was automatically a Bulgarian, whereas an Orthodox was a Bulgarian-speaking co-ethnic (ομογενής). This could be described as the imperial/ecumenist model of ecumenism. Its two main components were: the alliance between Greeks and Ottomans against the Pan-Slavist danger expressed principally by the common enemy, the Bulgarians; and the creation of a reformed multi-ethnic Ottoman state, where the Greek element would be dominant due to its financial and cultural supremacy. In this case the national centre for the outside Greeks would be Constantinople, not Athens. This was the response of the upper class elites ‘to the agonizing questions of how to ‘save’ and transform the Ottoman Empire or, alternatively, how best to prepare for the post-Ottoman era’.

The amiras and especially the bankers also tried to retain their influential role in the affairs of the Armenian millet. According to Barsoumian, ‘grudgingly, they endorsed the constitution, more to block the radical elements from positions of power in the new system than out of genuine conviction in favour of the constitution’. However, in contradistinction with the Greek Orthodox bankers, they failed. The Armenian constitution and the strict separation between religious and lay duties was a heavy blow to both the sarrafs and the clergy and resulted in their political marginalization. The leadership of the millet would gradually adopt a more nationalist policy. This was the consequence of the political predominance of the ethnocentric Armenian middle class and the subsequent weakening of the church, which during its heyday, until the mid-nineteenth century, advocated loyalty to the Porte.

On a cultural level, the main precondition for the establishment of the supremacy of the Greek element was the Hellenization of the Orthodox millet through Greek education. However, the content and aims of this education were not determined in

---

142 Ibid., 346-7.
144 Özkırımlı-Sofos 2008: 17.
146 Davison 1963: 125.
Constantinople, but in Athens. The revolution of 1821 and the subsequent establishment of an independent state in 1830 and an autocephalous church in 1833 split the Orthodox millet and for the first time divided the Greeks into two categories, the autochthons (αυτόχθονες), those born within the 1830 boundaries, and the heterochthons (ετερόχθονους), those born outside the Greek kingdom. The liberation and incorporation of these outside Greeks into a greater Greek state would form the basis of an ambitious political plan, the *Megali Idea*, (‘Μεγάλη Ιδέα’, Great Idea).\(^{148}\) This term was coined by the Greek politician Ioannis Kolettis, who was himself a heterochton, and favoured the political cause of the heterochthons for equality between these two groups.\(^{149}\)

The ideological support for the irredentist policy of the Greek state was provided by the work of the folklorist and historian Spyridon Zampelios and the historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos. The former, in his effort to determine the historical and geographical limits of modern Greek ethnicity (Νεοελληνική εθνότητα), identified three significant periods in the history of Hellenism: ancient, medieval and modern Hellenism. As a result, to the ‘Greek’ and ‘Orthodox unity’ of the nation provided by history and Orthodoxy respectively, he added the imperial element of ‘Roman’ (ρωµαϊκήν) unity provided by medieval times. Based on Zampelios’ periodization, Paparrigopoulos integrated Byzantium into Greek historiography as the period connecting ancient with modern Greek history.\(^{150}\) According to Paparrigopoulos:\(^{151}\)

> By saying Byzantium we mean the spirit of Hellenism, which owing to the church, owing to the language, owing to the customs, owing to the Greek people, who struggled for the political establishment of the Byzantine years, prepared the national unity of Greeks.

Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos did not invent the imagery of the Greek nation *de novo*. They selected from Greek culture those specific aspects that would promote the national unity of the autochthons and heterochthons Greeks and they recombined and

---

\(^{148}\) Clogg 2004: 47; Veremis 1990: 11; For an overview of the ideological development of the *Megali Idea* see IEE 1977: 467-484.


\(^{150}\) Matalas 2003: 158-9; Özkerimli-Sofos 2008: 84.

\(^{151}\) Cited in Skopetea 1988: 183; See Appendix 1.
reinterpreted these Greek myths, symbols, memories and traditions by attaching a new value and meaning to them.152 This constructed hybrid concept, named Hellenochristian civilization (Ελληνοχριστιανικός πολιτισμός), stressed the unproblematic and unbroken continuity between ancient, Byzantine and modern Greece.153 The employment of history as a means to establish uninterrupted continuities of national existence was not a unique Greek phenomenon, but a general trend among the different nations in the Balkans.154 Smith offers a convincing explanation for the necessity of using history as a means to achieve national unity:155

‘History’ becomes the focal point of nationalism and nation-formation. The ‘rediscovery’ or ‘invention’ of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter of national honour and collective endeavour. Through the tracing of our history, ‘we’ discover (or ‘rediscover’) who we are, whence we came, when we emerged, who are ancestors were, when we were great and glorious, who our heroes are, why we declined… But the rediscovery of the ‘national self’ is not an academic matter; it is a pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, which spells life or death for the nationalist project of creating a nation.

Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos provided Greek nationalists with the historical argument to justify the incorporation of the unredeemed Greeks of the Ottoman Empire into a greater Greek state.156 During this period Athens became the ideological centre of Hellenism and in a sense alleviated the outside Greeks from the process of self-determining its identity.157

As Kitromilides argues, ‘the external dimension of this nation-building […] involved the export of the newly elaborated national ideas, the new norms of national identification and ethnic definition, from the independent state to the territories beyond its borders, the irredeinta’.158 This effort for the cultural renewal and regeneration of the Ottoman Greeks was carried out by the educated strata of the middle class. Initially they did not have the means to disseminate these ideas to the larger masses. Ubicini noticed this weakness in 1856:159

153 ÖzkırımlıbSofos 2008: 55.
154 Kitromilides 1990: 24
158 Kitromilides 1990: 42.
Hellenism, like Germanism, exists as yet only in theory. Imported into Turkish Greece by professors from Athens, it has scarcely yet made its way beyond the circles of the literary and social life. [...] It must, however, be acknowledged that these few [Greeks in Turkey] belonged to the most enlightened and liberal class of the nation; namely the members of the medical, legal, and literary professions. Beyond this narrow circle, Hellenism, however well adapted to flatter the national vanity of the Greeks, cannot boast of many adherents.

The new political and financial conditions created by the Tanzimat reforms allowed the middle class to assume a more active role in the cultural affairs of the Orthodox millet. The establishment of the PNMC brought communal education under the control of the lay element of the community. This education had to be secular in order to be in agreement with the spirit of secularization and modernization of the empire introduced by the Ottoman reformers. However, the state did not pursue a policy of establishing a common and unified Ottoman education.\textsuperscript{160} On the contrary, by entrusting the administrative councils of the non-Muslim millets with the task of organizing their own educational network according to their own cultural criteria, it indirectly encouraged the fragmentation of education into smaller milli (communal) educations. As a result, the Muslim millet had its own Turkish secular education, the Rum millet its own Greek secular education, the Armenian millet its own Armenian secular education and the Jewish millet its own Jewish secular education.\textsuperscript{161} In the case of the Orthodox millet, the only group able to organize and offer an education along national lines were the ethnocentric circles of the middle class, who had been educated mainly at the University of Athens.\textsuperscript{162}

Apart from the general political context, the increasing ethnic antagonism with the Bulgarians also created favourable conditions for the involvement of the middle class in the education of the millet. The ‘Greek Literary Association of Constantinople’ (GLAC), the first and most important educational association in Constantinople, was established in 1861, immediately after the first serious political clash with the Bulgarian element.\textsuperscript{163} The establishment of the GLAC inspired the creation of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{160} Rodrigue 1990: 33-5; Rodrigue 1995: 244-6.  
\textsuperscript{161} Anagnostopoulou 1997: 290-1,293.  
\textsuperscript{162} Kitromilides 1990: 43-4; For the role of the University of Athens in the dissemination of Greek national ideas in the East see IEE 1977 : 462-5.  
\textsuperscript{163} Mamon 1990: 215-6 ; Matalas 2003 : 312.}
numerous educational and cultural associations in Constantinople. During the period 1861-1922, approximately 500 associations were formed in different parts of the Ottoman capital\(^{164}\), a phenomenon called at the time ‘club-mania’ (‘συλλογομανία’).\(^{165}\) These associations were the main instruments employed by the intellectuals to propagate and consolidate Greek national ideology in the East.\(^{166}\)

According to Iroklis Vasiadis, the president and central figure of the GLAC, ‘the diffusion of Greek culture in the East will bring its complete Hellenization, will establish everywhere the triumph of Greek intellectual supremacy and will prepare the coreligionists of the East for a union of brothers and for the restoration of a united and indissoluble polity’.\(^{167}\) The need for the regeneration of Greek culture becomes evident in the report of the educational committee of the GLAC in 1872: ‘Greek culture [… ] which we call Hellenism, after it civilized the world and gave life to the barbarian nations, burned out in its birthplace’.\(^{168}\) This feeling of cultural uniqueness and superiority over other people needed to be rediscovered and restored through education.\(^{169}\) These ideas would have to be disseminated to the larger masses through an organized school network. Since 1871 the president of the GLAC Odysseas Ialemos had expressed the opinion that the association should be established as a kind of ‘quasi ministry of Education of the Greek and Hellenized people of Turkey.’\(^{170}\) In order to achieve this, the GLAC pursued the development of a Greek-speaking educational system and offered its moral and financial support to Greek schools and associations throughout the Ottoman Empire.\(^{171}\) The hellenocentric leadership group had realized that whoever controlled the schools would be able to determine whether the group would maintain its ethnic distinctiveness and be prepared for political mobilization on ethnic grounds.\(^{172}\) The construction of a Greek educational network in the East also allowed the Greek state to play a significant role in the cultural and

\(^{164}\) Mamoni 1990: 222.
\(^{166}\) Kitromilides 1990: 46 ; Matalas 2003 : 312; Also see Weber in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 25.
\(^{167}\) Cited in Matalas 2003: 203; See Appendix 1.
\(^{168}\) Cited in Exertoglou 1996: 76; See Appendix 1.
\(^{169}\) See Smith 1988: 47.
\(^{171}\) For the school network in Constantinople during this period see Issawi 1982: 60-1; For the educational activities of the GLAC see Vassiadis 2007.
\(^{172}\) See Brass 1991: 45.
educational affairs of the community. The University of Athens supplied the majority of the teaching personnel, and educators based their curriculum on the standards set by the university. Furthermore, upper class Constantinopolitan Greeks encouraged students to study in Athens by providing financial support.\footnote{Kitromilides 1990: 45. Exertzoglou 1996: 140-1.}

The ethnocentric orientations of the middle class that formed the bulk of the GLAC were also reflected in the cultural activities of the association. In an effort to transmit and reinforce the idea of historical continuity conceived by Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos the association offered scientific as well as public lectures by ‘people who had knowledge of the spirit of antiquity and tried to revitalize it in order to renew the national spirit’ or lectures ‘focusing on Byzantine history or the cultural advancements after the fall [of Constantinople]’.\footnote{Cited in Exertzoglou 1996: 21; See Appendix 1.} Similarly the GLAC issued a set of rules to be followed for the writing of a Greek history textbook that would promote the connection between ancient, Byzantine and modern Greece by focusing on the biographies of great men, ‘who originated from the nation and contributed to its glory and rising, [...] paving the way for the greatness of following generations’.\footnote{Exertzoglou 1996: 109.} It could be argued that the secularizing intelligentsia heading the educational efforts of the GLAC aimed at the ‘rediscovery’ of the Greek ethnic past as it was constructed by the emerging Greek national historiography and the ‘revitalization’ of Greek ethnic ties and sentiments.\footnote{See Smith 1988: 145; See Smith in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 153.} The aim of these lectures and textbooks was to define the boundaries of the wider Greek nation according to the irredentist aspirations of the Greek state. As Kane points out, ‘by connecting events and actors from the past to current institutions and social structure, narratives integrate the past, the present and possibly the future into evolving wholes’.\footnote{Kane 2000: 248.}

Although the GLAC was the brainchild of the ethnocentric elites it gradually attracted members belonging to all factions of the upper and middle class: figures of the Neo-Phanariot aristocracy like Stefanos Karatheodoris who guaranteed with their presence the legitimacy of the association and tried to keep the expression of ethnocentric views under some control; wealthy bankers like Zografs and Zarifs
who realized that by supporting it financially they extended their authority from the
cultural to the social facet of the millet; scholars and teachers, who identified with
the educational activities and purposes of the association; professionals such as
doctors, lawyers and architects, who had studied abroad and were agents of Western
secular culture; and finally officials in the embassies in Constantinople. Therefore,
the GLAC was the vehicle of a lay-dominated culture, which reflected the effort of
the different elites within the Constantinopolitan Greek upper and middle classes to
promote Greek education within the empire, but also use it as a means for the
achievement of their own political aims.\textsuperscript{178}

The Gregorian Armenians also experienced a cultural renaissance during this
period. Similar to the Rum upper class, the \textit{amiras} financially supported the cultural
revival of the Armenian people in an effort to expand their political domination over
the social facet of the millet. They founded schools, cultural associations and clubs,
journals, hospitals, and churches and gave significant sums towards philanthropic and
religious charities. Until the mid-nineteenth century they were able to guide the
development and orientation of these institutions and use their wealth to retain their
influential role as the leadership of the community. However, the dispute over the
control of the Armenian college established in the late 1830s challenged for the first
time their political supremacy and resulted eventually in the adoption of a
constitution which was based on secular principles and promoted the aims of the
middle class.\textsuperscript{179} At the same time, a more popular literature dealing with non-
religious subjects began to develop in Constantinople and the rapidly expanding
Armenian press shifted from church language to the language of the people. The
establishment of schools, the press, the secular and vernacular literature, together
with the concomitant growth of national consciousness, strengthened the reformist
faction within the millet.\textsuperscript{180}

In the case of the Jews, the failure of the reformers and the establishment of a
conservative leadership prevented the expression of more ethnocentric views within
the millet. However, a Jewish middle class, the product of the educational reforms

\textsuperscript{179} Barsoumian 1982: 177-8.
applied by the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*\(^{181}\) and supported financially by the reformist faction, soon came into existence. This group would eventually challenge the political predominance of the rabbinical authorities and their conservative supporters and play a significant role in communal politics after 1908.\(^{182}\) The educational activities of the Alliance were very similar to the activities of the GLAC. Founded in Paris in 1860 by French Jews, it had as its main goal the ‘civilization’ and ‘regeneration’ of Eastern Jewry, which would result in their emancipation and reform into the image of the acculturated European Jew.\(^{183}\) The means to achieve this was the establishment of a school network, where modern and secular education would be taught according to the Western model.\(^{184}\) The educational reform programme of the Alliance gained the immediate support of the reformist elite in the Ottoman Empire. They had realized that the Jews needed to acquire new skills and learn European languages in order to be able to compete successfully with the Greeks and the Armenians.\(^{185}\) The Francos especially assumed a leading role in the promotion of modern education and the establishment of Alliance schools. As soon as the Alliance was established in Turkey in 1863, Camondo became the president of the Regional Committee in Istanbul. He was also a member of the Central Committee in Paris.\(^{186}\) The network of Alliance schools became so extensive that by 1914 each Turkish Jewish community had an Alliance institution. The total enrolment throughout the Ottoman Empire was approximately 19,000 students, who constituted almost 5 percent of the total Jewish population.\(^{187}\)

The impact of the educational policies of the Alliance on the Jewish millet was catalytic. The growing trend of secularization removed religion as the central element of Jewish ethnic identity.\(^{188}\) The teaching of French brought Western culture to the Jews and was used as a means for their ‘regeneration’. Specific importance was given to the teaching of secular Jewish history, which was perceived as the confirmation of

\(^{181}\) For a thorough account on the activities of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* see: Rodrigue 1990.


\(^{183}\) Rodrigue 1990: xii, 22-4; Rodrigue 1994: 440; Dumont 1982: 209


\(^{188}\) Rodrigue 1995: 253.
secular Jewish solidarity and emancipation. Hebrew was also taught at the Alliance’s schools. The combination of language and history provided this ethnic group with a multiplicity of symbols differentiating them from the groups surrounding them. Secular Judeo-Spanish literature and press output also became popular and disseminated Western news and ideas to the population. The result was the creation of a new intellectual class that formed the basis for the development of Zionism. The transition from ‘regeneration’ of the Jews to Jewish national ‘regeneration’ is something that the Central Committee in Paris had not anticipated and was not willing to promote.\textsuperscript{189} Rozen argues that ‘once you provide people with an education, you can no longer control what they do with it. The Alliance, too, could not impose boundaries on the products of its own education’.\textsuperscript{190}

The foundation of the Alliance schools also reinvigorated the associational life of the community. Associations and clubs linked to the educational activities of the schools were established, aiming at acculturating the students into Western secular ways. In addition, traditional associations underwent a progressive secularization, due to the progress of modernization and the decrease of religious values among the population. The whole movement resembled the Greek \textit{syllogomania}. As in the case of the Greeks and the Armenians, the elites involved in this network of schools and associations were also using them to advance their interests in the millet.\textsuperscript{191} According to Rozen, ‘the political struggle over the leadership of the community and the \textit{kulturkampf} were interrelated’.\textsuperscript{192} In fact, the educational reform caused the reaction of the religious conservative faction within the millet. The rabbis felt that Western culture, and especially the teaching of French, was contrary to Jewish religion and tradition. An additional reason was that they lost their absolute control over education, a fact that damaged them also in financial terms. However, after the intervention of the Porte the two sides reached a compromise. French would continue to be taught while religious and Hebrew instruction would also have a central place in the curriculum. Furthermore, the conservatives were not in a position to fight

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{189} Rodrigue 1990: 84, 85, 88; Rodrigue 1995: 252; Rozen 2005: 67-8.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Rozen 2005: 111.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Benbassa 1994: 458-463.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Rozen 2005: 84.
\end{itemize}
against an institution able to spend significant sums of money on the establishment of
these schools.\footnote{Rodrigue 1994: 447-9; Rodrigue 1995: 249; Rozen 2005: 74.}

Similarly to the Jewish millet, the interference of the lay element in the educational
affairs of the Greek Orthodox community was not well received by the Patriarchate.
The establishment of associations like the GLAC challenged the cultural domination
of the Church and their independent aspirations were considered insulting and
revolutionary.\footnote{Anagnostopoulou 1997: 295.} Additionally, the ethnocentric spirit of these associations, expressed
through the promotion of Greek language and culture, threatened the Church’s
position as an ecumenical and Pan-Orthodox institution.\footnote{Kitromilides 1990: 51-3; Exertzoglou 1996: 92.}
However, a relationship of mutual dependence gradually developed between the Patriarchate and the GLAC.
The latter needed the official recognition and protection of the former in order to be
able to function within the legal framework of the Ottoman state. At the same time,
the separation of a significant part of the Orthodox flock forced the Church to
legitimize and adopt the educational activities of the GLAC and similar associations
in order to retain its power over the Orthodox millet.\footnote{Anagnostopoulou 1997: 296-7.}
As the religious schism with
the Bulgarians was becoming more evident, the connection between Hellenism and
Orthodox Christianity was stressed both by the clergy and the ethnocentric
Constantinopolitan Greek press.\footnote{Matalas 2003: 316-9.} In September 1871, \textit{Neologos}, the mouthpiece of
the ‘Party of Hellenism’ published by Stavros Voutyras, wrote: ‘The leafy tree of
Hellenism on which Christianity was rooted conquered the nations of the world.
Hellenism and Orthodoxy exist for centuries as inseparable words’.\footnote{Cited in Matalas 2003: 319; See Appendix 1.}

Hroch identifies three structural phases between the beginning of a national
movement and its successful completion with regards to non-dominant ethnic groups
in multi-ethnic empires. During Phase A, activists commit themselves to scholarly
inquiry into the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of their ethnic group. In
Phase B, a new range of activists emerge aiming to convince as many members of
their ethnic group as possible about the project of creating a nation. Finally in Phase

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotetext[193]{Rodrigue 1994: 447-9; Rodrigue 1995: 249; Rozen 2005: 74.}
\footnotetext[194]{Anagnostopoulou 1997: 295.}
\footnotetext[195]{Kitromilides 1990: 51-3; Exertzoglou 1996: 92.}
\footnotetext[196]{Anagnostopoulou 1997: 296-7.}
\footnotetext[197]{Matalas 2003: 316-9.}
\footnotetext[198]{Cited in Matalas 2003: 319; See Appendix 1.}
\end{thebibliography}
C, national consciousness becomes the concern of the majority of the population and results in the formation of a mass movement.\textsuperscript{199} It is definitely the case that the Ottoman Greeks were not ready yet for such a movement. As Ubicini noted at the time, ‘I have conversed with many Greeks in Turkey, and amongst them have met with very few who seriously believed in the possibility of such an annexation [to Greece], still fewer who were disposed to act in the cause’.\textsuperscript{200} Therefore, it could be argued that the movement was still in its first phase where the intelligentsia of the millet committed itself to bringing to the surface the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of the Greek ethnic group.\textsuperscript{201} However, in this first phase the educated strata did not attempt to mount any patriotic agitation or express specific political goals, mainly because of their political isolation. However, they laid the foundation for the subsequent formation of Greek national identity.\textsuperscript{202}

The transition from a religious to an ethnic group was reinforced by the development of Bulgarian nationalism. Although initially Orthodoxy was the single central symbol providing cohesion within the Orthodox millet, the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate forced the lay leadership of the millet to identify a multiplicity of symbols that would stress the different ways members of the group were similar to each other and collectively different from others.\textsuperscript{203} The Bulgarians achieved this multi-symbol congruence by adding the symbol of Bulgarian language to religion. In the case of the Greeks the ideological framework was provided by Athens and the concept of uninterrupted historical continuity of Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos. \textit{Ellinorthodoxia} (Ελληνορθοδοξία, Greek Orthodoxy) became the symbolic name of this multi-symbol congruence defining a Greek ethnic group, the Greek Orthodox community.\textsuperscript{204}

In general, it could be argued that by the end of the Tanzimat period in 1876 the Ottoman Empire no longer represented a multi-religious, but rather a multi-ethnic state. As Rozen points out when referring to the reforms, ‘in many ways this new

\textsuperscript{199} Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000: 157-9.
\textsuperscript{200} Ubicini 1856: 237.
\textsuperscript{201} Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000: 158.
\textsuperscript{202} See Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000: 158.
\textsuperscript{203} See Brass 1991: 20-1.
\textsuperscript{204} See Brass 1991: 20-1; Matalas 2003: 317-9.
foundation nullified the earlier autonomy and replaced it with a structure based not on religious differences – as had previously been the case – but on ethnic differences between various groups on an ideological and symbolic basis.\textsuperscript{205} The institutional differentiation into millets helped the several non-Muslim communities to strengthen their ethnic identity, while the antagonism between them laid the foundations for their transformation into political communities.\textsuperscript{206} Therefore, the Ottoman population was not reformed and homogenized as one entity, but in a fragmented manner. The separate secularization of the institutions of each millet resulted in an ethnic segmentation of Ottoman society. As long as the upper class elites retained their political control over their millets and supported the principles of Ottomanism, this ethnic segmentation did not pose a threat to political and social coherence.\textsuperscript{207} However, the absolutism of Sultan Abdüll-Hamid II and the gradual involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of the millets would reinforce this segmentation and pave the way for their politicization.

The proclamation of the Constitution on 23 December 1876 was received by the Ottoman Greeks with enthusiasm. According to Articles 8 and 17 all subjects of the empire were Ottoman citizens irrespective of their descent and had equal rights in the eyes of the law. The Constitution provided for the representation of the millets in the Ottoman parliament. Nineteen Ottoman Greeks represented the Rum milleti during its first session (20 March-20 June 1877) and sixteen during the second (13 December 1877-16 February 1878). Seven Greeks were appointed members of the Senate and two became vice-ministers of foreign affairs and justice respectively. The Greek deputies on several occasions expressed their support for the constitutional regime and the policy of Ottomanism.\textsuperscript{208} A typical example of this attitude is the statement of the deputy of Constantinople Vasilios Seragiotis, regarding the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims: ‘Allow us to put an end forever to the terms Muslim, non-Muslim, Greek and Armenian. No more discrimination, we are all Ottomans’\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{205} Rozen 2005:61.
\textsuperscript{206} See Moore 2001: 17.
\textsuperscript{208} Alexandris 1980: 375-6, 378, 380-3.
\textsuperscript{209} Cited in Alexandris 1980: 380.
The ambitious experiment of the constitutional regime came abruptly to an end in February 1878, when Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved parliament and the empire entered a period of absolutism (August 1876-July 1908). Although he continued the modernization and secularization programme initiated during the Tanzimat reforms, he placed pan-Islamism at the centre of his policy. This meant that being Muslim became an essential criterion of Ottomanism. In this way he excluded the non-Muslim communities from the Ottoman nation, contrary to the original aim of the reformists. Two factors played a significant role for the shift of Ottoman policy. The first was the loss of territory mostly comprised of Christian populations, which altered the demography of the empire, making the Muslim element dominant. The second was the open involvement of foreign states in the affairs of the non-Muslim millets. In the case of the Rums it was Greece that assumed a more active role with regards to the issues of the Greek Orthodox community.

In the early 1880s the Greek government assigned to the ‘Association for the Promotion of Greek Letters’ (‘Σύλλογος προς Διάδοσιν των Ελληνικών Γραµµάτων’, APGL) the promotion of its irredentist policy within the Rum milleti, especially in areas targeted by rival nationalisms in places such as Macedonia and Thrace. The APGL, in cooperation with the Greek consuls, tried to place the administrative mechanisms of the Patriarchate under its control in order to diffuse Greek nationalist ideology to the populations of these regions. The cooperation of the bishops was essential for this purpose. However, this proved to be a difficult task, because several bishops refused to place themselves in the service of the Greek state and cede to its representatives their power over communal affairs. This resulted in their replacement by members of the clergy who had adopted Greek national ideas. Additionally, the government subsidized the bishops of the areas in dispute and tried to gain the support of the secretaries of the bishoprics, the lower clergy and the teachers. The APGL also managed to gain control of the education of the Greek Orthodox populations in Macedonia and Epirus.

---

The policy of Athens undermined the authority of the Patriarchate over the *Rum milleti*. Patriarch Ioakim III reacted by criticizing the utilization of bishops by the Greek state. He believed that the bishops participating in the promotion of Greek irredentism ran the danger of being either characterized as nationalists by the other ethnic groups or revolutionaries by the Ottoman state. Similarly, he disapproved of the approach of certain consuls, claiming that it had been harmful for the ‘nation’ (‘genos’, γένος) and that the clergy should not act as if it served foreign political ideas. He also pointed out that the representatives of the Greek government should be more cautious regarding their actions.\(^{214}\) According to Ioakim, official Greek involvement in communal education would intensify the mistrust of the Ottoman authorities and endanger the Patriarchate’s privileges. His approach was more moderate. He was convinced that in order to win over the Slav-speaking populations of Macedonia and Thrace, a less aggressive and more tolerant policy should be followed. This should be based on educational and financial support and political concessions, without trying to enforce upon these populations the adoption of Greek language and national ideas. To this end, he tried to negotiate with the Bulgarians through the mediation of Russia, in order to lift the ecclesiastical schism between the two churches. However, his policy was refuted as anti-national by Greek official circles.\(^{215}\) On the issue of education, Ioakim made an effort to counterbalance the increasing influence of the APGL. With the support of Georgios Zarifis and other members of the Constantinopolitan upper class he established the Educational Fraternity ‘Agapate Allilous’ (Φιλεκπαιδευτική Αδελφότης ‘Αγαπάτε Αλλήλους’, EFAA), which after an unofficial agreement with the Greek state retained control over education in Constantinople, Thrace and Asia Minor.\(^{216}\)

Ioakim’s actions should be seen in the context of intra-communal antagonism between different elites. His election in 1878 confirmed the political and social hegemony of the bankers of the Greek Orthodox millet. The dissolution of parliament by the Sultan, and the conservatism of the new regime, forced them to change their policy and break their ties with the ethnocentric circles they had supported in the

\(^{215}\)Kofos 1986: 113-5.
past. Instead, this mixed lay/clerical elite promoted the Pan-Orthodox model of ecumenism, which they had opposed during the Tanzimat reforms. Their aim was twofold: Their incorporation into the Ottoman state and a policy of rapprochement with the Russians. It was during this period that Zarifis, Ioakim’s political protector, became the personal banker of Abdülhamid and gained a significant position in the economic life of the empire. In addition, the moderate approach towards the Bulgarian Exarchate was employed as a means to re-establish their connections with Russia.217

At the same time, the Porte proceeded to measures that challenged the traditional prerogatives of the Patriarchate, an issue that became a reason of constant friction between the state and the leadership of the millet, commonly designated as the ‘Privileges Question’ (‘Προνομιακό Ζήτηµα’).218 The Porte contested the authority of the patriarch on issues of education and ecclesiastical and family law and tried to place them under its control. It denied any violation of the Church’s prerogatives and claimed that it had the right to alter them if needed, since they were just concessions. Furthermore, it justified the modification of the berat as part of the reform programme and argued that there was no official evidence on paper proving the award of privileges to the patriarch in the first place.219

Despite the appeals of the Greek government to protect the rights of the millet, Ioakim’s reaction was rather passive. According to Stamatopoulos, this was a calculated policy that served the purposes of the elite in power.220 Nevertheless, Anagnostopoulou argues that the Ottoman political context did not allow the Church to protect these prerogatives in an effective manner.221 Whether calculated or not, it could be safely assumed that Ioakim was not willing to clash with the Porte over this issue. His reluctance combined with his Russophile policy during this period caused the reaction of nationalist circles in Istanbul. Under pressure from the Greek embassy and its supporters, Ioakim was forced to resign in 1884 and was prevented from being

---

218 The Privileges’ Question is divided into three periods: 1883-1884, 1890-1891, and 1908-1918.
221 Anagnostopoulou 1997: 427.
Dimitris Kamouzis  Page 67 of 325

re-elected until 1901, because nationalists believed that he championed the survival of the empire instead of Greek irredentism.222

Gradually, the tension in relations between the Church and the Ottoman state escalated and in 1890 the Greek schools were closed down by force and issues of family law were tried by Turkish courts. Following the advice of the Greek ambassador in Constantinople, Patriarch Dionisios resigned and the Holy Synod and the PNMC declared the Church under persecution and closed all Greek churches.223

The international impact of this demonstration and the firm resistance of the Patriarchate to accept any compromising proposal forced the Sultan to restore the privileges of the Rum milleti with an official decree.224 The question of the privileges revealed the secularization of Church institutions that had taken place during the reforms. The prerogatives of the patriarch had become political rights of the whole Rum milleti. Therefore, any attempt to curtail them was perceived as a violation of the rights of the whole community. At the same time, it brought to the foreground the weakness of the Patriarchate in defending these privileges on its own. Despite its efforts to retain its role as the sole authority of the millet, under the pressure of the state’s policies it was forced to allow the involvement of Athens in its affairs.

The intervention of Russia had a similar effect on the Armenian millet although the measures taken by the Ottoman state and the responses of the Armenians were much harsher and brutal. Early in the nineteenth century Russia added the Armenians to the populations it protected.225 The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 provided the Armenians with hope that an autonomous or even an independent Armenian state would be established. Prior to the signing of the peace treaty of San Stefano, the Armenian Patriarch Nerses Varjapetian, the Armenian prelate of Adrianople and Armenian notables from Istanbul had consecutive meetings with the Russian delegates presenting the situation of the Armenians in the Eastern provinces and asking them for reforms. The Russians responded positively to Armenian demands

and included a relevant article in the treaty, which was signed on 3 March 1878. Based on Article xvi Russia would remain in the areas of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, which it had annexed during the war, and guarantee application of the agreed reforms by the Porte. However, the Great Powers and especially Britain were dissatisfied with the treaty, because it jeopardized their financial interests in the Black Sea. The Porte was also unhappy due to the fact that a significant part of their country was under Russian domination. As a result, at the Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878, Russia was forced to agree to the amendment of some articles including Article xvi. According to Article 61 of the new treaty the signatories would oversee the application of the reforms. Furthermore, there was no mention of the foundation of a semi-autonomous Armenian entity, despite an appeal submitted to the Congress by an Armenian delegation led by the former Patriarch Khrimian.

Russia’s military intervention in Western Armenia and the increasing pro-Russian sentiment of the Armenians amplified Abdülhamid’s suspicion towards them. As a result, throughout the 1880s the reforms remained a dead letter and the Armenians of these areas suffered from the arbitrariness of the Kurds and the Circassians, who acted with the tolerance of the government. In the late 1880s, two Armenian nationalist political parties were formed in Russian Armenia, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Hnchak party. The former aimed at the establishment of an autonomous Armenia under Ottoman suzerainty, while the latter had as its goal the creation of an independent socialist Armenia. Both parties infiltrated Ottoman Armenia, coordinated revolutionary activity and imported arms. In an effort to draw international attention to the issue of the reforms, they also employed terrorist methods like assassinations, an armed organized demonstration in Istanbul in September 1895 and the takeover of the Imperial Ottoman Bank of the

---

227 Article xvi stipulated that: As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries (Russia and Turkey), the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvement and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians and to guarantee their security against the Kurds and Circassians. See Krikorian 1978: 6.
228 Stamatopoulos 2006: 267; Bloxham 2007: 47.
capital in August 1896. The activities of the Armenian nationalists caused the reaction of the Hamidian regime. However, it was the Armenian population who suffered the reprisals. Between 1894 and 1896 approximately 80-100 thousand Armenians were killed by official and unofficial military groups organized by the state. In addition, thousands of Armenians emigrated during Abdülhamid’s reign and thousand hectares of Armenian land were confiscated by the authorities.\textsuperscript{231}

The involvement of Greece and Russia in the affairs of the Rums and the Armenians respectively, and the positive response of the nationalist circles within the leadership of these two millets, combined with the oppressive policies of Abdülhamid, further polarized the existing ethnic division and prepared the ground for their total politicization along national lines. On the contrary, the lack of an external protecting power for the Jews directed them towards a policy of understanding with the Ottoman state. The Young Turks’ rise to power and the interlude of the second constitutional period would finalize the internal break-up of Ottoman society.

The politicization of the millet: ‘Nationalists’ and ‘Anti-nationals’ (1908 – 1912)

The ultimate aim of the Young Turk revolution in July 1908 was to save the Ottoman state from the dangers that threatened it. This aim could be achieved by restoring and defending the constitution of 1876.\textsuperscript{232} The success of the revolution brought to the foreground two competing political groups among the Young Turks that had begun to form in 1902 during the first stages of the movement’s development: the Liberals and the Unionists. Both shared the ideology of Ottomanism, but differed in the way they perceived it and the means used for its realization. The Liberals focused on constructing a decentralized administration system and encouraging private initiative.\textsuperscript{233} They favoured a federalized Ottoman state where the different communities would retain their communal rights and administrate themselves through local government under state control. This approach, combined with the promotion of liberal economic policies and the freedom of private enterprise, was indirectly supporting the nationalism of the non-Muslim communities. Their policies provided a fertile ground for the development of national separatism.\textsuperscript{234} On the other hand, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) promoted a type of Ottomanism along strictly secular lines, which aimed to bring about Ottoman unity through state controlled educational and financial policies. Equal citizenship for all Ottoman subjects irrespective of race and religion was the essence of union for the CUP. As a result, communal privileges and rights differentiating citizens were to be abolished. This policy of homogenization inevitably turned against the millet system and the privileges of the non-Muslim communities. As Berkes points out, ‘the right of maintaining autonomy, cultural and political, which meant union to the separatists [Liberals], meant dissolution to the Unionists’.\textsuperscript{235} The latter set out to create a civic-territorial nation without realizing, though, that the core element for creating a common culture was the millet system in its post-reform secularized version. The

\textsuperscript{232} Ahmad 1969: 16; Lewis 1961: 208.
\textsuperscript{233} Lewis 1961: 197-200.
\textsuperscript{235} Berkes 1998: 331.
Liberals seemed to be aware of it since they were part of the old ruling elite that had initiated the reforms. On the other hand, the Unionists, mostly comprising junior military officers and the new emerging intelligentsia, formed an as yet non-realized Turkish middle class that did not identify itself with the previous system.\textsuperscript{236}

At the same time, different political stances developed within the Rum milleti. The Society of Constantinople (SC) expressed the more ethnocentric circles of the community’s lay leadership. The SC was established in Constantinople in early 1908 by an officer of the Greek army, Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, with the support of Athens, initially aiming to fight against the Bulgarian threat in Thrace. However, the enthusiasm the Young Turk revolution created among the Ottoman population changed the objectives of the SC.\textsuperscript{237} The cooperation of all peoples of the empire for the creation of a multi-ethnic ‘Eastern’ state became the new goal. According to Souliotis-Nikolaidis,

The new constitution was an opportunity. Its declaration created a feeling of fraternization among the nations of Turkey, -all the Eastern nations-, and the constitutional freedoms facilitated Hellenism of Turkey to set and follow a political programme, which had as its final aim a coalition of the nations and states of the East.\textsuperscript{238}

In this effort, Souliotis- Nikolaidis was joined by Ion Dragoumis, a member of a prominent Greek family, who served in Constantinople as a diplomat. Disappointed by the incapability of the Greek state to realize the Megali Idea, Dragoumis believed that “the Megali Idea does not move people anymore, because many times they suffered for it and it didn’t come true. […] Now, they can believe more in a great state that would unite the entire Greek nation”.\textsuperscript{239} He was willing to work for the creation of a great Eastern state that would include Greece and the Greeks, but at the same time he did not perceive the different nations of the region as being as similar as Souliotis-Nikolaidis did.\textsuperscript{240} He wanted the Greeks to be at the centre of this coalition, whereas Souliotis-Nikolaidis believed that this would happen in time.\textsuperscript{241} It

\textsuperscript{236} Ahmad 1969: 16-8.
\textsuperscript{238} Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 63; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{239} Dragoumis 1911: 74; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{240} Dragoumis 1911: 109.
\textsuperscript{241} Souliotis Nikolaidis 1984: 63; Dragoumis 1911: 107, 110.
could be argued that their movement aimed at the Hellenization of the Ottoman state and its reform into an Empire, Eastern according to Souliotis-Nikolaidis and Greek according to Dragoumis.\textsuperscript{242}

A few days after the restoration of the constitution Souliotis-Nikolaidis and Dragoumis sent a letter to the Greek Foreign Minister, Georgios Baltatzis, explaining the aims of their political programme. They asked Athens to pursue an alliance with the Porte and argued that the Greek nation should be allowed to develop within the Ottoman Empire with its own powers.\textsuperscript{243} The preconditions for the achievement of their programme were the abandonment by Greece of any claims on Ottoman regions and the compliance of the Ottoman Greeks with the constitutional reforms, apart from education and religious affairs, which should be under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. However, Athens did not respond.\textsuperscript{244} Instead, the Greek government followed Baltatzis’ suggestion and, after negotiations with the Young Turks, decided to send Pavlos Karolidis, a professor at the University of Athens, to represent its views in the Ottoman parliament.\textsuperscript{245} Karolidis, Vasilios Orfanidis and a few other Greek deputies of the parliament formed in 1908 formed the opposition to the SC.\textsuperscript{246} They represented a less ethnocentric and more compliant political stance within the lay leadership of the Rum milleti. Karolidis believed that the new regime would allow a sincere understanding between the Greek and Turkish element aiming at fighting the common enemy, the Slavic threat in Macedonia. However, he failed to understand Ottoman reality and did not promote the Greek government’s objectives. His erratic policy and his obstruction of the work of the SC made him unpopular among many Greeks.\textsuperscript{247}

It seems that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (GMFA) was not fully aware of the progress the SC had made in drawing members from the Constantinopolitan middle class. In the summer of 1908, the SC established its political instrument, the ‘Greek Political League of Constantinople’ (‘Ελληνικός Πολιτικός Σύνδεσμος

\textsuperscript{242} Skopetea 1999: 28-31; See Breuilly in Özkırımlı 2000: 108.
\textsuperscript{243} Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 64-5, 272-4.
\textsuperscript{244} Veremis 1999: 187.
\textsuperscript{245} Anagnostopoulou 1997: 472.
\textsuperscript{246} Ahmad 1982: 409.
Κωνσταντινοπόλεως’, GPLC), which appointed the Greek candidates for parliament in Constantinople and ran the political campaign for the upcoming elections. In November 1908, a few days prior to the elections, the SC organized a massive demonstration in Istanbul against the arbitrariness of the Young Turks with regards to the electoral procedure. In a short period of time, the SC had managed to mobilize support from broad groups of the population who were previously excluded from the political process, namely the middle class. Most of its members belonged to this social group. The SC supplied them with a political platform where they could express their ethnocentric ideas and provided them with the long awaited opportunity to gain direct access to the political administration of the millet. It should also be pointed out that prominent figures of the SC, like the publishers Alexandros Voutyras and Konstantinos Spanoudis, held Hellenic citizenship, a fact that demonstrated even further the political orientations of the organization.

Due to its rapid and effective networking the SC gained control over the PNMC. The majority in both bodies of the council were also members of the SC and supported it on all the issues of ‘national importance’. The last and greatest obstacle to establishing its political supremacy within the millet was Patriarch Ioakim III. Since the revolution of 1908 the Patriarchate was cautious towards the Young Turks. Their proclamations for the creation of a constitutional state based on the equality of rights for all citizens and the abolition of the millet system were not welcomed by the Church. Ioakim, who had been re-elected in 1901 with the consent of the Greek embassy, had realized that the secular and centralist policies of the state threatened his power over the Ottoman Greeks. At the same time though, he saw the efforts of the SC as an intrusion into his affairs and regarded the organization as an instrument of the Greek state. Ioakim’s main purpose was to safeguard his status as the ‘national’ authority of the Rum millet. According to Dragoumis, ‘he does not identify himself with Hellenism more than is necessary to secure his high

---

248 Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 73, 75.
office. [...] He is the patriarch of the Orthodox and claims all the Orthodox flock as his own or would like to dominate it spiritually. There are two facts that give credence to Dragoumis’ assessment. The first one is that in order to be re-elected he had to convince the Greek embassy that he championed Greek policy with regards to the integrity of the empire and relations with the Russians. The second is that he entered into an alliance of convenience with the SC, despite his discontent regarding its activities. The common ground was the protection of the privileges of the Patriarchate, which after the Tanzimat reforms had developed into political rights of the whole millet. The SC was the only political body willing to oppose the centralist policies of the CUP. As a result, loakim offered them his support and treated the deputies cooperating with the CUP with mistrust. This provided the SC with the necessary legitimization in the eyes of the people. At the same time the SC protected the patriarch from the anti-loakimist faction. Thus, in the new political context created after the Young Turk revolution, the traditional Helleno-Ottoman upper class elite became politically marginalized and the middle class elite assumed control over communal affairs.

The SC also tried to come to a political understanding with the Armenians, without any significant results. Souliotis-Nikolaidis attributed their reluctance to cooperate to their fear of the Turks. He argued that despite the attitude of solidarity they demonstrated with the patriarch and the members of the GPLC, in the end they always did what the CUP ordered them to do. Souliotis-Nikolaidis was probably not aware of the fact that since 1907 the ARF had begun cooperating with the Young Turks, both Liberals and Unionists for the dethronement of Abdülhamid. Pleased with the restoration of the constitution, the ARF ended its demands for European intervention and the application of Article 61 of the Congress of Berlin and abandoned its propaganda efforts in Europe. As already mentioned, their aim was not separatism or Russian occupation, but the creation of an autonomous Armenia under

255 Stamatopoulos 2003: 369; Stamatopoulos 2006: 266.
259 Souliotis- Nikolaidis 1984: 78.
Ottoman suzerainty. The means to achieve this was cooperation with the Turks and the formation of a joint body to deal with the general problems. Therefore, after the revolution the ARF continued offering its support to the CUP. Similar to the SC, the ARF found itself at odds with the Patriarchate and the amiras, who felt their power threatened by this new revolutionary elite. Soon however, the ARF, using its contacts with the CUP and certain ministers, became the dominant political force within the millet.\footnote{Kaligian 2009: 2, 6-7, 14, 18, 23.}

However, relations between the two parties were not as harmonious as they seemed. The ARF was also dissatisfied by irregularities committed by the CUP during the electoral process, but could not opt for severing its ties with the Unionists.\footnote{Ibid., 19.} According to Souliotis-Nikolaidis, the Armenian deputies would not have been elected without the support of the Unionists, given that in a lot of districts the Armenian electoral body constituted a minority compared to the Turkish population.\footnote{Souliotis- Nikolaidis 1984: 78.} As the following telegram of November 1908 sent by the ARF to the CUP branch in Thessaloniki shows, Souliotis-Nikolaidis’ assessment was correct:

> The election is not going well. In Khapert only one Armenian deputy was elected. We told you to send orders to your local bodies to cooperate with our committees or form joint election committees to work together and do propaganda etc. Our proposals were not implemented. The former government officials should be removed to benefit the people. You have the contacts with the government and could have it done. The situation is reaching crisis proportions. To prevent it we call on you and your democratic spirit and sincerity to pay attention to this situation.\footnote{Cited in Kaligian 2009: 19.}

Interestingly, throughout this period the SC approached all the other ethnic groups apart from the Jews.\footnote{Souliotis- Nikolaidis 1984: 152.} This seems strange taking into account the fact that after 1908 the Jewish progressive middle class who had been educated in the Alliance schools, the \textit{Alliancists}, came to power and that the \textit{Zionists}, the more ethnocentric group within the millet, won the communal elections of 1910-11.\footnote{Levy 1994: 115; Rodrigue 1990: 122-5, 127; Rodrigue 1995: 254.} Although Souliotis-Nikolaidis does not provide any specific reason for this political choice, a few
assumptions based on relations between the two communities and the policies of the Jewish leadership could be made to explain this deliberate lack of contact.

The first and more obvious reason is that the Alliancists immediately became active supporters of the CUP and established good connections with leading figures of the party. The lack of a foreign power acting as an external protector for the Jews left them with no other choice but to fully cooperate with the new regime. Three out of four Jewish deputies elected to the parliament were CUP members and prominent Unionists like Talat Paşa had either taught or studied in Alliance institutions.\(^{266}\) With regards to the Zionists, they were more interested in bringing social change within the millet and gaining control over communal affairs than participating in the broader political debate. Furthermore, Zionism in the Ottoman Empire, unlike the nationalist and separatist movements of the non-Muslims, advocated the territorial integrity of the state and its continuation as a multi-ethnic entity. Therefore, it did not pose a threat to the CUP.\(^{267}\)

An additional reason for avoiding contact could be the traditional antipathy and competition between Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The blood libels and boycotts against the Jewish communities initiated mainly by Greeks and supported by the Armenians in large cities like Istanbul and Izmir is an example of the hostility created, due to the financial and social ascendancy of the Jews in the nineteenth century. In response, the Jews turned to the state for aid and gradually a mutual Jewish-Muslim understanding developed.\(^{268}\) This fact, combined with the opportunities provided to the Jews during the Tanzimat reforms, reinforced in their eyes the image of the Porte as their protector. This explains the absolute loyalty of the Jewish leadership to the state both under Abdülhamid’s rule and the Young Turk regime. However, the same loyalty probably added to the suspicion and the contempt shown towards the Jews by the leaderships of the other millets, especially the nationalist factions, and made the prospect of a political collaboration more difficult.


After the 1908 elections, the CUP became the dominant political force in the empire. Immediately, they put into action their programme of centralization and secularization by passing a series of laws which challenged the rights and privileges of the non-Muslim communities. Whether these policies were nationalist or not is hard to define. Lewis refers to them as ‘repressive and centralist policies’ and ‘policies of Turkification’. Ahmad, on the other hand, claims that they were part of the process of creating a common culture and bringing about Ottoman unity. What can be safely assumed is that the CUP was not satisfied with the response of the non-Muslim communities to their effort to Ottomanize them. In August 1910, Talat Paşa reportedly said that ‘the Ghiaurs [infidels] … stubbornly resist every attempt to Ottomanize them’. According to the British Ambassador in Constantinople Sir Gerald Lowther, ‘to them [the CUP] “Ottoman” evidently meant “Turk” and their policy of “Ottomanization” is one of pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar’. In any case, the nationalist faction of the Greek Orthodox millet regarded these policies as nationalist and oppressive. As Georgios Skalieris wrote:

[The Unionists] believed that the Constitution was made only for the Turks and that it was a one-sided and partial contract, providing benefits and rights for the Turks and […] obligations for the non-Turks. Traditions, customs, language, religious beliefs, communal fortunes, ecclesiastical institutions, rights […] were scorned, violated and ignored.

With regards to the Rums, out of a total of twenty three Greek deputies elected in 1908, fifteen were members of the SC and constituted the ‘Greek Party’ (Ελληνική Ομάδα’ GP). Souliotis-Nikolaidis criticized some of the deputies who had not

---

271 Ahmad 1982: 410-413.
274 Georgios Skalieris was an ardent supporter of the Liberals and a close friend of their leader Prince Sabaheddin. He was also one of the founding members of the Party of Liberal Ottomans (Osmani Ahrar Firkastı) and a prominent member of the SC. See Skalieris 1997: 13, 47; Alexandris 1980: 392.
275 Skalieris 1997: 48-9; See Appendix 1.
276 Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 82-3; Veremis 1999: 187; Alexandris 1980: 393; Boura 1983: 77; Skalieris 1997: 40-1. Alexandris and Boura claim that the members of the SC and GPLC were sixteen out of twenty four. However, according to Souliotis-Nikolaidis the deputy Drizis was replaced by Vamvakas. As for deputy Kourtoglou whom Boura includes in the Greek Party, Souliotis-Nikolaidis said that, although he was not a member of the SC, he cooperated with them in several issues.
joined the SC, arguing that they wanted to benefit from their relations with the Unionists and manipulate the Greek deputies. He characterized their policy as ‘hostile’ towards the deputies of the SC and added, referring mostly to Karolidis, that they had ‘no other way to suggest than the submissive (ραγιάδικη) policy of tricks, cunning and flattery towards the Turks, a policy of whining and resignation’. The opposition refuted Souliotis-Nikolaidis’ arguments. According to Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, deputy of Smyrna:

The GPLC had gathered all the troublemakers, who wanted to represent themselves to the people as fervent patriots through irresponsible claims and inarticulate statements. […] They did not take into account the problem they were creating for the Greek element in Turkey and the high price the poor classes paid […] for the harshness of articles written in a secure environment and speeches delivered without the fear of danger.

As a result, two opposing political stances formed within the Greek parliamentary body, the ‘Nationalists’ (‘Εθνικόφρονες’) and the ‘Anti-nationals’ (‘Αντεθνικοί’). It could be argued that the two different stances within the minority also assumed a mixed lay/clerical character with the Nationalists and Ioakimists forming one group and the Anti-nationals and the Anti-Ioakimists the other.

The political predominance of the SC became apparent in the actions taken by the lay and religious leaderships of the community towards the policy of the CUP. Ioakim, with the support and the encouragement of the SC, resisted the restriction of his jurisdiction over educational and religious issues. On 16 June 1909 he sent the first in a series of letters to the Grand Vezir complaining about the state policies:

The Ecumenical Patriarchate, as the religious and national centre of the Greeks in Turkey, firmly believed that the new regime would protect and safeguard its acknowledged and vested rights and privileges […] After all, the safeguard of these rights is a law of the constitution, an article of which explicitly stipulates that the State protects the free practice of all the acknowledged religions in the Empire and the granted privileges of every community.

---

277 Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 83; See Appendix 1.
278 Emmanouilidis 1924: 306; See Appendix 1.
279 Boura 1983: 77.
On 12 August 1910 the majority of the Greek deputies submitted a similar memorandum to the cabinet.\textsuperscript{282}

All these (policies) establish in the conscience of the Greek Nation the certainty that it is held, like in the period of absolutism, as a prisoner, whose confinement in a lower position is one of the objectives of the government’s policy, aiming [...] at obstructing its development. Even more than before there is the tendency to use the term of the Constitution ‘Ottoman Ethnicity’, in order to impose Turkish Ethnicity.\textsuperscript{283}

No official reply was provided by the Porte, which according to Souliotis-Nikolaidis revealed the intransigence of the CUP towards the community.\textsuperscript{284} The formation and consolidation of Greek national identity was reinforced by the policies of exclusion of the CUP.\textsuperscript{285} On 27 November 1910, the Patriarchate sent a letter (tehrir), written by Souliotis-Nikolaidis, to the Porte arguing that the reason behind the Ottoman Greeks’ tendency to avoid military service was their unequal treatment in the Ottoman army.\textsuperscript{286} Among other things the Patriarchate suggested that: \textsuperscript{287}

The relevant (military) laws and regulations should be altered, in order to respect equally the religion, education and customs of all the soldiers. [...] The internal regulation of the army should be modified, in a way to reflect that the Ottoman Army belongs to Ottoman Christians as much as to Muslims and [...] include clauses as favourable to Christian traditions as to Muslim traditions.

On 4 December 1910 in a similar letter to the Ministry of Education\textsuperscript{288} the Patriarchate protested against the violations of the community’s educational rights stressing that ‘the Rum nation considers its educational and [...] religious self-administration, as a vital issue of its cultural and moral existence’.\textsuperscript{289} It also suggested the application of specific measures that ‘would remove any disbelief, and [...] the Rum nation reassured regarding its educational self-administration, which is irrelevant from politics, would make every effort to assist the policy of the

\textsuperscript{282} Souliotis- Nikolaidis 1984: 112-7.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., 115; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., 118.
\textsuperscript{285} See Moore 2001: 17.
The Ministry of Education refuted the arguments of the Patriarchate and expressed the following view on the whole issue:

If the aim of the Patriarchate is to become a kind of autonomous and independent state within the Ottoman state on the issues of education and schools belonging to the Greek Orthodox community, then such a claim is not imposed by the spiritual existence and national life of the Greek community and cannot possibly be accepted on the basis of the existence of the whole Ottoman nation.²⁹¹

According to Hastings, ‘a state could exist very easily with a multiplicity of ethnicities within it, employing different languages and even systems of local government and customary law. As a state modernises this becomes impossible without a thorough policy of federalism and pluriformity – something difficult to achieve to the satisfaction of all sides’.²⁹² This describes with accuracy the situation under the Young Turk regime. The undifferentiated concept of Ottoman citizenship the CUP was trying to apply, did not take into account the specific rights and privileges of the different ethnic groups.²⁹³ The difference of opinion between the Patriarchate and the Ottoman government expressed the first stages of the transformation from a Rum/ethnic to a Greek/national community and at the same time from a multi-ethnic to a Turkish national state. The more the CUP equated Ottoman with Turkish identity the more the community identified Rum with Greek.

The reply of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Ministry of Education made this fact clear:

The insistence of the Ministry of Education to confuse the term ‘Ottoman Nation’, in which it aims at incorporating all the ethnicities of the country, with the term ‘Ottoman State’ that has Mohammedanism as its religion and Turkish as its language, does not contribute to removing the suspicion of the Rum Nation that its spiritual existence and its national life is in danger.²⁹⁴

The policies of the CUP alienated the non-Turkish ethnic groups and made any attempt at cooperation futile. From early January 1911 the SC began to coordinate its

²⁹¹ Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 126; See Appendix 1.
²⁹³ See Chatterjee in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 211.
²⁹⁴ Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 127; See Appendix 1.
activities with Athens. Souliotis-Nikolaidis sent a report to the Greek government informing them about the situation in Istanbul and especially their efforts to establish contacts with deputies from other ethnic groups in order to bring about a coalition against the Unionist regime.\footnote{Ibid., 151-6.} In the report there was a special mention of the Bulgarians and the Armenians.\footnote{Ibid., 155.} The willingness to cooperate with the Bulgarians, until recently the worst enemies of the Greeks, revealed the dissatisfaction of the leadership of the millet with the policies of the CUP. Turkey had again become the archenemy. As for the Armenians, disillusioned by the 1909 massacres in Adana and the continuous broken promises of the CUP for applying the measures of land restitution and reform for improvement of the livelihood of the Armenian people, they decided to end their cooperation with the Unionists.\footnote{Kaligian 2009: 31-7, 43-8, 64, 81, 83-6, 121.}

Among the measures proposed by Souliotis-Nikolaidis as a means to put pressure on the Ottoman government was a joint military intervention with the participation of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. For this purpose he argued that Athens should start negotiations with Sofia and Belgrade in order to prepare the ground.\footnote{Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 155.} This was in agreement with Greek policy after the rise of Eleftherios Venizelos to power in 1910. From this point on Athens started to pursue actively the realization of the Megali Idea through Greek irredentism. As a matter of fact, Souliotis-Nikolaidis considered Venizelos as the only Greek politician who understood best the ideas of the SC.\footnote{Ibid., 105.}

According to the instructions sent in September 1911 by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to the embassies of Constantinople and Sofia, the Greek deputies were to form a coalition with the other ethnic communities of the empire in order to secure recognition of their rights from the Porte and receive official guarantees for their protection. The minister also ordered the Greek ambassador in Sofia to approach the Bulgarian government for the creation of a common front for the support of the rights of the different ethnicities in Turkey. Closing his letter he urged ‘the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Ottoman deputies to intensify their actions according to the programme suggested in their memorandum, the tahrir [encyclical]
of the Patriarchate and the instructions of the Royal Ministry.\textsuperscript{300} All the signs showed that the situation was leading to an armed conflict in the region.

In Constantinople the GPLC seemed prepared to ignore completely the CUP and the opposition within the millet. Obviously the negotiations with the Greek state had provided the SC with the necessary moral encouragement to directly challenge the Unionists. Thus, for the elections of April 1912 the GPLC reached an agreement with the Liberals, ignoring Karolidis’ advice that the Liberal Party did not have the cohesion and the political organization to win the elections. The deputies opting cooperation with the CUP argued that in the empire power belonged to the Turks and any effort towards a Christian victory in the elections would be futile. They also criticized the actions of the GPLC that prevented an agreement between the CUP and the Patriarchate for the latter’s support of specific candidates in the elections. The CUP had offered to raise the number of Greek deputies to 37, to put an end to the restrictions of ecclesiastical privileges and officially recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the only national centre of the Greek Orthodox in the empire.\textsuperscript{301}

The elections of April 1912 brought to the foreground the competing stances within the leaderships of both the Young Turks and the Rums. The Unionists accused the Liberals of having ‘sold out to the Greeks’ while at the same time the GPLC referred to the Greek deputies of the opposition as ‘creations of the CUP’.\textsuperscript{302} The CUP dominated the elections using any means possible to win.\textsuperscript{303} Out of sixteen Greek deputies elected, twelve belonged to the CUP and only four to the GPLC.\textsuperscript{304} The defeat of the GPLC and the outbreak of the First Balkan War on 8 October 1912 brought the activities of the nationalists to an end. The death of Ioakim a month later also signalled the fall of the Ioakimists from power.\textsuperscript{305} The Anti-national/ Anti-Ioakimist faction took advantage of the new circumstances and managed to take over as the religious and lay leadership of the community.

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 178-180.
\textsuperscript{301} Emmanouilidis 1924: 308; Boura 1983: 78-9; Boura 1999: 197-8.
\textsuperscript{302} Anagnostopoulou 1997: 492-3.
\textsuperscript{303} Alexandris 1980: 79.
\textsuperscript{304} Boura 1999: 198.
\textsuperscript{305} Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 22-3; Boura 1999: 199; Mavropoulos 1960: 62.
Young Turks and Ottoman Greeks (1912 – 1918)

From the outbreak of the First Balkan War until the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, the CUP was the dominant political force in the country, apart from a period between July 1912 and January 1913. During the Balkan Wars the Ottoman state suffered heavy territorial losses in European Turkey. It lost Macedonia, Crete, Rumeli and Epirus and managed to retain only the hinterland extending from Constantinople to Edirne. This resulted in the rapid de-Ottomanization of the empire, which lost territories containing large non-Muslim populations. Thus, Ottomanism became far less important as the means to bring political unity. In addition, with the mass migration of Muslims from the Balkans to Anatolia, a Turkish ethnic core was formed in the region. The existence of this ethnic core reinforced the nation-building policy of the CUP aiming to transform the ethnic Turks into a Turkish nation.

A policy of secular reforms was initiated in 1913 and intensified during World War I. The ideological basis of these reforms was mainly provided by the theories of Ziya Gökalp, a prominent Turkish ideologue and writer, and was defined as Turkism. Gökalp believed that the adoption of Western civilization into Turkish culture would result in bringing about a Turkish nation. Regarding Turkism he wrote:

> The mission of the Turkists is nothing but to uncover the Turkish culture which has remained in the people, on the one hand, and to graft Western civilization in its entirety and with all its living forms on to the national culture, on the other.\(^{306}\)

Secularization via Turkification would be the means to accomplish Turkism.\(^{307}\) In that spirit, a programme of complete secularization of religious courts, schools and foundations, which aimed at restricting the religious leadership of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities to purely religious affairs, was put into action.\(^{308}\)

Furthermore, as soon as the Ottoman Empire entered the World War I in November 1914, it ordered a general mobilization. The Ottoman Greeks who managed to pay exemption tax did not enrol. The others worked under grave

\(^{306}\) Gökalp 1959:289.


conditions in work battalions (Amele Taburu) in inner Anatolia and did not form a part of the regular Ottoman army.\(^{309}\) In addition, Greek populations were deported from strategically sensitive areas.\(^{310}\) Severe financial measures were taken especially towards the Greeks of Istanbul and Izmir in order to undermine their economic supremacy. Anti-Greek boycotts, open favouritism towards Turkish merchants, intimidation of Greek entrepreneurs by the Special Organization (Teşkilât-I Mahsusa) were all employed in this effort to Turkify the economy.\(^{311}\)

However, the ethnic group that suffered the worst were the Armenians. After the ARF broke its relations with the CUP in the summer of 1912, it resumed its appeals to the Great Powers for the application of reforms. Russia grasped the opportunity and re-emerged as the political protector of the Armenians. The reform programme promoted with Russian support enraged the extreme nationalists in the CUP, who considered that the issue had been brought up at a time when Turkey was weak and vulnerable. Thus, one of the war aims for Turkey in 1914 became the abrogation of the Armenian reform plan. The Armenian nationalists decided to collaborate with the Entente in an effort to seize the area of historic Armenia and accomplish their nationalist aspirations. Russia played a crucial role in convincing them by promising to support them towards this end. The result was the formation of seven battalions composed of Armenian volunteers that fought alongside the Russian army. The uprising at Van crystallized in the minds of the Ottoman Turks the image of all Armenians as the enemy within and provided them with the pretext for mass deportations coupled with killings and extensive acts of violence during the period 1915-1916. In the process, approximately 1,000,000 people lost their lives, a tragic event dubbed ‘the first modern genocide’. The Armenian nationalists continued to fight alongside the Russian, and after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, French armies, until the end of the war.\(^{312}\)

On the other hand, the Jewish leadership followed a policy of cautiousness and cooperation with the CUP from 1911 until the end of the World War I. The

\(^{309}\) Emmanouilidis 1924: 61; Persécutions 1918: 18.
\(^{310}\) Alexandris 1992: 43; Mavropoulos 1960: 77, 80-1.
\(^{312}\) For a detailed account of these events see Bloxham 2007.
communal executive council always included at least one functionary of the Young Turks and especially in the period 1915-1918 it was headed by a CUP member. As Rozen points out, loyalty to the regime ‘was due not only to the fact that it conformed with their political culture […] but also because this regime was good to them on a personal level: they were on its payroll’. In addition, as the case of the Armenians demonstrated, any other political choice apart from cooperation would be unwise.

Similar to the Jews, the response of the religious and lay leaderships of the Greek Orthodox community to the nationalist policies of the Young Turks was rather compliant. In January 1913, the Metropolitan of Chalkedon Germanos V was elected patriarch. Both Mavropoulos and Emmanouilidis argue that Germanos followed a submissive policy, despite the problem of the deportations that had caused the indignation of the Greek population. At the same time it seems that he was on good terms with the regime of the Young Turks. It is not clear whether the patriarch avoided protesting against the measures of the Turkish government, because he was unable to act or because he wanted to retain his power. Mavropoulos claims that on several occasions, Germanos took advantage of his good relations with the Turks in order to deal with the opposition within the Patriarchate. The only exception was his decision of 27 May 1914 to declare the Church in a state of persecution as a way of protest against the deportations, which did not have any impact. Emmanouilidis on the other hand argues that the circumstances did not allow Germanos to assume a more assertive policy. Both sources refer to the activities of the member of the CUP and deputy of Constantinople Orfanidis, who was the liaison between the Patriarchate and the state and played an influential role in Germanos’ compromising policy. In any case, the Constantinopolitan Greeks considered Germanos a person favoured by the Turkish establishment and disapproved of his actions. Additionally, the majority of the Greek deputies in Parliament had been elected with

---

313 Rozen 2005: 121.
314 Ibid., 122.
316 Mavropoulos 1960: 75-6, 89-90.
318 Emmanouilidis 1924: 290-1.
319 Emmanouilidis 1924: 291-2; Mavropoulos 1960: 75-6, 89-90.
320 Mavropoulos 1960: 74-5.
the CUP and also worked in an atmosphere of animosity and suspicion. Therefore, they could not openly oppose Turkey’s nationalizing policies.321

Meanwhile, Greece could not assume a more active role for the protection of the Ottoman Greeks during this period, since it was nationally torn between two opposing political stances regarding its participation in World War I. On the one hand King Constantine, royalist politicians and the General Staff considered continuous neutrality as the best option. On the other hand, Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, was eager to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Entente. Finally, on 25 November 1916 the Allies proceeded to a naval blockade of Greece, which led to the final dethronement of Constantine on 29 May 1917. Two days later Venizelos resumed office and the new government, having the de jure recognition of the Allies, officially declared war on the Central Powers on 15 June 1917. Venizelos’ untiring effort to bring the country into the fray had finally paid off. Greek forces played their part in the autumn 1918 offensive which drove Bulgarian forces from Macedonia and culminated in Bulgaria’s surrender, quickly followed by Turkey, now too exposed and exhausted to continue. The signing of the armistice at Mudros on 30 October 1918 found Greece on the victorious side of the Entente, as Venizelos had always intended. The Ottoman Greeks supported Venizelos, because they believed that Greece had left them helpless during this period and blamed Constantine’s policy for their misfortune.322 They were ready for a change. The overthrow of Germanos and Venizelos’ irredentist policy would provide them with this opportunity.

322 Emmanouilidis 1924: 284; Papadopoulos 1978: 82.
Conclusions

The transformation of the *Rum milleti* from a religious to a national community was the result of a gradual and multi-dimensional process conditioned by the changing political and social conditions in the Ottoman Empire and the developments within the group. This process can be divided into three main stages.

The first stage covers the period from the mid-nineteenth century until 1908, during which a Greek ethnic group was fully formed. The Tanzimat reforms allowed the emergence of two competing parties within the millet, a Helleno-Ottoman represented by the upper class elites and a Hellenocentric composed of members of the middle class. The former aimed at the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and the Hellenization of the Orthodox millet via education. Accordingly, Helleno-Ottomanism assumed two dimensions, one ethnic, Helleno/Greek, and one political, Ottomanism. The ethnic dimension did not negate the political one, since the upper class adopted, adjusted, reproduced and finally incorporated Greek culture into its policy of Ottomanism in order to establish its social hegemony over the Greek Orthodox population.

Contrary to the upper class, the middle class did not have ‘dual loyalties’. In their case, there was a congruence between the ethnic and political facet of their identity. They identified with Greece both in ethnic and political terms. Mostly educated in Athens, the middle class led a movement of cultural renewal and regeneration based on the establishment and the activities of institutions, associations and schools, where Greek culture and education became dominant. This intelligentsia committed itself to bringing to the surface the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of the Greek ethnic group and laid the foundation for the subsequent formation of Greek national identity. However, in this first phase they did not attempt to mount any patriotic agitation or express specific political goals, mainly because of their political isolation.

The reforms also divided the upper class elites into a conservative and a reformist faction. The former was supporting the predominance of the clergy over the laymen, whereas the latter was promoting the programme for the reform and modernization of
the millet. These elite groups were not purely lay or purely clerical, but lay/clerical
due to the administration system of the millet. An inner upheaval, similar to the one
created in the Rum milleti by the reforms, also took place within the Armenian and
Jewish communities. In all three millets the Constantinopolitan element in the newly
formed communal councils was dominant. However, in the case of the Rum milleti
this fact instigated the reaction of the Bulgarian element and created the conditions
for a competition between different ethnic groups to develop. The pro-western
reformist wing, led by the bankers Christakis Zografos and Georgios Zarifis, pursued
a no-concessions policy incorporating into their arguments views expressed mainly
by the representatives of the Hellenocentric party. Their aim was to marginalize the
political influence of the Russophile ecclesiastical wing and become the dominant
leadership group within the Helleno-Ottoman party and the whole millet. The result
was the official recognition of an independent Bulgarian Church by the Porte, the
Bulgarian Exarchate.

The transition from a religious to an ethnic group was reinforced by the
development of Bulgarian nationalism. Although initially Orthodoxy was the single
central symbol providing cohesion within the Orthodox millet, the establishment of
the Bulgarian Exarchate forced the lay leadership of the millet to identify a
multiplicity of symbols that would stress the different ways members of the group
were similar to each other and collectively different from others. The ideological
framework was provided by Athens and the concept of uninterrupted historical
continuity of Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos. Ellinorthodoxia (Ελληνορθοδοξία,
Greek Orthodoxy) became the symbolic name of this multi-symbol congruence
defining a Greek ethnic group, the Greek Orthodox community.

In general, it could be argued that by the end of the Tanzimat period the Ottoman
Empire no longer represented a multi-religious, but rather a multi-ethnic state. The
institutional differentiation into millets helped the several non-Muslim communities
to strengthen their ethnic identity, while the antagonism between them prepared the
ground for their transformation into political communities. The separate
secularization of communal and educational institutions of each millet resulted in an
ethnic segmentation of Ottoman society, which was further reinforced by the
absolutism of Sultan Abdüll-Hamid II and the gradual involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of the millets.

The policies of the absolutist Hamidian regime challenged the prerogatives of the Patriarchate and allowed Athens to get involved in communal affairs by offering its support to the Church. The whole issue revealed the secularization of the religious institutions that had taken place during the reforms. The prerogatives of the patriarch had become political rights of the whole Rum milleti. Therefore, any attempt to curtail them was perceived as a violation of the rights of the whole community. At the same time, the involvement of Greece and the positive response of the nationalist circles, combined with the oppressive policies of Abdülhamid, further polarized the existing ethnic division and paved the way for their total politicization along national lines.

This politicization took place from 1908 until 1912 and constitutes the second stage of the transition from an ethnic to a national community. The restoration of the constitution of 1876 by the Young Turks brought to the foreground two competing political stances within the communal lay leadership, the ‘Nationalists’ (‘Εθνικόφρονες’) and the ‘Anti-nationals’ (‘Αντεθνικοί’). The former were politically organized by the SC, which managed to mobilize support from members of the middle class, who were previously excluded from the political process. In a short period of time the SC gained control over the Patriarchate and the PNMC. Thus, in the new political context created after the Young Turk revolution the traditional Helleno-Ottoman upper class elite became politically marginalized and the middle class elite assumed for the first time control over communal affairs. Furthermore, the competition between the two different stances also took on an ecclesiastical character, with the Nationalists and Ioakimists forming one group and the Anti-nationals and the Anti-Ioakimists the other.

The communal authorities guided by the SC began to respond to the nationalist policies of the CUP by making claims on the basis of their rights and their distinct ethnic identity. The organization coordinated its activities with the Greek state and tried to form an anti-Unionist coalition composed of deputies from the other non-Turkish ethnic groups. However, the defeat of the GPLC in the elections of 1912,
combined with the outbreak of the First Balkan War and the death of Ioakim the same year, resulted in the fall of the nationalists from power.

The Anti-national/ Anti-Ioakimist faction took advantage of the new circumstances and managed to take over as the religious and lay leadership of the community until 1918. During this period the Ottoman state lost territories mostly composed of non-Muslim populations, which resulted in a rapid de-Ottomanization of the empire. Thus, Turkism replaced Ottomanism as the means to bring political unity. The CUP applied a programme of secularization via Turkification in an effort to transform the ethnic Turks into a Turkish nation. In that spirit they took measures that violated the rights of the non-Muslim communities. These nation-building policies intensified as soon as the Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914 and had tragic consequences for the Rums and even more so for the Armenians. The response of the religious and lay leaderships of the Greek Orthodox community was rather compliant. The circumstances created during the war did not leave them with any other option. In addition, Patriarch Germanos V was on good terms with the Young Turks and took advantage of his good relations to deal with the opposition within the Patriarchate. The people became alienated by the nationalist policies of the CUP and the passive attitude of their leadership. In addition, they believed that Constantine’s Greece had abandoned them at the most crucial hour. As a consequence, they identified with Venizelos and his effort to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Entente.

By the end of the war their transformation into a Greek national community was complete. As Hroch points out ‘between the manifestations of scholarly interest, on the one hand, and the mass diffusion of patriotic attitudes, on the other, there lies an epoch characterized by active patriotic agitation: the fermentation-process of national consciousness’.\(^{323}\) This describes with accuracy the post-Hamidian period and especially the years 1908-1912. A nationalist movement within the Rum milleti would develop fully after 1918, when the religious and lay leaderships of the community actively supported Greek irredentism and Venizelist expansionism. The

\(^{323}\) Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000: 159.
new range of activists who emerged under the political umbrella of the SC would try to convince the *Rums* about the project of uniting with the rest of the Greek nation.
Chapter Three:

Constantinople and Greater Greece, 1918 – 1922
Introduction

Hail and rejoice, oh Christian people, for the unheard have been heard by the Divine psalmist now, coming from the mouth of His Excellency the Governor of Greece, who brought the message to our National Center a little while ago with the most official manner of the accomplished victorious peace! Now, the unheard miracle of our national restitution has been heard and becomes a reality! Now, after five hard and most adverse centuries of slavery, the rose finger of freedom, the eye and soul, the one and undivided Greek soul, which has regained its moral courage, has shone to its greatest extent with respect to the fatherland issues in the East and is heading at full speed toward the great and general command of its wonderful Political Leader, towards its final fate! 324

Archbishop of Brussa Dorotheos, locum tenens of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 15 August 1920

Dorotheos’ utterances encapsulate the political and national identification of the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Venizelos and Greek irredentist expansionism. This chapter traces the development of that identification and accounts for the devotion to the Greek statesman. It will be argued that Venizelos falls into the modern cult of great men; for the unredeemed Greeks, he was the man to realize ‘Greater Greece’ or as Mazower points out, a ‘messiah in the service of the nation’. 325 To borrow Smith’s words, he represented the ‘vessel of the community’s creativity. […] Above all, he [was] part of, or closely related to, the golden age. He [was] its exemplification’. 326 Throughout this period Venizelos inspires and offers direction to the lay and religious leadership of the Greek Orthodox community in Constantinople. He becomes the Archigos, the Leader of the Nation.

Emphasis will be given to the endeavour of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the lay leadership of the community to promote the unification of Constantinople with Greece. Their actions can be divided into two major stages: The return of the nationalists to power and their effort to sever the community’s ties with the Ottoman establishment and manifest their desire for union; and the politicization of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, expressed by their support for Venizelos in his dispute with King Constantine and the anti-Venizelists. The term ‘nationalists’ refers to the

324 Ekklisiastiki Alithia (29 August 1920); See Appendix 1.
elite that had ethnocentric political orientations and made claims on the basis of the community’s Greek ethnic identity. The development of these two stages will be examined in an attempt to explain how and why Constantinople became the centre of Venizelist opposition to royalist Athens.
The return of the nationalists (1918 – 1920)

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in autumn 1918 and the impending signing of an armistice provoked an effort on behalf of the nationalist circles within the community’s leadership to overthrow Patriarch Germanos V. The decision was taken in September 1918 during a meeting at the house of Solon Kazanovas with the participation of the Metropolitans of Amasya, Germanos, and Ainou, Ioakim, as well as the laymen, Stefanos Karatheodoris and Avrilios Spatharis.\textsuperscript{327} These individuals belonged to the Nationalist/Ioakimist faction.\textsuperscript{328} The former Metropolitan of Kaisarea Amvrosios was entrusted with the preparation for the removal of the patriarch. He contacted the bishops residing in Constantinople and the six Metropolitans who had been dismissed from the Holy Synod by Germanos in 1917.\textsuperscript{329} After several meetings at the house of the Metropolitan of Smyrna Chrysostomos, who was exiled to Constantinople at the time\textsuperscript{330}, they decided to force Germanos to resign by publicly discrediting him as incapable and corrupt.\textsuperscript{331} A campaign against Germanos for financial scandals, initiated by Konstantinos Spanoudis’ newspaper \textit{Proodos} in 1917, had already damaged his reputation.\textsuperscript{332} Whether these accusations were true is hard to verify. On the one hand, Spanoudis was a nationalist and an ardent supporter of Ioakim III. He was definitely hostile and biased against Germanos, the principal representative of the anti-Ioakimist faction, and had participated in 1914 in the first attempt to remove him from power.\textsuperscript{333} On the other hand, Emmanouilidis claims that after the signing of the armistice Germanos

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{327} Mavropoulos 1960: 90-1. \\
\textsuperscript{328} Ainou Ioakim, Kazanovas and Spatharis were former members of the SC. Furthermore, Kazanovas and Karatheodoris were councilors of the PNMC under Patriarch Ioakim III, Germanos V’s main opponent. See Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 223-4, 228; Mavropoulos 1960: 64. \\
\textsuperscript{329} These Metropolitans had been dismissed from the Holy Synod, because they had criticised Germanos for his passive attitude towards the Unionists with regards to the persecutions of the Greek Orthodox population and had protested against the appointment of a Patriarchal Commissioner in 1916. See Mavropoulos 1960: 86-7, 89-90. \\
\textsuperscript{330} Chrysostomos had been relieved of his duties and exiled in Constantinople by the government during the war, because his activities for the protection of the Greek Orthodox population in Asia Minor were considered subversive by the Turkish authorities. See Emmanouilidis 1924: 299. \\
\textsuperscript{331} Mavropoulos 1960: 90-1. \\
\textsuperscript{332} Emmanouilidis 1924: 297; Alexandris 1992: 55. \\
\textsuperscript{333} Spanoudis was a former member of the SC. He had also written a book on Ioakim III. See Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 228; Vovolinis 1961: 464; Spanoudis 1902.
\end{flushright}
was charged for abuse of authority by a Turkish prosecutor. Either way, this campaign, combined with the public discontent regarding Germanos’ passive policy during the war, paved the way for a movement against him.

Unable to withstand the pressure, the patriarch officially stepped down on 12 October 1918 and the archbishop of Bursa Dorotheos Mammelis was elected locum tenens of the patriarchal throne. After Dorotheos’ election the return of the nationalists to power was thorough and rapid. Two members of the Holy Synod and all the National Councillors of the PNMC were replaced by people who supported the Greek national idea. Almost all of them had been Ioakimists, had served in the PNMC under Ioakim III and were also former members of the SC. In addition, all the clerics who had been dismissed under Germanos’ patriarchate were reinstated and promoted to higher posts. After almost six years in opposition the elite who promoted Greek irredentism within the Greek Orthodox community had returned to power.

According to Dimitrios Mavropoulos, a few days before the signing of the armistice, a secret meeting took place in Constantinople between a British military official, Dorotheos, Metropolitan of Philadelphia Chrysostomos and Kazanovas. The British officer stressed the importance of the point that during the armistice, the Greek population should remain calm and not provoke the Turks by openly demonstrating their national feelings. He also advised them not to disrupt their relations with the Turkish government, because the armistice was not a guarantee for the future. Despite these warnings, the leadership of the community did not show any sign of moderation, because the new political context provided the conditions for the implementation of a full-scale nationalist programme. Realizing that the empire was collapsing, they grasped the opportunity to fulfil their national aspirations and became determined to sever the community’s ties with the Ottoman past and openly express their alignment with Greece. Venizelos’ successful policy during World War

---

I provided the nationalists with the confidence that ‘national redemption’ was now feasible.

The Patriarchate had no other choice, but to endorse the ideas of the laymen and support Greek irredentism. The dissolution of the empire meant that its authority of over the Greek Orthodox could not be legitimized any longer by its incorporation into the Ottoman establishment. At the same time, the upper class, the Patriarchate’s only ally at keeping the middle class at bay, had also lost their political power emanating from their position in the Ottoman administration system. As a result, the Patriarchate approached the only political entity that allowed it to retain its power over its flock and legitimize its position as the authority of the Ottoman Greeks, the Greek state.\(^{338}\)

The authority of the Church was also threatened by the lay leadership that had identified itself with the whole community and claimed to represent the interests of the people.\(^{339}\) Therefore, as Anagnostopoulou points out, the adoption of the *Megali Idea* ‘brought to the surface the futile effort of a traditional establishment, the Patriarchate, to understand and adapt to its own logic regarding power, the modern logic about power of the lay element of Constantinople and of the Greek state’.\(^{340}\)

From this point on the Patriarchate entered the political fray as a faction supporting Greek nationalism. To borrow Smith’s words, ‘religion now had become an outgrowth, even a manifestation, of the national spirit and genius’.\(^{341}\) As a result, on 15 November 1918 a patriarchal encyclical was issued announcing the elections for new communal councils in an effort to completely replace the old establishment with one that would champion Venizelos’ policy.\(^{342}\)

The popular masses seemed also ready for a change. Alienated by the nationalizing measures of the Young Turks and disillusioned by the passive policies of the previous religious and lay leadership,-the Anti-Ioakimist/Anti-national faction-, they identified with Venizelos and his policy.\(^{343}\) As a result, they immediately showed their affiliation with the representatives of the Greek state. When the Allied fleet

\(^{338}\) Anagnostopoulou 2007: 382, 387, 393, 396.
\(^{340}\) Anagnostopoulou 2007: 400.
\(^{341}\) Smith 1988: 159.
\(^{342}\) Anthemion, H1-20: Patriarchal encyclical (15 November 1918).
\(^{343}\) Emmanouilidis 1924: 283-4; Papadopoulos 1978: 82.
entered the Bosphorus on 13 November 1918 they welcomed them as liberators. The presence of the Greek battleship *Averoff* was received with enthusiasm and people greeted each other with the blessing ‘Christ has risen’ (Χριστός Ανέστη). Approximately 5,000 Rums visited *Averoff* during its first fortnight in Constantinople and the Greek Naval Commander Commodore Georgios Kakoulidis, his political counsellor Ioannis Alexandropoulos and the Greek sailors were treated as saviours.\(^ {344}\)

The Constantinopolitan Greek intelligentsia supported and reinforced Greek national feeling in the capital. Omiros Bekes’ poem ‘The Evzones’ (‘Οι Εύζωνες’)\(^ {345}\) is a clear manifestation of the effort of the intellectuals to promote Greek nationalist ideology through the dissemination of the constructed stereotypes of Greek race and history:\(^ {346}\)

Rum most brave bereaved birth, I salute you!
Your walk beguiles my mind
And from your marble shed bodies
the mountain breeze reaches me wavy and fresh.

The fire of the Greek sky was coupled inside you
Like something from the Spartan courage,
Like something from the religious Byzantine soul,
And like something from the inexhaustible breath of Twenty One.

Would you like the sound of flute? Would you like a slow paean?
Would you like the sound of a monastery bell?
Whatever my verse will say, it will be poor, dead,

Because your shoe has the feathers of fame,
Because as if in every angle of your fustanellas’ crease
Glory has placed a lasting light.

The repetition of Greek national ideology, and especially Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos’ conception of historical continuity, would continue throughout this period via newspaper articles, speeches, announcements and public demonstrations.

\(^ {344}\) Emmanouilidis 1924: 332; Alexandris 1992: 57.

\(^ {345}\) *Logos*, Year 1- No1, November 1918; See Appendix 1. Bekes was a Constantinopolitan Greek professor of Greek and French literature and a poet; Mamoni 2001: 223.

\(^ {346}\) See Breuilly in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 111.
The aim was to influence the larger masses of the population and solidify their support for the Greek nationalist movement.347

Meanwhile, the Greek deputies in the Ottoman parliament formed in 1914 had begun to demand the punishment of those who had committed crimes against the Greek population during the war.348 In early November 1918, the CUP was dissolved and formed again as the Renovation Party (Teccediü Fırkasi).349 The presence of the party’s members in high posts in the cabinet and parliament provoked the reaction of the Greek deputies. On 4 November 1918, they presented a memorandum (takrir) detailing the atrocities of the Young Turks against the Greeks and the Armenians, denounced the CUP’s reform programme, and enquired about the new government’s intentions regarding the prevention of similar events in the future.350 On 11 November 1918, the Grand Vizier Izzet Pasha resigned under pressure from the Sultan, who wanted him to remove members of the former CUP from the government. He was replaced by the old diplomat Ahmet Tevfik Pasha, who formed an anti-Unionist cabinet.351 The latter’s initial attitude towards the Ottoman Greeks was positive.352 However, their gestures of good-will did not seem to placate the leadership of the Rums. The unenthusiastic response of the deputy for Aidin Emmanouil Emmanouilidis to the policy speech of Tevfik Pasha on 18 November 1918 was a clear manifestation of the impact of nationalism on Ottoman politics: 353

It made us sad that the government did not mention the rights of the nationalities. [...] The principle of nationalities has already won. [...] The term ‘communal rights’ is a relic of the years of absolutism and it is impossible to be satisfied with these kinds of things.

Similarly, during the discussion regarding the granting of amnesty for crimes committed throughout the war, the Greek deputies demanded the punishment of those responsible for the persecutions against the Greeks and the Armenians.354

---

347 Ibid.
348 Emmanouilidis 1924: 327, 376-7.
353 Emmanouilidis 1924: 383; See Appendix 1.
These, combined with President Wilson’s point XII, had shattered the social web of the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman society.

The political instability of the country culminated in a serious disagreement between the Liberal government and the Renovation Party that resulted in the dissolution of parliament on 18 December 1918. Immediately afterwards, an anti-Unionist campaign began. Under these circumstances, the Liberal Turks approached the Greeks in January 1919 in an attempt to reach some kind of political understanding. However, the communal leadership rejected every offer for Greek-Turkish cooperation. The reason behind their reluctance was that since late December 1918 the PNMC had sent an encyclical to all the parishes advising Ottoman Greeks to abstain from municipal elections and resign from any positions they held in the Ottoman establishment. This course of action was also promoted by the official Greek state.

Breaking ties with the Ottoman establishment served Venizelos’ policy on Constantinople. In his *Greece Before the Peace Congress*, a memorandum on Greek claims that he composed in December 1918 after a request from US President Woodrow Wilson, he maintained that according to Wilson’s point XII Constantinople could not remain under Ottoman control. On the contrary he asserted that the ‘natural solution’ would be for it to become part of Greece. However, because of the international significance of the Straits, Constantinople should become an international state including the Straits and a sufficient hinterland. This state should be placed under the protection of the soon to be established LoN, with its administration in the hands of a governor appointed by the latter. Venizelos presented Constantinople as a Greek city completely omitting its Ottoman past. He referred to

---

355 Point XII stipulated that ‘the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees’; Howard 1931: 202, Petsalis-Diomidis 1978: 57-8.
356 Emmanouilidis 1924: 333.
357 Zürcher 1998: 143.
359 Venizelos 1919; Petsalis-Diomidis 1978: 115-6, 123-4; Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 71-2; Alexandris 1992: 52. On 26 February 1919, the Armenians submitted a similar memorandum to the Peace Conference in an effort to promote their own claims. See: Armenian National Union of America 1919.
Constantinople as the capital of the Greek Empire, a flourishing Greek colony, the seat of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate. Similarly he refused to acknowledge the importance of the Turkish element. Although he admitted the Muslims were a numerically larger group, he did not include them in the native population of the city. This way he implied that they were not entitled to have any claim over the city. On the contrary, the Greeks were the principal element, numerically, financially and culturally superior compared to all the other nationalities. On 3 and 4 February 1919 Venizelos presented in detail the official Greek claims before the Supreme Council, where he pointed out once again that Constantinople was ‘in reality a Greek town’.

It could be argued that Venizelos was aiming to secure a special status for the Greek population in the future state. This would allow Constantinople to become part of Greece at a later stage. Thus, he advised the leadership of the Rum milleti not only to request union with Greece, but at the same time to co-operate with the other non-Muslim communities, an action that would only benefit the Greek cause. The Rums should sever their ties with the Porte, but not ignore the Muslim population. The latter should be dealt with in a way that would allow them to accept the idea of a Greek occupation. Finally, the Ecumenical Patriarchate should only recognize the authority of the Ottoman government de facto.

The Constantinopolitan Greeks, following Venizelos’ advice, approached the Armenians in an attempt to establish some form of cooperation between the two communities. In January 1919 a joint conference was held at the island of Prinkipos (Büyükada) for this purpose. Similar activities continued to take place both in Constantinople and in London, where a Greek-Armenian Committee operated. On several occasions the leaderships of the Rums and the Armenians would demonstrate this solidarity and form a common front when the two communities were in danger. On the other hand, the Jewish leadership retained its policy of caution, even after the

---

360 Venizelos 1919: 19.
resignation of Chief Rabbi Hayim Nahum in March 1920 and the ascendancy of the Zionists to power.\textsuperscript{364}

At the same time the Patriarchate, consistent in its policy of breaking its ties with the Ottoman establishment, proceeded to take radical decisions regarding the education of the community. According to a patriarchal encyclical sent to the Central Church Board of Stavrodromi (Κεντρική Εφορεία Σταυροδρομίου, CCBS) on 28 January 1919,\textsuperscript{365}

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] The Turkish language course is removed from the programme of our schools and its teaching is abolished […].
\item[c.] The teaching of Ottoman History and Geography, both in Turkish or Greek, is abolished and will be replaced by the instruction of General History and Geography.
\item[d.] All the regulations imposed on our education such as hanging signboards in Turkish and using Greek-Turkish seals, headings, degrees, schools reports and documents are abolished. Any correspondence of the administrative boards [of the schools] with authorities foreign to the Patriarchate is forbidden. The use of the Greek language will be restored in all the Greek schools under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
\end{itemize}

The only person against this decision was the president of the PNMC, Metropolitan of Chalkidona Gregorios, who argued that the Patriarchate should follow a less provocative approach and not fall out of favour with the Turkish authorities. The two bodies not only rejected Gregorios’ objections, but demanded his removal from the PNMC from Dorotheos. Dorotheos accepted their request and asked Gregorios to resign from the Holy Synod as well.\textsuperscript{366} The nationalist feeling and the determination of the new leadership was so great that every dissenting voice was to be immediately silenced.

At the same time Dorotheos expressed to the Greek High Commissioner Kanellopoulos his wish to go to Paris and promote the claims of the unredeemed Greeks at the Peace Conference. The latter passed on Dorotheos’ request to Venizelos, who did not approve it. His argument was that the presence of a patriarchal delegation (Πατριαρχική Αποστολή) at the conference was unnecessary,

\begin{thebibliography}
\bibitem{364} Rozen 2005: 127-130.
\bibitem{365} Anthemion, H1-20
\bibitem{366} Mavropoulos 1960: 127.
\end{thebibliography}
because the Greek government was the only responsible authority dealing with this matter. However, after the insistence of Dorotheos and the two bodies, the PNMC and the Holy Synod, Venizelos finally consented to the dispatch of a patriarchal delegation composed of Dorotheos, the Metropolitan of Trebizond Chrysanthos Philippidis and the PNMC member Pappas. It was obvious that Athens wanted to handle the issue of the unredeemed Greeks without the interference of the Phanar. After their arrival in Paris, the patriarchal representatives met with members of the French, British, American and Greek delegations. According to Dorotheos, their purpose was ‘to draw the attention of the Peace Conference to the suffering inflicted by the Turks on the Greek population of the Turkish Empire […] and to ask the Peace Conference to assign Constantinople to its 450,000 Greek inhabitants’. The delegation also began cooperating with the representatives of the Central Committee of the Unredeemed Greeks (Κεντρική Επιτροπή των Αλυτρώτων Ελλήνων, CCUG), an organization established in Greece and dedicated to the promotion of Greek national aspirations.

Back in the city itself the Greek High Commission began to play a more active role in the decision-making process of the community. First of all it managed to dismiss Charalambidis from the newly elected PNMC. The reason was that he resisted the High Commission’s efforts to place the communal institutions under the control of the Greek government and had a more moderate approach regarding the policy of the community. The High Commission also suggested holding massive public meetings in the different communities in order to express the request of the Constantinopolitan Greeks for unification with Greece. During a preliminary meeting of the communal authorities, former councillor Charalambidis objected to this proposal arguing that such an action would ridicule the unredeemed Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In addition, the feelings of the Ottoman Greeks were already known to the Allies; therefore, these demonstrations would not express anything new.

---

368 Cited in Alexandris 1992: 60.
369 The CCUG established a network of official branches both within the Ottoman Empire and in Europe and cooperated with the GMFA. See Alexandris 1992: 56; President of the Paris committee was the former senator in the Ottoman parliament and supporter of the Liberals, Vasilios Gkikas-Mousourou. Members were the Venizelists Konstantinos Spanoudis, Tomazos Sgourdaios, Gregorios Triantafyllidis, Stelios Seferiadis, N. Kyriakidis, and M. Mataragkas. See Mavropoulos 1960: 110.
Charalambidis replied to Kanellopoulos’ insistence that it was more important to safeguard, and if possible strengthen, the privileges of the Patriarchate at this stage.\footnote{Mavropoulos 1960: 125-6.} The whole event demonstrates that even within the nationalists different stances existed. Charalambidis belonged to the group that wanted the Patriarchate to retain its leading role over the unredeemed Greeks and not submit its powers to Athens.

However, the majority of the millet’s leadership had a different opinion. As a result, on 16 March 1919 the Constantinopolitan Greeks gathered in the churches and pledged their loyalty to Greece. According to the official resolution for ‘Union with Greece’:\footnote{Cited in Alexandris 1992: 56-7.}

The Greeks of Constantinople and the neighbourhood [… ] proclaimed their unshakeable wish to obtain complete national reestablishment. They regard Union with the mother country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future […] and entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme national authority, with the task of transmitting the present resolution to the representatives of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Greece at the Peace Conference.

This was an expression of the legitimacy of their goals towards the Ottoman state (complete national reestablishment), towards Greece (Union with the mother country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future) and towards powerful external agents (Britain, France, the United States and Italy).\footnote{See Breuilly 1996: 166-7.} The same day the Patriarchate officially broke off any direct communication and cooperation with the Porte. Constantinopolitan Greeks were requested to abstain from participating in Ottoman elections, abolish Turkish teaching in their schools and resign from their positions in the Ottoman administration. The Greek flag was raised in the Patriarchate and in several houses in the Greek neighbourhoods, and a huge picture of Venizelos was erected in Taksim square.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 56-60; Mansel 1997: 385.} At this point, the nationalist movement in Constantinople entered a new phase and its goal became unification (\textit{enosis}) with Greece.\footnote{See Breuilly in Özkırımlı 2000: 108.}
To the warnings of Admiral Richard Webb, acting British High Commissioner, in March 1919 regarding the dangers of these ‘overenthusiastic’ demonstrations, the patriarchal council denied any involvement in organizing them. They claimed that these public meetings were a spontaneous reaction of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, who wanted to express their national aspirations to the representatives of the powers at the Paris Peace Conference. In this way they sought to invalidate the latter’s argument that the population was passive and content with the present situation.  

Still, it could not escape anyone’s attention that this was a coordinated operation organized by the leadership of the community. On 20 March 1919, just four days after these demonstrations in Constantinople, the patriarchal delegation submitted an official memorandum with their claims to the conference. A month later, the patriarchal printing house published a volume on the suffering of Hellenism in Turkey during the Great War entitled *Mavri Vivlos* (The Black Bible). On 30 April 1919, the Greek deputies in parliament submitted to the Allied commissions and General d’Espéry a memorandum declaring ‘the firm desire of the Greek people to unite with the motherland, the Greek state’. However, when the prospect for the acquisition of Constantinople appeared in May 1919, it was Venizelos, out of all people, who rejected it.

By the end of March 1919, the discussions between British and American experts regarding a US mandate had reached a deadlock. As a result, Arnold Toynbee and Harold Nicolson, the two British experts, proposed to give Constantinople, the European shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmara to Greece, which would abandon its claims on Smyrna. When on 2 May Venizelos was told by Nicolson about the British scheme he was not pleased and claimed that he was ‘the only Greek on earth able to refuse Constantinople’. On every possible occasion, he had pointed out that Constantinople was Greek, but he supported its internationalization together with the Straits. Venizelos had made claims on Western Asia Minor and Thrace,

---

375 Alexandris 1992: 59, 64.  
376 Both General Franchet d’Espéry, supreme commander of the Allied forces, and Kanellopoulos had advised the Constantinopolitan Greeks to show self-restraint; Alexandris 1992: 64.  
378 Mavri Vivlos 1919.  
379 Emmanouilidis 1924: 393-401.
because he believed that the presence of Greece in these areas would allow Constantinople to become Greek at a later stage. An artificial international state of Constantinople with a strong Greek character, both culturally and demographically, and surrounded by predominantly Greek areas, would not be able to withstand the pressure and would eventually become Greek. For this reason he had entered into secret negotiations with Basri Bey, an Old Turk and former deputy in the Ottoman parliament, who supported Greek-Turkish cooperation. On 20 March 1919, he had stated to Venizelos that he would use his connections with the sultan and the people close to him to promote this idea. He believed that even a Greek mandate for the city could be accepted. At a later meeting he accepted Venizelos’ terms for an official Ottoman declaration or an imperial iradé recognizing Greeks claims in Asia Minor and Thrace and the concession of extensive administrative powers to the Ottoman Greeks. In return he asked Venizelos to support the Turkish claims at the Conference and the neutralization of the Straits. Furthermore, the sultan should be allowed to remain in Constantinople. Venizelos consented to these demands and provided him with a personal letter of recommendation addressed to Kanellopoulos.380

It could be argued that Venizelos was trying to keep his options open. If Constantinople and the Straits were to become an international state his initial plan could be realized. If on the other hand the city became Turkish, Basri’s proposal for a Greek-Turkish cooperation would allow the Ottoman Greeks to become politically stronger and assume control of the city from within, an idea initially put forward by the SC. Yet, the Toynbee-Nicolson proposal left him with no option – or at least, with one he was not willing to consider: the loss of Asia Minor. Therefore, when the Allies decided to send the Greeks to Smyrna on 6 May 1919, Venizelos grasped the opportunity ‘as readily as a duck will swim’.381 Petsalis-Diomidis argues that not considering the option of Constantinople ‘may well have been one of his most tragic mistakes’.382 Nevertheless, Venizelos’ decision should be seen in the context of his policy of maximal gains, which was the creation of a Greater Greece, extending over

381 Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 77-81; Churchill 1944: 366.
two continents and five seas.\textsuperscript{383} Naturally, the Allied decision to dispatch Greek troops to Asia Minor brought the negotiations with Basri Bey to an end.\textsuperscript{384}

The Greek landing at Smyrna on 15 May 1919 gave the final blow to the relations between the Rums and the Ottoman establishment, because it enhanced the awakening of Turkish nationalism and the desire to resist to the dismemberment of the Empire. Mustapha Kemal used the occupation of Smyrna as a means to rouse the national feeling of the Turkish people and gain popular support for organizing a national resistance movement.\textsuperscript{385} While in Constantinople the Turkish population was holding mass public meetings to protest against the Greek landing, the Patriarchate was sending an official letter of gratitude to the High Commissioners and Dorotheos was praising the Greek Prime Minister during the Te Deum in the patriarchal temple.\textsuperscript{386} There is no doubt that the leadership of the community was fully devoted to Venizelos and his expansionism, a policy that entailed serious dangers. The reason was that the Patriarchate and the PNMC openly compromised the position of the whole \textit{Rum milleti} towards the Turkish government and people. In June 1919, Admiral Webb provided a grim description of the situation:\textsuperscript{387}

> What I was going to write about was the increase of friction out here between Greeks and Turks. […] Every day makes the situation more difficult and dangerous, and every day adds to the degree of hate, now extremely intense, which exists in this country between Moslems and Christians.

The rapid growth of the nationalist movement became evident when Ali Riza Pasha replaced Grand Vizier Damad Ferid in October 1919 and formed a pro-nationalist cabinet. Ali Riza allowed the praise of Kemal and the nationalists’ achievements in the press and pursued a strict policy towards the non-Muslims in the capital. Greek flags hanging from various buildings were pulled down by the Turkish police and a campaign against the Constantinopolitan Greeks and Armenians got under way. Nationalist pamphlets urged the Muslim population to boycott the commercial interests of Christians, while Muslim clerics exhorted their believers to resist the

\textsuperscript{383} Alexandris 1992: 54; 
\textsuperscript{385} Mango 2004: 220-33. 
\textsuperscript{386} Alexandris 1992: 60; Mango 2004: 223; Mavropoulos 1960: 120-1. 
\textsuperscript{387} DBFP 1952, #433: Webb to Graham (28 June 1919).
occupation of the country. On 17 October 1919 Dorotheos and the Armenian patriarch, responding to these actions, represented to the British High Commissioner ‘in the strongest terms the danger of the situation created for the Christian population of Turkey by the triumph of the national movement [and] recent change of government which they regard as nothing more nor less than the return to power of the Committee of Union and Progress’. They also added that they would resign their posts and leave the Allies to safeguard the interests of their flocks.

Despite the new measures taken by the Ali Riza administration, the Greek population continued to express publicly their national feelings and their support for Venizelos. The Prime Minister’s name-day, on 15 December, was celebrated as a national holiday. Services were held in the churches praising the Greek statesman and praying for him to have health and strength for his work. The Patriarchate, worried by the latest achievements of the Turkish nationalists, issued warnings for avoiding rallies and cheering after the services. However, after a whole year of instigating public national sentiment, the people could not be restrained. The journalist Stefanos Papadopoulos recalled a demonstration that began at the Church of the Holy Trinity in Stavrodromi. The crowd was singing in favour of Venizelos and at the head of the demonstration a senior clerk of the community of Stavrodromi was waving the Greek flag. In a state of enthusiasm, several of the participants were shredding their Ottoman identification cards (nufus) into pieces, for ‘such was their belief that the City would become part of Greece’. Nationalist fervour was running so high that a month later the Patriarchate was forced to officially forbid hanging flags in the churches.

At the same time, Venizelos visited London and held meetings with several members of the British government in an effort to promote the Greek claims in Turkey, including the internationalization of Constantinople. During his discussion with Curzon in late October 1919, he argued that since none of the Great Powers was

---

389 DBFP 1952, #552: de Robeck to Curzon (19 October 1919).
390 Anthemion, H1-20: Patriarchal encyclical (14 December 1919).
392 Anthemion, H1-20: Patriarchal encyclical (18 January 1920).
willing to take a mandate for the city, an international administration with a High Commissioner under the LoN should be established. The British minister though understood Venizelos’ real intentions:

I could not stop thinking that, in the long argument which he developed on these lines, the Greek Prime Minister had in view, more than anything else, a hope for the expansion of his own people. British, French or Russians in Constantinople might close the door forever to the ambitions of Greece, but it might be that, at some future date, an international administration (always a difficult thing to maintain) would be glad to hand over the reins of power to those who would be the numerical majority both in the city and in its neighbourhood. This idea was not expressed, but M. Venizelos is so ardent a patriot and so far-sighted a politician that I could not but feel sure that it lurked in his mind, even if it did not find expression on his lips.\(^{394}\)

Finally, after long negotiations the Allies decided on 12 February 1920 to allow the Turks to retain Constantinople and place the Straits under international control.\(^{395}\) Two days later, Dorotheos addressed a memorandum to Lloyd George arguing that the city was not truly Turkish in origin, culture or population. Furthermore, it was not sacred for Islam as it was for the Greeks. In true nationalist fashion he went on to declare that:\(^{396}\)

The ideal of the Greek nation will not be realised so long as Constantinople is not united with Greece by a strong tie […] We therefore ask for the union of Constantinople with the mother country, and we propose this arrangement, together with the internationalization of the Straits, as the best solution, because it guarantees the right of self-determination and the interests of the Powers concerned. If, for reasons which we can appreciate, this solution appears to be of too radical a nature, we should propose that Greece should receive a mandate to govern the State of Constantinople.

At the meeting of the Supreme Council on 16 February 1920, Lloyd George announced to Venizelos that the Allies had ‘provisionally agreed’ to place the Straits under their control and allow the Turks to remain in Constantinople. Despite the provisional character of the Council’s decision, Venizelos did not challenge it. On the contrary, he used it as a negotiating card to claim a larger territory in Thrace. He was

\(^{394}\) DBFP 1952, #558: Curzon to Granville (21 October 1919).
\(^{395}\) Macfie 1975: 393-9; Montgomery 1972: 778, 780.
\(^{396}\) DBFP 1958, #70.
also offered the opportunity to state once again the Greek case on Smyrna. In other words, Venizelos remained focused on his plan, which did not count the acquisition of Constantinople as one of its priorities. Lloyd George, who presided over the conference, strongly supported the claims of his close ally and managed to secure for Greece an extended area in Asia Minor under Greek administration and the annexation of Eastern Thrace up to the Chatalja lines. At the same time, he publicly declared his government’s desire to protect the non-Muslims of the Empire. He also entrusted the British Secretary of State for War and Air Winston Churchill with the task of asking Venizelos whether Greece was willing to use military means to enforce the terms of the treaty regarding Thrace and Asia Minor. Venizelos replied on 6 March 1920 that Greece had both the will and the power to undertake the necessary military operations.

British fears were justified, because the Turkish nationalist movement seemed to grow stronger as time went by. In Constantinople the British had the minister of War and the chief of the General Staff removed, when they realized that the government was not persecuting the nationalists. Still, these measures proved unsuccessful. On 17 February members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies endorsed the National Pact, a manifestation of open support for the Turkish nationalists. At the same time the Kemalist forces inflicted a severe blow on General Gouraud’s French troops in Cilicia, while some thousands of Armenians were killed in Marash. The Allies responded immediately. On 3 March Ali Riza was forced to resign, because of his refusal to arrest the nationalists in Constantinople and officially condemn Kemal and his collaborators. On 15 March army officers and civil servants were arrested in Constantinople and the following day the Allies took over control of the city. Finally, on 18 March, parliament was dissolved.

When Kemal was informed about these actions he released an official statement:

397 DBFP 1958, #8: British Secretary’s notes of an Allied Conference (February 1920).
398 Montgomery 1972: 784.
401 The National Pact (Misaki Milli) was the body of principles proclaimed in the summer of 1919 by the Turkish nationalists for the preservation of the territorial integrity of their country and the protection of the sultanate and the caliphate. For more details see Shaw & Shaw 1997: 344-7.
This last blow, which has just been directed against the sovereignty and political freedom of the Ottoman nation, strikes – still more than at the Ottomans who are resolved to defend their lives and their independence at all costs – at the principles that have been regarded by humanity and civilization of the 20th century as sacred, such as the sense of freedom, of nationality and of country [...] As for ourselves, we are imbued with the sacred character of the struggle we have entered upon for the defence of our rights and independence, and we are convinced that there is no power on earth that can deprive a nation of its right of existence.\textsuperscript{403}

Kemal used the events in Constantinople as a means to gain more support for the nationalist movement and strengthen his position in Turkish politics. On 19 March the Grand National Assembly (\textit{Büyük Millet Meclisi}, GNA) was established in Ankara and on 23 April he was elected president of the GNA, while Ismet Inonü became Chief of Staff. In mid-June 1920 the Turkish nationalist forces attacked the British troops stationed at Ismid and for the first time threatened the Allies at the Straits. Action needed to be taken and Venizelos seized the opportunity at the conference of Hythe to reassure Lloyd George that Greece had the necessary forces to deal with the nationalists. As a result, the latter and his new French counterpart Alexandre Millerand approved a clearing operation against the forces of Kemal.\textsuperscript{404} In late June 1920 the Greek army took the offensive in an effort to crush Kemal’s movement.

In Constantinople, the Venizelist National Association of Constantinople (Εθνικός Σύνδεσμος Κωνσταντινούπολες, NAC)\textsuperscript{405} took the initiative to compose a resolution in an attempt to show the support of the Constantinopolitan Greeks to Venizelos and the Greek Army. The resolution was also meant to be a criticism on the actions of the opposition in Athens. The Greek population responded with enthusiasm to the NAC’s initiative,\textsuperscript{406} as 117 associations and church committees (εφοροεπιτροπές) signed the following:\textsuperscript{407}

\textsuperscript{403} Kemal 1929: 360.
\textsuperscript{404} Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 123-5; Howard 1931: 259.
\textsuperscript{405} The NAC was established in 1919, with Georgios Sotropas as president and Nikolaos Makridis, Kyriakos Gkiokas and Stefanos Narlis, all former members of the SC, as board members; Chronos (11/24 June 1920, 22 July/04 August 1920); Souliotis-Nikolaides 1984: 221, 226, 228; GMFA 1922, 92/2: Greek High Commission to MFA (09 October 1921).
\textsuperscript{406} Chronos (3/16 June 1920, 10/23 June 1920).
\textsuperscript{407} Chronos (15/28 June 1920); See Appendix 1.
The National Societies of Constantinople representing the people of the most Greek Queen City [Βασιλίδος] have gathered and voted unanimously: they express their infinite joy at the great national achievements and their profound gratitude, accompanied by their deepest respect for Eleftherios Venizelos, the glorious architect of these unparalleled triumphs. […] The people, astonished at the insensitivity of the Opposition of 16 towards him, the admirable paradigm of eternal national aspirations, and their ongoing impious plots during these unique events in the contemporary history of Hellenism, denounce with the utmost anger the anti-national position of these uncaring and heartless offspring of mother Greece and of the entire [Greek] Race, a Race that has been challenged in an unheard of manner for centuries, but never had been deprived of its glowing patriotism.

On 27 June 1920 a massive celebration was held at the gardens of Taksim in Constantinople to honour the victories of the Greek army in the presence of Kanellopoulos, Katechakis, Dorotheos and the lay leadership of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Greek and allied flags were hoisted everywhere. Pictures and busts of Venizelos, Athanasios Diakos and Ioannis Kapodistrias were bought by rich Ottoman Greeks, who donated them to the GLAC and the Greek military mission. Groups dressed as Evzones, Souliotes and ancient Greeks danced Greek traditional dances. The British brass-band played the Greek national anthem to a burst of applause from the crowd, while the brass-band of the Greek battleship Kilkis responded by playing the British national anthem. A movie of Venizelos’ glorious reception upon his return to Athens was shown to the enthusiastic audience and boyscouts bearing torches paraded in the gardens. At the end, Venizelos’ picture surrounded by pictures of a Red Cross nurse and an Evzone were raised among fireworks. The celebrations and the employment of Greek national symbols was one more public manifestation of Greek national sentiment.408 In Hroch’s terminology, the national movement in Constantinople had completed Phase B.409 The Megali Idea was no longer an abstract idea discussed only among the intellectual circles of Constantinople, as Ubicini had noted approximately 70 years ago, but a popular political ideology.410 The effort of the nationalists to gain popular support for Greek nationalism that had started in the period 1908-1912 was finally paying off. In other

---

408 Chronos (15/28 June 1920).
410 See Breuilly in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 111.
words, the Rums had severed their bonds with their Ottoman past and had become Greeks. For them, these were not victories of the Allies, but victories of Hellenism. At the same time, Venizelos was treated as a cult figure and was raised to the Pantheon of Greek heroes, next to Diakos and Kapodistrias. He exemplified all the national virtues and achievements of the nation. He was the embodiment of the Megali Idea or, as Chronos described him, ‘the demigod Leader of the Race (Φυλής)’. 411

The Patriarchate though soon realized that extreme pro-Greek manifestations jeopardized the position of its flock, since there was no guarantee for their safety until the treaty with Turkey was finally signed and even beyond that. Therefore, on 23 June/6 July 1920 it issued an encyclical advising people to show self-restraint and avoid extreme demonstrations that could be perceived as provocative by the Turks. This was a ‘demand both ecclesiastical and political’. 412 However, the successive victories of the Greek forces throughout July made the enthusiasm of the Greeks even greater. 413 Both the NAC and the CCBS sent congratulatory letters to Lieutenant-General Leonidas Paraskevopoulos, Commander in Chief of the Greek army, as an expression of their appreciation. 414 A similar letter was communicated to Venizelos by Kanellopoulos on behalf of the Greek High Commission and the Greek people of Constantinople. 415

With the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920, 416 Greater Greece was becoming a reality. Despite the fact that Constantinople would not become part of the Greek kingdom, the civic and cultural rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox population of the city were guaranteed and placed under

---

411 Chronos (15/28 June 1920).
412 Anthemion, H1-20: Patriarchal encyclical.
413 For the military operations see Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 126-8; Shaw & Shaw 1997: 357-8; IEE 1978: 130-1.
414 Chronos (14/27 July 1920); Anthemion, M1-27: Greek High Commission to Central Church Committee of Stavrodromi (28 July 1920).
415 Chronos (25 July/07 August 1920).
416 Turkey ceded to Greece Eastern Thrace, the islands of the Eastern Aegean, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The city of Smyrna and its hinterland were to remain under Greek administration for a period of five years. When this period elapsed, a local parliament would ask by a majority of votes the Council of the LoN for the definitive incorporation of Smyrna into the Kingdom of Greece. With a separate Greek-Italian agreement signed the same day, Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands except Rhodes to Greece. See: CEIP 1924; IEE 1978: 139-144.
international protection. Naturally, the Constantinopolitan Greek press was delighted with news of the signing:

This very important treaty constitutes a world condemnation of a perennial heinous regime and the codification and solemn establishment of the rights of our martyr race, and the rights of all the oppressed people of the East that today celebrate the miracle of their resurrection.\textsuperscript{417}

However, the political animosity between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists and the return of King Constantine would play a critical role in the final collapse of the fragile Treaty of Sèvres and result in the shattering of the nationalists’ aspirations.

\textsuperscript{417} Chronos (31 July/13 August 1920); See Appendix 1.
Venizelist Constantinople against royalist Athens (1920 – 1922)

On 12 August 1920, just two days after the signing of the peace treaty with Turkey, two Greek royalist officers carried out an assassination attempt against Venizelos at the Gare de Lyon station, wounding him in the process. In Athens, fervent Venizelists retaliated by breaking the offices of opposition newspapers and killing Ion Dragoumis. The legacy of the national schism was still poisoning Greek political life. The news of the assassination attempt shocked Constantinople. In the patriarchal temple and in the churches of the city services were held and people prayed for Venizelos’ health. Representatives of the Armenians, of the French High Commission and of several associations and communal councils visited the Greek High Commission to express their best wishes to the Greek Prime Minister. The majority of the Greek press condemned the attempt, expressing at the same time its contempt for the anti-Venizelists.

The incident in question was the first in a series of shocking events for the Constantinopolitan Greeks, as well as for the rest of Venizelos’ supporters. In September Venizelos announced the holding of elections for 7 November, convinced that after the successful conclusion of the treaty he would win. However, the sudden death of King Alexander on 25 October again brought to the surface the constitutional issue. The elections would be decided on the question ‘Constantine or Venizelos’. One of the strategies the Venizelist party employed in order to strengthen their electoral basis was to allow Greek citizens from the new territories to vote in the elections because it believed that they considered Venizelos as their liberator. The mobilization in Constantinople was immediate. Leading figures of the Constantinopolitan Venizelist elite held a meeting at the office of Antonis Kalvokoresis, president of the Mediterranean Bank (Τράπεζα Μεσογείου), and formed three committees: one for the registration of the voters, one for securing financial assistance and one for arranging the transfer of the voters to Greece. Several wealthy

418 Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 144.
419 Chronos (01/14 August 1920, 04/17 August 1920).
420 Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 135, 139-40.
Greeks donated money for the expenses of Greek citizens who could not afford to travel.\textsuperscript{421} At the same time, the Constantinopolitan Greek press, with the exception of the newspaper \textit{Patris},\textsuperscript{422} tried to mobilize people to support the Venizelist party.\textsuperscript{423}

Despite these efforts and the introduction of the army vote, Venizelos lost the elections of 1/14 November 1920 with the Liberals securing only 118 out of 369 seats. The dissatisfaction of the people regarding Venizelos’ internal policy combined with the desire to bring Constantine back were the decisive factors behind Venizelos’ loss.\textsuperscript{424} The leadership of the Greek Orthodox in Constantinople was shocked. In the early hours of 2/15 November 1920 a pale and trembling Dorotheos announced the results to the clerics of the Patriarchate. The next morning the Greek press attacked \textit{en masse} the Greeks of Old Greece (Παλαιά Ελλάδα) for not electing Venizelos\textsuperscript{425}:

The great leader, the saviour of the race, the creator of mighty Greece collapsed. [...] Old Greece, the near-sighted Greece, generally voted against him. New Greece constituted thankfully, the most honorable contrast. [...] Old Greece has repeated the monstrous precedent of the unforgotten Trikoupis, so monstrous at the present time, as were the mythical actions of Venizelos.\textsuperscript{426}

On 9/22 November 1920, the board of the political association People’s Party of the Liberal Principles (Λαϊκό Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων Αρχών, PPLP) called a meeting of the lay leadership of the community at the GLAC.\textsuperscript{427} The participants were representatives of the other political associations and communal councils, the boards of several societies and guilds, the owners of the Venizelist Greek newspapers, as well as several prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks. According to the opening statement of the president of the PPLP Alexandros Voutyra, the purpose of the meeting was to decide on the attitude of the communal and political authorities of Constantinople towards the new government established in Greece. He argued that Constantinople always believed in cooperation with Britain and France as a means

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{421} \textit{Chronos} (19/30 October1920, 20/31 October 1920, 24 October/ 4 November 1920); Mavropoulos 1960: 129.
\textsuperscript{422} Mavropoulos 1960: 129.
\textsuperscript{423} \textit{Chronos} (20 October/ 2 November 1920).
\textsuperscript{424} Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 140-1, 150, 154.
\textsuperscript{425} Mavropoulos 1960: 130.
\textsuperscript{426} \textit{Chronos} (3/16 November 1920); See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{427} GMFA 1921, 3/3: Report on the activities of the \textit{Epitropi Ethnikis Amynos Konstantinoupoleos} (9 November 1920-12 March 1921); \textit{Chronos} (9/22 November 1920).
\end{footnotes}
for the liberation of Hellenism. As long as the new regime did not officially reassure the unredeemed Greeks that the country’s foreign policy would remain the same, it was impossible for them to remain inactive. Demonstrating the support Venizelos enjoyed in the city he added: ‘Constantinople will be the stronghold of Venizelism in the future’. 428

Spanoudis, who was also present at the meeting, suggested issuing an official protest against the Greek government, while expressing at the same time their gratitude to the Great Powers. He also proposed to draw up a resolution addressed to Venizelos and send a delegation representing the people of Constantinople to deliver it to him personally in France. When Aristoklis Aigidis, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Neologos, 429 announced that the Rallis’ government was thinking of holding a referendum for the return of King Constantine, the response was nothing short of an outrage. People started criticizing the policy of the royalists claiming it was disastrous for the nation. They also shouted abusive words against the former king and praised Venizelos, who ‘represented virtue to Constantine’s evil’. 430

Several suggestions were put forward in order to deal with the situation. V. Aristovoulos argued that the Patriarchate should be placed at the head of any action. Alexandros Pappas and Nikolaos Margaritis, editor-in-chief of Chronos, proposed the formation of a committee that would decide on the future policy of the community. According to Margaritis the committee should be composed of the editors-in-chief of Neologos, Proodos, Proia, Tachydromos and Chronos as well as the suitable people who would undertake ‘national action’ in the future. Leonidas Iasonidis, president of the Greeks of Pontus, added that the committee should maintain Venizelist support among the Greek population. Dimitrios Damaskinos, editor-in-chief of the Proodos, 431 proposed to consider the 1st of November a black-letter day in Constantinople, to continue celebrating Venizelos’ name day, and to announce to the Greek government that the people of Constantinople would follow Venizelos’ programme and that if the unredeemed Greeks did not participate in the referendum,

428 Ibid.; See Appendix 1.
429 Aristoklis I. Aigidis, along with Konstantinos Makridis, had become editors-in-chief of the Venizelist Neologos in October 1918; PSV 1920: 6; Konstantinopolis, (3 November 1929).
430 See footnote # 427.
Constantine would be King of Greece, but not King of the Greeks. Margaritis followed up by stating that if the Greek government brought the king back, they would be forced to break away into a separate state one day. This idea would re-emerge again in the near future.

At the end the assembly decided the following:

1. To approach the leadership of the Patriarchate and offer it their support.
2. To address the High Commissions of the Great Powers in Constantinople protesting against the result of the elections of November 1st and stating that they would form a movement similar to Thessaloniki’s, since the Greek people who voted against Venizelos did not represent the majority.
3. To form a committee composed of the directors of the five national (εθνικών) newspapers and representatives of the different political associations of Constantinople.

The members appointed to the committee were Alexandros Voutyras, Alexandros Pappas, Georgios Arvanitidis, Ioannis Kehayioglou, Leonidas Iasonidis and I. Filikos representing the four political associations of Constantinople – the PPLP, the NAC, the Liberal Party of Constantinople (Φιλελεύθερο Κόμμα Κωνσταντινούπολεως, LPC) and the Political Club of Constantinople (Πολιτική Λέσχη Κωνσταντινούπολεως, PCC) – and the editors-in-chief of the Proodos (Konstantinos Spanoudis), Chronos (Nikolaos Margaritis), Proia (Aristodimos Kalotaios) Neologos (Aristoklis Aigidis and Konstantinos Makridis) and Tachydromos.432 On the suggestion of Panagiotis Bekes434 the twelve-member committee was named Committee of National Defence of Constantinople (Επιτροπή Εθνικής Άμυνας Κωνσταντινούπολεως, CNDC). Its aim was ‘to work in accordance with the will of the Greek people of Constantinople and the provinces and above all to obstruct the hired instruments of the ex-King coming to Constantinople to undertake propaganda targeting the people’. Following Sofia Spanoudis435 advice, everyone participating at

\[\text{\footnotesize 432 Ibid., 97.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 433 See footnote # 427.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 434 He was the brother of Omiros Bekes and a former member of the SC. At the time he was general secretary of the Association of Greek Merchants of Constantinople (Σύνδεσµος των Ελλήνων Εµπόρων Κωνσταντινούπολεως); Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 226; Chronos (1 December 1920).} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 435 Sofia Spanoudis was a well-known piano teacher, music critic and journalist of Constantinople, and wife of Konstantinos Spanoudis; NEL vol.IZ: 148.} \]
the meeting swore faith and devotion to the ‘Great Saviour of the Race’, Venizelos. As Voutyras put it, ‘today we decided on a revolution against Constantinism’. 436

From the moment the Constantinopolitan Greek leadership decided to enter the fray against the anti-Venizelists, the national schism was transferred beyond the limits of the Greek state. This was a turning point in the political life of the unredeemed Greeks, because for the first time Constantinople would openly challenge the political predominance of Athens. Whether the Venizelists from Greece played a role in the formation of the CNDC or Venizelos himself had been contacted in advance and had given his blessing to this effort it is hard to verify, because there is no documentary evidence to support conclusive answers. Taking under consideration the short period of time that had elapsed between the elections and the meeting of the lay leadership of the community at the GLAC, it would be safe to assume that most probably at this stage neither had knowledge of the initiative of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Venizelos and his associates got actively involved when the prospect of a separatist movement in Constantinople came to the foreground as an alternative policy to the one the Gounaris’ administration was pursuing in Asia Minor.

The first action of the CNDC was to make an official appeal to the people of the Greek kingdom. The reason behind this appeal was the announcement of a referendum for 5 December in order to decide on the issue of the king’s return, combined with articles in the French and British press suggesting a possible revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. 437 Speaking on behalf of all the unredeemed Greeks, the CNDC asked the free Greeks to place the high interests of Hellenism above their personal loyalty to specific persons and consider the disastrous results of a policy that would bring Greece against the Great Powers. In this case, free Greece would always bear the responsibility for the failure of long and common struggles for the achievement of national restoration. 438 The appeal was published in Constantinopolitan Greek newspapers on 12/25 November 1920 and four days later it

436 See footnote # 427.
437 Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 161-2; Chronos (12/25 November 1920).
438 See footnote # 427.
was communicated to the Rallis’ administration in Athens, the main newspapers of Britain, France and New York and the Greek press published abroad.439

Although the CNDC’s request to their fellow Greeks to place their devotion to Constantine lower as a priority contradicted the CNDC’s own blind loyalty to Venizelos, their argument regarding the change of the Allies’ attitude towards Greece seemed to be correct. At the first meeting of the Anglo-French Conference held in London on 26 November 1920 the French delegation argued that the Allies should notify Athens that they ‘could not entrust important strategic positions in the Near East to an unfriendly Government’.440 This would be one of the measures to prevent the return of Constantine. The following day Curzon circulated a memorandum to the Conference stipulating the conditions for the return of the king. One of them was an Allied veto restricting the Greek government’s ability to contract loans or conclude diplomatic or military conventions. Some details of the memorandum found their way to the press and were even published in Athenian dailies.441 On 18 November/ 1 December 1920 the CNDC submitted a resolution to the High Commissioners of the Allied Powers in Constantinople in an effort to demonstrate their disapproval of the Greek government’s actions.442 After rejecting the results of the elections as not being representative of the beliefs of the whole of Hellenism, the ‘Greek people of Constantinople speaking on behalf of all the unredeemed Greeks’ declared that:

1. They would remain dedicated to the national policy of Venizelos and loyal to his principles.
2. A feeling of eternal gratitude connects them with the Great Powers, their benefactors, and they will always stand by their side.

The same day the CNDC drew up a resolution addressed to Venizelos, which was a tribute and at the same time a statement of devotion to the Greek statesman. Phrases like the ‘great creator of the Hellenic glory’, the ‘architect of the Hellenic wonder’, the ‘liberator of unredeemed Greeks’ and the ‘bright apostle of the Greek Idea’ were

439 Chronos (12/25 November 1920, 16/29 November 1920).
440 Cited in Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 165.
441 Ibid.
442 See footnote # 427.
employed to describe him. More importantly however, they expressed their commitment to their saviour and his policy:

We proclaim our unanimous conviction, here in the great capital of Hellenism, that we are ready to participate in all your fights and we are willing to make any sacrifice you invite us to make […]. If Athens today, the brain of Free Greece, has become deranged, Constantinople, the great heart of Hellenism, is beating and vibrating with the purest feelings of enthusiasm and worship for you, the great Patriot, for you the Preacher of National truth. And this heart of outer Hellenism with its great pulses will coordinate today every national action for the future.\(^\text{443}\)

In order to give a more official character to the resolution and demonstrate that it represented all the people of Constantinople, it was decided to call the societies and associations of the city to go to the GLAC and sign it.\(^\text{444}\) For this purpose a public appeal was made through the Greek press.\(^\text{445}\) The Patriarchate complemented with its actions the efforts of the CNDC. On 14/27 November 1920, Dorotheos sent a letter to Venizelos on behalf of the two bodies expressing their gratitude for everything he had achieved for the unredeemed Greeks.\(^\text{446}\)

Meanwhile, as the day of the referendum was approaching, fanaticism in Constantinople was becoming worse. Several beatings of Constantinists were reported in the press and at the New Theatre (Νέον Θέατρον) the audience forced the orchestra to play the anthem of Venizelos, because there were rumours that the manager was a supporter of the king. At the same time, the Venizelist press in Athens published the appeal of the CNDC to the ‘free’ Greeks, while the antib-Venizelist newspapers were accusing the Constantinopolitan Greeks of being ignorant and ungrateful to the national army.\(^\text{447}\) The situation was aggravated by the joint declaration of the Allies issued on 4 December 1920.\(^\text{448}\)

The British, French, and Italian Governments […] have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece. But they feel bound to declare publicly that the restoration to the throne of Greece of a King, whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the war caused them great embarrassment and loss.

\(^{443}\) Ibid.; See Appendix 1.
\(^{444}\) Ibid.
\(^{445}\) *Chronos* (18 November/1 December 1920).
\(^{446}\) *Chronos* (20 November/3 December 1920); *Ekklisiastiki Alithia* (28 November/11 December 1920).
\(^{447}\) *Chronos* (16/29 November 1920, 21 November/4 December 1920).
\(^{448}\) Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 169.
could only be regarded by them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts. This step would create a new and unfavourable situation in the relations between Greece and the Allies, and in that case the three Governments reserve complete liberty for themselves in dealing with the situation thus created.  

The following day, while the referendum was under way in Greece, the representatives of the communal boards and associations gathered at the GLAC and signed an official protest against the return of the King, an anti-referendum (αντιδηµοψήφισµα) as the Greek press called it. The resolution was submitted to the Greek High Commissioner, who promised to communicate it to Athens. There is no doubt that the CNDC had instigated this action. The person who had publicly announced the content of the resolution in the Greek High Commission and had requested it to be sent to the Greek government was Alexandros Pappas. In addition, the board of the CNDC sent a similar telegram to Rallis arguing that his government would be responsible for any damage caused by the return of Constantine.  

When it became clear that the referendum was in favour of the king’s return, the Holy Synod and the PNMC held an urgent meeting and decided to ask Constantine to abdicate. The Patriarchate’s appeal was signed by Dorotheos and dispatched to Constantine on 23 November/6 December 1920:

In the name of the two bodies, the Holy and Sacred Synod and the Mixed Council, and according to the decision taken at their official meeting, the Locum Tenens of Ecumenical Patriarchate is obliged to state before his Highness that if there were princes who renounced their crown in order to save their dynasty, it is your duty to resign from your claims for the salvation of the Homeland.

The local Greek press defended the Patriarchate’s plea and accused the Greek government of publishing a censored version of the Allied declaration, omitting the part referring to the consequences of Constantine’s restoration. Thus, at a very crucial point the highest authority of the unredeemed Greeks took an official position on the constitutional issue, which legalized the actions of the Venizelists in the eyes

---

449 DBFP 1962, #457; Also cited in Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 166.
450 Chronos (22 November/5 December 1920)
451 Ibid.
452 Chronos (23 November/6 December 1920); Ekklesiastiki Aithia (28 November/11 December 1920); See Appendix 1.
453 Chronos (23 November/6 December 1920, 24 November/7 December 1920).
of the Constantinopolitan people and damaged at the same time its traditionally good relations with Athens.

Behind this appeal were once again the laymen of the Patriarchate. Alexandros Pantazis, director of the Intelligence Office of the High Commission and appointee of the new regime in Athens, informed Rallis that the telegram had been prepared by Gkikas-Mousouros and Pappas, who imposed its dispatch on the two bodies without allowing them to have a clear knowledge of its content. Mavropoulos agrees with this version, arguing that the CNDC put pressure on the two bodies to send the telegram, and adding that the only ones who refused to sign were the Metropolitan of Ainou loakim and Spatharis. As soon as Kanellopoulos found out, he called Dorotheos and advised him against sending the telegram. However, according to Pantazis, his intervention was not sincere because he was present at a meeting at Pappas’ house, where the dispatch of the protest letter to Constantine was decided. Although everyone involved claimed that they gave in to the demands of the laymen, Pantazis was certain that the Patriarchate had received a considerable amount of money from Kanellopoulos for this purpose, hoping that the non-recognition of the king would lead to the fall of the government.

To what extent Pantazis’ version of events is accurate is hard to verify. But some conclusions can be drawn from this event. First of all, since some of the leading figures of the CNDC were councillors in the PNMC they might have tried to impose a more radical policy on the two bodies. Therefore, their involvement in the preparation and the dispatch of the telegram is probably true. The Chronos of 24 November/7 December 1920 also made allusions in this direction. The second point is that there was definitely a division within the Greek authorities in Constantinople between the people who were already serving in the Greek High Commission under Venizelos and the ones who had been recently appointed by the new administration. The former were spreading propaganda against the king and his supporters, while the latter were trying to win over the Constantinopolitan people and convince them to

---

454 GMFA 1921 2/4: MFA to Greek High Commission (1/14 November 1921).
455 GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Ministry of Navy (1/14 December 1920).
457 See footnote #455.
sympathize with the new regime. Pantazis insisted on the removal of several officials including Marketis, the First Secretary of the High Commission, and Melas because both of them exerted pressure on the High Commissioner. However, Pantazis advised against the replacement of Kanellopoulos at this specific time, despite the fact that he seemed to have an insidious attitude towards the government of Athens. The reason was that he was a popular figure among the Constantinopolitan Greeks and such a decision would possibly upset an already agitated public opinion.

Athens’ response to Dorotheos’ telegram was severe. Rallis replied criticizing the Patriarchate for its action, while the government decided to discontinue its financial assistance to the Phanar. His response had a serious impact on the members of the Holy Synod, who were inclined to send a new document to the government in an effort to refute the telegram to the king. This suggestion was made by Ioakim, who although a nationalist was also a royalist and cooperated with Pantazis. When the two bodies met on 30 November/13 December 1920, they decided to form a committee composed of Ioakim, Kazanovas, Gkikas-Mousouros and Chatzopoulos to prepare an official reply to the Greek government. Chronos, targeting Ioakim, expressed its doubts as to whether all the members of the committee were aligned with the political convictions of the majority of Constantinopolitan Greeks.

Some further incidents forced the communal lay and religious leadership to show a more conciliatory mood. On the night of 3/16 December a demonstration took place at the Great Street of Pera in favour of Venizelos and approximately sixty people destroyed the offices of the only pro-royalist newspaper Patris, which was being secretly financed by the new government. According to Pavlos Palaiologos and I.D. Kollitidis, publishers of the Patris, members of the CNDC had met with them twice in person and had threatened that if they did not stop supporting the new regime they would destroy their offices. The two men also claimed that Pappas tried

---

458 Ibid.
459 Chronos (09/22 November 1920).
460 Chronos (1/14 December 1920, 5/18 December 1920, 7/20 December 1920); Alexandris 1992: 71.
461 See footnote #455.
462 Chronos (1/14 December 1920).
to buy them off and when he failed, warned them that the Patris would be silenced by any means possible. Pantazis verified these claims, informing Athens that the CNDC had instigated the demonstration and the breaking of the newspaper’s offices. The disapproval of these events by international public opinion and the more moderate Greek laymen placed additional pressure on the Venizelists. The Greek press issued appeals to the population to express its views within reason and avoid similar actions in the future. The CNDC issued a similar announcement and decided to cancel the public protest it was planning to hold for Sunday 6/19 December, the day of the king’s return to Athens.

On 4/17 December two drafts were submitted to the PNMC and the Holy Synod; the first was prepared by Ioakim, the second by Kazanovas. The two bodies decided to examine both drafts and meet for the final approval on 9/21 December. The next day the Greek government requested that Pantazis arrange the dispatch of a greetings telegram from the two bodies on the day of Constantine’s arrival. It was to state that the fears expressed regarding his decision to return were false and the result of a bad assessment of the possible dangers it entailed for the nation. A similar telegram should be sent to the government, an action necessary for the restoration of good relations between Athens and the Patriarchate. Pantazis, aware of the fact that Ioakim was among the members of the committee, replied to Athens that the document of the two bodies would definitely be more moderate than the first one and his people would make sure of that.

One day before the final approval of the response, Pantazis informed Dorotheos that the British High Commissioner and a French officer had pointed out to Kanellopoulos on 4/17 December that national unity was necessary for Greek interests. However, the latter had avoided announcing these news to the Patriarchate and Admiral Nikolaos Votsis, captain of the battleship Kilkis, which in the meantime had replaced the Averoff. Pantazis implied that Kanellopoulos acted this way because

466 GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (7/20 December 1920); Chronos (4/17 December 1920; 5/18 December 1920, 7/20 December 1920).
467 Chronos (5/18 December 1920).
468 GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Pantazis (5/18 December 1920).
469 GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (7/20 December 1920).
he was aware that this information could restrain and bring to reason the leadership of the community. The CNDC was unsettled once it was made aware of the latest developments.\textsuperscript{470}

The Patris incident and the admonitions of the Allied representatives affected the work of the committee preparing the response to Rallis. Its final version was truly more moderate and to a certain degree apologetic. The Patriarchate stated that it was above parties and political conflicts and its main concern was to promote the interests of all Greeks. Furthermore, it had never forgotten everything the free homeland had done for the common cause. Trying to justify its actions, it argued that it was shocked by the change of attitude of the Great Powers towards the Greek Kingdom, which threatened to destroy the Treaty of Sèvres and the realization of the national dreams.\textsuperscript{471} On 10/23 December the document was announced to the Greek High Commission with the request that it be communicated to the Greek government.\textsuperscript{472}

The following day the Patriarchate issued an encyclical to be read in the churches of the capital promoting national unity:\textsuperscript{473}

The Greek people of the Queen City [Βασιλίδος], […] focused without doubt on the national interest, which demands national solidarity and unity between everyone and not the provocation of internal divisions and passions, will abstain from any provocation or act of revenge and provide an example of political profundity and maturity with its calm and moderate conduct.

In his report to Athens, Pantazis expressed his satisfaction, claiming that the situation was improving and that the greetings telegram to the king would soon follow. He also pointed out that ‘his Metropolitan’, that is Ioakim, had played a decisive role in preparing the final draft of the response.\textsuperscript{474}

Pantazis also tried to sabotage the upcoming celebration to honour Venizelos on his name-day. He believed that this would significantly decrease the influence of the CNDC. Therefore, he asked Athens to send the following instructions to Kanellopoulos: to advise the Patriarchate to abstain; to convince the Boy Scout

\textsuperscript{470} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (10/23 December 1920).
\textsuperscript{471} Chronos (10/23 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (11/24 December 1920).
\textsuperscript{472} Chronos (10/23 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (no date).
\textsuperscript{473} Ekklisiastiki Alithia (19 December 1920); Chronos (12/25 December 1920); See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{474} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (11/24 December 1920).
commissioner A. Oikiadis to keep the Boy Scouts out of it; and to instruct the educational counsellor of the High Commission to speak to the school supervisors in order to prevent students participating in the celebration.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (8/21 December 1920).} Momentarily it seemed that his plan would succeed. On 11/24 December he informed the Ministry of the Navy that the Patriarchate had decided to abstain completely from the celebration and that the Holy Synod had forbidden the prelates to make speeches. In addition, the obligatory closure of schools and shops was prevented.\footnote{See footnote #474.} However, two days later he complained to Athens that the clerks of the High Commission were acting against his efforts by trying to allow the celebration to take place at the schools. He also expressed his confusion as to whether the government had sent instructions to the High Commission.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Rallis (17/30 December 1920).} Once again one faction within the official Greek authorities in Constantinople cancelled out the actions of the other. In the event, Venizelos’ name-day was celebrated according to the instructions of the CNDC – not those of Pantazis.\footnote{Ibid.; Chronos (16/29 December 1920).} To add insult to injury, Dorotheos sent a personal telegram to Venizelos calling him a ‘future saviour’.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Rallis (18/31 December 1920).} Pantazis tried to play down the importance of the celebrations, but anyone who reads the accounts in the press of that time can realize that the CNDC had won this specific battle.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Rallis (17/30 December 1920); Pantazis to Rallis (18/31 December 1920).}

Pantazis did not give up. He managed to approach pro-royalist and moderate, neutral Constantinopolitan Greeks from the middle and upper classes in order to form an organization, whose aim would be to bridge the gap between the national elements [εθνικών παραγόντων] and restrain fanaticism in the city. The organization was finally established on 15/28 December and was named League of National Unity (Σύνδεσµος Εθνικής Ενώσεως, LNU). It numbered more than forty members, the majority of them belonging to the middle class.\footnote{Ibid.; Chronos (16/29 December 1920).} Its most prominent members were Kollitidis, Palaiologos, Stavros Antoniadis, Moutzis, Charalambidis, Chatzipetros,
The board of the LNU did not express its affiliation to the king publicly but, two days later, sent the following message to Constantine through Pantazis:

For the promotion and triumph of the idea, which we consider as an emblem both by tradition and duty, we established the LNU on December 15. By expressing our devotion to unity, the mandate of the plenum is to submit respectfully to Your Majesty the request to accept our warmest wishes and to reassure you that we wish to work by your side and under the orders of your Respected Government in order to realize the national ideals by uniting our national powers.

They claimed that the reason behind this secrecy was the official announcement of the Allies prohibiting any kind of political demonstrations, including their announcement in the press. However, it could be safely assumed that this was not entirely true. After the Allied order was issued, the Chronos published a threatening article arguing that the people who were against the patriotic ideology, that is the anti-Venizelists, were becoming more and more provocative and should not accuse Venizelos’ supporters if things got out of hand. Thus, in such a hostile environment and shortly after a massive celebration honouring Venizelos, the LNU would probably have preferred to keep a low profile. In any case, the prohibition of demonstrations worked in the government’s favour, because it forced the CNDC to cancel a protest against the visit of the King to the front. Pantazis reported that the situation was steadily improving. His optimism however would soon prove ephemeral. Political passions in Constantinople were running high, due also to the presence of Venizelist officers in the city.

These officers had either left their posts voluntarily after the November elections, not willing to serve under Constantine, or had been dismissed by the new
administration. They included senior, non-commissioned and reserve officers, numbering approximately 150. The most prominent figures among them were generals Dimitris Ioannou, Epameinondas Zymbrakakis, Konstantinos Mazarakis, Colonel Georgios Kondylis, as well as Katechakis, who was replaced as the representative of Greece at the Allied Military Mission by General G. Koutsis. Most of them were established at the hotel *Péra Palas* owned by Bodosakis Athanasiadis, who was cooperating with the CNDC. The latter also organized a system of donations from the community in order to support them financially.\footnote{Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 175, 362; Alexandris 1992: 70; Mavropoulos 1960: 130-1; Papadopoulos 1978: 91-92; Zavitsianos 1947, vol.II: 118; Malainos 1963, vol.6: 22; Veremis 1977: 71; Dagklis 1965, vol. II: 399; Zafeiropoulos 1984: 195; Katsiambas 1982: 79; DBFP 1962, #472: Granville to Curzon (10 December 1920); Their number varies depending on the sources from 60 to 500, although most of them agree on 150. Regarding the system of donations organized by CNDC see: GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (11/24 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Epitropi Ethnikis Amynas #7 (02 January 1921); Papadopoulos 1978: 91-2; Mavropoulos 1960: 130.}

As soon as they arrived to Constantinople they began cooperating with the CNDC and the Venizelist clerks of the Greek High Commission, especially Marketis and Melas, who had a major influence on Kanellopoulos. This Venizelist coalition undertook a propaganda campaign against the king and the new government.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Ministry of Navy (1/14 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (20 December 1920/ 2 January 1921); Papadopoulos 1978: 125; Mavropoulos 1960: 130; Zavitsianos 1947, vol.II: 118-9.} At the same time, Spanoudis left on 04/17 December for Nice as a member of a committee delivering the resolution of the Patriarchate to Venizelos. His actual purpose however would be to ask Venizelos whether he endorsed the preparation of a movement by the officers and public servants, similar to the one in Thessaloniki a few years ago. Kondylis soon followed him to Nice with the same objective.\footnote{GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (No date, document #61); GMFA 1921 5/8 1921: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (8/21 December 1920); *Chronos* (3/16 December 1920, 4/17 December 1920); Zafeiropoulos 1984: 197. The other members of the committee travelling to Nice were Leonidas Iasonidis and T.K Stavridis.} Periklis Argyropoulos, the Greek ambassador in Cairo, had been in contact with Kondylis and was also aware of the plan.\footnote{Argyropoulos 1970: 307.} Pantazis warned Athens repeatedly, claiming that the situation was dangerous because of the lack of devoted officers and public servants. He was afraid that they were planning to occupy the High Commission and the rest of the buildings of the Greek Mission, which were not
guarded by loyal soldiers. Therefore, he requested their replacement, including the body of Cretans guarding the Patriarchate. Athen reassured him that it would gradually remove all these officials, including Kanellopoulos. They also decided to send Major Stefanos Dragoumis, brother of the assassinated Ion, to strengthen the Greek Military Mission. These measures did not seem to have a great effect on the CNDC. When the government ordered the Venizelist officers to return to Athens, it faced their anger and contempt. Soon, things got out of hand.

On 20 December 1920/ 2 January 1921 two men shot and seriously wounded Stefanos Dragoumis. The news shocked both Constantinople and Athens. Votsis expressed fears that this could be the beginning of a series of attacks aimed at terrorizing the Greek representatives who were loyal to the government. Using Kanellopoulos as a messenger, he threatened taking retaliatory measures against those who financially supported the officers. At the same time, the Constantinopolitan Greeks who cooperated with the royalists warned Votsis, Koutsis and Pantazis to be careful. Pantazis argued that the CNDC was probably receiving secret orders from Venizelos, an assessment that could not be excluded as a possibility. He reported that after the attempt against Dragoumis, some of its members were considering its dismemberment out of fear of reprisals. However, he believed that their purpose was merely to deceive the government’s people and avoid being accused as the instigators. Similar views were expressed by Captain Kriezis, who was serving at the naval base in Constantinople. He added that the attempt was not the consequence of the people’s indignation, but that basically the CNDC, whose actions were encouraged and supported by the Venizelist officers, was responsible. Therefore, according to Kriezis, Constantinople should be purged of the latter and of the public servants of the High Commission who were using public money for the purposes of CNDC. The irony of the whole event was that Stefanos Dragoumis was the brother of Ion Dragoumis, who just a few years beforehand had for the first

---

491 GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Ministry of Navy (1/14 December 1920).
492 GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Pantazis (5/18 December 1920).
493 Chronos (12/25 December 1920, 14/27 December 1920).
494 Chronos (22 December 1920/ 4 January 1921, 23 December 1920/ 5 January 1921).
495 GMFA 1921 2/4: Votsis to Ministry of Navy (4 December 1921).
496 GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (23 December 1920/ 5 January 1921).
497 GMFA 1921 2/4: Kriezis to Athens (23 December 1920/ 5 January 1921).
time organized the Ottoman Greeks into a Greek nationalist party, with the cooperation of Souliotis-Nikolaïdis, and had laid the foundations for a national movement in Constantinople. Now, the same Ottoman Greeks were accused of instigating the attempt against the brother of their former leader. Meanwhile, the Patriarchate tried to keep its distance from the whole incident and show its sympathy for the victim without compromising its position towards the government. As a result, the Secondary Deacon Dorotheos (Mavropoulos), who was an anti-Venizelist, was sent on behalf of the locum tenens to visit Dragoumis in hospital. 498

The attempt against Dragoumis again brought to the surface the uglier aspects of the national schism, while it established Constantinople as the stronghold of Venizelism in the public eye. The conflict was immediately picked up by the media of both sides. The pro-government press in Athens published severe articles condemning the crime and accusing the Constantinopolitan Greeks and the Liberals. The Venizelist newspapers in Constantinople responded criticizing the Athenian press for exploiting this event for political purposes, recalling the crimes the royalists had committed against their opponents and implied that perhaps Dragoumis had provoked the two men. 499 On 25 December 1920/7 January 1921 Pantazis warned Athens that the local press was trying to put the blame on the royalists and that the Greek legal authorities could not be trusted, because they were controlled by the CNDC. Thus, he requested once again the replacement of Venizelists from the High Commission and the Greek consulate, because they were fighting against the royalists using state resources. 500 The next day more bad news reached Constantinople. The Venizelist Colonel Stefanos Fatseas had been assassinated in Athens as a reprisal for the attempt against Dragoumis. This time it was the turn of the Constantinopolitan Greek press to attack the government for instigating the crime and to criticize the royalist newspapers in Athens for trying to discredit the victim. 501

On 12 January 1921 Pantazis reported to Athens that judge Achilleas Lambrou, a supporter of Venizelos, was cooperating with Topakas and Antypas to portray

498 Chronos (23 December 1920/5 January 1921).
499 Chronos (23 December 1920/5 January 1921, 24 December 1920/6 January 1921).
500 GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Rallis (25 December 1920/7 January 1921).
501 Chronos (26 December 1920/8 January 1921, 28 December 1920/10 January 1921).
Dragoumis as the one provoking the attack.\textsuperscript{502} The same day the \textit{Chronos} published a letter by Lieutenant Charilaos Papanargyrou,\textsuperscript{503} who assumed the responsibility for wounding Dragoumis claiming that the major had started the incident and that he was forced to shoot him in self-defence. According to Papanargyrou, the reason for admitting he was the perpetrator and explaining the events was to refute the argument that the Venizelist officers were behind this incident. It is hard to verify whether he had written his letter under their guidance or influence. However, its publication was definitely used as a means to alleviate any public suspicions that they were responsible for the attempt against Dragoumis and that it was a planned political assassination. A specific element implies something like that. The letter was not addressed to the newspaper, but to retired Commander Toumpas, who sent it to Koumaris, the Greek Consul, for the purposes of the investigation. Therefore, the Greek Consulate would not have publicized a private letter to the Venizelist press, unless it served the aims of the anti-Constantinist coalition. At the same time, the letter gave unofficial closure to the investigation, because Papanargyrou made it clear that he would not surrender himself to the royalist authorities. On the contrary, he would answer for his actions only when justice was re-established, meaning with the establishment of a Venizelist regime.

These events stigmatized Constantinople and took their toll on the local population. According to Pantazis the Greek community was beginning to realize what was happening and was worried about the presence of Venizelist officers in their midst city. Therefore he ruled out any attempt to reach an understanding with the Venizelist leadership. On the contrary, he argued that due to the positive news from the front, the cooperation of the British High Commission, the assertive attitude of the military and naval authorities, the activities of LNU, and the articles of \textit{Patris} the Greek people had begun to show a willingness to support the reconciliation effort.

\textsuperscript{502} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (29 December 1920/11 January 1921). Topakas was an interrogator of the consular court and Antypas was surgeon-general and head of the Red Cross. Both men were Venizelists and were among the public servants Pantazis had asked Athens to replace. He had suggested the same for Lambrou, whom he considered to be a prominent Venizelist; \textit{Chronos} (22 December 1920/4 January 1921); GMFA 1921 5/8: Votsis to Pantazis (1/14 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (11/24 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Rallis (14/27 December 1920); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (22 January 1921).

\textsuperscript{503} \textit{Chronos} (29 December 1920/1 January 1921).
while they criticized at the same time the actions of the officers. It seems that there was also a breach among the members of the CNDC and many of them admitted that they had been misled by the officers and started showing their disregard for them. In addition, prominent figures like Thomareis had approached Pantazis in order to find ways to restore order.\textsuperscript{504} Once more Pantazis was optimistic: ‘The imposition of the power of the state here, without concessions to the fanatics and the egocentrics, will destroy the Venizelist prestige’.\textsuperscript{505}

The Amynites sought to take advantage of Kondylis’ return from Nice in order to turn round the hostile attitude created against them. They claimed that Kondylis was conveying Venizelos’ opinion to continue their efforts and put pressure on the Patriarchate in order to support a separatist movement when the time was right. This policy should be entrusted to a committee composed of the dismissed Greek Ambassadors of Paris and London. Pantazis reported that Dorotheos had expressed his opinion in favour of the advised separation. The Greek official however was not equally convinced about the CNDC’s intentions. He argued that its members suspected Kondylis of not transferring Venizelos’ true thoughts, but they played along because they were using the Venizelist officers for political purposes. The elections for the new PNMC were approaching and the CNDC needed the support of the officers to impose the formation of an extreme Venizelist board. According to Pantazis, a possible success in the elections would allow them to overthrow the pro-royalist members of the Synod, replace them with their own people and eventually elect a Venizelist patriarch. This would lead to a final and complete break between the Patriarchate and the government.\textsuperscript{506} Although the elections were postponed to a later date\textsuperscript{507}, Pantazis’ prediction would prove right about a year later. The same could not be said for his assessment of Venizelos’ views and the CNDC’s support of the separatist movement.

\textsuperscript{504} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (29 December 1920/ 11 January 1921); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (30 December 1920/ 12 January 1921); GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (31 December 1920/ 12 January 1921).

\textsuperscript{505} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (31 December 1920/ 12 January 1921); See Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{506} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (1/14 January 1921); Zafeiropoulos 1984: 198. For the PNMC elections see: \textit{Ekklesiastiki Alithia} (28 November/11 December 1920); \textit{Chronos} (31 December 1920/13 January 1921).

\textsuperscript{507} GMFA 1921 5/8: Pantazis to Ministry of Navy (7/14 January 1921).
In late December 1920, Spanoudis, Iasonidis and Stavridis, the three representatives of the leadership of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, met with Venizelos and submitted to him the resolution of the Patriarchate. After their meeting Venizelos sent a letter to Sir John Stavridis, asking him to assist them in making contact with Lloyd George. The Greek statesman guaranteed that they represented the unredeemed Greeks. Their purpose would be to prove that if the Greek state was unable to retain Smyrna, the Greeks of Turkey would be able to undertake this task as long as they had the diplomatic and financial support of the Allies, and especially Britain. On 14 January 1921, the three men met with Admiral Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secretary, and reassured him that if Constantine decided to abandon Smyrna they would be able to hold the city with their own troops without any Allied military assistance. They explained that they could already rely on two Venizelist divisions and believed that a lot of unredeemed Greeks would volunteer from Constantinople, Pontus and the Islands. These men would be organized into troops by the Venizelist officers. The committee claimed that they could raise total forces of about 45,000 men. Kerr, speaking on behalf of Lloyd George, said that the latter was in favour of the idea, with the precondition that Constantine would have first failed to maintain the Treaty of Sèvres.

The self-styled committee also submitted a memorandum to Kerr, in which they declared once again their loyalty to Venizelos and his policy. At the same time however they expressed the desire of New Greece to assume an active and independent role in Greek political affairs:

Those Greeks still under Turkish yoke, and those living outside Greece proper, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at their head, representing a power not only spiritual but above all national, which derives its prestige from the fall of Constantinople five centuries ago, desire with all their power to take in hand the continuation of the national work of M.Venizelos. This they desire to do not in making war or declaring antagonism against the party in power, but by trying to mitigate the dangerous consequences of the recent mistaken policy of Old Greece.

---

508 Chronos (22 December 1920/4 January 1921).
510 JSP, File 8: Stavridis to Kerr (14 January 1921); Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 187-8.
511 Ibid.
From the memorandum it becomes apparent that the military side of the whole plan was prepared by ‘Greek officers of the highest rank still in Constantinople’. Furthermore, there is no doubt that they took the Thessaloniki government as an example and an inspiration: ‘This struggle we are prepared to take in hand to save us from the ill effects of the recent catastrophe and to help re-establish, as in the year 1917, the honour of the Greek name’. Thus, the ultimate goal of the nationalist movement shifted from unification with Venizelos’ Greece to the creation of a separate state for the unredeemed Greeks in the Near East, as a reaction to the policy of Constantinist Athens.

On 25 January 1921, Venizelos travelled from Nice to Paris to discuss with Lloyd George the issue of Asia Minor. The same day he met with Kerr and insisted on the importance of maintaining Greek claims. He argued though that if the Greek government found itself in a financial deadlock, it should clear the recently occupied areas and restrict its presence to the areas conceded to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres along with the Meander valley. For the defence of this region a force of three divisions or 45,000 men would be sufficient, exactly the same number mentioned a few days earlier by the committee of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Venizelos communicated a letter to the Greek government via P. Metaxas, the Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, informing them about his discussion with Kerr in order to deal with the situation more effectively and prepare for the upcoming London Conference. However, with the exception of Rallis, the royalists ignored Venizelos’ approach.

It can be safely argued that the plan organized by the CNDC and the Venizelist officers had the support of both Venizelos and Lloyd George. Although both men expressed their reservations, the precondition they placed on the movement had two major consequences. First of all, it brought the unredeemed Greeks into a conflict with the royalist government and obstructed the Greek effort in Asia Minor. In other words the Venizelist coalition in Constantinople would prefer Constantine to fail, in order for their plan to get the go-ahead from Venizelos and the British. The second and more important consequence is that the response of the two statesmen

512 Ibid.
encouraged the committee and reassured them as to the legitimacy of their separatist policies. According to Llewellyn-Smith, ‘Venizelos, like Lloyd George, was playing the dangerous game of keeping the *Amyna* in reserve in case Constantine failed’.\(^{515}\)

Encouraged by the response of Venizelos and Lloyd George, the CNDC started preparing for the upcoming London Conference. On 4 February the two bodies decided to form a patriarchal delegation to travel to London for that purpose. Spanoudis insisted that Dorotheos should head the delegation, despite his ill-health.\(^{516}\) The CNDC made sure to exclude from the mission anyone who did not support Venizelos.\(^{517}\) The royalist authorities in Constantinople strongly advised Athens not to approve any grant to the Greek High Commission, which was trying to support the whole effort financially. Therefore, in order to cover the credit requested from the Athenian Bank (Αθηναϊκή Τράπεζα) and finance the delegation’s trip, the system of donations was put into action.\(^{518}\)

In the event, the Allies refused to allow any representatives of the Ottoman Greeks to present their case at the conference. In addition, the British High Commission officially replied to the Patriarchate that their presence at the conference was unnecessary since only the Greek government was responsible for their issue. Nevertheless, the Patriarchate insisted and finally the British issued them with private passports to travel to London. The delegation arrived in the British capital on 1 March and began a series of meetings with influential British personalities such as the King of Britain, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Curzon. None of these meetings however had any significant result. Furthermore, on 18 March 1921 Dorotheos died in London from a heart failure. Immediately, the Greek Prime Minister Dimitrios Gounaris visited the hotel where the delegation was residing to express his condolences and offered a Greek battleship for the transfer of the body of the locum tenens to Constantinople. However, the delegation rejected this offer and accepted that of the British government for the transfer of Dorotheos’ body by the

\(^{515}\) Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 185-7.

\(^{516}\) GMFA 1921 2/4: Votsis to Ministry of Navy (4 February 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 133; Alexandris 1992: 67.

\(^{517}\) Mavropoulos 1960: 133-4.

\(^{518}\) GMFA 1921 2/4: Mathios to Ministry of Navy (24 January/6 February 1921).
battleship *Centaur*. According to Mavropoulos, this was a further manifestation of the hostile relations between Athens and Constantinople.519

A few days after Dorotheos’ death, Votsis and Koutsis initiated an attempt at reconciliation with the CNDC. The board decided to form an unofficial committee and listen to what the two men had to propose. However, the latter wanted the meeting to take place at the High Commission, a suggestion that the CNDC dismissed. As a result, the negotiations were postponed. On 12/25 March the board met again in order to take an official decision on the issue and discuss the future policy of the CNDC.520 Filikos opened the session and argued that after Dorotheos’ death the government had publicly tried to show its conciliatory mood and had not abandoned the effort for the realization of the national idea. Therefore, he believed that they should conceal their true feelings regarding the moral values of the king and his supporters, tolerate them and stand by their side in the ongoing struggle. Kalotaios and Zotos agreed with Filikos, but added that the CNDC should not abandon its work. Antypas refuted the arguments of the moderate faction and claimed that the intentions of the royalists were not sincere and that Koutsis’ plan was to get rid of the officers and the CNDC and after that control Constantinople. Thus, he proposed to continue the fight against Constantine and his supporters, while simultaneously supporting the fighting troops. Similar opinions were expressed by Margaritis, Stavridis and Damaskinos. In addition, the cooperation between the CNDC and the Venizelist officers should remain intact because this constituted the actual power of the CNDC. Finally, the more radical anti-Constantinist faction imposed its decision for non-cooperation. The board decided against the dissolution of the CNDC and agreed that it should remain alert and continue to monitor the policy of the royalists, who could not be trusted.521

From that point on the Venizelist coalition continued their anti-Constantinist campaign with more vigour than before. The first occasion was Dorotheos’ funeral sermon, which according to the British High Commissioner Horace Rumbold was

520 Present at this meeting were A. Voutyras, I. Filikos, D. Damaskinos, N. Margaritis, N. Iliaskos, P. Zervos, A. Kalotaios, T.K Stavridis, A. Siniosoglou, K. Arvanitidis, I. Konstantinidis, K.A. Gerardos, P. Miliotis, X. Zotos, G. Zamanos, Antypas, Kotsis and Mavrokordatos; See footnote #426.
521 See footnote #427.
‘more in the nature of a political address than a sermon’. Father Alexandros Zotos, who delivered it, reached the point of arguing that the ‘martyrical death’ of the locum tenens might be considered as ‘a stroke of the Almighty who got angry for the deviation from the programme’ of Venizelos. Rumbold’s assessment of the situation was the following:

This funeral illustrates in a striking manner the amazingly anomalous situation which exists here at present and the embarrassment in which it involves the allied authorities. Greece is engaged in a war, which is technically being waged against the Kemalists, but which all Turks in Constantinople now regard as a national one. Nevertheless, Constantinople is as much a theatre of Greek as of Turkish activity. The Patriarchate is the head centre of Greek political propaganda, and loses no opportunity of exhibiting itself as something Byzantine, if not Hellenic. […] We are confronted with the curious spectacle of the head of the Greek Church in Turkey telegraphing his blessing to General Papoulas and sending messages to the Greek Government in which inter alia he is reported to have exhorted them to reinstate competent officers, who were dismissed from their commands for their Venizelist sympathies.522

At the same time, the Turkish government started complaining to the British authorities regarding the activities of the CNDC. In order to deal with these grievances General Charles Harington, Commander of the Occupation Army in Constantinople, suggested removing any Greeks from the city, irrespective of their political beliefs, who were either potential recruits for the Greek army or likely to create trouble with the Turks. He added that non-Ottoman Greeks who were liable for mobilization should be given a short period of time to leave Constantinople and those who stayed after that should either be interned or strictly supervised. He even argued that this task could be entrusted to the Turkish authorities. Rumbold agreed with Harington on the issue of not allowing the Greeks to mobilize in Constantinople or use it as their base. However, he expressed his misgivings regarding the proposals put forward by the British General, fearing that they would create more problems. In order to find a solution he asked for instructions from London. On 15 April Curzon replied, advocating an Allied announcement stating that since the Allies were neutral

522 NA, FO371/6566/E4611: Rumbold to Curzon (13 April 1921).
in the present hostilities and responsible for Constantinople, no recruiting by either side could be allowed there.\footnote{DBFP 1970, #103: Rumbold to Curzon (12 April 1921).}

Britain was trying to keep a safe distance from both warring camps and retain order in the city. In line with this policy, Rumbold met with the new locum tenens Nikolaos of Kaisareia and two lay members of the PNMC on 18 April 1921. The High Commissioner asked the locum tenens whether he had pushed for the reinstatement of the Venizelist officers by the Greek government. When Nikolaos admitted that he had unofficially approached Athens on this issue, Rumbold pointed out that ‘the Patriarchate was indulging in political activities which were bound to produce an unfortunate impression on Turkish opinion’. Nikolaos argued in his defence that he was trying to assist in keeping public order in the city by removing the officers. However, Rumbold insisted on his views, and forced the two laymen to admit that the motive behind requesting the reinstatement of the officers was indeed to strengthen the Greek Army in their struggle against the Turkish Nationalists. In response, the High Commissioner made the remark that the Patriarchate should not be surprised if its motives were misunderstood and caused resentment.\footnote{DBFP 1970, #124: Rumbold to Curzon (20 April 1921).}

Thus, the Patriarchate and the CNDC were becoming increasingly isolated. Besides the pressure placed on them by Constantinist Athens and its representatives, they had also managed to lose the support of the British, who wanted to preserve stability in the city. The greatest danger however lay in the hatred of the Turks caused by the overt nationalism manifested by the leadership of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. If their risky policy failed, the consequences for the Greek population would be devastating. However, their nationalist and Venizelist fervour was so high at the time, that it did not allow them to consider this possibility. On the contrary, ignoring Rumbold’s advice they proceeded with the implementation of their plans.

On 12/25 April, the Patriarchate issued an encyclical on 12/25 April for holding a patriarchal election in June,\footnote{AEP, Code A/91: p.96-7, no 2463 (12/25 April 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 144.} provoking the Turks even more. As Rumbold reported to Curzon, this decision raised certain political questions:

\footnote{DBFP 1970, #103: Rumbold to Curzon (12 April 1921).}

\footnote{DBFP 1970, #124: Rumbold to Curzon (20 April 1921).}

\footnote{AEP, Code A/91: p.96-7, no 2463 (12/25 April 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 144.}
In view of the rupture of relations between the Patriarchate and the Porte, it may be assumed that on this occasion the patriarchal authorities will disregard the Turkish Government entirely. [...] Angora is, of course, hostile both to the Patriarchate and to the perpetuation of the privileges of the Ottoman Greek community in their old form. It is therefore unlikely to allow any participation in the election which it can prevent by local pressure.\textsuperscript{526}

The \textit{Amynites} also tried to make contact with the Venizelists in Athens. On 18 May 1921, Argyropoulos, who meanwhile had resigned from his post in Egypt and had gone to Constantinople\textsuperscript{527}, communicated a letter to the leader of the Liberal Party General Panagiotis Dagklis, informing him about the activities of the CNDC.\textsuperscript{528} Argyropoulos argued that apart from the common cause, which was ‘the amendment of the disaster of 1 November’, there were two main objectives of the Venizelists in Constantinople: to uplift the morale of the Greeks vis à vis the Turks; and not allow the government to destroy the National Centre, meaning Constantinople, and annihilate the status of the Patriarchate. As he pointed out:

Today the Patriarchate should be stronger than ever and independent both in the eyes of the Allies, who do not want to see the National Centre enslaved to Constantine and the Ottoman Empire, whose shadow exists only in Constantinople. For this reason, we insist on the speediest election of the patriarch.\textsuperscript{529}

Argyropoulos also enclosed an appeal of the CNDC to the Greeks residing abroad to assist their efforts financially.\textsuperscript{530} This document is revealing of the application of the decisions taken at the meeting of 25 March. The CNDC claimed that headed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it continued to represent Venizelos’ ideology towards the Allies. Furthermore, it gathered in Constantinople all the Venizelist forces, especially the dismissed officers, in order to coerce the government of Athens not to abandon the National Struggle. However, they maintained that the threat of the rapidly expanding Kemalist movement made the military organization in Constantinople necessary.\textsuperscript{531} To achieve this goal the CNDC was reformed

\textsuperscript{526} NA, FO371/6566/E5452: Rumbold to Curzon (4 May 1921).
\textsuperscript{528} Vozikis 1925: 125-6.
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid.; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{530} Ibid.,126-8.
\textsuperscript{531} Ibid.
establishing a political bureau under the supervision of Argyropoulos and a council of officers composed of Generals Ioannou, Zymbakakis, Mazarakis, Kalomenopoulos, Colonel Kondylis, 140 permanent and more than 200 reserve officers.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this account. The first is that the CNDC was going ahead with the separatist plan proposed to Venizelos and Lloyd George. Although it claimed that the reason behind forming troops was to defend themselves against the Kemalists, there is no doubt that the movement would eventually turn against Constantine and the royalist government. The second point is that an attempt that had begun as a political protest of the Constantinopolitan Greeks after Venizelos’ defeat had evolved into a full scale conspiracy against the Greek government. In addition, the CNDC was not leading the movement anymore, but rather it was following orders. The real power was now in the hands of the Venizelists who had executed the Thessaloniki movement in the past. The Venizelist lay leadership of the community had been absorbed into the national schism and was pursuing a policy that entailed grave dangers for the people they represented, namely the Constantinopolitan Greeks.

Dagklis was not supportive of the Venizelists’ activities in Constantinople. On the contrary, he was worried. On 18 May, he sent a letter to Ioannou emphasizing that the Liberals in Athens did not consent to radical actions which at this specific time would not produce any benefit. According to the Liberal leader the main interest of the nation was the implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres and since the government undertook the task of realizing this goal, the Liberal party morally supported the ‘cause’. Therefore, he asked Ioannou to advise the officers and the CNDC to avoid radical actions and inflaming articles and show a more moderate attitude. He also told him to try and restrict Argyropoulos’ involvement, because most of the Liberals considered his activities rather damaging. Finally, he argued that it was necessary to find a way for the Venizelist officers to return to duty and offer their services at the Asia Minor front. A week later Dagklis repeated his positions to Venizelos, referring also to his requests to Ioannou. However, he did not seem to be aware of Venizelos’
involvement, because he asked him whether he knew what was happening in Constantinople and if he had actually sent instructions to the officers there.\footnote{Dagklis 1965, vol. II: 399-402.}

In addition to Dagklis’ disapproval from Athens, the Venizelist coalition was also facing problems in Constantinople. First of all, the communities had started expressing their discontent for the donation system, because the financial situation in the city was becoming worse every day. There were several cases where people refused to pay the patriotic tax for the subsistence of the officers.\footnote{GMFA 1921 2/3: The situation in Constantinople (Η κατάστασις εν Κωνσταντινούπολει), 20 May/2 June 1921; GMFA 1921, 3/3: Epitropi Ethnikis Amynas Konstantinoupoleos; Dagklis 1965, vol. II: 399.} The economic difficulties also had an impact on the unity of the Venizelists. According to a report by the Greek High Commission dated on 20 May/2 June 1921, three different categories had been formed within the coalition: the intransigent, the moderate and the ones favouring full support for the Greek government. As a result, four persons had resigned from the CNDC. Among them were Aigidis, Makridis and Margaritis, the directors of the newspapers Neologos and Chronos. As a matter of fact, Neologos had gradually abandoned its fanatic Venizelist line and assumed a pro-reconciliation attitude, to the point that rumours were spread that the newspaper had sold out to the royalists.\footnote{GMFA 1921 2/3: The situation in Constantinople (Η κατάστασις εν Κωνσταντινούπολει), 20 May/2 June 1921.}

Similar signs of corrosion began to show within the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In early May 1921 the Grand Vicar of the Patriarchate Athinagoras was suspended from his functions by the two bodies, because he prayed publicly for King Constantine during a service at the temple of St.Georgios in Chalki. Furthermore, on 2/15 May a popular demonstration took place against members of the Holy Synod and ecclesiastical clerks, who were suspected of being Constantinists. According to Mavropoulos, who was among the persons attacked, this was organized by the PNMC in an effort to remove the anti-Venizelists from the Phanar.\footnote{NA, FO371/6566/E6774: Rattigan to Curzon (3 June 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 142-3.} Two days later, a patriarchal encyclical was issued condemning the protest against the clergymen, while declaring at the same time the Patriarchate’s firm support for its political ideology, meaning Venizelist expansionism. As in the case of Dragoumis, the
Patriarchate was trying publicly to keep its distance from events that could compromise its status. Therefore, Mavropoulos’ bitter remark that the purpose of this condemnation was to make a good impression is probably accurate.536

On 28 May the British Military Governor of the Aegean Islands F.B Finlaison reported that four Metropolitans were expelled from Constantinople for being supporters of the royalist Party. These prelates found refuge at Adrianople and, supported by Athens, called for an assembly of the Metropolitans of New Greece in order to take a decision on the issue of the patriarchal election. The meeting was planned to take place on 18/31 May.537 According to Frank Rattigan, Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople, the election was not going to proceed rapidly or smoothly. The reason was that ‘the apparent unity in Patriarchal circles on the issue between Venizelism and Constantinism has sustained some severe shocks’.538 The Greek authorities made the same assessment. They argued that the clergymen of the PNMC favoured reconciliation, because they had realized that the struggle against Athens was futile. On the contrary, its lay members, who were in control, did not want any changes regarding the Patriarchate’s policy.539

The Metropolitans met for the first time in Adrianople on 22 May/4 June.540 A week later they approved the dispatch of a memorandum to the locum tenens arguing that the time for a patriarchal election was not appropriate, because the nation was still fighting the ultimate struggle for the liberation of their unredeemed brothers. Therefore, they should first wait for the end of the military operations. Furthermore, the procedure of the patriarchal election should be arranged and specific stipulations should be made regarding the number of Metropolitans and laymen participating in the election. At the end, they threatened that if the election was held in any other way, they would consider it null.541

---

536 *Ekklisiastiki Alithia* (08/21 May 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 142.
537 NA, FO371/6566/E7183: Granville to Curzon (4 June 1921).
538 NA, FO371/6566/E6774: Rattigan to Curzon (3 June 1921).
539 See footnote #533.
540 The assembly in Adrianople was composed of 32 Metropolitans and Bishops. Head of the meeting was the Metropolitan of Irakleias Gregorios. For a detailed account about the participants see Mavropoulos 1960: 147-8.
541 Ibid., 147-9.
The two bodies of the Patriarchate approached the prelates of Adrianople in order to reach an agreement on the issue. In response, the latter decided to send a committee to Constantinople with the task of submitting its memorandum to the two bodies and holding negotiations with the authorities of the Patriarchate. Finally, the two sides arrived at an accord on 8/21 June stipulating that:

1. The patriarchal election would be adjourned and held in due course but not until the political and military situation was clearer.
2. For the purpose of the new election, all metropolitans subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate should be entitled not merely to nominate candidates, but to vote, and that all dioceses should be entitled to lay representation in the electoral body.

The agreement was afterwards ratified by the Adrianople assembly and was communicated to the Patriarchate via the Greek High Commission.\(^\text{542}\)

Thus, the clergy managed to overcome the intrasigence of the more extreme Venizelist laymen on the patriarchal issue and avoid a schism within the Church. An article entitled ‘Sad encroachments’ (‘Λυπηράι υπερβασίαι’) was published in the official instrument of the Patriarchate *Ekklisiastiki Aithia* on 31 July/13 August criticizing the enforcement of opinions and decisions of the lay leadership on the clergy. However, the influence exerted on the two bodies by the CNDC was very strong. As a result, on 1/14 October 1921 the authorities of the Patriarchate decided to hold the patriarchal election in December, breaking their arrangement with the prelates of Adrianople.\(^\text{543}\)

Athens reacted to the Patriarchate’s initiative. The Greek government favoured a postponement that would allow it to influence the electoral process and secure the election of a royalist patriarch. On 25 October, it communicated a telegram to the Patriarchate claiming that the time for the election was inappropriate and this decision was an infringement of the *modus vivendi*, since the national questions had not yet been resolved. Therefore, it insisted on the adjournment of the election and

---

\(^\text{542}\) Ibid., 149-50; NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (19 December 1921).
\(^\text{543}\) AEP, Code A/91: p.330-1, no 6660 (6/19 October 1921); *Ekklisiastiki Aithia* (9/22 October 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 153.
recommended sending the mission of a patriarchal committee to Athens in order to
discuss the issue further.\textsuperscript{544}

This invitation became a reason of conflict within the Patriarchate and revealed the
poisonous effects of the National Schism on the lay and religious leadership of the
community. According to Rumbold, seven out of eleven members of the Holy Synod
were metropolitans in dioceses under Greek occupation and had leanings towards
Constantine. Also three out of the eight lay members of the PNMC favoured
negotiations with Athens.\textsuperscript{545} These were Pavlos Karatheodoris, Angelos Ioannidis
and Thiseas Papadopoulos, who represented the more moderate Venizelists.\textsuperscript{546} The
two sides entered a heated debate on whether they should send a committee, which
led to resignations and counter-resignations. Finally, a decision was taken against the
immediate dispatch of a committee. This would be done only after the completion of
the patriarchal election. On 27 October the CNDC decided not to pursue the
replacement of the opposing National Councillors and members of the Holy Synod
until the return of Gounaris from Europe. The reason for this postponement was that
they did not want to provide him with the opportunity to put the blame of a possible
failure of his policy on the controversy surrounding the patriarchal issue. As a result,
the lay members of the PNMC retained their posts.\textsuperscript{547}

On 2/15 November Athens responded insisting on the adjournment. The
Patriarchate received similar telegrams from prelates and associations, probably
belonging to the Constantinist camp.\textsuperscript{548} At the same time, the decision of the
Patriarchate to go ahead with the election infuriated the Porte. According to the
Turkish press the Ministry of Justice approached the Grand Vizierate regarding the
irregularities of the election proceedings. This hostility towards the Patriarchate was
not a new phenomenon, but rather a consequence of the policy followed by the
Phanar. As Rumbold pointed out, ‘the Government of Constantinople have naturally
resented all along the conduct of the Patriarchate in breaking off all official relations,

\textsuperscript{544} NA, FO371/6566/E13058: Rumbold to Curzon (22 November 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 154.
\textsuperscript{545} NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921).
\textsuperscript{546} The other five members who represented the hardliners of the Venizelist cause were X. Zotos, A.
\textsuperscript{547} NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); GMFA 1921 2/4: MFA
#11950 (Constantinople 14/27 October 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 154.
\textsuperscript{548} Mavropoulos 1960: 154.
sending missions abroad, and generally assuming a quasi-sovereign position in regard to matters affecting ‘the unredeemed Greeks’’. Therefore, the election provided the Porte with the opportunity to show that they still had some power in Constantinople.\(^{549}\)

Despite these reactions however, on 5/18 November the two bodies voted 10 to 9 against the postponement of the election. They also invited the prelates to come to Constantinople and participate in the proceedings and officially decided to send a committee to Athens after the patriarch was elected. The prelates residing in Athens convinced the government to allow the clergy to travel to Constantinople, reassuring it that they would secure the exclusion of the Venizelist Meletios Metaxakis from the list of candidates. The Greek Foreign Minister Georgios Baltatzis instructed Avrilios Spatharis, who favoured a negotiation with Athens, and P. Kosmidis to go to Macedonia and pave the way for the election of representatives supporting the current regime.\(^{550}\)

However, the Greek government decided to change its policy. It retracted its initial acceptance allowing bishops and lay representatives belonging to territories under its control to participate in the elections and forbade them to proceed to Constantinople. It also threatened to refuse to recognize the patriarch if elected and allowed the Athenian press to make this threat public.\(^{551}\)

At the same time, the Greek Minister of Marine Petros Mavromichalis visited the locum tenens and although he reassured him that the government did not intend to interfere in the election, requested the exclusion of Meletios claiming that he would be established in Constantinople ‘not as a spiritual leader, but as an agent of Venizelism’.\(^{552}\)

The British Chargé d’Affaires in Athens Charles Bentinck provided a quite lucid explanation for the reasons behind the policy of Gounaris’ government. He argued that they were afraid of the election of a Venizelist patriarch, since the public sentiment in Constantinople was in favour of Venizelos and until recently Venizelism

\(^{549}\) NA, FO371/6566/E13058: Rumbold to Curzon (22 November 1921)

\(^{550}\) Mavropoulos 1960: 154; GMFA 1921 2/4: MFA to Greek High Commission (2 November 1921).

\(^{551}\) NA, FO371/6566/E13917: Bentinck to Curzon (5 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 155.

\(^{552}\) NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 141; Malainos 1963, vol.6: 197.
dominated the Patriarchate. He added that the royalists anxiously wanted to ‘buttress the throne by the Church’ and get a royalist patriarch elected in order to bless King Constantine. As he pointed out, ‘the Greek Government’s threats of non-recognition, &c., show how nervous they are and how much they fear that a non-royalist patriarch will be elected’.\footnote{NA, FO371/6566/E13917: Bentinck to Curzon (5 December 1921).} One could add that the patriarchal election was the government’s last opportunity to restrain Constantinople and possibly place it under its control. After all, the Patriarchate did not represent only the Constantinopolitan Greek community but all unredeemed Greeks. Therefore, its cooperation was necessary for the success of Greek official policy both at the front and abroad.

Both sides fought hard over the issue of the election in order to protect their interests. From the end of November the CNDC started putting pressure on the members of the Holy Synod who were against the election to change their mind. However, when the Holy Synod met on 23 November/6 December the royalist majority stated that they were in favour of an adjournment and withdrew from the meeting. Despite their withdrawal, the two bodies decided to hold the elections on 25 November/8 December.\footnote{NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 155-58.} On the eve of the election the Metropolitan of Metron Ioakim and Spanoudis visited the Patriarchate and announced that they had received a telegram from Venizelos recommending the election of Meletios Metaxakis for national reasons in an effort to influence the prelates. Although the telegram was actually signed by Konstantinos Tsolainos, Venizelos’ private secretary, everyone believed that it communicated the views of the Greek statesman. In addition, Mavropoulos claimed that 25,000 Turkish liras were sent to the CNDC in order to buy out votes for the election of Meletios.\footnote{NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Vozikis 1925: 155; Mavropoulos 1960: 159; Malainos 1963, vol.6: 197.} This claim was later verified by Francis C. Whitehouse, Canon of the British Embassy Chaplain in Constantinople, who reported that the Greeks of America promised 500,000 dollars to the Patriarchate in order to follow Venizelos’ instructions. As he pointed out, this sum was necessary,
since the financial assistance from Athens had not been paid for the past five months.\textsuperscript{556}

The next morning the electoral assembly met at the Patriarchate. It was composed of 100 members, while according to the agreement of 21 June there should have been approximately 300 members. As a result, the royalist camp was represented by few Metropolitans and only one lay member, whereas the rest of the laymen were from Constantinople representing either dioceses within the city or dioceses under Kemalist control. The seven royalist members of the Holy Synod and four Metropolitans who shared their views decided not to attend. Their absence created a deadlock, because the Holy Synod had to be complete for the election to take place. In order to deal with this problem, the assembly asked for the immediate replacement of the seven Metropolitans. The four remaining members of the Holy Synod and the eight Councillors held an extraordinary meeting and discussed this request. Ioannidis and Karatheodoris disagreed with the replacement proposal, with the latter claiming that ‘our conscience does not allow us to become ministers of such a dangerous coup’. The members of the Holy Synod asked the prelates present at the assembly whether it was possible to dismiss members of the Holy Synod, as had happened under the patriarchate of Ioakim III. The prelates responded that this was a legal action. Thus, the two bodies treated the absent members of the Holy Synod as having resigned and proceeded to their replacement by prelates present at the assembly.

The election then proceeded in a pro-Venizelist atmosphere. Speeches were delivered criticizing the Greek government and three royalist laymen were excluded from the proceedings. The three nominees for the patriarchal throne were Meletios, Nikolaos and the Metropolitan of Amasya Germanos. However, Nikolaos and Germanos implied that they would step down for Meletios. Germanos was also convinced by Thomareis and K.Galanis to support the Venizelist favourite in the final election of the prelates. In addition, the majority of the laymen, influenced by Tsolainos’ telegram, also supported Meletios’ nomination. Meletios and Nikolaos received 83 votes each and Germanos 78. The final decision lay on the present

\textsuperscript{556} NA, FO371/6566/E14338: Whitehouse to Archbishop of Canterbury (17 December 1921).
prelates, who voted 16 to 2 in favour of Meletios.\textsuperscript{557} He was notified about his victory, while promoting the Venizelist cause in the Greek communities of the United States.\textsuperscript{558}

The turning point of the election was the absence of the seven members of the Holy Synod. This decision was criticized both by Mavropoulos, who represented the royalist point of view, and \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alithia}, which after Meletios’ election resumed its pro-Venizelist line. The former argued that this was a mistake because if they had participated, Meletios would not have been elected. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical newspaper used their discreditable withdrawal to justify the decision of the two bodies to replace them and proceed with the election.\textsuperscript{559} In any case, it could be safely assumed that these Metropolitans tried to sabotage the election and were beaten by the Venizelists. As Rumbold reported, ‘if the Patriarchal authorities put this election through in spite of all obstacles, it was due to the determination of the local Venizelist organisation known as the ‘National Defence’’.\textsuperscript{560}

Meletios’ election infuriated Athens. This was an open challenge to the same government that had dismissed him from the Archbishopric of Athens as soon as they had come to power.\textsuperscript{561} The royalist press represented the election ‘as an attempt on the part of Constantinople to dictate policy to Athens’. On the other hand, the Venizelist party was satisfied by this development, which damaged Constantine’s prestige.\textsuperscript{562} At the same time, British officials both in Constantinople and Athens expressed their concerns regarding the consequences of the election of a Venizelist patriarch on the relations between the Patriarchate and the Church of Greece.\textsuperscript{563}

On 12 December 1921, a council of ministers met in Athens and declared the election null and void, due to the irregularities that had taken place during

\textsuperscript{557} For the account of these events see: NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 160-66; \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alithia} (27 November 1921).

\textsuperscript{558} Alexandris 1992: 72; Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 247; \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alithia} (27 November 1921); Mavropoulos 1960: 166.

\textsuperscript{559} Mavropoulos 1960: 159-60; \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alithia} (27 November 1921).

\textsuperscript{560} NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921).

\textsuperscript{561} NA, FO371/6566/E13582: Rumbold to Foreign Office (9 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E14338: Whitehouse to Archbishop of Canterbury (17 December 1921).

\textsuperscript{562} NA, FO371/6566/E13733: Bentinck to Foreign Office (12 December 1921).

\textsuperscript{563} NA, FO371/6566/E13900: Rumbold to Curzon (10 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E13917: Bentinck to Curzon (5 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E14338: Whitehouse to Archbishop of Canterbury (17 December 1921).
proceedings. An account of the events had been presented to them by the Metropolitans of Ainos Ioakim and Dardanelles Eirinaios, who were among the seven royalist prelates withdrawing from the election. This dissident group decided to send the Metropolitan of Trebizond Chrysanthos to London with the mission to present to the Archbishop of Canterbury the irregularities that took place and secure the non-recognition of the new patriarch by the Anglican Church. To Rumbold’s enquiry whether the Greek government was involved in organizing this trip, the First Secretary of the Greek High Commission denied any involvement of the Greek authorities. However, at the end of December Bentinck notified London that Philipppos Dragoumis and Souliotis-Nikolaidis would escort Chrysanthos on his trip to Britain and after a special request from the Greek government he had issued diplomatic visas for both men. Therefore, Athens was either orchestrating or actively supporting the whole effort of invalidating the result of the elections and discrediting Meletios. The choice of the people constituting this committee also holds a specific significance. Chrysanthos was at some point regarded as the Constantinist candidate for the patriarchal throne and had also abstained from the recent election. Philipppos Dragoumis was the brother of Ion, who had been killed by Venizelists, and Stefanos, who had been attacked in Constantinople. Souliotis-Nikolaidis was a close friend of Ion Dragoumis and had cooperated with him in the establishment of the SC. The irony is that he was travelling to London to argue against the actions of the CNDC, which was composed of his former associates in Constantinople.

Meanwhile, Venizelos tried to obtain an official British recognition of Meletios. On 17 December he sent a telegram to John Stavridis instructing him to visit Lloyd George and ask him to support the establishment of Meletios, in case the Ottoman authorities refused to recognize him. Venizelos’ fears were justified. Two days later the Turkish Foreign Minister notified Rumbold that the Porte considered the patriarchal election as null and void, on the grounds of breaking all the existing rules.

566 NA, FO371/6566/E14328: Bentinck to Foreign Office (29 December 1921).
567 NA, FO371/6566/E14194: Rumbold to Curzon (20 December 1921).
568 JSP, File 9: Venizelos to Stavridis (17 December 1921).
of conduct set up by Turkish official decrees. On 22 December Stavridis contacted both Sir Edward Grigg, Lloyd George’s private secretary, and Nicolson at the Foreign Office communicating Venizelos’ request. In both letters he pointed out that the Greek government was doing everything possible to prevent the ratification of the election by the Ottoman authorities. Grigg replied on 24 December reassuring Stavridis that the British Prime Minister would ‘do all he can to support the appointment of His Eminence Archbishop Meletios to the post of Oecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople’. Nicolson’s reply was not equally positive and demonstrated a certain level of caution on behalf of the Foreign Office. He argued that they did not wish to interfere in internal ecclesiastical issues of the Orthodox Church and posed the rhetorical question, whether it would be unwise to ‘press upon the Ottoman Government, in their present mood, a candidate who was disqualified by all precedents’.

Stavridis insisted and a few days later responded to Nicolson claiming that Meletios’ nomination was valid and attaching the documents proving it. In order to influence Nicolson he referred to his correspondence with Grigg and argued that the British government could support the election of Meletios through the High Commissioner in Constantinople. Finally, he asked the British diplomat to arrange a meeting between Meletios and Curzon, if possible. Nicolson politely evaded the request claiming that he was no longer working on eastern questions and that the Secretary of State was still away but even if he returned soon, political work would render impossible the reception of Meletios.

The reason behind the reluctance of the Foreign Office to get involved in this issue was that they wanted to dissociate themselves from Meletios. Rumbold was a strong advocate of this policy, because as he reported the general impression in Constantinople was that the British authorities had assisted the running of the

569 DBFP 1970, #489: Rumbold to Curzon (19 December 1921).
570 JSP, File 9: Stavridis to Nicolson (22 December 1921); JSP, File 9: Stavridis to Grigg (22 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E14088: Stavridis to Nicolson (22 December 1921).
571 JSP, File 9: Grigg to Stavridis (24 December 1921).
572 JSP, File 9: Nicolson to Stavridis (28 December 1921); NA, FO371/6566/E14088: Nicolson to Stavridis (28 December 1921).
573 JSP, File 9: Nicolson to Stavridis (11 January 1922); JSP, File 9: Stavridis to Nicolson (16 January 1922).
elections. In addition, on 29 December 1921 the Foreign Office advised the Archbishop of Canterbury not to get involved in the dispute between Venizelists and Constantinists and avoid meeting with either Meletios or Chrysanthos. The same day Reverend G.K.A. Bell reassured Crowe that the Archbishop would not be embroiled in this political controversy. However, he did not rule out an interview with Meletios, if this was considered necessary on public grounds. Although the Archbishop attributed to his illness his inability to receive Meletios, his representatives treated the new patriarch with honours that befitted his office. This could be explained by the fact that Meletios was a supporter of the ecumenical movement and was willing to cooperate with the Anglican Church, especially on the issue of the recognition of Anglican consecrations. Thus, when the Archbishop of Canterbury met with Chrysanthos at a later stage, he argued that it was necessary to recognize Meletios as a legal patriarch.

While in London, Meletios managed to meet with Lloyd George and showed his intentions regarding the policy he would follow as patriarch. During their meeting he asked the British statesman what the reaction of Britain would be, if the Greek army renounced Constantine and continued the war. Lloyd George seemed reluctant to reply and Meletios did not insist. However, at the end of their conversation, Meletios wondered rhetorically, whether it would better serve the interests of Britain and the Allies to place Constantinople and Asia Minor under the administration of Venizelos in any possible form, adding that this way the purification and redemption of Greece would become easier. He expressed similar accusations against the king and the Greek government, during his discussions with French officials in Paris. Meletios’ interview with Lloyd George caused a scandal when it was published in the Athenian press. On the other hand, the Venizelist newspapers in Constantinople congratulated the patriarch for his ‘holy struggle’ and his ‘historical interview’.

---

574 NA, FO371/6566/E13817: Rumbold to Foreign Office (15 December 1921).
575 NA, FO371/6566/E14338: Bell to Crowe (29 December 1921); Chronos (4/17 January 1922, 5/18 January 1922). The date on these two issues is 4 December 1922 and 5 December 1922, but these are printed mistakes.
578 Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 245; Chronos (15/28 January 1922).
While Meletios was introducing the idea of a separate state to the British Prime Minister, the CNDC approached General Anastasios Papoulas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army in Asia Minor, and Aristeidis Stergiadis, the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna, in order to find out whether they would support such an effort. In late December 1921, Ioannis Siotis, a member of the CNDC, travelled to Smyrna and met with the two men. Papoulas’ initial reaction was positive, but he made it clear to Siotis that the government’s consent and support was necessary before any action was taken. On the other hand, Stergiadis rejected the proposal, because an autonomous Asia Minor would lack the financial support of Athens and would also result in the division of the army. In addition, he was by that time convinced that the Greek occupation of Asia Minor could not be maintained.

A few weeks later, on 24 January/6 February 1922 Meletios arrived in the city and immediately endorsed the cause of the CNDC, becoming one of its leading figures. After Meletios’ arrival, the CNDC held a meeting in order to plan their next step. Meletios and the board listened to Siotis’ account of his discussions in Smyrna and decided to continue their negotiations with Papoulas. In February 1922 Siotis returned to Smyrna and resumed talks with Papoulas. He presented the views of Constantinople on the separatist movement and submitted to Papoulas a memorandum of the CNDC, which described their plan in detail. The CNDC argued that the evacuation of Asia Minor from the Greek Army would have disastrous effects on the Greek populations. Only a movement headed by Papoulas could unite the royalist and Venizelist faction within the Army and allow them to deal with this threat. This appeal for unity was followed by an effort to downplay their fervent Venizelism:

---

579 Siotis was also a former member of the SC; Souliotis-Nikolaidis 1984: 228. He later served as Minister of Religious Affairs and Education in the revolutionary Government of Stylianos Gonatas; Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 249; http://www.ggk.gr/governments.php?ord=num&gov=22, last accessed on 04/07/2007.
581 Chronos (24 January/6 February, 25 January/7 February 1922); Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 248; Mavropoulos 1960: 179.
582 Passas 1925: 175-6.
583 The memorandum can be found in Passas 1925: 177-184. It was signed by T.K. Stavridis, G. Tziotis, D. Iasonidis, P. Bekes, L. Kazanovas and A. Antypas. See also: Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 252-4.
First of all, Sir Commander-in-Chief, we should reassure you that the National Defence of Constantinople is absolved of any prejudice in favour or against specific individuals. Neither King Constantine, nor Eleftherios Venizelos have ever influenced our feelings as persons or have inspired one or the other political direction of ours. If an overwhelming enthusiasm on the part of the people of this city was expressed in favour of Eleftherios Venizelos during the past years, this is only due to his liberation work.\textsuperscript{584}

Llewellyn-Smith argues that ‘the Amyna unconvincingly protested political neutrality. […] The Venizelist orientation of the movement was as evident as its revolutionary nature. The \textit{Amyna}’s true feelings about the Gounaris government and King Constantine were suppressed in deference to Papoulas, and in the hope that competent royalist and ‘neutral’ officers would not be deterred from joining the movement’.\textsuperscript{585} This explanation is partly true. The CNDC definitely had to tone down its Venizelism in order to secure Papoulas’ support for the movement. After all, since November 1920 Constantinople had become the spearhead of anti-Constantinism. Yet, there was also an element of honesty in this statement. No matter how much they detested Constantine and the royalists, the situation had become extremely dangerous for the Greek population in Turkey. Their welfare was a higher priority than their Venizelism. This becomes evident in their commitment to assist this patriotic movement in any way possible:

Under the current extreme circumstances for the Nation, especially in Ionia and Constantinople, unredeemed Hellenism is willing to support the person who will oppose the decision of abandoning the people in the hands of the Turks. […] If there are men on the Venizelist side incapable of understanding this feeling of patriotic sacrifice, we renounce these men in advance with the right afforded to us by the great majority of the people of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{586}

This conciliatory mood also characterized their proposals. On the one hand, they offered Papoulas the opportunity to form a government of his choice and agreed to announce to Athens the reasons that led to this new regime. On the other hand, they suggested the appointment of Venizelos as the delegate of the new state to Paris and London.\textsuperscript{587} However, nothing came out of these negotiations. Despite Papoulas’

\textsuperscript{584} Ibid., 179; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{585} Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 254.
\textsuperscript{586} Passas 1925: 179, 181; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., 180-1.
willingness to support the movement, and the efforts of the CNDC and the Patriarchate to show a more moderate attitude towards Athens, the Greek government on two occasions rejected the plan.\(^{588}\) The mistrust between the two sides did not permit any kind of understanding. The royalists believed that the Venizelists were using Papoulas as a pawn in order to appease the army and mislead them into believing that the movement had the approval of Athens. They were also afraid that the CNDC would eventually take advantage of the movement to turn against Constantine and the Greek government.\(^{589}\) Therefore, they claimed that the continuation of the struggle by an ‘unofficial organization’ was unnecessary and claimed that everyone should assist the country either by enlisting or offering financial support.\(^{590}\)

On the other hand, the intransigence of Gounaris and the Minister of War Nikolaos Theotokis to cooperate or even consider the plan had agitated the CNDC. In their letter to Papoulas after the failure of the negotiations, they expressed their disappointment: \(^{591}\)

And finally, Sir Commander-in-Chief, the management of our case by the government of Athens fills us with disappointment, because, allow us to speak frankly, nobody trusts the administration of Gounaris anymore […] Therefore, the difference between the hope that the separatist movement offers and the desperation that the decision of the government for the continuation of the war creates, is colossal. Our views, Sir Commander-in-Chief, are so indisputable, that one is honestly surprised by the fact that the official circles in Athens were not convinced by the need for a movement. On the contrary, they were influenced by unfounded suspicions about the purposes that have dictated the promotion of this solution to the committee of the National Defence.

Horowitz argues that, ‘whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, […] is determined largely by internationals politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state’.\(^{592}\) In the case of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, the refusal of the Greek government to cooperate was not the CNDC’s only problem.

---

\(^{588}\) For Papoulas’ support for the plan and the Greek government’s rejections see: Passas: 186-191, 194-196. Regarding the efforts of the Patriarchate and the CNDC to manifest a more moderate attitude towards Athens see: \textit{Chronos} (1/14 March 1922, 25 March/7 April 1922, 12/25 April 1922).

\(^{589}\) Vozikis 1925: 161.

\(^{590}\) Passas 1925: 186-7

\(^{591}\) Ibid., 222-3; See Appendix 1.

\(^{592}\) Cited in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 262.
It soon realized that all its supposed allies were not offering any substantial support. In early March 1922, Venizelos rejected the appeal of the CNDC to disrupt his trip to the United States and return to Europe in order to defend the rights of the unredeemed Greeks. He claimed that his return would provide the government with the opportunity to disclaim all responsibility for its policy.\(^{593}\) When the Greek statesman finally decided to offer his advice to the CNDC in late March he did not commit to undertake the task of representing the possible new state in Europe. Even on the issue of political authority he proposed Stergiadis for the leadership.\(^{594}\) In addition, Venizelos’ involvement annoyed Papoulas, who felt that his patriotic intentions were exploited for political purposes and distanced himself from the CNDC. The last attempt at cooperation between the two sides, which focused on the issue of the return of Venizelist officers to the army, failed when Papoulas resigned at the end of May.\(^{595}\)

Furthermore, Britain, the European power the Venizelists considered to be their greatest ally, disapproved of the separatist movement and believed it would have disastrous results.\(^{596}\) Already, the policy of the CNDC had exposed its members, as well as the Constantinopolitan Greek community, to the danger of retaliations by the Turks. On 1/14 March the newspaper *Ileri* had dedicated a whole article to the activities of the CNDC, describing the Patriarchate as ‘their Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ and Péra Palas as their ‘headquarters’.\(^{597}\) At the beginning of May, *Chronos* reported that the issue of the CNDC was discussed at the GNA in Ankara and it was decided to draw up catalogues with the names of the Ottoman Greeks participating in these activities, in order to account for their crimes against the state after the end of the war.\(^{598}\)

The collapse of the negotiations considerably destabilized the CNDC, which was in desperate need of political orientation. Thus, in May 1922 Argyropoulos travelled to Paris to meet with Venizelos, who in the meantime had returned to Europe. He was

\(^{593}\) *Chronos* (19 February/4 March 1922).


\(^{595}\) Passas 1925: 199; Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 264.

\(^{596}\) DBFP 1970, #278; Curzon to Lindley (31 March 1922); Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 263.

\(^{597}\) Reprinted in *Chronos* (1/14 March 1922).

\(^{598}\) *Chronos* (21 April/4 May 1922).
carrying with him a report with the recent activities of the Venizelists prepared by himself, Meletios and Kondylis and signed by the patriarch. Argyropoulos reported to Kondylis that the Greek statesman approved of the policy followed by the CNDC.\textsuperscript{599} It seems that Venizelos had decided to play a more active role in the Asia Minor affair. In late May he went to London in order to discuss the situation with the British officials. During his meeting with Crowe on 24 May, he brought again to the table the proposal of organizing a local defence force in Smyrna, composed of men and officers originally drawn from this region. This force would resist the penetration of Kemalist forces in the area and protect the local population. He argued however that the financial assistance of the Allies was necessary for the success of this endeavour.\textsuperscript{600} A few days later, he met with Lloyd George and both men agreed that it was necessary for Constantine to abdicate in order for the Great Powers to change their attitude towards Greece.\textsuperscript{601} From that point on, the CNDC resumed its anti-Constantinist policy in an effort to overthrow the Athens regime. Venizelos not only supported, advised and encouraged them,\textsuperscript{602} but also tried to approach Stergiadis with regards to his negative stance towards the CNDC. However, the Greek High Commissioner was not willing to meet Venizelos or change his mind on the issue, an attitude that severely damaged relations between the two men.\textsuperscript{603}

It seems however that this renewed and fiercer anti-Constantinist campaign no longer expressed public feeling, but rather the views of the community’s Venizelist political elite. As a matter of fact, the people of Constantinople had become disaffected with the whole situation. A characteristic example is reported in the correspondence of the Greek High Commission with Athens, dated 28 May/10 June 1922. According to this report, a meeting took place between the board of the CNDC and the representatives of several Constantinopolitan societies and associations on the issue of financial assistance for the Venizelist officers. Most of the participants supported its continuation, because an opposite action could be perceived as ‘an abandonment of the Idea’ and ‘a change of the political beliefs of the people’. Zervos

\textsuperscript{599} Vozikis 1925: 226.  
\textsuperscript{600} DBFP 1970: #642 (Record by Sir E.Crowe of a conversation with M.Veniselos).  
\textsuperscript{601} Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 270-1.  
\textsuperscript{602} Vozikis 1925: 229-237.  
\textsuperscript{603} Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 265, 271-2.
recalled Theotokis’ statements that the Constantinopolitan people would soon react and refuse to continue maintaining the officers and argued that the financial aid should continue just to ‘prove Mr. Theotokis wrong’.\(^{604}\) Therefore, despite the fact that the people had already shown their resentment towards this situation,\(^ {605}\) the Venizelist leadership was willing to continue placing this financial burden on them just to prove a point to their opponents in Athens.

The collapse of the Asia Minor front in August 1922 put a tragic and sudden end to all these efforts. A few days before the entry of the Turkish army into Smyrna, Meletios appealed for the final time to Venizelos:\(^ {606}\)

Dear friend and brother, Eleftherios Venizelos,

The great moment for a great gesture on your behalf has come. Hellenism in Asia Minor, the Greek state and the entire Greek Nation are descending now into a Hell from which no power will be able to raise them up and save them. For this unimaginable catastrophe it is of course your political enemies who bear the blame; but you too bear a great weight of responsibility for two of your actions. First because you sent as High Commissioner an utterly deranged egotist to Asia Minor. Secondly, because […] you had the unfortunate and guilty inspiration to order elections on the very eve of your entry to Constantinople and the occupation of it by the Greek army in the implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres - now alas forever destroyed. […] It is not necessary for this Hellenism and these territories with Constantinople to be united with Greece, because that dream has been removed from us for at least a hundred years, but hasten to raise your powerful voice so that these territories may be made an autonomous Eastern Christian state, even under the sovereignty of the Sultan, with your noble self as High Commissioner.

But it was too late. The burning of Smyrna and the tragic death of Metropolitan Chrysostomos shocked and terrified the Constantinopolitan Greeks and especially the prominent Venizelist figures. Exactly four years after their return to power they were fleeing Constantinople out of fear of retaliation.\(^ {607}\) The majority of the Venizelist political elite moved to Athens, where they continued to play an active role in the

\(^{604}\) Vozikis 1925: 228-9.


\(^{606}\) Cited in Llewellyn-Smith 1999: 302-3.

\(^{607}\) Papadopoulos recalls that among the first who left was Spanoudis, his director at Proodos, due to the articles he had published against the Turks during the war. See Papadopoulos 1978: 97-8.
affairs of the Constantinopolitan community until the signing of the Ankara accord in 1930.
Conclusions

September 1918 saw the return of the nationalists to power after the interlude of the Balkan Wars and World War I. Supported by the majority of Constantinopolitan Greeks, who were disillusioned by the compromising policy of Germanos V towards the Young Turks, they managed to overthrow the ageing patriarch and become the new leadership of the community. Almost all of them belonged to the Ioakimist faction and were former members of the SC. Their desire was for Constantinople to become part of Venizelos’ Greater Greece and they set out to promote their unification with the motherland.

Initially their activities focused on severing the community’s ties with the Ottoman establishment and manifesting their desire for union. Thus, after the signing of the Mudros armistice, they disrupted their relations with the Porte and did not show any sign of moderation, despite the warnings of the Allies. The people started to show their Greek national feelings publicly and to express their adoration of Venizelos. The nationalizing policies of the Young Turks had alienated them and had encouraged them to identify with his expansionist policy.

Venizelos’ loss in the elections of November 1920 was a turning point for the policy of the Constantinopolitan Greek leadership. Devoted to Venizelos, they established the CNDC in an effort to support the ‘Leader of the Nation’ in his dispute with King Constantine and the anti-Venizelists. From this moment, the national schism was transferred beyond the limits of the Greek state. Soon Constantinople became the centre of Venizelist opposition to royalist Athens.

The establishment of the CNDC completed the formation of a nationalist movement, which had been initiated by the policies of the SC in 1908-1912. The CNDC had all the essential elements of an effective political organization. It did

\[608\] Brass (1991: 48-9) identifies some basic elements for a nationalist political organization to be effective. Political organizations that can command some community resources are likely to be more effective and successful than those that cannot. A political organization that succeeds in identifying itself with the community is likely to be more effective against external political competition and potential internal rivals. It must be able to shape the identity of the group it leads. It must also be effective in the pursuit of nationalist goals and provide continuity and must be able to withstand changes in leadership. Finally, one political organization must be dominant in representing the demands of the ethnic group against its rivals.
not just represent the Greek Orthodox community, but identified itself with it, since Venizelism and the *Megali Idea* had acquired a dominant position in the consciousness of the population. Therefore, it was able to withstand the external political pressure exercised by the government in Athens and the royalists in Constantinople. At the same time, the CNDC commanded the community’s resources. Its members were in control of the PNMC and the majority of the Greek newspapers, as well as several communal boards, clubs and associations. Furthermore, it was acting under the legitimizing umbrella of the Patriarchate, the highest authority within the *Rum milleti*. The CNDC also demonstrated signs of continuity. Taking into consideration that it was composed of former members of the SC, it can be safely argued that there was a definite ideological link between the two political organizations. The methods, means and strategies employed by the CNDC revealed the experience its members had acquired during their active involvement with the SC.

Therefore, despite the changes in leadership and the redefinition of its national aims, the main body of the movement, composed of members of the nationalist circles, had retained its coherence. Above all however, the leadership of the movement had managed to shape the identity of the Rums since they came to power in 1918. The public expressions of Greek national sentiments throughout this period showed that national consciousness was no longer restricted to the elites, but had become the concern of the majority of the population. In Hroch’s terms, the Greek national movement in Constantinople had completed its Phase C. Its aim had shifted from unification with Venizelos’ Greece to the creation of a separate state in the Near East as a reaction to the policies of Athens.

However, the activities of the CNDC and their overt support of Venizelist expansionism did not only cause the hostility of the royalist government and the disapproval of the Allies, but more importantly provoked the national feeling of the Turks. The Patriarchate, the members of the CNDC and the Greek population were exposed to the danger of retaliations by the Turks. Overwhelmed by their nationalist fervour and poisoned by the political fanaticism of the National Schism, the

---

609 See Hroch in Özkırımlı 2000: 159.
Venizelist leadership of the community did not make any provisions for the protection of the people they represented in case their policy failed. As a result, when the Asia Minor front collapsed and the news of the Smyrna events reached Constantinople, they were the first to leave the city and seek refuge in Greece. The Greeks who remained in Constantinople had to deal with a number of problems. Their leadership had abandoned them; stigmatized by their support for Greek nationalism, they had to face the consequences of the nationalists’ policies; and they had to adjust to the new conditions created after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty.
Chapter 4:

The establishment of an authority in exile 1923 – 1930
Introduction

This chapter will focus on the policies of the ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks and their consequences on the Greek-Turkish negotiations of this period as well as on their co-nationals residing in Istanbul. The term ‘non-exchangeable’ refers to the persons who were exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations according to Article 2 of the ‘Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations’ signed on 30 January 1923. The term ‘absent’ is used to describe the non-exchangeable Greeks of Istanbul, who had left Turkey before the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. These people belonged to the nationalist upper and middle class elite who had dominated communal affairs and had supported Venizelos and Greek irredentism during the period 1918-1922. Although according to the clauses of the treaty they had every right to return to Istanbul and actually wished to do so, the Turkish authorities did not allow them to exercise this right. It will be argued that they gradually became a displaced community and assumed the role of an authority in exile for the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. The term ‘displaced community’ is used to describe a group of people who have voluntarily or by force left their homeland on account of their race, religious faith, nationality or their association with a particular social or political group.\(^{610}\)

In this context, emphasis will be given to the activities of ‘La Commission exécutive plénipotentiaire soussignée, chargée de la défense des Grecs, sujets turcs, établis à Constantinople et séjournant provisoirement en Grèce’ (Executive Committee, EC), a representative committee founded by the ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks in Athens. The protests of the EC to the Greek state and the LoN will be presented in an attempt to understand the motives and interests of this specific leadership group with regards to the affairs of the whole minority. At the same time, the chapter will examine the development of the relations between this elite and Venizelos, their trusted political leader, from the moment he returned to politics in 1928 until the signing of the Ankara accord in 1930.

From fugitives to political exiles

On 17/30 September 1922, a few days after Smyrna was razed to the ground, Patriarch Meletios addressed an agonizing appeal to his Greek Orthodox flock in Istanbul.\(^{611}\)

The Church and the Nation [Γένος] are going through days of great hardship. [...] The unparalleled, in the sad history of military disasters, tragedy of Smyrna had an impact on the psychological balance of us all. [...] Today we wish to say to our fellow Christians that even if the seriousness of our situation at certain moments was alarming for international peace, in reality it was never so grave as to justify the crowd in front of the office issuing passports and the haste to leave the country. From three or four days ago, these critical moments belong to the past. The Allies agreed to maintain a firm attitude, the troops responsible for the order and security of Istanbul and the Straits were reinforced and the whole matter is under peaceful negotiations. Therefore, we suggest in a fatherly fashion that the children of the Church should put aside the fear of any imminent disaster for Istanbul, continue their work with peace of mind and abandon the idea of leaving. There is only one danger that all should be beware of. We mean the danger caused by panic.

His words demonstrated the panic created by the atrocities committed at Smyrna and the fear that similar events would take place in Istanbul, as soon as the city came under the control of the Kemalist forces. After all, a significant number of Constantinopolitan Greeks belonging to the middle and upper classes had openly and actively supported the irredentist policy of the Greek state. In a letter to the Greek government on 23 September/6 October 1922, the Public Committee of Unredeemed Greeks (Κοινή των Αλυτρώτων Ελλήνων Επιτροπεία, PCUG) and the Special Committee of Constantinopolitans (Ειδική Επιτροπή Κωνσταντινουπολίτων, SCC), both established in Athens, made a plea for the protection of their brethren.\(^{612}\) They argued that entrusting the political administration of Istanbul to the Kemalist authorities would be a ‘deadly blow’ to Hellenism and the Christians of the city, if it took place before granting general amnesty for any kind of political crimes and actions committed during the war or before the signing of the final treaty, which should also include a provision for a general amnesty. The Turkish authorities had

---

\(^{611}\) *Ekklissiastiki Alithia* (24 September 1922); See Appendix 1.

\(^{612}\) GMFA 1922 3/2.
already prepared long catalogues with the names of all the notables and the most prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks in terms of education, science, commerce, art and wealth and had started searching for them. They claimed that if measures were not taken, every indictment would amount to a sentence to death. If the usual method of accusations and false testimonies was employed, even people that were innocent beyond any doubt would be destroyed and Hellenism in the city would be relentlessly decimated. According to them, the rest of the Constantinopolitan Greeks would flee the country in terror, abandoning their property. Therefore, it was necessary to make provisions for the protection of 400,000 Greeks, and 100,000 refugees and orphans of war who were in extreme danger.

The letter was signed on behalf of the SCC by Damaskinos, Nikolaos Makridis, P.Zervos, Ioannis Hrisafidis, and F.Flouridis. The first three were prominent figures of the CNDC and had been politically involved in the promotion of Greek irredentism in Istanbul. The same could be safely assumed for Hrisafidis and Flouridis. They were both well acquainted and had worked with ardent Venizelists and members of the CNDC. These people obviously represented the upper and middle class Constantinopolitan Greeks, who formed the lay leadership of the community and had championed the Megali Idea during the critical years 1919-1922. Organized as a purpose group in Constantinople, they had regrouped in Athens under the name SCC and organized resistance against the Kemalist regime. The arguments they employed to justify the request for a general amnesty offer a fair understanding of the way they perceived their role and their position in the Constantinopolitan community.

613 For the involvement of Damaskinos, N.Makridis and Zervos in the CNDC see: Chapter 2, pp.111, 117, 137, 157-8; Chapter 3, p.173
614 Hrisafidis had been a member of the committee that had organized the celebration in honour of Stavros Voutyras, the Constantinopolitan journalist and publisher of the Greek newspaper Neologos, who had completed 50 years in journalism. Voutyras’ son, Alexandros, was president of the PPLP and among the co-founders of the CNDC. Other members of the same organizing committee who actively participated in the CNDC were Damaskinos, N.Makridis, Spanoudis, K.Makridis, K.Gerardos, Aristodimos Kalotaios, Pananos Kesisoglou, Nikolaos Margaritis, and Ioannis Kehayioglou. See PSV 1920: 3.

Hrisafidis was also in the school board (οφορεία) of the ‘School of Languages and Commerce’ (Σχολή Γλωσσών και Εμπορίου) with N.Margaritis and V.Aristovoulos, also members of the CNDC. See EIEA 1923.

Flouridis had collaborated in 1919 with Damaskinos in a committee appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate for the drafting of a new regulation for the election of the members of the PNMC. See AEP, Code A/90: p.118, no 9751 (12 September 1919).
615 See Wood 1994: 608.
They were the pillars of the community and without them Hellenism in the city would perish. In other words, the survival of the Greek Orthodox population of the city was directly connected with, if not depended on, the granting of amnesty to this Constantinopolitan elite group.

In any case, the reassurances of the patriarch and the appeal of the SCC did not prevent the mass departure of Constantinopolitan Greeks from the city. On 19 October 1922 a delegation of the Turkish nationalists headed by General Refet Bele was sent to Istanbul. As the British ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold pointed out to Lord Curzon, ‘preparations which have been made for the welcome of the Kemalist gendarmerie as well as for arrival of Refet Pasha are not calculated to allay the fears of the Christian population’.\(^{(616)}\) On 5 November 1922 the Imperial government resigned and Refet took over. He stated to the press that as the only authorized representative of the Ankara government, he had taken over administration of Constantinople. He also told the city’s *Vali* that he could only carry on as an incumbent of the Ankara government and placed the staff of the municipality and *vilayet* under his orders.\(^{(617)}\) Immediately after coming to power, the nationalist administration showed its intentions to resume absolute control of public services and the police, causing the official protest of the Allies.\(^{(618)}\) The High Commissioners even considered proclaiming Istanbul in a state of siege, a proposal dismissed by the Allied Generals on the grounds that it would lead to a rupture with the Kemalists, who would immediately attack at the Chanak and Ismid front.\(^{(619)}\) According to General Harington, the situation had become very serious:\(^{(620)}\)

I am unfortunately and much against my will fettered in Constantinople by the presence of 500,000 Christians who are very frightened and if the British withdraw, it will result in panic. Owing to the demands of the Kemalists and the attitude adopted by them in Constantinople the centre of gravity has moved here.

---

\(^{(616)}\) DBFP, 1/18, No 128: Rumbold to Curzon (21 October 1922).
\(^{(617)}\) DBFP, 1/18, No 155: Rumbold to Curzon (6 November 1922).
\(^{(618)}\) DBFP, 1/18, No 157: Rumbold to Curzon (6 November 1922).
\(^{(619)}\) DBFP, 1/18, No 158: Rumbold to Curzon (7 November 1922).
DBFP, 1/18, No 174: Rumbold to Curzon (11 November 1922).
DBFP, 1/18, No 183: Rumbold to Curzon (12 November 1922).
\(^{(620)}\) DBFP, 1/18, No 197: Curzon to Hardinge (16 November 1922).
The Kemalists rapidly took over the civil administration of the city, a fact confirmed by the departure of the Sultan on 17 November 1922.621 At the same time, G.W. Rendel, second secretary in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, reported that large numbers of Ottoman Greeks were constantly reaching Greece from Constantinople. According to Rumbold, 3,000 Ottoman Greeks departed on a daily basis.622 By the end of November 1922, a *modus vivendi* came about between the Refet mission and the Allies. The Turks assumed full control of civil administration without accepting any Allied interference, the result of the Allies’ failure to impose a state of siege at an early stage. On the other hand, the Allies retained military control of the city.623 However, when the Turks tried to gain control of the police towards Greeks with Hellenic nationality (Hellenes) and Russians, their demand was firmly resisted by the Allies.624 At the end a compromise was reached. Hellenes and Russians were omitted from an enumerated list of the Allies enjoying Allied police protection, but until further arrangements were made, they would continue to be treated in accordance with the procedure laid down in the clause concerning Allied subjects.625 Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, came under the jurisdiction of the Turkish police. After this agreement, the Turkish police proceeded to the arrests of Ottoman Greeks who had cooperated with the Allies and the Greeks.626

On 5 December 1922 passport control came under Turkish jurisdiction. The Allies were not in a position to guarantee the safety of the non-Muslims. As Henderson admitted, ‘through failure to institute a state of siege a month ago we have in fact abandoned all protection of the native Christian population. The last step in this respect has been the admission of the principle that henceforth Ottoman subjects to

---

621 DBFP, 1/18 No 200: Henderson to Curzon (17 November 1922).
DBFP, 1/18 No 204: British Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d’Orsay (18 November 1922).
622 DBFP, 1/18 No 202: Memorandum by Mr Rendel on the Situation of the Refugees in Greece, (17 November 1922); Alexandris 1992: 82.
623 DBFP, 1/18 No 233: Henderson to Crowe (28 November 1922).
624 DBFP, 1/18 No 214: Henderson to Crowe (22 November 1922).
625 DBFP, 1/18 No 223: Henderson to Crowe (25 November 1922).
leave Constantinople must be provided with Turkish passports’.\textsuperscript{627} In addition to this, Refet passionately declared that Hellenes, being subjects of an enemy state, could not benefit by any special treatment and their interests should be entrusted to a neutral legation.\textsuperscript{628} On 10 December 1922, Henderson reported to Curzon that the Greek High Commissioner received a telegram from the Greek delegation in Lausanne ordering them to close the High Commission and entrust the Greek interests to the Spanish Minister.\textsuperscript{629} Indeed, on 12 December 1922 the Greek High Commission closed and approximately 80,000 to 90,000 Hellenes were despatched to Spain.\textsuperscript{630}

All these facts intensified the fear and insecurity of the Constantinopolitan Greeks and were used as an indirect form of coercion by the Kemalists in order to force them to leave the country. From the moment the Greek population became convinced that failure to migrate would result in imprisonment or even death, fleeing to survive seemed the only option.\textsuperscript{631} This widespread belief resulted in a new wave of emigration. During the period October–December 1922, approximately 40,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks belonging to the wealthier classes fled Istanbul and temporarily settled in Greece.\textsuperscript{632}

On 30 January 1923 the Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed at Lausanne. Article 2 stipulated that the Greek Orthodox citizens of Constantinople, Imbros and Tenedos and the Muslim citizens of Western Thrace were not included in the compulsory exchange of populations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{633} According to Articles 2 and 16,\textsuperscript{634} these people were entitled to return to Turkey if they wished to. Article 2 stipulated that:

All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.

At the same time, Article 16 stated that:

\textsuperscript{627} DBFP, 1/18 No 259, Henderson to Crowe (6 December 1922).
\textsuperscript{628} DBFP, 1/18 No 223, Henderson to Crowe (25 November 1922).
\textsuperscript{629} DBFP, 1/18 No 269, Curzon to Henderson (10 December 1922).
\textsuperscript{630} Alexandris 1992: 83.
\textsuperscript{631} See Wood 1994: 609.
\textsuperscript{632} Alexandris 1992: 82-3, 101, 104; Pallis 1937: 167.
\textsuperscript{633} Treaty of Lausanne 1923: 175.
\textsuperscript{634} Ibid., 175, 185.
No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece. This provision shall not be invoked as a motive for preventing the free alienation of property belonging to inhabitants of the said regions which are expected from the exchange, or the voluntary departure of those among these inhabitants who wish to leave Turkey or Greece.

However, until the peace treaty with Turkey was signed and ratified by the Greek and Turkish governments, the Convention could not become operational. Consequently, the Turkish authorities, still free of any obligation, did not allow these non-exchangeable Greeks to return to Istanbul, on the grounds of irregularities with their passports. As a matter of fact, these people had left Turkey in a state of panic carrying all sorts of passports: special inter-allied visas on laissez-passer passports, Imperial Ottoman passports, temporary Greek passports and foreign passports. Some of them had left without any official papers, while the few that had managed to obtain regular Turkish passports faced the same difficulties when they decided to return.

On 3 March 1923, the Central Committee of Constantinople (‘Κεντρική Επιτροπή Κωνσταντινουπόλεως’, CCC), an association of non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks founded in Athens, sent a letter to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Apostolos Alexandris, protesting against the measures taken by the Turkish government. They claimed that the chargé d’affaires of Turkey in Athens and abroad had received strict orders from Ankara not to deliver visas or issue passports for Istanbul, even to those who had left with regular Turkish passports. The reason behind this policy was that ‘the Kemalist government regarded all those who had departed as traitors without distinction or that they had lost their Ottoman citizenship ipso jure’. The Greek citizens and the Ottoman Greeks, who returned to Istanbul with visas provided by the consulates assigned to represent Turkish interests, were interrogated at the police station of Galata. The Ottoman Greeks were sent

---

635 According to article 19 of the Convention, the latter would come into force immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace by Greece and Turkey; Ladas 1932: 345.
636 GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (3 March 1923); Alexandris 1992: 83; The Times (23 July 1929).
637 GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (3 March 1923).
638 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
afterwards to Nikomidia and inner Asia Minor. The ones whose visas were not in order were forced to go back on the same boat.

According to the CCC, the Kemalists were using the abandoned property law of 20 April 1922 to confiscate and sell the property of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks. The law stipulated that the abandoned property would be managed by the state and the absence of the owner could be confirmed through a juridical decision, unless the person who had departed had defected to the enemy. They stressed the fact that most of the Constantinopolitan Greeks before leaving had either sublet their property by signing contracts verified by the Turkish authorities or appointed a proxy through official notaries. However, their personal estate and landed property was sold off for depreciated prices to Muslims who had connections with the authorities, without any juridical decision and against the law. The same policy was followed for the Constantinopolitan Greeks who had departed years before the war. At the same time, the prefecture of Istanbul, following orders from Ankara, started to sell properties of ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks under the pretext of enforcing the law of war profits tax. The Turks claimed that these people owed huge amounts of money from the war profits of the period 1916-18. The authorities did not allow either the ‘absent’ owners to return in order to safeguard their rights or their representatives by proxy to appear in front of the state committees to protest and use the legal means available against the illegal imposition of the tax. This was not the first time accusations were made regarding the confiscation of properties. On 25 November 1922, Kanellopoulos had reported that properties belonging to Greeks who had left were registered and sealed up, with the purpose of being considered abandoned.639 A month later, Anninos, a member of the Greek delegation, had expressed his despair at the reluctance of the Allied High Commissions to make the necessary representations to prevent the confiscation of Greek properties.640 Patriarch Meletios had also remonstrated with the Allied powers against these confiscations.641 However, the CCC’s protest was the first official attempt of a faction of the

639 GMFA 1923, 2/2.
640 GMFA 1923, 2/2: Anninos to MFA (23 December 1922).
641 Alexandris 1992: 118.
Constantinopolitan Greeks to claim their rights and respond to the new conditions created after the victory of the Kemalist forces.

The CCC also drew the attention of Athens to Ankara’s intentions to apply Kemalist laws in Istanbul such as the education law, the family law, the law of military compensation, the law regarding alcoholic drinks and the establishment of Independence Tribunals.\(^{642}\) The application of these laws before the signing of the minority treaty would result in a ‘complete national disaster’. As they pointed out, the actions of Ankara ‘lacked any legal or moral bases’ and violated Article 16 of the Convention concerning the exchange of populations. As a result, they asked the Greek government to intervene and use any means possible to convince the GNA of Ankara to:

1. Ensure the unobstructed and free departure and return to Istanbul of non-exchangeable Greek citizens and Ottoman Greeks and the exercise of their ownership right either in person or through proxies.
2. Postpone the application of the Ankara laws in Istanbul until the ratification of the peace treaty.
3. Grant full amnesty for all the crimes and misdemeanours committed from 1 August 1914 until the ratification, or at least until the signing, of the peace treaty.

This was the first in a series of letters addressed to the GMFA.\(^{643}\) In all of them the CCC claimed to speak on behalf of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, both the fugitives and the ones still residing in Istanbul. The policy of the CCC was twofold: to claim their right to return and regain their lawful rights over their property; and to defend the rights of their co-nationals in Istanbul. It can be safely assumed that the CCC had succeeded the SCC in representing the upper and middle class non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks, who had supported the *Megali Idea* and had fled the city in the period October-December 1922. Solon Kazanovas, the CCC’s president, and Kyriakos V. Gkiokas, who had signed and sent the letters to the Greek government, had been important public figures in Constantinopolitan Greek society, well-known

---

\(^{642}\) On 29 April 1920 the GNA passed the ‘High Treason Law’ or ‘National Treason Law’ in order to suppress local or regional rebellions against the nationalists in Anatolia. In this context, they established the Independence Tribunals to try and execute on the spot. These courts continued to function long after 1920 and were used by the Ankara government as means to suppress opposition; Shaw 1997: 352; Zürcher 1998: 159.

\(^{643}\) GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (3 March 1923); GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (19 April 1923); GMFA 1923, 2/2: CCC to MFA (4 June 1923); GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (11 June 1923).
supporters of Venizelos and members of the CNDC. They had also cooperated in the past with Hrysafidis, Damaskinos, Floridis and Zervos, all members of the SCC, and knew them well. The foundation of the CCC in such a short period of time implies that these people had the political experience and the resources, both financially and in terms of connections, to constitute a representative body and respond to the new challenge. Despite their flight from Istanbul, they wanted to show that they retained their leading role in the affairs of the minority. As the name ‘Central Committee of Constantinople’ reveals, they tried to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group by stressing that they were the sole – the central (κεντρική) – authority of the minority. The name also sounded very much like their former representative body, the SCC, or like previous organizations with a nationalist agenda, such as the PCUG or the SC, which reflected the political background of these people. It could be argued that the granting of amnesty was a precondition for their return to Istanbul. However, since the Convention was not ratified yet, they could not lodge their protests with the LoN and the Allies. Therefore, the intervention of Greece was at the time the only way to promote their requests both towards Ankara and the international community.

This fact became more evident in a detailed letter they sent to the GMFA on 19 April 1923, where they put forward their own suggestions on the minority issues discussed at the negotiations in Lausanne. Regarding the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the future Turkish state, they contested the proposal of the Turkish delegation to allow the Patriarchate to retain only its spiritual privileges exercised outside Turkey. On the contrary, the authority of the Patriarchate should be

---

644 For Kazanovas’ involvement in the CNDC see GMFA 1921, 5/8: Greek High Commission to MFA. For his support to Venizelos see Chronos, (10 August 1920, 24 November 1920, 1 December 1920, 5 December 1920, 10 December 1920, 17 December 1920).

645 Gkiokas belonged to the NAC, which formed part of the CNDC. See Chapter 2, p.111.

646 Zervos was also a member of the NAC. For the communal elections of 15 November 1920, the NAC had formed a coalition with the PPLP. Gkiokas and Damaskinos were among the nominees of the two parties’ joint ballot. See Chronos (12 October 1920, 14 November 1920).

Kazanovas, Damaskinos and Floridis were on the same committee appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1919 for the drafting of a new regulation for the election of the members of the PNMC. See AEP, Code A/90: p.118, No 9751, (12 September 1919).

Kazanovas had also worked with I. Hrysafidis in the board of the ‘School of Languages and Commerce’ (Σχολή Γλώσσων και Εμπορίου). See ΕΙΕΑ 1923.

647 See Brubaker 1996: 61.

647 GMFA 1923, 5/8: CCC to MFA (19 April 1923).
completely independent of Turkish jurisdiction and the Greek delegation should insist to the point of not signing the treaty. They also asked that the latter seek to postpone the evacuation of Istanbul by the Allied Forces after the ratification of the treaty, until the clauses of the treaty for the protection of the minorities were applied. If not, the Turks would be able to enforce their programme, ‘which is the extermination of the Greek element in Constantinople and the plundering of its property’.  

On the issue of the exchange of populations, they accused Ankara of violating Articles 2 and 16 of the convention, in order to eliminate and uproot the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The Turks would not allow Greeks not born in Istanbul to stay or ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks to return, despite their permanent and continuous settlement in the city decades before the Mudros armistice. In order to prevent this Turkish arbitrariness, Athens should secure the immediate return of all the fugitives who had left Turkey, before the peace treaty was ratified and the new census in Turkey carried out. Furthermore, these people should be freed from Turkish threats of being indicted on the charge of leaving without the consent of the government, which could result in imprisonment from three months to one year. Legally speaking, the measures of the Turkish authorities were not ‘violations’, because the convention had not been ratified yet. Most probably the CCC was aware of this fact. However, the reference to the articles of the signed convention added validity to their requests and allowed them to put pressure on the Greek government to act on their behalf.

At the same time, the CCC insisted on the granting of full and complete amnesty for all the crimes and misdemeanours committed by Ottoman Greeks from 1 August 1914 until the ratification and application of the peace treaty. As they pointed out, ‘the upper and middle class in Constantinople got involved in several ways in the national organizations and until today, both in Constantinople and abroad, do not cease to work for the protection of the national interests’.  

According to the CCC, military service was also an issue of great national importance for the Ottoman Greeks, directly related to the existence of the Greek

---

648 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
649 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
element in Istanbul. If it was enforced, the Greeks would return temporarily to
Istanbul, sell their property and leave for good. If they stayed, the Turks would find a
reason to call them to arms and destroy thousands of them during a month’s labour in
Asia Minor. Similarly, the application of the laws of Ankara before the ratification of
the treaty, especially the ones relating to education and family law, would be
disastrous for the minority. Finally, they asked Athens to take measures in order to
force Ankara to:

1. Suspend the registration and liquidation of the property of the ‘absent’
   Greeks.
2. Return to the beneficiaries or their representatives by proxy their property and
   recognize all the official and private contracts of the Greeks and Ottoman
   Greeks living abroad.
3. Compensate the beneficiaries for the illegal confiscation and sale of their
   property.
4. Allow the Constantinopolitan Greeks who had emigrated, the right to buy and
   sell their property at the land registry of Istanbul, either directly or indirectly
   through their proxies.

The letters of the CCC were sent from the GMFA to its delegation at Lausanne and to
all the embassies accredited to the Secretariat of the LoN (SLoN), in order to be
utilized during the negotiations.\(^{650}\) This was additional evidence of the high social
and political status of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks and the credibility they
enjoyed among Greek official circles.

Their requests were positively received at the Lausanne negotiations. At the
meeting of the Political Committee on 19 May 1923, a note by the Drafting
Committee on the amnesty declaration was discussed. The Drafting Committee
proposed to add to paragraph 1 a sentence that would extend the benefits of the
declaration to non-exchangeable Turkish and Greek subjects, who had already left
Turkish and Greek territory. The Allies took this opportunity to address the issue of
the problems created by the Turkish authorities regarding the return to Istanbul of
Greeks and Armenians, who had left in autumn 1922.\(^{651}\) Of course, there was no
mention of the Jews, the only non-Muslim community who remained loyal to the

\(^{650}\) GMFA 1923, 5/8.
\(^{651}\) DBFP 1/18, No 533: Rumbold to Curzon (19 May 1923).
According to Cagaptay, ‘Turkish nationalism, which formed anti-Greek and anti-Armenian sentiments through its struggles with Greek and Armenian nationalisms, nurtured a neutral, if not positive, attitude toward the Jews’. In the case of the Greeks and the Armenians, the Allies stressed the fact that they left Istanbul during a period of panic, carrying British, French and Italian papers instead of Turkish passports, which they could not have obtained under the circumstances prevailing at the time. According to a new decree passed by Ankara, Turkish subjects who had left Turkey without a regular Turkish passport would not be allowed to return. Rumbold, the head of the British delegation, argued that many of these Turkish subjects were people of influence and considerable wealth, whose properties were treated as abandoned owing to their inability to return. The Allies strongly advised Inonü ‘to repair this injustice and to interpret the amnesty in the widest possible sense’. They also pointed out that many of these Turkish citizens had become refugees in foreign states, thus relieving Turkey of its proper responsibilities. Venizelos and Montagna, the Italian delegate, drew attention to the fact that according to Articles 2 and 16 of the Exchange Convention non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks had the right to return to Istanbul. Inonü promised to look into the issue of the decree regarding passports and reassured the Allies that the Turks wished to carry out their engagements fully and interpret the amnesty declaration in a broad sense. He also agreed to refer the issue of the amnesty declaration to a committee of experts to examine it.

Despite the fact that the majority of the requests of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks were introduced in the official discussions in Lausanne, the CCC continued to exercise pressure on Athens to act on their behalf. On 4 June 1923, they sent a new memorandum to the GMFA calling again for full amnesty, free and unobstructed return to Istanbul, free exercise of ownership rights, abolition of the abandoned property law, and compensation for the illegal confiscations. At the meeting of the

---

654 DBFP 1/18, No 533: Rumbold to Curzon (19 May 1923).
655 GMFA 1923, 2/2.
Political Committee on 5 June 1923, the report of the experts regarding the Amnesty Declaration was discussed. Rumbold pressed the Turkish delegation to explain the ‘raison d’être’ regarding the return of Armenian and other Turkish subjects who had left Turkey since the armistice was signed. Riza Nur, the Turkish representative, explained that ‘while the amnesty was a general one and while the Turkish delegation had every intention of carrying out the Exchange of Populations Convention, the Turkish Government reserved for itself the right to prevent the return to Turkey of all suspects, spies and evil doers etc.’ However, he pointed out that peaceful persons with good character would be allowed to return. The Allies contested his argument and claimed that Ankara took on its own the initiative to make more exceptions from the amnesty than what the separate protocol of the declaration stipulated. The Conference could not ignore the fact that a large category of Turkish subjects were not allowed to return and were deprived of their homes. While these people were forced to live at the expense of other countries that provided shelter for them, their properties in Turkey were confiscated and sold. Rumbold and General Pellé, the French High Commissioner in Turkey, demanded from İnönü to clearly state that the Armenians would be allowed to return, unless there was definite evidence proving the guilt of specific individuals. However, İnönü refused to commit himself to permitting these people to return as a whole. He claimed that the well-known Armenians would not find it difficult to convince the Turkish authorities of their good character, without explaining though whether and in what way people who were suspected by the government would prove their innocence before the courts. Under pressure from the Allies, the head of the Turkish delegation replied that ‘the amnesty only concerned persons in Turkey or after they had entered Turkey and in no way affected the Turkish Government’s right to prevent those of its subjects who had left from returning’. İnönü’s statement was an obvious sign of Turkey’s firm position not to allow non-Muslims who had fled Istanbul to return. As Rumbold pointed out, ‘this

---

656 DBFP 1/18, No 590: Rumbold to Curzon (5 June 1923).
657 According to the protocol, ‘the Turkish Government reserves to itself the right to prohibit sojourn in and access to Turkey of 150 persons included in the category of persons referred to in the said paragraph’; Treaty of Lausanne 1923: 195.
question had perforce to be left in an unsatisfactory state by the Conference, but the Turkish attitude of course renders the amnesty to a large extent a farce’.

Although until that point the discussion had focused more on the Armenians, Venizelos found the opportunity to put forward the demands of the CCC. He insisted that Inonü officially reaffirm the articles of the Exchange of Populations Convention, which provided the ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks with the right to return to Istanbul. Inonü demanded a similar statement from the Greek delegation regarding the Muslims of Western Thrace. Venizelos offered complete reciprocity regarding any Muslims who were forced to abandon their homes. However, Inonü’s declaration regarding the Greeks of Istanbul did not satisfy the head of the Greek delegation and arrangements were made to discuss the matter in private. Consequently, on the same day Venizelos sent a letter to Inonü protesting against the Turkish policy of not allowing non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks to return, which constituted a violation of Articles 2 and 16 of the exchange convention.658

However, the Turkish authorities did not seem to change their policy towards the Greeks and the Armenians. At the meeting of the Political Committee on 17 July 1923 Rumbold strongly advised the Turks to respect the Declaration both in letter and in spirit.659 He drew the attention of the Conference to the arrest in Istanbul of Greeks who had cooperated with the British, and on Turkish measures taken against the return of the Armenians. The representatives of the other Allied delegations made statements along the same lines. In reply Inonü reassured the Allies that Turkey would apply the amnesty ‘sincerely and with rapidity’. Yet, he justified the policy of not allowing dangerous Armenian elements to return. Venizelos once again found the opportunity to raise the issue of the non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks. He argued that although the Exchange of Populations Convention provided them with the right to return to Istanbul, he was concerned with Rumbold’s report regarding the legal treatment of persons who had cooperated with the enemy forces. Nevertheless, he said that he would discuss this issue directly with Inonü.

658 GMFA 1923, 2/2: (5 June 1923).
659 DBFP 1/18, No 678: Rumbold to Curzon (17 July 1923).
This is how the negotiations regarding the issue of the ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks ended. Despite his efforts, Venizelos did not manage to extract an unambiguous and official statement from the Turkish delegation for the abrogation of the restrictions imposed on the Greeks who wished to return, apart from a general confirmation to the Allies that Turkey would respect the Amnesty Declaration both in letter and spirit. On the contrary, on every occasion both İnönü and Riza Nur defended the policy of the Kemalists and argued that Ankara reserved the right to prohibit Turkish subjects considered dangerous by the authorities from returning to Istanbul. It could be argued that Venizelos did not wish to put any further pressure on the Turkish delegation on the subject of the ‘absent’ Greeks in order to safeguard the diplomatic gains of the Greek delegation on issues of higher importance such as the presence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey and the protection of the minority still residing in Istanbul.  

Thus, his proposal of discussing the matter in private talks meant that the problems related to the forced absence of the Constantinopolitan Greeks were not resolved before the signing of the treaty. Finally, on 24 July 1923 the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was signed at Lausanne. According to Article 1 of the Declaration of Amnesty signed the same day:

No person who inhabits or who has inhabited Turkey, and reciprocally no person who inhabits or who has inhabited Greece, shall be disturbed or molested in Turkey and reciprocally in Greece, under any pretext whatsoever, on account of any military or political action taken by him, or any assistance of any kind given by him to a foreign Power signatory of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, or to the nationals of such Power, between the 1st August, 1914, and the 20th November, 1922.

This article, combined with Articles 2 and 16 of the Exchange Convention, provided the Greeks who had fled Istanbul with every legal right to return and enjoy their properties.

The practical application of these articles soon proved very difficult due to the intransigence of the Turkish government. On 22 August 1923, the Police Commissioner of Istanbul Vehbi Bey clearly stated to Imerisia Nea, a Greek

660 See Chapter 5, pp. 239-244.
newspaper published in Istanbul, that the non-Muslims who fled Anatolia and became fugitives of their own will and the ones who changed their citizenship would not be accepted in Istanbul. Regarding their land, he claimed that it was registered and transferred to the committee for the liquidation of abandoned properties.\textsuperscript{662} Despite the ratification of the peace treaty by the GNA on 23 August 1923 and by Greece two days later\textsuperscript{663}, it was apparent that Ankara had no intention to return properties to the Constantinopolitan Greek fugitives. Only five days later, the Turkish authorities stated that the confiscated properties would not be given back to their owners, even if the latter returned to Istanbul. They maintained that these properties had come into the possession of the state and only a new law would repeal the current law for abandoned properties. The argument used by the Committee for Abandoned Properties (CAP) to justify its policy was that all the fugitives were Ottoman subjects who changed their citizenship after the armistice and became Greek subjects without notifying the government and respecting the laws of the state. Therefore, these people were not allowed to return and their property was considered as abandoned.\textsuperscript{664}

It is true that in the circumstances of panic that prevailed during the mass exodus of autumn 1922, many Constantinopolitan Greeks had sought the help of the Greek Consulate to escape. Stefanos Papadopoulos, a well-known Constantinopolitan journalist wrote in his memoirs\textsuperscript{665}:

The drama of Smyrna greatly distressed the Rums (την Ρωμιοσύνη), the Hellenism of the City. It also terrified them. […] The Rums started to leave. They were departing for Piraeus with Greek and foreign boats. The departures were constantly increasing and for a period of time, which lasted more than a month, the Greek Consulate was supplying the departing Rums with a document that was a form of passport, without making a distinction between Greek or Turkish citizenship.

According to the Turkish government, this fact proved that the fugitives had changed their citizenship.

\textsuperscript{662} Imerisia Nea, (22 August 1923).
\textsuperscript{663} Ladas 1932: 345; Alexandris 1992: 103; Shaw 1997: 368; Imerisia Nea, (24 August 1923)
\textsuperscript{664} Imerisia Nea, (28 August 1923, 29 August 1923).
\textsuperscript{665} Papadopoulos 1978: 97-8; See Appendix 1. Stefanos Papadopoulos worked in the Constantinopolitan Greek newspapers\textit{ Patris, Proodos, Proia, Apogevmatini} and he was a correspondent of the Athenian daily\textit{ Eleftheron Vima}. He was deported from Istanbul on 5 May 1965 as a Greek citizen and died in Greece on 14 April 1973.
The situation seemed to change in late October 1923, when news of the official granting of a general amnesty started to circulate. On 26 October 1923, *Imerisia Nea* published an editorial with the title ‘Forgetting the past’ (‘Η λήθη του παρελθόντος’), in which it supported the granting of amnesty to all those who had committed political crimes during the war. The editor argued that everyone should work together for the creation of future Turkey, regardless of the role they played in the recent past. It was stressed that the state should make a start of putting the past behind it by declaring the amnesty and soon afterwards the citizens would follow its example. The newspaper was thrilled with news coming from Ankara at the beginning of November that the granting of amnesty was a definite fact and would also include the fugitives. \(^{666}\) It seems that the community was eager to sever its associations with the past and show its loyalty to the new Turkish state. The events of the war were still very recent and there was a general, and to a certain degree justified, feeling of mistrust and animosity towards the Rums. Therefore, the granting of amnesty declared by the state was perceived by the Constantinopolitan Greeks as a precondition, both in symbolic and practical terms, for their inclusion in Turkish society and their active involvement in the making of modern Turkey. At the same time, they openly championed one of the main requests of their ‘absent’ co-nationals, who would be allowed to return if they were included in the amnesty.

However, the decisions of the Turkish authorities did not meet the minority’s expectations. The instructions issued by the Committee of the Interior on 17 November 1923, regarding the entrance of foreigners into Turkey, were very clear\(^{667}\):

All the foreigners besides the Christian Greek citizens are allowed to enter Istanbul without a permit of the Committee of Interior.

The fugitives that cooperated with the enemy will not be accepted.

The foreigners that were Ottoman citizens and acquired foreign citizenship without the permission of the government will not be accepted and no exceptions will be made.

On 23 November 1923 *Imerisia Nea* argued that the Turkish delegation in the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations (MCEP) should support the proposal for the return of the departed non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks.

\(^{666}\) *Imerisia Nea*, (12 November 1923).

\(^{667}\) *Imerisia Nea*, (17 November 1923).
According to the newspaper, the absence of these Greeks was very damaging for the state’s interests and the financial life of the country, because they were valuable professionals and merchants. However, shortly after, Ankara issued new orders to all the prefectures that any non-Muslim fugitive, exchangeable or not, would be prevented from returning to Turkey.  

At the same time, the Turkish delegation at the MCEP argued that the latter was not competent to decide on the return of the ‘absent’ Greeks, which was an issue of Turkish domestic policy.

The formation of a government under Venizelos in January 1924 created new hopes for the resolution of several outstanding issues deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne, including the return of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks. In his telegram to İnönü on 17 January 1924, Venizelos expressed his wish to cooperate with the Turkish government for the honest application of the peace treaty terms and the creation of a relationship of trust and friendship between the two countries. İnönü’s reply was also along these lines. At the same time, Papas, the Greek delegate at the MCEP, on several occasions, stated that negotiations on the issue of the fugitives were progressing well and would soon lead to a settlement. Under these circumstances, Imerisia Nea publicly asked for the return of its co-nationals. According to its editorial article of 23 January 1924, the Turkish policy was justified immediately after the war, because of the negative memories and the intense anti-Greek sentiment in the city at the time. However, this was not the case anymore. The government should permit the return of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks, who were no more responsible for the events that took place than the Greeks still residing in Istanbul. It was claimed that these people had left under very specific circumstances, and concluded with the following appeal:

Today, we speak on behalf of all the Rums of Constantinople and make an appeal to the Government. Some of us have parents, some have brothers, and some have relatives abroad. They are also Turkish citizens and have made a strong and irreversible decision to give all their mental and physical capacities for the progress of this place, since they are destined to live here.

668 Imerisia Nea, (21 November 1923).
669 Ladas 1932: 477.
670 Imerisia Nea, (18 January 1924).
671 Imerisia Nea, (23 January 1924, 24 January 1924).
672 Imerisia Nea (23 January 1924); See Appendix 1.
Obviously, the Constantinopolitan Greeks still residing in Istanbul regarded the ‘absent’ Greeks as an integral part of the minority and fully sympathized with their cause. The use of the pre-Lausanne term *Rum* (*Ρωµηοί*) to describe their co-nationals and not *Hellenes* (*Ελληνες*/ Greeks) makes that fact more evident.

In a somewhat bold editorial entitled ‘A reply to Rüştü Bey’673, the newspaper refuted a few days later the arguments of the president of the Turkish delegation at the MCEP, Tevhik Rüştü Bey, for obstructing the repatriation of the fugitives. They claimed that his interpretation of the treaty was wrong because not only did it violate their co-nationals’ lawful right to return to their birthplace, but also it was not based on the laws of the Turkish state. They even argued that this case was above Turkish laws, ‘*supra leges*’, because of its urgent and special nature. Contrary to Rüştü’s argument that people without an identity card (*nüfus*) issued in Istanbul should be considered exchangeable, the newspaper maintained that the treaty was referring to residents, not citizens of Istanbul. Establishment did not mean obtaining a *nüfus*, but long and permanent settlement at the prefecture of Istanbul before 30 October 1918, when the Mudros armistice was signed. Of course the article failed to mention that many Constantinopolitan Greeks had not registered at all with the civil authorities in order to avoid paying taxes674 and others during the Venizelist frenzy in Istanbul had shred their *nüfus*, out of certainty that the city would become part of Greece.675

The newspaper also dealt with Rüştü’s statement that the fugitives who had left with foreign passports had lost their Turkish citizenship. They claimed instead that the classification of these passports as foreign was not accurate, because these were not regular, but temporary passports. Citizens who wanted to travel were forced to obtain and use them, since Turkish passports were not recognized abroad. This fact, according to the article, could not be perceived as evidence of changing citizenship, since this was not the intention of passport holders. Similarly, the states that issued these passports had no intention of accepting them as their citizens, given that they did not fulfil the other criteria of obtaining a citizenship, such as taking an oath and

---

673 *Imerisia Nea*, (28 January 1924).
registering with the civil authorities. But also according to Turkish law, there was not a case of forfeiting citizenship by obtaining a foreign passport. This was an offence punishable by law, but it did not result in the loss of citizenship. Furthermore, a sentence could not be passed on these people, since all offences committed during the war were pardoned under the general amnesty. Finally, the newspaper asserted that the return of the Constantinopolitan Greek fugitives would be based on the terms of the peace treaty and the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and not on Rüştü’s interpretation.

This article articulates the bond between the Greeks still residing in Istanbul and their ‘absent’ non-exchangeable fellow nationals. The arguments used to contest the statements of Rüştü were in complete harmony with the arguments of the CCC, proving that the two groups were separated only geographically. This could explain the rather precarious, but also courageous, decision of the newspaper to publicly contest the opinion of Tevhik Rüştü Bey. At the same time however, this act of opposition reveals the Constantinopolitan Greeks’ lack of understanding of their position in Turkey after the signing of the peace treaty. This was no longer a multinational empire, but a state under construction based on the Turkish nation. People formerly belonging to non-Muslim millets had been recognized officially as members of minorities. Therefore the concept of expressing views that represented the interests of a specific ethnic group would not be tolerated in the new state, where national homogeneity was the ultimate goal. Especially at a time when memories and events from the war were still very recent and created a divisive ambiance, doubts about the state policy voiced by a national minority, which as far as the Turks were concerned had betrayed the nation and collaborated with the enemy, were completely inopportune. The statement that the return of the fugitives was above Turkish laws, since it was stipulated in the terms of the peace treaty, brought into the foreground the problem of incompatibility between state sovereignty and international law. Naturally the Constantinopolitan Greeks regarded the Treaty of Lausanne to be supra leges, because it provided them with a protected minority status and safeguarded their rights. On the other hand, during the negotiations at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation had expressed its misgivings about the level of international interference in its
domestic affairs under the pretext of the protection of minorities and had even suggested that the rights of any remaining minorities would be guaranteed by the laws of the country.\textsuperscript{676} Rüştü’s interpretation of the treaty should be seen in this context. For Ankara the return of the fugitives was an issue of domestic policy that should be managed without external intervention, regardless of international law. These two different understandings of the concept of international protection of minorities underlie the problem of the application of the peace treaty’s terms and the grievances of the Constantinopolitan Greeks after 1923.

The Greek delegation at the MCEP did not seem to have a clear idea of how to respond to the problem. On 28 January 1924, Papas proceeded to an ambiguous statement to the press. He confirmed that according to the peace treaty, the departed Constantinopolitan Greeks would return to Istanbul and their confiscated land and property would be given back to them. At the same time however, he argued that possibly the people who became citizens of the country they had moved to would be exempted from returning.\textsuperscript{677} In that way he legitimized the Turkish policy of not allowing the fugitives to return based on the argument that they had forfeited their Turkish citizenship and had become citizens of another country by leaving Istanbul carrying foreign passports. This was reasserted by Rüştü on 4 February 1924 when he stated that these Constantinopolitan Greeks would not be allowed to return and their properties would be confiscated.\textsuperscript{678} As a result, the CAP continued the confiscation of the fugitives’ properties.\textsuperscript{679}

In May 1924 more favourable circumstances appeared for the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitans to reach their goal. Since January 1924 the Greek government had not been able to execute the agreement of restoring immovable properties to Turkish subjects in Greece, because these estates were used for the housing of Asia Minor refugees. Therefore, it decided to purchase them and in May 1924 Georgios Roussos, the Greek foreign minister, made this offer to Rüştü. A month later the Turkish government agreed in principle with the Greek proposals and negotiations

\textsuperscript{676} See Chapter 5, pp. 232, 234-7.
\textsuperscript{677} Imerisia Nea, (28 January 1924).
\textsuperscript{678} Imerisia Nea, (4 February 1924).
\textsuperscript{679} Imerisia Nea, (13 February 1924).
between Rüştü and Papas began. The representatives of the ‘absent’ Greeks seized the opportunity and asked Athens to also negotiate the execution of Article 16 of the exchange convention. Papas managed indeed to include this issue in the negotiations and in July 1924 a draft agreement regarding the properties and a draft resolution to be endorsed by the MCEP for the execution of Article 16 were prepared. Articles 2 and 3 of the resolution stipulated that:

All properties movable or immovable, seized or placed under sequestration by the two governments in Constantinople and Western Thrace by reason of the departure of the proprietors who were non-exchangeable, were to be restored to the interested persons, who had the right to dispose freely of the same.
The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace and the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople who were not subject to exchange, and were now ‘absent’ from these regions, had the right to return there. [...] In regard to those ‘absent’ persons who in the meantime had changed their nationality by complying with the laws of the country of their residence, the Mixed Commission was to submit their cases to the two governments.

The Greek state in return undertook the obligation to move elsewhere a significant number of refugees occupying properties of Muslims in Western Thrace and establish other refugees in properties that would be acquired by the state or already belonging to it (Article 1). Obviously, Articles 2 and 3 were the solution the ‘absent’ Greeks were longing for. Athens was quick to approve both drafts and in August 1924 Papas and Rüştü requested the consent of Ankara. The latter approved the property agreement, but raised its objections regarding the draft resolution, especially on the issue of the return of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The agreement and the resolution were not finally signed, due to Turkish objections and the dispute between the two governments over the interpretation of the term ‘established’ in Article 2 of the exchange convention.

On 31 October 1924, the Turkish government claimed that the property of more than 50,000 Turks in Western Thrace had been confiscated by the Greek government and these people were ‘in a state of lamentable destitution’.

A month later, İnönü asked Athens whether it would sign the properties’ agreement and leave the execution of Article 16 to the decision of the MCEP. The Greek government denied

681 Alexandris 1992: 120; According to the Greek authorities the number of these ‘absent’ Muslims was approximately 6,000. See Ladas 1932: 508.
because it believed that Ankara would finally execute Article 16 under the pressure of the Greek refusal to restore the properties of Turkish subjects. However, on 16 December 1924, Mavridis, a member of the Greek delegation of the MCEP in Istanbul, reported that a Turkish delegate held a meeting with the representatives of the press and advised them to write articles against Greek policy in Western Thrace and demand retaliations against the Greeks of Istanbul. The purpose was to put pressure on the Greek government to improve its policy towards the Thracian Muslims. He added that the newspapers *Vatan* and *Cumhuriyet* had published relevant articles on 11 and 13 December.\(^{682}\) As a result, the Turkish government not only forbade the return of the ‘absent’ Greeks, but also proceeded to further confiscations of properties belonging to non-exchangeable Greeks and considered abandoned, the more valuable of which had been distributed among Turkish higher officials by the end of 1924. The argument used by the Turkish delegation to justify this action was that their government retaliated because of the occupation of Muslim properties in Western Thrace by refugees.\(^{683}\)

Therefore, more than a year after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the ‘absent’ Greeks had not managed to return to Istanbul and enjoy their properties, despite the fact that they had every legal right to do so. In a sense, they had found themselves in no man’s land. On the one hand, they could not benefit from their status of non-exchangeability, because they were not allowed to return. On the other hand, they could not benefit from the refugee resettlement schemes, because officially they were not refugees.\(^{684}\) They had left Istanbul of their own will and were also exempted by the compulsory exchange of populations. So from fugitives they had become political exiles. This stalemate would force them to address directly the LoN in order to find a solution to their demands. The Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1925-28 provided them with the perfect opportunity.

The detailed account of this first phase of negotiations shows that the Greek-Turkish war of 1918-1922 and the exchange of populations placed the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul and the Muslims in Thrace at the epicentre of post-war Greek-

\(^{682}\) Kamouzis 2008:62.

\(^{683}\) Ladas 1932: 505-06; Alexandris 1992: 118-19.

Turkish relations. Roger Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’ provides a schematic way of presenting the dynamics and complexities of these relations. It could be argued that these two significant historical events laid the foundations for the formation of two triangular interacting configurations: The first one between the Republic of Turkey as a nationalizing state, Greece as an external national homeland and the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul as a national minority; and the second between Greece as a nationalizing state, the Republic of Turkey as a national homeland and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace as a national minority.

In the first case, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the victorious war of independence against the Greeks, carried out under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal, necessitated the building of a state of and for the Turkish nation based on secular values. As a result, from 1923 onwards Turkey would undergo a process of nationalization, assuming occasionally nationalizing policies in order to promote the language, cultural flourishing, demographic predominance, economic welfare, or political hegemony of the Turkish nation. The refusal of the Turkish authorities to allow the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks, still an integral part of the minority, to return to Istanbul should be seen in the context of this policy. In addition, Article 45 of the Exchange Convention stated that ‘the rights conferred by the provisions of the present section on the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Muslim minority in her territory.’ Thus, the treaty linked the two triangular configurations to each other and introduced the political practice of reciprocity into Greek-Turkish relations. The reciprocal character of Article 45 provided both countries with the opportunity to either seek international intervention for the protection of their ethnic kin or resort to reciprocal retaliations against the minorities residing within their political realm as a means to express their national homeland policy. This explains the measures taken by Ankara in order to

---

685 Brubaker 1996.
688 Ibid., 83.
689 Treaty of Lausanne 1923: 35.
690 Kamouzis 2008: 53.
put pressure on Athens to improve its policy towards the Muslim population in Thrace.

From 1923 onwards, the Greek state assumed the responsibility of a transborder homeland for the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. According to Brubaker, a state becomes an ‘external national homeland’ when cultural or political elites construe certain residents and citizens of other states as co-nationals, as fellow members of a single transborder nation, and when they assert that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states and possess other citizenships.\(^{691}\)

After the revolution of the Young Turks and especially during the Balkan Wars, Greece established its political role as the national centre and liberator of unredeemed Greeks. Although the failure of the ambitious Megali Idea plan in 1922 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 forced Athens to abandon its irredentist plans, it continued to monitor and assess the position of the remaining Greek co-nationals in Istanbul and to act on their behalf within the international context set by the treaty.

The Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul constitutes the third party in this triadic relational nexus. Since the Tanzimat reforms, the Rums were trying to balance between two opposing poles of authority, the Ottoman and the Greek states, since they were sharing citizenship, but not ethnicity, with the former and ethnicity, but not citizenship, with the latter. The politicization of the Orthodox millet, - the result of the nationalist policies of the Young Turks and Greek irredentism - , and the open support of the Constantinopolitan Greeks to Venizelist expansionism during 1918-1922, solidified them as a national minority. The affirmation of this fact was the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which institutionalized this uneasy relationship of the minority with the host state and its external homeland. The claims of the ‘absent’ group were made on the grounds of this internationally recognized minority status, which secured specific cultural and political rights for all Constantinopolitan Greeks without exception. The Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1925-1928 would provide the  

\(^{691}\) Ibid., 5.
‘absent’ Rum elite with the opportunity to intensify their claims for returning to Istanbul and regaining their properties.
By 1925, several outstanding issues, originating from the failure of the two countries to apply the peace treaty terms, remained unresolved. In addition, the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI from Istanbul on 30 January 1925 further aggravated Greek-Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{692} However, in March 1925 both countries started showing a more conciliatory spirit regarding the issue of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{693} Athens decided to enter into direct negotiations with Ankara, realizing that a solution through international channels seemed improbable. At the same time the return of Ismet Inönü to power on 4 March 1925, after the fall of the Fethi Okyar government, created better circumstances for a general understanding between the two countries. By April 1925, Greek-Turkish relations had improved significantly and with the mediation of Widding, the president of the MCEP, negotiations resumed.\textsuperscript{694}

One of the issues that came again to the foreground during the negotiations was the return of the fugitives. The response of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks in Greece was immediate. On 12 April 1925 the ‘General Assembly of Greeks, Turkish subjects, established in Constantinople and temporarily residing in Athens’, numbering 1200 persons, gathered in the room of the theatre Kyveli in Athens and formed ‘La Commission exécutif plénipotentiaire soussignée, chargée de la defense des Grecs, sujets turcs, établis à Constantinople et séjournant provisoirement en Grèce’ (EC). The EC was also authorized to represent the Greeks of Constantinople temporarily residing in Thessaloniki, Eastern Thrace, Mytilini, Corfu and Crete.\textsuperscript{695} The official name of the committee comprised all the arguments of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks. They were Turkish subjects (sujets turcs) and had not forfeited their citizenship as the Turkish authorities were claiming. They had been established (établis) in Constantinople before 30 October 1918 and were residing temporarily (provisoirement) in Greece, stressing the fact that they still belonged to

\textsuperscript{692} See Chapter 5, pp. 256-71.
\textsuperscript{693} Cross ref
\textsuperscript{695} GMFA 1925, Γ/68: La Commission Executive to Mixed Commission (14 July 1925).
the minority and had both the right and the intention to return to Istanbul. As Malkki points out, being a displaced person assumes a central place in the narrative processes of a displaced community. They value and protect their status ‘as a sign of the ultimate temporariness of exile and of the refusal […] to put down roots in a place to which one does not belong. Insisting on one’s […] displacement is also to have a legitimate claim to the attention of international opinion and to international assistance’. 696

The EC was an offspring of the CCC. Solon Kazanovas was elected President of the EC and Konstantinos G. Makridis, as secretary. The two men had worked together in the past.697 Makridis was also a member of the CNDC698 and along with Aristoklis I. Aigidis, had been editor-in-chief of the Neologos from October 1918 until he left Istanbul in autumn 1922.699 In autumn 1923, he was a candidate for a member of parliament with the National Coalition of Alexandros Zaimis.700 Additionally, his brother, Nikolaos, had been a member of the SCC. Therefore, there is no doubt that all three organizations – the SCC, the CCC and finally the EC – represented the interests of the same group of people, the upper and middle class nationalist elite, who had dominated the lay leadership of the community in the years 1918-22.

The Greek government decided to ask for the EC’s opinion, or rather its consent, on the solution being promoted at the negotiations with Turkey regarding this issue. Ankara and Athens were prepared to agree on the reciprocal prohibition against the return of ‘absent’ persons who had left the country without a regular passport, whether these were non-exchangeable Greeks or Muslims.701 Apostolos Orfanidis, the Minister of Health and Welfare, approached the EC on behalf of the government, since he was well acquainted with many influential Constantinopolitan Greeks.702

696 Malkki 1992: 35.
697 Makridis was also a member of the committee appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1919 for the drafting of a new regulation for the election of the members of the PNMC. See footnote #645.
698 For his involvement in the CNDC see GMFA 1921, 5/8: Greek High Commission to MFA.
699 PSV 1920: 6; Konstantinopolis, (3 November 1929).
700 Imerisia Nea, (10 October 1923); IEE 1978: 271.
701 GMFA 1925, Γ/68: The non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks in Greece to the Greek government (18 April 1925).
702 Orfanidis had played a major role in founding and organizing the ‘Hospital of Refugees of Athens’ (‘Νοσοκομείο Προσφύγων Αθηνών’) in October 1922, which later became ‘Ρ.G.N.A Ippokrateio’
The government’s effort to approach the EC and the choice of Orfanidis as intermediary shows that the mobilization of the ‘absent’ Greeks had definitely made a strong impression in higher official circles, due to the elite composition of the group. Already well-connected, they would rapidly become a powerful pressure group, initially on the Greek state and then on the LoN.

On 18 April 1925, the EC sent a memorandum signed by Kazanovas and K. Makridis, replying to the Greek government and raising their objections to the proposals discussed between Greece and Turkey regarding this issue. They argued that the solution suggested by the government abolished forever their right of repatriation. If accepted, they would lose their Turkish citizenship and become Greek subjects and their property in Turkey would be exchanged with the property of the non-exchangeable Muslim Turkish subjects in Greece. For the EC the proposed solution was equal to a new convention for the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. They placed special significance on the fact that, according to the Lausanne Treaty, they formed part of the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul and their rights were guaranteed by the LoN. Therefore, neither Greece nor Turkey had any right to create a new category of an exchangeable population belonging to an internationally recognized minority. Furthermore, the abolition of the rights of a considerable part of the minority would create a general sentiment of insecurity for the rest of the Constantinopolitan Greeks resulting inevitably in the complete dissolution of the whole minority. As they put it, ‘the destruction of a part of the established and indissoluble institution of the minorities will lead to the collapse of the whole construction’.

It becomes apparent that they intentionally used the fact that they were officially part of the minority, as a means to exert pressure on the Greek government in order to promote their interests. They presented their cause as

(‘Π.Γ.Ν.Α Ιπποκράτειο’). He had recruited the best refugee doctors from the hospitals of Smyrna and Istanbul to work there. Among these doctors were Nikolaos G. Makridis, Konstantinos Makridis’ brother, and Alexandros Pappas, a former member of the CNDC. Makridis became General Secretary of the hospital board and Pappas a member. See: [http://www.hippocratio.gr/istoriko.html](http://www.hippocratio.gr/istoriko.html), [http://www.hippocratio.gr/P.G.N.A._IPPOKRATEIO.DOC](http://www.hippocratio.gr/P.G.N.A._IPPOKRATEIO.DOC), last accessed on 10/05/2006.

On Apostolos Orfanidis see NEL Vol. 1E: 71.

703 GMFA 1925, Γ/68: The non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks in Greece to the Greek government (18 April 1925).

704 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
being fought in the name of the whole minority. Therefore, it seems that this discourse of identification and responsibility for their co-nationals in Istanbul was deployed in a consciously calculated fashion to achieve primarily their repatriation to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{705} As a result, they made a final appeal to the government to follow the policy of its predecessors and insist on the application of the peace treaty terms. The EC closed its memorandum with the following warning:\textsuperscript{706}

In the opposite case, [the EC], rejecting any solution impinging upon the essential and crucial rights of the part of the Greek minority of Constantinople it represents, disavows any responsibility and […] will pursue the recognition of its rights at the LoN.

This showed that they were willing to go head to head with the Greek government and take their problem to higher authorities. In their case the official Greek policy of internationalizing the issue of minorities, and placing their rights under the protection of the LoN, had backfired. The minority treaty clauses and especially the Right of Petition for Minorities\textsuperscript{707} provided the EC with access to the instruments of the LoN. Their actions could lead to international intervention and restrict the political choices of Athens.

On 1 June 1925, the EC sent a request to the Council of the LoN denouncing the violation of their rights by the agreement negotiated between Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{708} They claimed that both states had assumed the obligation to observe strictly the stipulations of the minority treaty and could not jointly dismiss the rights of the minorities. However, Athens decided to move forward with its policy and, despite the EC’s protest, the Ankara accord between Greece and Turkey was signed on 21 June 1925. Article 4 of the agreement stipulated that:

The Greek and Turkish governments have the power respectively to refuse the right of return to ‘absent’ persons who had left the country without a regular passport, respectively Greek and Turkish.

\textsuperscript{705} See Brubaker 1996: 131-2.
\textsuperscript{706} GMFA 1925, Γ/68: The non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks in Greece to the Greek government (18 April 1925); See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{707} de Azcárate 1945: 102.
\textsuperscript{708} GMFA 1925, Γ/68: The Committee of non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks to the MCEP (14 July 1925).
This meant that the Greek government based on the principle of reciprocity officially consented to the Turkish policy of not allowing the ‘absent’ non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks to return. Furthermore, ‘these people should dispose of their properties in Turkey within a period of four years and the Turkish government had the power to purchase such properties under the conditions of the Agreement on Properties’. In return, Athens was relieved of the obligation to transfer refugees settled in Muslim properties in Western Thrace to other parts of Greece, which was very difficult to perform at the time.\footnote{Ladas 1932: 507-08.} The decisions of the Greek government should be seen in the context of the policy of improving its relations with Turkey by settling all the outstanding – and in this case thorny – issues related to the Treaty of Lausanne.

These clauses caused the immediate reaction of the EC, which sent a series of lengthy memoranda to the MCEP, to the Greek government and to the Council of the LoN protesting against the signing of the treaty. Addressing the MCEP on 14 July 1925,\footnote{GMFA 1925, Γ/68: The Committee of non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks to the MCEP (14 July 1925).} they argued that the treaty excluded the Greeks, who were Turkish subjects, from returning to Istanbul and their properties would be confiscated and submitted to forced liquidation. Furthermore, they claimed that the Greek minority in Turkey was composed of all the Greeks, who were Turkish subjects, originating from Constantinople or established in this city before October 1918. The Lausanne Treaty did not stipulate any possible distinction between the persons currently residing in Constantinople and those who, having temporarily left the city under irregular circumstances without valid papers, found themselves in the position of not being able to return for the past two years following the prohibition dictated by the Turkish government. As a result, those who were there at the time and those who against their will were ‘absent’, all enjoyed the rights granted to the minorities.

According to the EC, Article 44 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulated that these rights could not be modified without a decision taken officially by the majority of the Council of the LoN. In case of an infraction or danger of an infraction to any of the
rights, the Council had the right to intervene. In addition, they pointed out that the MCEP could not grant its approval to the clauses of the new Convention signed in Ankara, because:

1. The Council of the LoN was the only authority on the matter.
2. The competence and jurisdiction of the MCEP were limited to the exchangeable persons and to the properties of these persons.

As a result, the EC made an appeal to the MCEP to abstain from approving any of the clauses of the new convention signed in Ankara by declaring itself incompetent to decide.

Once again the leadership of the ‘absent’ Greeks employed their political and national association with their co-nationals residing in Istanbul as their main line of argument. They were fully aware that the legitimization of their demands in the eyes of the international community could only be achieved by stressing their status as ‘absent’ and showing that their physical absence from Istanbul was forced and temporary. As far as they were concerned, they had every right to benefit from the clauses of the minority treaty.

However, the newly formed Greek government of Theodoros Pangalos continued the policy of its predecessors, despite previous statements and promises that the clauses of the agreement violating the rights of the ‘absent’ would either be altered or abolished. On 13 August 1925, Konstantinos Rentis, the foreign minister, personally informed the EC that although the government recognized the soundness of their views, it had decided to enforce the Ankara accord and sacrifice their interests and rights. He justified that decision by claiming that the government was facing difficulties in its foreign affairs.

In a rather emotionally charged memorandum addressed to Pangalos on 18 August 1925, the EC criticized once again the policy of the Greek state. They argued that Athens’ duty was to safeguard the rights of the minority. On the contrary, by signing the Ankara agreement, it had legitimized Turkish violations against a significant part

---

711 Theodoros Pangalos came to power on 25 June 1925, four days after the signing of the Ankara agreement.
713 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
of the minority and paved the way for the abolition of the rights of their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul. According to the Committee, the collaboration of the Greek government in this infringement significantly damaged the faith of the whole minority in ‘Mother Greece’. Furthermore, Greece acting in a ‘cold and calculating way’ (ψυχρώς και εσκεµµένως), created a new category of 40,000 exchangeable persons. The use of a forced exchange of population as a means to solve problems of bilateral relations would become common practice after the application of the Ankara agreement. As a result, the minority still residing in Istanbul, seized by a feeling of insecurity, would start leaving the city for Greece resulting in the ‘decline and elimination of Greek Constantinople, which in circumstances much worse for the Nation did not cease to be the pride and joy of every Greek’.\footnote{Ibid; See Appendix 1.} Finally the EC protested once again on behalf of the people they represented against the agreement with Turkey, which ‘made definite the national death of a great and fine part of Hellenism, the only one left in the East, which forever was the nucleus and guardian of national traditions’.\footnote{Ibid; See Appendix 1.}

The EC obviously made an attempt to sensitize the Greek government and remind it of the traditional role of ‘Mother Greece’, the guarantor and protector of the rights of all Greeks. The ‘cold’ and ‘calculated’ signing of the agreement was presented not only as a violation of the ‘absent’ Greeks’ rights, but also as the beginning of the destruction of the Greek presence in Istanbul. Protesting against the terms of the agreement and trying to impede its application was the means to avert the ‘definite national death of a great and fine part of Hellenism’. This was a deliberate, selective representation or even a distortion of the recent international developments with regards to their demands.\footnote{See Brubaker 1996: 68.} By connecting their cause to the fate of their co-nationals in Istanbul, they were reaffirming their role as an authority in exile fighting to safeguard the rights of the whole minority. The choice of symbolic words also shows an attempt to exploit standard Greek nationalist rhetoric in order to achieve their own goals and promote their own interests.\footnote{Ibid., 131.} Constantinople is ‘Greek’ and is ‘the pride and joy of every Greek’. The Constantinopolitan Greeks are ‘the only great and fine

\footnotetext{715}{Ibid; See Appendix 1.} 
\footnotetext{716}{Ibid; See Appendix 1.} 
\footnotetext{717}{See Brubaker 1996: 68.} 
\footnotetext{718}{Ibid., 131.}
part of Hellenism remaining in the East’ and have always been ‘the nucleus and guardian of the national traditions’.

Their arguments proved successful with the MCEP. In mid-August 1925 Dendramis, the chargé d’affaires in Bern, reported that the three neutral members of the MCEP had disclaimed their competence to deal with the memorandum of the Greeks of Constantinople and that the ordinary procedure for the petitions of minorities would be followed. On 20 August 1925, E. de Haler, the General Secretary of the MCEP, replied to the EC, stating officially that the Commission could not transgress the rights and prerogatives entrusted to it by Article 12 of the Exchange Convention. At the same time, he admitted that the MCEP did not have the authority to assess subsequent agreements and intervene between the Greek and Turkish governments, but rather it could only execute the agreements. In other words, the MCEP refused to approve the Ankara accord. In order to overcome this problem, the MCEP’s neutral members proposed two solutions. Either the agreement would be endorsed by the majority of the MCEP, with its Greek and Turkish members voting in favour of the agreement and its neutral members abstaining from voting; or the draft resolution for Article 16 would be presented as an agreement between the two governments and the MCEP would vote unanimously for its execution. The Turkish delegation was willing to accept either of these two solutions. However, Pangalos’ administration, hesitating under the influence of the EC’s protests, failed to send instructions on time to Georgios Exindaris, who had replaced Ioannis Politis as head of the Greek delegation in the MCEP. This fact aroused Turkish suspicions that Athens would not execute the Ankara accord. About the same time, the MCEP requested an extension from both Greece and Turkey in order to complete its work on the adjudication of claims under the Declaration as to Muslim properties in Greece. In September 1925, Ankara gave its consent to the extension, but Athens delayed in doing so. As a result, the Turkish government resorted to retaliations against the

719 GMFA 1925, Π/68: Dendramis to MFA (Bern, 14 August 1925).
720 GMFA 1925, Π/68: E. de Haler to Kazanovas (Constantinople, 20 August 1925).
721 Article 12 stipulated that in a general way the MCEP shall have full power to take the measures necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide all questions to which this Convention may give rise. The decisions of the MCEP shall be taken by a majority. All disputes relating to property, rights and interests, which are to be liquidated shall be settled definitely by the MCEP; Treaty of Lausanne, 1923: 181.
Greeks of Constantinople, both Hellenes and Turkish subjects. When the Greek government was informed of these events, it ordered the Greek delegation on 24 October 1925 to submit the draft resolution to the MCEP and in November 1925 a complete agreement was reached. However, by that time Ankara did not seem willing to support the execution of the agreement anymore. Instead, it followed a delaying strategy and on 14 January 1926, the Turkish foreign minister informed Argyropoulos, the Greek minister at Ankara, that the accord should be revised – in effect denouncing it.722

This fact had a negative impact both on the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks and their co-nationals in Istanbul. On 26 January 1926, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the president of the Turkish delegation at the MCEP, stated that Turkey would secure the rights of its nationals who owned land in Greece, despite the non-cooperative attitude of the Greek government.723 The Turkish press, encouraged by these statements, demanded reprisals against the Greeks. Halk Gazetesi wrote that ‘the Greek policy on the issue of the non-exchangeable Turks, who are the counterbalance of the Greeks in Istanbul, is not well intended. […] However, we also have many ways to harm Greek interests’.724 Cumhuriyet argued that the state should retaliate by seizing the property of Greeks in Turkey and if Greece was still not willing to cooperate, to abolish completely the right of Greeks owning property in Turkey.725 Consequently, the Turkish government, acting on behalf of its co-nationals in Greece, resorted to retaliations by taking possession of Greek property in Istanbul. On 25 February 1926 Diamantopoulos, the Greek consul in Istanbul, wrote in his annual report726 that the Turkish government initially applied the retaliation law to the properties of the fugitives. However, as time passed and the outstanding issues between the two states remained unresolved, Turkey also applied the law to the properties of Greeks currently residing in Istanbul, in an effort to put psychological pressure on the Greek government and its representatives at the MCEP. In addition, further measures were

723 Apogevmatini, (26 January 1926).
725 Cumhuriyet, (15 February 1926) as reprinted in Apogevmatini; Kamouzis 2008: 63.
726 GMFA 1927, 92.2/1: Diamantopoulos to Louka Kanakari Roufo.
taken against the Constantinopolitan Greeks: The registration of immovable property was forbidden for all Greeks; they were not allowed to travel either abroad or within the country; commerce was gradually being taken over by the Muslims through laws that were either part of the nationalist programme of modern Turkey or the result of the country’s financial needs; the lower bread-winning trades were taken away by force from Christian traders and craftsmen and were given to Muslims; finally there was no longer any respect for the right of ownership. According to Diamantopoulos,

The reason behind this oppressive atmosphere was the failure to execute the agreements of Ankara and consequently the outstanding issues regarding the exchange of populations. […] It’s no wonder that our element here is in despair, waiting in vain for three years for the outcome of this situation.\(^{727}\)

The ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks unmoved by Turkish retaliations, and probably without realizing that their actions contributed to the aggravation of the situation for their fellow nationals in Istanbul, continued to press for an international solution to their problem, following the procedure for the petition of minorities. On 20 February 1926, at about the same time as Diamantopoulos’ account, the EC sent a report to the delegates of Spain, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay at the Council of the LoN, who were also members of the Committee for Minorities.\(^{728}\) Addressing the Spanish delegate, Quinon de Leon, the EC repeated their objections to the terms of the Ankara agreement as they had been laid out in their petitions to the Council on 1 June and 20 August 1925. They argued that the SLoN would have followed their demands through, but the Council could not be officially committed and act without the intervention of at least one of its members. Therefore, the EC, speaking in the name of a community of at least 40,000 persons, made an appeal to the Spanish delegate to introduce their case to the Council, because the Ankara agreement had abolished the status of a considerable part of the Greek minority of Turkey, leading to its collective exile and the forced as well as total expropriation of its fortune. Additionally, the questions they put forward were of the highest moral and international interest, and this fact made the intervention of the Council of the LoN mandatory. In opposition to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, a whole population

\(^{727}\) Ibid; See Appendix 1.
\(^{728}\) Konstantinoupolis, (06 March 1927).
was threatened to be deprived of their homeland, their place of habitation, the possibility to be able to live and die in Constantinople, land of their ancestors. In such a serious case, the intervention of the Council of the LoN was not only a right, but also a duty.\footnote{GMFA 1925, Γ/68.}

The leadership of the ‘absent’ Greeks had realized that as long as the Treaty of Lausanne remained unmodified, there was still hope of returning to Istanbul. On the contrary, the Ankara accord made their exile official and definite. Once again the demonstration of their displacement allowed them to have a legitimate claim to the attention of international opinion and to international assistance. In their words, it was an issue ‘of the highest moral and international interest’. At the same time, there was no mention of the Constantinopolitan Greeks in Istanbul as in their previous memoranda. It seems that gradually a conflict of interests had started to emerge between the two groups, the result of the recent Turkish retaliations. In any case this was a desperate plea for help. As the wish to return, live and die in Constantinople, - the ‘land of their ancestors’-, demonstrates, these people were convinced by that point that they would remain in a state of exile.

Despite these appeals, the Turkish authorities continued their policy of confiscating and selling abandoned properties. According to a law passed by the GNA on 12 March 1926, the immovable property of non-exchangeable persons that was confiscated as abandoned would pass to the full ownership of the refugees living in them since 1923.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 127.} Three days later Ioannis Pappas, a special Greek envoy in Ankara\footnote{Ioannis Pappas was sent to Ankara by the Greek government to convince the Turkish government to apply the Ankara agreement; Konstantinopolis, (21 February 1926).}, reported to Kanakaris-Roufos, who was in Geneva at the time, that the CAP in Istanbul was selling immovable properties of the ‘absent’ Greeks and advised him to ask the Council of the LoN to intervene. After consulting the director of the LoN responsible for these issues, Kanakaris-Roufos sent instructions to Athens to advise the president of the EC to officially protest to the General Secretary of the LoN against this new violation of Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty.\footnote{GMFA 1925, Γ/68: Kanakaris-Roufos to MFA (Geneva, 15 March 1926).}

Consequently, on 18 March 1926 the Committee sent a letter of representation to Sir
Eric Drummond, General Secretary of the LoN, arguing that these measures violated their rights and asking the Council to intervene.\textsuperscript{733}

On 24 March 1926 the Secretary General forwarded the telegram of the ‘absent’ Greeks to the Turkish government and to the members of the Committee of the Council, who were studying the question. Almost three months later, on 15 June 1926, Tevfik Rüştü, the Turkish foreign minister, sent his observations to the Secretary General. He maintained that according to the Exchange Convention and the clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne, it was solely the MCEP, an instrument of the LoN, which was entrusted with the questions that formed the subject of the petitions of Giottis and Makridis. Furthermore, he stressed that his government had always scrupulously respected the engagements drawn from the Treaty of Lausanne and did not fail to execute the decisions that the MCEP took regarding the Greeks of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{734} Ankara was not willing to change its policy regarding the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks and it insisted on presenting the MCEP as the only authorized instrument of the LoN that could decide on this issue.

Meanwhile, Pangalos’ erratic policy towards Turkey and the consequent harsh measures of retaliations taken by Ankara had created a growing feeling of insecurity among the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. Facing the consequences of the non-application of the Ankara accord, they longed for a final solution regarding the outstanding issues of the Lausanne Treaty. On 13 June 1926, just three years after the public appeal of \textit{Imerisia Nea} for the return of their fellow ‘absent’ Greeks,\textsuperscript{735} \textit{Apogevmatini}, another Constantinopolitan Greek newspaper, openly supported the Turkish view on the issue of the compensations:

Saraçoğlu Şükrü Bey stressed that the Greek-Turkish issues should be resolved decisively […] and the solution would be achieved not by pursuing the unaccomplished and unrealizable desire of a full and exact compensation […] to the people who have suffered damages from both sides, but on a logical and

\textsuperscript{733} GMFA 1925, Γ/68. The letter was signed by the president, Georgios Giottis, who had succeeded Kazanovas after the latter’s death in December 1925 and the secretary, Konstantinos Makridis. Giottis was also actively involved in the affairs of the community during 1918-1922. In the communal elections that took place in Istanbul on 15 November 1920, he had been elected representative of Tatavla; \textit{Chronos}, (16 November 1920).

Regarding Solon Kazanovas’ death see \textit{Apogevmatini} (23 January 1926).

\textsuperscript{734} GMFA 1927, B/92.2/1: Secretary General to Members of the Council (2 July 1926).

\textsuperscript{735} See Chapter 4, p. 182.
strictly just basis. This would ensure that these people suffer as little as possible […] since they lived during a period when the issues between these two states were to be settled once and for all.\footnote{Apogevmatini (13 June 1926); See Appendix 1.}

According to the newspaper, if Greece did not execute its obligations deriving from a new agreement, an unjustified period of hostility would follow.

There was an obvious change of attitude in Istanbul. After the initial shock created by the Smyrna events and the flight of its lay leadership to Greece, the minority was trying to recover and adapt to the new conditions. As a result, their representation of the issue of the ‘absent’ Greeks was completely different compared to that of the EC. They had realized that their inclusion in the rhetoric employed by the latter, which on several occasions connected its claims with the status of the whole minority, was actually detrimental to their own specific interests, because they were also facing the consequences of the policy of their co-nationals in Greece. Therefore, two different and competitive stances were formed within the minority, each seeking to represent the minority to its own members as well as to the Greek and Turkish states according to their own interests.\footnote{See Brubaker 1996: 61.} In other words, the geographical separation had also become political.

The fall of Pangalos in August 1926 allowed a rapprochement between the two governments and on 7 September 1926 a draft properties’ agreement was prepared. The Greek government, in a final attempt to achieve the return of the ‘absent’ Greeks to Istanbul, proposed to the Turkish government that it should apply the agreement of July 1924, which allowed these people to return under the condition that Greece would transfer 40,000 refugees from Western Thrace to other parts of Greece. However, Ankara did not consent to the Greek proposals.\footnote{Ladas 1932: 512.} In the event, on 1 December 1926 the Athens accord was signed by Periklis Argyropoulos, the Greek representative in Ankara, and Saraçoğlu. The draft decisions for the execution of Article 16 of the Exchange Convention were submitted to the vote of the MCEP. Its neutral members abstained from voting, arguing that since these texts were incorporated into the agreement between the two countries they could not express
any opinion on them. As expected, the Greek and Turkish members voted for these decisions, which were subsequently approved by the MCEP. Decision xxviii practically prohibited the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks from returning to Turkey. At the same time it allowed them to dispose of and sell freely and without any special authorization, through their agents, all their movable and immovable property, which would be restored to them. They had four years from the date of restoration to do so. According to the agreement, all Greek properties in Constantinople and all Muslim properties in Western Thrace would be restored within a month of its enforcement.\textsuperscript{739}

The editorial of \textit{Apogevmatini} on 3 December 1926 reflected the relief of the Greeks still residing in Istanbul:

\begin{quote}
December 1 was a landmark in Greek–Turkish relations. […] With the agreement both populations will benefit, […] because they will either receive their property back or they will be compensated. The two governments will resolve an issue which for years has created problems. The path for achieving a political friendship has been smoothed down. The remaining non-exchangeable populations of the two countries will be able to live and work undistracted in a stable environment.\textsuperscript{740}
\end{quote}

However, the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks did not share this feeling of optimism. On 5 December 1926 they publicly denounced the Athens agreement with a front page article entitled ‘The new disgrace’ (‘Το νέον αίσχος’) in their official newspaper \textit{Konstantinoupolis}. The article was revealing of their anger and despair:

\begin{quote}
The acceptance of such disgraceful terms right after the disaster could be understood to a certain extent. But today, four years later and three years since the exact opposite was agreed at the international Convention of Peace, it shows our fear of this scarecrow called the Republic of Mustafa Kemal, whose existence depends on one final effort of Hellenism.\textsuperscript{741}
\end{quote}

In a fresh attempt to draw the attention of the international community, the EC sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the LoN on 19 December 1926 protesting against the new agreement. They argued that the part of the agreement referring to them lacked any legal validity and its application would constitute a violation of their

\textsuperscript{739} Ladas 1932: 515, 517-8; Alexandris 1992: 128; \textit{Konstantinoupolis} (5 December 1926).
\textsuperscript{740} \textit{Apogevmatini} (3 December 1926); See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{741} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (5 December 1926); See Appendix 1.
rights. At the same time they made the mordant remark that all their previous representations to the instruments of the LoN did not have any results.\textsuperscript{742} Two months later, in February 1927, the acts of the agreement were ratified.\textsuperscript{743}

In accordance with the agreement, in June 1927 a committee was set up in Athens charged with examining the \textit{établis} (established) status of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks and deciding whether they should be allowed to return. This committee was subordinate to the Constantinople Sub-Commission for the \textit{établis} and was composed of the Consul General of Turkey at Piraeus and Aimilios Vryzakis, an official of the GMFA.\textsuperscript{744} From the beginning disagreements arose over the issue of the irregularity of the ‘absent’ Greeks’ passports. Vryzakis argued that any passport issued by a government of Turkey, either Ottoman or Turkish, should be considered as a regular Turkish passport. On the contrary, the Turkish consul supported the case that only passports issued by the Kemalist authorities after 28 October 1922, the day of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, were valid and regular. As was expected, the issue was put up for examination before the MCEP, which, unable to do anything, deferred reaching a decision. In the meantime, the Turkish consulate in Piraeus continued to prohibit the return to Istanbul of people holding Ottoman passports.\textsuperscript{745} At the same time the MCEP had to postpone its works because of the issue of the 119 Muslim claimants, whose properties the Greek government was refusing to restore on the grounds that these people were exchangeable. Athens, under pressure from powerful refugee organizations, stood firm on its position, despite the MCEP’s contrary decision on the subject.\textsuperscript{746} This resulted in a wave of threatening articles in the Turkish press. \textit{Vakit’s} title on 26 September 1927 was the following: ‘We will resort to retaliations against the Greeks! It is the shortest way to secure the restoration of Turkish land’.\textsuperscript{747} Consequently, the Turkish government continued the confiscation of Greek properties that were supposed to be restored. By the end of 1927 it became apparent that the provisions of

\textsuperscript{742} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (6 March 1927).
\textsuperscript{743} Ladas 1932: 512.
\textsuperscript{744} Ladas 1932: 412; \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (12 June 1927).
\textsuperscript{745} Ladas 1932: 413; \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (26 June 1927, 03 July 1927, 24 July 1927).
\textsuperscript{746} Ladas 1932: 470-71, 540-1, 546; Alexandris 1992: 129.
\textsuperscript{747} \textit{Apogevmatini}, (26 September 1927).
the Athens agreement would not be applied.\textsuperscript{748} These events affected the work of the Athens committee, which was unable to proceed without the cooperation of the MCEP.\textsuperscript{749}

In December 1927 the president of the Turkish delegation of the MCEP, Ihsan Bey, made the following informal proposals on behalf of the Turkish government to Diamantopoulos, president of the Greek delegation:

1. Renunciation on both sides of the appraisals then in process.
2. Payment on the part of the Greek government to the Turkish government of the sum of £500,000, the amount of the guarantee agreed upon by the Agreement of Athens.\textsuperscript{750}
3. Departure from Constantinople, as exchangeable, of about 25,000 Greeks.
4. In case of acceptance of these proposals and of some other secondary ones, the dissolution of the MCEP.

The same proposals were repeated on 13 January 1928 in a memorandum delivered to the GMFA by Dzevad Bey, the Minister of Turkey in Athens. Michalakopoulos, the Greek foreign minister, expressed his reservations regarding these proposals, especially on the issue of the exchange of 25,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks, which Athens was unwilling to discuss. Nevertheless, the Greek government decided to resume negotiations with Turkey.\textsuperscript{751} Throughout these negotiations the disapproval of the ‘absent’ Greeks was constant and acrimonious. In late January and early February \textit{Konstantinoupolis'} front page had the following titles: ‘The new Turkish extortion. An absolute wreck of Mr. Michalakopoulos’ Turcophile policy’ and ‘The 500,000 pounds. Not a penny to the Turks. Everything to fight them.’\textsuperscript{752} On 12 February 1928 the newspaper accused the Greek government of acquiescent policy towards Turkey. It also pointed out in an ironic manner that the government would justify the loss of the ‘absent’ Greeks’ properties as a necessary sacrifice for the protection of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greeks still residing in Istanbul, undermining in a sense the importance of this factor in the planning of Greek foreign policy. In March 1928 Michalakopoulos and Rüştü met in Geneva and further discussed the issue.\textsuperscript{753}

\textsuperscript{748} Ladas 1932: 540.
\textsuperscript{749} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (9 October 1927, 20 November 1927).
\textsuperscript{750} For the Athens agreement see Ladas 1932: 523-4.
\textsuperscript{751} Ladas 1932: 547-9.
\textsuperscript{752} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (29 January 1928, 05 February 1928).
\textsuperscript{753} Ladas 1932: 549.
Commenting on the meeting, *Konstantinoupolis* argued that a friendship accord with Turkey would not have any result and expressed the belief that no Greek minister would sign such a humiliating agreement. Its leader article of 8 April 1928 was also an outcry of the ‘absent’ Greeks against the suppression of their co-nationals in Istanbul:

Modern Turkey, still persecuting everything non-Turkish and with excessive furiousness everything Greek, raises a wall between her and us. […] Modern Turkey continues the programme of the Turkification of our brothers in Constantinople, breaking instead of creating friendly relations with the Greek state, and nothing can make us feel any enthusiasm for the signing of a Greek-Turkish agreement.754

However, the editorial of *Apogevmatini* just three days later showed that the Constantinopolitan Greek press in Istanbul approached the negotiations with a completely different view:

A new era has risen for the Near East. The old era of suspicion has ended. The two neighboring Republics, Turkey and Greece, linked by common interests […] will play an important role in the general political sphere in a spirit of close collaboration and mutual appreciation and respect.755

On 15 April 1928, during the Greek Orthodox Easter, *Konstantinoupolis’* front page hosted the image of the Byzantine symbol of the two-headed eagle with Agia Sophia over its head. The caption under the picture was the infamous rhyme of Greek irredentism: ‘With the passage of time, they will be ours again’ (‘Πάλι µε χρόνια µε καιρούς, πάλι δικά µας θάνατα’). This was a very strong public statement of nationalism expressing the scorn of the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks towards the policy of Athens, during a period of crucial Greek-Turkish negotiations. The adjacent editorial entitled ‘What kind of Easter can we celebrate?’ (‘Τι είδος ανάστασιν να εορτάσωµεν;’) was highly representative of the ideology of an elite who had been nurtured with the vision of the *Megali Idea*, had actively supported Greek irredentism in Istanbul and were now facing the consequences of their political choices. At the same time it demonstrated despair for their displacement and their

---

754 *Konstantinoupolis* (8 April 1928); See Appendix 1.
755 *Apogevmatini* (11 April 1928); See Appendix 1.
indignation for what they perceived to be the Greek government’s ‘treacherous’ policy:

But this Christian Hellenism, scattered throughout the new homeland, without a homeland, without a sense of home, far from its temples and away from the graves of its ancestors, feels its wound becoming deeper when the governors of Greece even dare to think that they can become friends with the descendants of the janissaries, the slaughterers of the Christians, the savages who have spilled blood and disrespect on its ancient hearths.⁷⁵⁶

Picture 1, *Konstantinoupolis*, 15 April 1928

⁷⁵⁶ *Konstantinoupolis* (15 April 1928); See Appendix 1.
Constantinople was for them a symbolic geographical centre. Sacred centres, commemorative association and external recognition were ways of demonstrating their ties with their homeland. The bond between them and the city was an essential part of the collective memory and identity of this displaced community. Smith argues that ‘exiled communities are measured by their distance from it [the land], designs for its recovery and restoration are imagined, and members identify themselves by their ‘origins’ in the land, mixing territory with genealogy even centuries after most physical ties with the territory have been sundered’. Thus, the recovery and restoration of Constantinople, a traditional feature of Greek nationalist rhetoric, became a personal issue for this leadership in exile and reinforced their nationalist and uncompromising attitude towards Turkey.

The negative attitude of Konstantinoupolis towards the Greek-Turkish negotiations caused the reaction of the Turkish press. In its correspondence from Athens on 22 April 1928 Milliet reported that Konstantinoupolis was the only exception in the Greek media that did not share the general optimism for the outcome of the negotiations. It expressed its sadness at the fact that the Greek authorities, under the pretext of constitutional freedoms, did not restrain the fervour of these people. It also characterized the owners of Konstantinoupolis as ‘crazy and utopian’ for publishing the two-headed eagle on their front page. In a bellicose reply demonstrating the self-perception of the ‘absent’ Greeks as an opposition in exile, Konstantinoupolis argued that due to their intervention the Turkish government had not yet received the amount of £500,000, which was the guarantee agreed to be allocated by Greece according to the Athens Agreement. They also claimed that Milliet’s allegations were an honour for them. To the satisfaction of Konstantinoupolis, the negotiations between the two states would once again stop temporarily in May 1928, due to the reluctance of the Turkish side to resolve all outstanding issues by arbitration.

---

759 Ladas 1932: 549-50; Konstantinoupolis, (20 May and 27 May 1928).
In the same month the Turkish parliament passed Law Nr 1312, the ‘Law of Turkish citizenship’. Article 9 stipulated that the Cabinet of Ministers could denaturalize people who joined the armies of other countries or assumed the citizenship of other countries without special permission from the government. In addition, according to Article 10, those who had served a foreign state in any capacity would lose their citizenship, if they did not abandon their positions within the deadline granted to them by the authorities. This law was obviously targeting the ‘absent’ Greeks and Armenians, who had fled Turkey during the war.\textsuperscript{760} Thus, Milliet’s characterization of the ‘absent’ Greeks’ views as utopian was closer to the reality of the time than the message put across by the publication of the two-headed eagle. The policy of Venizelos after his return to power in August 1928 would show in the most definite manner that the era of Greek irredentism belonged to the past, whereas the period of Greek-Turkish rapprochement was just beginning.

\textsuperscript{760} Cagaptay 2006: 72.
From ‘saviour of the nation’ to ‘benefactor of the Turks’

There is no doubt that the protests of the EC both towards the Greek government and international institutions during the period 1925-28 influenced the decisions of the Athens on a political level. However, apart from the political aspect of the activities of the ‘absent’ Greeks, there was also the social aspect. Monopolizing the legitimate representation of the group and assuming the role of a transborder leadership for the minority also had to be affirmed in social terms. They had to demonstrate to Greek public opinion as well as their co-nationals that they were representing the interests of the whole minority. This identification with and responsibility for their co-nationals in Istanbul was articulated and propagated through the construction of a Constantinopolitan Greek public discourse. The main instrument for this end was the weekly newspaper *Konstantinoupolis*.

At the beginning of 1926, Konstantinos G. Makridis and Aristeidis I. Aigidis started publishing *Konstantinoupolis* in Athens. Both men were experienced journalists. While in Istanbul they had been directors of the well-known *Neologos* from 1918 until they left for Athens in autumn 1922. It can be safely maintained that the middle and upper class ‘absent’ Greeks funded this rather expensive publishing undertaking in Greece, bearing in mind that the newspaper was not delivered only to subscribed readers, but was also available for the public in Athens and the provinces at the news agencies of the Company of Greek Press (‘Εταιρεία Ελληνικού Τύπου’). This also meant that it did not target only a specific group of people, but aimed at informing the general reading public on the issues of the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. According to the caption adopted under its headline, *Konstantinoupolis* was the ‘Great Weekly Newspaper of the Hellenic East’ (‘Μεγάλη Εβδομαδιαία Εφημερίς της Ελληνικής Ανατολής’), a title demonstrating the self-

---

761 According to Danforth (1995:81) ‘the deterritorialization of national communities’ does not lead to the eradication of their nationalism. On the contrary, they assume the role of a transborder leadership and act on behalf of their co-nationals still living in the homeland.

762 See Brubaker 1996: 132.

763 They became directors after Stavros Voutyras passed the ownership of the newspaper to his sons Alexandros and Konstantinos. See PSV1920: 6; *Konstantinoupolis*, (3 November 1929).

764 *Konstantinoupolis*, (23 May 1926).
perception of its publishers as the leadership, or rather the public voice, of the Greeks of the East.

From 1926 until 1928 *Konstantinoupolis* constantly protested against the violations of the rights of the Constantinopolitan Greeks in Turkey and the failure of the LoN to protect them. It accused the Turkish police of systematically obstructing them from establishing a communal system of administration; the Ministry of Education of imposing Turkish teachers and its own teaching curricula and books on the minority schools, in defiance of the minority’s right of freely running its educational institutions; the state of not financially assisting the Greek schools, but also appointing Turkish teachers to them and demanding the minority to pay them excessive wages, under the threat of closing these schools; the government of dismissing every Greek from the public services and succeeding in having hundreds of others fired from several private companies.\(^{765}\) The newspaper dealt with the minority’s renunciation of Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty, in an effort to refute the legality of this action and examine its consequences on the Greeks of Istanbul.\(^{766}\) It also compared the situation of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace to the one in Istanbul, maintaining that unlike Turkey, the Greek state had respected its obligations deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne.\(^{767}\)

On several occasions, *Konstantinoupolis* argued that the LoN was responsible for allowing these violations to take place. ‘Human-like ape’ (‘ανθρωπόμορφος πίθηκος’), ‘slimy mollusc’ (‘γλοιώδες µαλάκιον’), ‘a windbag full of big words’ (‘ασκός φουσκωµένος από µεγάλα λόγια’)) were some of the degrading phrases used to characterize the LoN.\(^{768}\) The paradox is that these allegations were expressed during a period when the Committee was officially trying to gain the support of the international community. According to the newspaper their efforts to draw the attention of the LoN to the problems of the minority could not have any result unless the Greek state decided to support them.\(^{769}\)

---

\(^{765}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (31 January 1926).
\(^{767}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (12 December 1926, 19 June 1927, 24 June 1928).
\(^{768}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (31 January 1926, 14 February 1926, 14 March 1926).
\(^{769}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (14 February 1926).
The newspaper also adopted a bellicose rhetoric against Turkey, which was strongly reminiscent of the polemic articles of 1919-1922. According to the newspaper:770

The Turks have declared a war of elimination against our brothers in Constantinople [...] But this must not, cannot be accepted by Greece [...] It takes force and only force, strength and only strength [...] War! There, the only Turkish justice. We are inescapably following this path, since those in Ankara neither change nor is it possible to change their attitude.

Part of that rhetoric was the revival of the Megali Idea and the restoration of Constantinople. The article entitled ‘The bells of Agia Sophia’ (‘Τα καµπαναριά της Αγίας Σοφίας’)771 constitutes a vivid expression of Greek irredentism and at the same time a demonstration of their tie with their homeland:

The restoration of Hellenism cannot take place and is not possible to be conceived without Constantinople and without the Cross on the dome of the Church of Agia Sophia. [...] This reclaim is no longer a vain dream, neither a lullaby sung over our birth crib. [...] One more noble effort and the dream that inspired the fighters of the revolution, the ideal that motivated the heroes of 1821 will become a reality. The Turkish scarecrow [...] is unable to restrain our national force.772

At the same time they managed to get actively involved in the political and social life of Greece and set up a network of organizations for the promotion of their interests and aims. Such associations were the General Union of Constantinopolitans (‘Γενική Ένωση Κωνσταντινουπολιτών’, GUC), the League of Constantinopolitans (‘Σύνδεσµος Κωνσταντινουπολιτών’, LoC), the League of Constantinopolitan Landowners (‘Σύνδεσµος Κτηµατιών Κωνσταντινουπολιτών’, LCL) and the Society of Constantinopolitans of Kallithea (‘Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπολιτών Καλλιθέας’, SCK). They also founded their own football teams. In 1924 the football club Athlitiki Enosi Konstantinoupoleos (‘Αθλητική Ένωση Κωνσταντινουπόλεως’, ΑΕΚ) was established in Athens with Konstantinos Spanoudis as its first president. The name did not reveal any association with Athens or even Greece, just Constantinople. A similar football club, Panthessalonikeios Athlitikos Omilos Konstantinoupoleos

770 Konstantinoupolis, (14 March 1926); See Appendix 1.
771 Konstantinoupolis, (9 May 1926).
772 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
('Πανθεσσαλονίκειος Αθλητικός Όμιλος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως', ΡΑΟΚ) was established in Thessaloniki in 1926. Both teams had as their emblem the Byzantine symbol of the two-headed eagle, more evidence of the association of their founders with their homeland.\textsuperscript{773} The leading personnel in these associations and clubs were people who had supported Venizelos and Greek nationalism in Istanbul during the period 1919-1922 and were well connected with each other. Prominent figures among them were Konstantinos and Sophia Spanoudis, Nikolaos and Konstantinos Makridis, Mihalis Theotokas, Anastasios Misiroglou, Alexandros Pappas and Alexandros Voutyras. To borrow Brubaker’s words, ‘they constituted an organized “public”, a structured, differentiated space of communication, discussion, and debate’.\textsuperscript{774} They had managed to re-establish their political and social network in Athens. The return of Venizelos, their political darling, to the political arena was perceived by them as the continuation of the national cause that had been interrupted by the elections in November 1920.

By 1927 the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks were completely disappointed with the policy of the Greek state, which they criticized several times as defeatist and submissive. As a result, on 8 May 1927 Konstantinoupolis made a public appeal for the return of Venizelos to politics with an editorial entitled ‘Let him come to govern’ (‘Ας έλθη να κυβερνήση’). According to the newspaper, the all-party government of Alexandros Zaimis\textsuperscript{775} faced difficulties that would allow new coups to take place and new dictators to come to power. Therefore, it was necessary for Venizelos to return in order to mend a situation he was also responsible for, a view that became the main argument of Konstantinoupolis. In December 1927, the newspaper argued that despite the Asia Minor disaster and consequent sufferings, which were the result of Venizelos’ self-exile, the refugees still had faith in him. Since his successors had failed him, it was his obligation to become politically active again and restore the trust of so many people, whose distress was also his responsibility.\textsuperscript{776}

\textsuperscript{774} Brubaker 1996: 132.
\textsuperscript{775} IEE 1978: 310.
\textsuperscript{776} Konstantinoupolis, (04 December 1927).
Since his return to Greece, Venizelos had been the recipient of complaints of Liberal politicians and military officers, who were dissatisfied with the policy of the Liberal Party. Publicly Venizelos had ruled out the possibility of getting involved in politics, but at the same time he often sent letters to Georgios Kafantaris, Minister of Finance and leader of the Progressive Liberal Party (‘Κόμμα Προοδευτικών Φιλελευθέρων’, PLP), giving him advice and expressing his complaints with respect to the policy of the government.  

In February 1928, a group of refugee members of parliament who disagreed with the government’s policy on refugees’ issues, splintered off the PLP and formed the Independent Liberal Parliamentary Group (Ανεξάρτητο Φιλελευθέρων Κοινοβουλευτικήν Ομάδα, ILPG). A month later three members of this group (Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, Leonidas Iasonidis and Alexandros Voutyras) visited Venizelos and discussed with him the prospect of his involvement in politics. Venizelos repeated his decision to abstain and advised the refugee politicians not to attempt to overturn the government, because it was impossible to form a new one from the existing parliament.

Konstantinoupolis, endorsing the cause of the refugee group, commented on Venizelos’ reply to them in a long and rather emotional article. Referring to Venizelos as Leader (Αρχηγέ), the newspaper claimed that the refugees remained loyal to the Liberal Party and supported Venizelos’ successors because they considered them to be the people who would carry on his work. However, these politicians ignored the refugees and pursued a petty policy that lacked ideology and soul. Konstantinoupolis also pointed out to Venizelos that he had abandoned them twice, the first time in November 1920 and the second time after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. As a result, the newspaper posed the question whether it was wise for the refugees to continue supporting the Liberals or follow different political directions, since Venizelos seemed unwilling to return. The article demonstrated a growing tendency among the refugees to seek political associations with other parties, due to their disappointment with the way the Liberal Party had treated them.

---

777 IEE 1978: 310.
778 Konstantinoupolis, (19 February 1928, 11 March 1928).
779 Konstantinoupolis, (1 April 1928).
as a group. They had supported Venizelism throughout 1918-28 and had suffered for the ideal of the *Megali Idea*. As a result, Venizelos’ refusal to return to politics was received by the refugees as abandonment.

Nevertheless, in May 1928 the situation changed radically. On 19 May 1928 Kafantaris asked Venizelos to approve his policy during a meeting between the two men and Nikolas Plastiras. Venizelos refused and consequently Kafantaris announced officially on 22 May 1928 his resignation from the leadership of the PLP and the government, which led to the resignation of Zaimis’ government the same day. On 23 May 1928, Venizelos announced his decision to become involved again in politics and assumed the leadership of the Liberal Party.\(^{780}\)

The editorial article of *Konstantinoupolis* on 27 May 1928 reveals the enthusiasm of the ‘absent’ Greeks for Venizelos’ return. The newspaper referred to the problems that emerged during his absence from politics and expressed the hope that this time he would correct the mistakes of the past. Especially on the issue of the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it argued that the sacrifices Greece made in Lausanne in order to secure their protection were in vain. Judging from the present situation, the Turks had benefited from the agreement and continued at the same time their plan of eliminating Hellenism and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The article finished with a strong statement of Greek nationalism, revealing the role they had assumed as a transborder authority for the minority:

> The Greek people are not willing to tolerate any longer these Turkish violations. They demand for our Patriarchate to be seated in the Phanar as our respected religious authority. They demand for our brothers remaining in Constantinople to be free of restrictions within the context of their communal, national and financial living. This claim is expressed more firmly by the refugees, who have perhaps a deeper awareness of the importance of Constantinople. [...] They do not wish to forget that Mr Venizelos was, and is bound to be also in the future, the politician who knows better than others ‘the path that leads straight to Agia Sophia.’\(^{781}\)

However, Venizelos during the electoral campaign refrained from using a bellicose rhetoric and seemed to support the idea of an agreement of friendship and

\(^{780}\) IEE 1978: 310-1.
\(^{781}\) *Konstantinoupolis* (27 May 1928); See Appendix 1.
cooperation with Turkey. While addressing a committee of Thracian and Constantinopolitan Greeks in Thessaloniki he stated:

I have my reservations with respect to one point in your wishes. As long as I am in office, war shall not take place. You should wish for me to die in order for my successor to fulfil your wishes. [...] I never had war as my political agenda. I was compelled to fulfil the duty of the state for the liberation of the unredeemed Greeks, when there were populations under the yoke of slavery. To this purpose I also made sacrifices. It is already a necessity to organize ourselves within the present state, in order to create prosperity for the people. I do not agree that Greece is a small country [...] Our present frontiers up to the Evros are enough.

It becomes apparent that as far as Venizelos was concerned Greek irredentism was a thing of the past. The new aim of his policy was to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the country from external threats. This could only be achieved by the signing of agreements with neighbouring states that would allow reconstruction of the country through a period of peace and stability.

The Constantinopolitan Greeks seemed unwilling to accept the views of their political idol. Konstantinoupolis expressed the belief that no matter how peace-loving he was, the day would come when he would be convinced that peace with the Turks would not come without a war. Nevertheless, with the slogan ‘You will not vote for specific individuals. You will vote for Venizelos’ (‘Σεις δέν θα ψηφίσετε άτοµα. Θα ψηφίσετε Βενιζέλον’), it strongly supported Venizelos throughout the electoral campaign. The elections of 20 August 1928 were a triumph for the Liberal Party, which received 178 seats. The coalition headed by the Liberal Party reached a majority of 223 out of 250 seats in the parliament. 49 refugees were elected as members of parliament, among whom were the liberal Constantinopolitan Greeks Alexandros Voutyras, Anastasios Misirloglou, Frangiskos Sarantis, Alexandros Pappas and Vasilios Papadopoulos.

Dedicated to his policy, Venizelos sent a letter on 30 August 1928 to his Turkish counterpart, İnönü, expressing his desire for the signing of a friendship accord of

---

783 Cited in Konstantinoupolis, (29 July 1928); See Appendix 1.
784 Anastasiadou 1980: 390-3; Svolopoulos 1999: 123.
785 Konstantinoupolis, (29 July 1928).
786 Konstantinoupolis, (8 July 1928, 22 July 1928, 12 August 1928, 19 August 1928).
788 Konstantinoupolis, (02 September 1928); Alexandris 1992: 178; NEL vol. IE: 472.
non-aggression and arbitration. İnonü’s response was equally positive to such a prospect.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 175.} As a result, in October 1928 negotiations between the two countries resumed. One of the issues discussed was the properties of the ‘absent’ Greeks, who had left with imperial or foreign passports after the Asia Minor disaster. Their property, confiscated as abandoned, was worth 2,500,000 Turkish gold pounds. Ankara was unwilling to discuss the restoration of these properties. Athens, however, insisted on doing so or else it would have to indemnify the claimants.\footnote{Ladas 1932: 551, 563.}

In the meantime, the refugees in general and the ‘absent’ Greeks in particular, assumed a negative attitude towards this rapprochement. In a series of articles from September 1928 until March 1929 \textit{Konstantinoupolis} expressed its reservations regarding the possible results of these negotiations.\footnote{\textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (02 September 1928, 07 October 1928, 28 October 1928, 23 December 1928).} At the same time, it protested against the violations of the rights of their conationals in Istanbul, arguing that the Greek government should take the same measures against the minority of Western Thrace as a means of retaliation.\footnote{\textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (11 November 1928, 09 December 1928).} Despite Venizelos’ public statements for a peaceful solution to the outstanding issues of Greek-Turkish relations, \textit{Konstantinoupolis} continued its bellicose campaign against Turkey, claiming that only war could resolve the differences between the two countries.\footnote{\textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (10 February 1929, 10 March 1929, 17 March 1929).} Once again the Turkish press described it as an ‘instrument of the fugitive Rums’ and accused it of obstructing the solution of Greek-Turkish issues.\footnote{\textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (18 November 1928).}

In the spring of 1929 the four associations of Constantinopolitan Greeks decided to cooperate and adopt a common policy regarding the promotion of their demands. From the beginning however, two stances emerged. The one assumed a more subtle attitude towards the government, mainly expressed by the president of the ACL Th. Papadopoulos. The other maintained that the rights of the Constantinopolitan Greeks were violated and was in favour of a stronger and more demanding approach. This standpoint was held by the president of the AoC Giottis, who seemed to also have the
support of *Konstantinoupolis*, published by his friend and colleague in the Committee Konstantinos Makridis.\(^{795}\) As *Konstantinoupolis* put it on 24 March 1929:

They should have understood that we live in a country where only the one who shouts is being heard whereas the one who is silent is being buried; where the person who is accepted for a hearing by the ministers is not the one who politely knocks on the door, but the one who jumps in by the window. [...] So let their societies act, let them yell, let them protest, let them mobilize the ones who are interested, for otherwise they have nothing to hope for.\(^{796}\)

The persistence of the more radical side resulted in a gathering of the Constantinopolitan Greeks on 25 May 1929 at the theatre ‘Kotopouli’, where the presidents and the boards of the four associations were authorized to manage their affairs. In all the meetings of the associations Papadopoulos stressed the real concern of Venizelos’ administration regarding the Constantinopolitan Greeks, claiming that in the near future the government would compensate them both in material and moral terms. Also present at these meetings was Sarantis, who was constantly claiming that only the Venizelist government could solve the issues of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. As a result, with the exception of Giottis, who continued to disagree and express a more independent opinion, the rest of the presidents and the boards complied with the advice of Sarantis and Papadopoulos.\(^{797}\)

Meanwhile, in April 1929 the senatorial elections took place. The elections constituted a test for the government of Venizelos, who was afraid that the dissatisfaction of the refugees would result in a defeat of the governmental party. The refugee organization Pamprosfigiki Organosi Amynis Dikaiouhon Antallaksimon (‘Παµπροσφυγική Οργάνωση Αµώνης ∆ικαίουχων Ανταλλαξίµων’, POADA) especially was inciting the refugees to abstain from voting. Under the pressure of a possible defeat, Venizelos addressed the refugees with a letter to the press and spoke to a rally in Piraeus arguing that no other government could offer them more.\(^{798}\)

*Konstantinoupolis* dealt with the issue in a diplomatic way. It argued that the refugees had a different opinion from Venizelos on some matters, but this did not mean they would break their ties with the party they belonged to. The issue of

---

\(^{795}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (18 December 1932).

\(^{796}\) *Konstantinoupolis* (24 March 1929); See Appendix 1.

\(^{797}\) *Konstantinoupolis*, (18 December 1932).

\(^{798}\) Anastasiadou 1980: 322-3.
compensation of the refugees was of a legal nature, whereas the elections a political one. As the newspaper pointed out, ‘their disagreements were a family affair and would be solved within the family’.\textsuperscript{799} In other words, the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks gave their vote of confidence to Venizelos. There was an additional reason behind their decision. One of the candidates selected by Venizelos for the senatorial elections was Konstantinos Spanoudis, a very popular and influential Constantinopolitan Greek. Spanoudis was a member of the AoC board, president of the football team AEK and vice-president of the sporting association SEGAS (ΣΕΓΑΣ).\textsuperscript{800} Finally, in the elections of 21 April 1929, the Liberal Party received 54, 85\% of the votes and 72 out of 92 seats, a result that for Venizelos meant a vote of confidence.\textsuperscript{801}

Whether the participation of Sarantis in the meetings of the Constantinopolitan Greek associations and the selection of Spanoudis as a candidate were deliberately decided on by Venizelos to appease and control the ‘absent’ Greeks is not quite clear. However, it could not be excluded as a hypothesis. The Prime Minister was aware of the fact that they formed an influential group and had protested in the past against the former Greek-Turkish agreements. At the same time he knew that their interests would be used as a bargaining tool in the negotiations of the two countries in Ankara. In effect, in May 1929 the neutral members of the MCEP, which was playing a mediating role in the negotiations, argued that the ‘absent’ Greeks should be allowed to return to Constantinople. Yet, since this issue was part of the agreement negotiated between the two governments, there was nothing they could do.\textsuperscript{802}

In any case, \textit{Konstantinoupolis} continued to raise its objections regarding these negotiations.\textsuperscript{803} On several occasions the newspaper criticized Venizelos to the point of characterizing him as the ‘benefactor of the Turks’.\textsuperscript{804} The ‘absent’ Greeks had started realizing that Venizelos’ proclamations for an agreement with Turkey were

\textsuperscript{799} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (07 April 1929).
\textsuperscript{800} GMFA:1929, B37: Syndesmos mi antallaksimon Kon/ton Ktimation tis Tourkias to A.Karapanos, 5 December 1928; NEL vol. IZ: 148; \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (21 April 1929).
\textsuperscript{801} Anastasiadou 1980: 323-4.
\textsuperscript{802} Ladas 1932: 564.
\textsuperscript{804} \textit{Konstantinoupolis}, (30 June 1929).
not just pre-election signs of good will but actual political goals. As the negotiations progressed their disappointment and frustration grew even greater. They could not accept the fact that Venizelos was still pursuing Greek-Turkish friendship, while their co-nationals in Istanbul suffered.\footnote{Konstantinoupolis, (14 April 1929, 30 June 1929).} It had become apparent to them that Venizelos had renounced the \textit{Megali Idea}, which for them was still alive.\footnote{Konstantinoupolis, (12 May 1929); See Appendix 1.}

If Mr Venizelos truly believes that Hellenism is able to live and prosper without Constantinople, or at least without the ideal of its restoration, please allow us to disagree. […] It is Constantinople! It is the glorious vision of the Greeks, it is our dream, and it is the Anchor of our race’s salvation and existence both as a race and as a state.

However, Venizelos would go ahead with his political programme. On 3 November 1929 K. Makridis, one of the publishers of \textit{Konstantinoupolis} and secretary of the Committee, died and the newspaper closed. On 10 June 1930 the Greco-Turkish convention was signed in Ankara by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Spyridon Polychroniadis, the Greek minister in Ankara.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 177.} Regarding the ‘absent’ Greeks, the treaty stipulated that all non-exchangeable persons who had left Turkey with passports issued by the authorities of the Turkish Republic were recognized as ‘established’. This provision excluded all persons who were established in Constantinople before 1918, but who had left prior to 1922, since there was no Turkish Republic before that date. These people were deprived of the right to return to Constantinople and lost their original nationality, acquiring that of Greece. Turkey consented to offer £25,000, to which an equal amount was to be added by the Greek government, thus forming a sum of £50,000 to be used for indemnifying those Greeks who had left Constantinople with irregular passports and whose properties had passed to the Turkish government.\footnote{Ladas 1932: 576, 582-3.} On the eve of the signing of the agreement the ‘absent’ Greeks demonstrated in protest.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 179.}

Despite their protests against the clauses of the agreement, the refugees belonging to the Liberal Party voted for its ratification.\footnote{Anastasiadou 1980: 327-9.} The Ankara agreement of 1930...
brought the involvement of the ‘absent’ Greeks to the issues of the minority and their authority as an exiled leading group to an end. No longer did they constitute a part of the minority. As Venizelos would argue, if Greece had not signed the accord, ‘the life of the minority in Istanbul would become unbearable’. According to this argument, the rights of the ‘absent’ Greeks had been sacrificed for the well-being of their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul. In reality they had paid a heavy price for their loyalty to Venizelos. Their frustration and disappointment becomes apparent in a public appeal regarding the indemnification of the ‘absent’ Greeks published in *Konstantinoupolis* on 28 January 1933:

The Constantinopolitan Greeks, being characterized by acumen and pure patriotism, foresaw the national aim behind the agreement and they did not complain, nor did they disapprove of the burdensome terms with regard to their personal interests. But it is time, we believe, that the leader of the Liberals undertakes supervision of the final settlement of the whole issue. […] Let the whole project proceed to its completion, so the people will at least have the moral satisfaction, - lacking the material one-, that they supported once again with important sacrifices a national case, which HE inspired and created.

The formation and activities of an organization like the Committee and the other voluntary associations founded in Athens were not a unique Greek phenomenon, but belonged to a general political trend in post-war Central and Eastern Europe, the consequence of the disintegration of multi-ethnic empires and the establishment of new states within completely new borders. As Brubaker has effectively maintained, the impact of Hungarian refugees on Hungarian politics was very significant. They exercised an influence in parliament and public life disproportionate to their numbers, due to their elite composition as a group. Radicalized by their traumatic territorial and social displacement, they were also demanding the restoration of lost territories and their uncompromising and revisionist attitude prevented Hungary from achieving reconciliation with its neighbouring states during the interwar period. Similarly, émigrés from transborder German communities, journalists and activists constructed a Germanic-oriented public discourse in an effort to propagate their

---

812 *Konstantinoupolis* was published again in 1932 under the direction of Kostas Ioannidis and Andreas Palasis
813 *Konstantinoupolis* (28 January 1933); See Appendix 1.
identification with and responsibility for their German co-nationals living outside the Reich.\textsuperscript{814}

\textsuperscript{814} Brubaker 1996: 132, 158-9, 165.
Conclusions

After their flight to Athens, the Constantinopolitan elite who had supported Venizelos and the policy of Greek irredentism during 1918-22, found themselves in no man’s land. On the one hand, they could not benefit from their status of non-exchangeability, because they were not allowed to return. On the other hand, they could not benefit from the refugee resettlement schemes, since officially they were not refugees. So from fugitives they had become political exiles. This displaced community gradually assumed the role of an authority in exile for the minority. Their effort to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group was primarily employed as a means to state their case to the Greek government and the international community. Safeguarding the rights of their co-nationals in Turkey was also their aim, although a secondary one.

However, the uncompromising attitude of the Committee with regards to Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1925-28 resulted in Ankara retaliating in an effort to defend the rights of their own co-nationals, the Muslims in Thrace. These retaliations took the form of property confiscations, which also included properties belonging to Constantinopolitan Greeks residing in Turkey. This fact created a rift in relations between the ‘absent’ Greeks and their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul and the geographical separation between the two groups gradually assumed a political character.

On a social level, the ‘absent’ elite tried to affirm its role as a transborder authority for the minority through the construction of a Constantinopolitan Greek public discourse. This identification with and responsibility for their co-nationals in Istanbul was articulated and propagated through the weekly newspaper Konstantinoupolis and the establishment of several voluntary associations and clubs. The elite that had dominated communal politics in Constantinople during 1918-22 had managed to reconstruct its social and political network in Athens. For them, the return of Venizelos into politics equalled the return of the ‘saviour of the nation’. They believed that he would follow a more aggressive policy towards Turkey and even resume the establishment of ‘Greater Greece’.
However, Venizelos’ policy had changed. He was no longer promoting Greek irredentism, but rather the need for peace and stability that would allow the country to be rebuilt and modernized. As a result, he preferred to sacrifice the internationally acknowledged rights of the ‘absent’ Greeks in order to secure the political stability and territorial integrity of Greece. He believed that the improvement of life of the minority in Istanbul would be analogous to the progress of Greek-Turkish relations. In a sense, the ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks had paid the price of supporting Venizelos during 1919-22. The signing of the Ankara accord of 1930 separated them officially from their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul and put an end to their role as a leadership in exile. The remaining minority faced a double challenge: to deal with the consequences of the political choices of its former leadership for the period 1918-1930; and to adjust to the new conditions created after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The responses of the new leadership to the policies of Turkish nation-building in the years 1923-30 set the framework for the presence of the Constantinopolitan Greeks in Turkey as a national minority.
Chapter Five:

Being a minority in secular Turkey, 1923 – 1930
Introduction

The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) redefined the legal status of the Constantinopolitan Greeks exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul was officially recognized as a non-Muslim minority and its rights were placed under the protection of the LoN. However, as Brubaker points out, ‘League of Nations Minorities Treaties […] did little to hinder the dynamic of nationalization; formal guarantees of minority rights failed to impede substantive nationalization’. The Greeks of Istanbul were negatively represented in Turkish social discourse as a different, deviant and even threatening group and had to face policies that curtailed their rights as an officially recognized minority. These nationalizing policies, part of Turkey’s programme of secularizing the state’s institutions, on several occasions caused the reaction of Greece. The latter continued to play the role of an external national homeland for the minority, acting on its behalf within the framework set by the LoN. At the same time, the power struggle between the different stances within the lay leadership of the Constantinopolitan Greeks influenced the responses of the minority to the policies of the two governments and its relations with them.

Emphasis will be given to the legal status of the minority after the signing of the treaty and its responses to the measures taken by the Turkish state. Especially after the flight of its lay leadership, and the resignation of Patriarch Meletios in October 1923, the minority found itself in a difficult position. Not only did it have to face the consequences of the nationalist policy pursued by Meletios and the CNDC as well as their ‘absent’ co-nationals, but also it had to adapt to the new conditions created by the Treaty of Lausanne. The chapter will examine the communal self-administration of the minority in relation to the patriarchal issue and the renunciation of Article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne. How was the pre-war communal system adjusted and incorporated into forming the administrative structure of the new state? What role did the clergy and the lay leadership play in the administration of communal affairs? The

---

815 Brubaker 1996: 106.
816 See Van der Valk 2003: 204; Trubeta 2003: 98.
reply to these questions could lead to some useful conclusions regarding the post-war relations between the minority, its national homeland and the host state.
The Treaty of Lausanne: Setting the framework for the protection of the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul

The end of World War I made evident the need for the protection of national minorities, as the Allies realized that the presence and oppression of minorities of different race, religion and language in nationalizing states had been one of the main causes of the war. The dissolution of multi-national empires, like Austro-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire, had created a new political map with large groups of different nationalities co-existing in the newly enlarged and successor states. According to de Azcárate, the political objective of the LoN was to prevent ‘inter-state frictions and conflicts which had occurred in the past, as a result of the frequent ill-treatment and oppression of national minorities’. In his speech on 31 May 1919 at a plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference, US president Woodrow Wilson opined thus:

Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities.

The Council of the LoN expressed its intentions to safeguard the protection of minorities when drafting its Covenant. In an early draft, President Wilson proposed the following clause:

The LoN shall require all new states to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States to accord to all racial and national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial and national majority of their people.

In the same spirit, Wilson and Lord Robert Cecil proposed clauses for safeguarding the free exercise of religion.

---

818 SLON 1938: 42.
819 The director of the League’s Minorities Questions Section.
820 Cited in de Azcárate 1945: 14.
821 Cited in de Azcárate 1945: 167.
822 Cited in de Azcárate 1945: 168.
823 The British representative in charge of negotiations for a LoN at the Paris Peace Conference.
824 de Azcárate 1945: 168.
Although these articles were not finally included in the Covenant, they set the foundations for the Minorities Treaties signed after the war. Their basic principles, according to a 1929 report of a LoN Committee, were:

Full and complete protection of life and liberty and [...] free exercise, whether in public or in private of any creed, religion or belief (for all nationals of the state); [...] equality of all nationals before the law; equality of civil and political rights; and equality of treatment and security in law and in fact.\textsuperscript{825}

The Treaty with Poland of 28 June 1919 was the first to include clauses for the protection of minorities and set the standard for the rest of the treaties concluded thereafter, including the Treaty of Lausanne.\textsuperscript{826}

The Treaty of Peace with Turkey was signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 and nullified the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920, apart from a protocol concerning the Protection of Minorities in Greece.\textsuperscript{827} The proceedings of the treaty are particularly important because they reveal the different policies followed by the Great Powers, Turkey and Greece in relation to the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister and President of the Territorial and Military Commission at the conference, was determined to conclude a peace agreement between Athens and Ankara that would allow Turkey to rebuild herself and draw the country away from the Soviet Union and closer to Western powers. To this end, on several occasions during the negotiations, Curzon urged Turkey to become a member of the LoN after the conclusion of the Peace Conference. Even before the opening of the conference, Britain pushed for the formation of a united stance towards Turkey and on 18 November 1922 the three Great Powers agreed on a common policy.\textsuperscript{828} The ultimate goal was to bring stability to the Near East, where British, as well as French and Italian interests, were vital. As far as the Great Powers

\textsuperscript{825} Cited in de Azcárate 1945: 172-73.
\textsuperscript{827} Treaty of Lausanne 1923: 9.
\textsuperscript{828} Howard 1931: 277-8.
were concerned, the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece and the protection of the rights of the minorities excluded was one of the basic preconditions for establishing security in the region. According to Dr. Fridjof Nansen, Britain, France, Italy and Japan believed that ‘to unmix the populations of the Near East will tend to secure the true pacification of the Near East’.

As early as October 1922, Nansen had been authorized by the representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople to contact the governments of Greece and Turkey, in order to start discussions on the issue of the exchange of populations. Venizelos, who had been appointed by Athens to negotiate the peace treaty terms, favoured this solution. In his letter to Nansen on 13 October 1922, he put forward his proposal:

Allow me to insist and ask you to proceed with any measure you deem necessary in order to achieve the beginning of the exchange of populations before the signing of the peace treaty.

The problem of housing the Asia Minor refugees made necessary the evacuation from Thrace of the approximately 350,000 Muslims still residing there. At the same time, according to Nansen the Turkish authorities had given a one-month deadline for the evacuation of Asia Minor and they were determined to forcibly deport people in order to achieve it. As Venizelos pointed out to Nansen, the Turkish Minister of the Interior had already announced Ankara’s intention of proposing a compulsory exchange at the upcoming peace conference. The High Commissioners of the Great Powers supported Venizelos’ suggestion, but the Turkish government stated that it agreed in principle with the exchange on the condition that the Constantinopolitan Greeks would also be included. A full exchange served the policy of Ankara, which after the war was seeking to create a nation-state based on ethnic and religious homogeneity, wherein the presence of different ethnic groups

---

829 Dr. Nansen had been sent to the Near East by the Assembly of the LoN to work on the issue of the refugees of the Greek-Turkish war. See LCNEA 1923: 113.
830 Cited in Petropulos 1976: 143.
832 Cited in Svolopoulos 1999: 102; See Appendix 1.
834 Svolopoulos 1999: 108.
835 Petropulos 1976: 142.
was perceived as an obstacle to the realization of this goal.\textsuperscript{837} As one of the members of the Turkish delegation, Riza Nur, wrote in his memoirs:

The most important thing was the liberation of Turkey from the elements which through the centuries had weakened her either by organizing rebellions or by being the domestic extensions of foreign states. Hence the making of the country uniformly Turkish […] was a huge and unequalled responsibility.\textsuperscript{838}

Regarding the protection of minorities, the aim of Turkish policy was to prevent this issue from becoming a pretext for the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Turkey and threatening the national sovereignty of the country. As a result, throughout the negotiations the Turkish delegation resisted the efforts of Venizelos to place the protection of the Greek Orthodox minority under the protection of the LoN. Thus, they adopted a stance of negative representation of the Greek and Armenian element in Turkey, in order to justify Ankara’s reluctance to allow the presence of non-Muslim minorities in the future Turkish state. On 29 November 1922 Ismet Inonü, the head of the Turkish diplomatic mission, had told a member of the American delegation that Turkey would ‘not have Armenians and Greeks remaining as the means of importing corruption and disloyalty into our country.’\textsuperscript{839} The attribution of disloyalty was used several times during the negotiations to stigmatize the Greeks and Armenians as deviant and threatening.\textsuperscript{840} This mistrust is partly justified as a consequence of the overt support of both communities to Greek and Armenian separatist nationalisms respectively. Yet, it should also be seen as a part of the Turkish strategy in the conference, which aimed at officially excluding the possibility of different ethnic groups remaining within the new Turkish state.

On 1 December 1922, the issue of the exchange was officially introduced at the conference by Curzon. After the preliminary statements of Nansen, who put forward the basic principles of the exchange, it was the turn of the Greek and Turkish delegations. Naturally, Venizelos accepted Nansen’s proposals. On the other hand, Inonü stated that the Constantinopolitan Greeks should also be included in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{837} Keyder 2003: 41-2, 47; Aktar 2003: 79, 87; Oran 2003: 99-100; Cagaptay 2006: 15, 156.
  \item \textsuperscript{838} Cited in Aktar 2003: 87.
  \item \textsuperscript{839} Cited in Alexandris 1992: 85.
  \item \textsuperscript{840} See Van der Valk 2003: 189.
\end{itemize}
compulsory exchange.\footnote{LCNEA 1923: 120.} The Greek delegation was opposed to this, on the grounds that Greece was unable to accommodate any more refugees from Turkey. In Venizelos’ words ‘such an expulsion would amount to an unprecedented political, economic and social catastrophe’.\footnote{Ibid., 121.} The end of the war had found Greece defeated and having to accommodate thousands of refugees, who had fled during the war from Anatolia and Asia Minor and continued to arrive from Istanbul. Since November 1922, Athens had declined a similar request of the Turks and had sent instructions to Venizelos to point out at Lausanne the financial and political weakness of the country to deal with the continuous influx of people from Turkey.\footnote{Alexandris 1981:304-5.} Therefore, the Greek delegation’s main aim during the negotiations was to retain the minority in Istanbul and secure at the same time the presence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey, which for centuries was considered the religious and political authority of the minority.\footnote{Petropulos 1976: 144.} Placing the minority’s rights under international protection was an essential precondition for the success of Greek policy. Even before the start of the peace conference, Athens had expressed its mistrust regarding Turkey’s minority policies. On 7 October 1922, Dimitrios Kaklamanos, the Greek ambassador in London, had sent a letter to the \textit{Times} refuting Turkish allegations of persecutions committed against the Turks by the Greek army during the war. Concluding his letter he wrote:

Exterminations systematically organized by Turkish Governments are a principle. It is against this system and this principle that the conscience of every civilized man and the very soul of civilization rises in protest, and demands real and tangible guarantees for the unfortunate remnants of my race and faith.

In agreement with the Greek point of view, Lord Curzon made clear that an exchange of all the populations was not possible and that specific measures should be taken for the protection of the remaining minorities. Especially on the issue of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, he said that it would be in Turkey’s best financial
interests to allow them to stay. In return, the Muslim population of Western Thrace could also be excluded from the exchange.\textsuperscript{845}

On 12 December 1922 the question of the protection of minorities came up for discussion. Curzon reminded Turkey of the commitments it made in February 1920 and October 1922 regarding this issue and expressed the hope that after the signing of the peace treaty, the country would enter the LoN, which was the most qualified body to safeguard the rights of minorities. He also urged Ankara to show a more conciliatory attitude in the case of the Constantinopolitan Greeks.\textsuperscript{846} The reason was that since 10 December the negotiations of the Sub-commission on Minorities had reached a deadlock, due to Riza Nur’s request to include the Greeks of Istanbul in the exchange and exclude only the Muslims of Western Thrace.\textsuperscript{847} Inonü responded by offering an historical account of the presence of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire, claiming that ‘the very liberality of the Ottoman Empire towards its non-Muslim subjects was thus turned against it. The Christians, enemies of the Ottoman State, remained organized in national communities ready for revolt.’\textsuperscript{848} While referring to the Armenian question, he said that the Armenians, before the interference of foreign powers, in the mid-nineteenth century had gained the trust of the Turks, ‘in contradiction with the Greeks whose turbulence during previous years had caused such great trouble to the Ottoman State’.\textsuperscript{849} He continued the stigmatization of the Greeks and the Armenians by blaming them for the calamities they endured:

\begin{quote}
It follows from the facts and the preceding evidence that the Turks have never failed to acknowledge the rights of the non-Moslem elements so long as the latter did not abuse the generosity of the country in which they lived in comfort for centuries. […] The blame for the distressing events in the case of the Greeks and the Armenians falls entirely upon themselves.\textsuperscript{850}
\end{quote}

According to Inonü, the two principal factors that had caused the suffering of minorities were the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Turkey,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[845] LCNEA 1923: 118, 122.
\item[846] Ibid., 175-180.
\item[847] LCNEA 1923: 330; Alexandris 1992: 86.
\item[848] LCNEA 1923: 192.
\item[849] Ibid., 197.
\item[850] Ibid., 201.
\end{footnotes}
under the pretext of protecting the minorities, and the desire of the latter to liberate themselves and create independent states. In order to prevent these actions, he suggested that ‘the minorities ought in the first place to be deprived of any political protection whatsoever other than that which is guaranteed to them by the laws of the country.’ In addition, he expressed the view that the LoN was not in a position to avert foreign intervention in Turkey, which could stir up troubles between the state and the minorities, as had happened in the past. The reason was that the legal framework of the LoN allowed every member of the Council to raise questions on minority issues, a right that could be exploited by countries that had designs on Turkey. Closing his statement, İnönü laid down the Turkish delegation’s suggestions regarding the issue of national minorities. He proposed the exchange of the Turkish and Greek populations, a move which he characterized as the ‘most radical and humane remedy’. In the case of the remaining minorities, he said that the best guarantees for their security ‘would be those supplied by the laws of the country and by the liberal policy of Turkey with regard to all communities whose members have not deviated from their duty as Turkish citizens’.

İnönü’s views and proposals revealed Ankara’s strong desire to set from the beginning the foundations for an ‘ethnically cleansed Turkish entity’. The exchange of populations and the reluctance of the delegation to accept the presence of minorities in the state should be seen in that context. The aim of Turkish nationalism was to create a nation-state based on a Turkish national identity. İnönü identified the Greek national identity with the non-Muslim religious identity. The terms ‘non-Moslems’, ‘Christians’ and ‘Greeks’ employed by İnönü referred to the same group of people. The reason for this identification is that religion was used as the essential criterion of defining identity, since the founders of the Turkish Republic had based the differentiation of the Turkish nation in relation to ‘alien’ elements on the pre-war religious division of populations into millets. The fact that the Treaty of Lausanne named the minorities with religious terms does not mean that these minorities were not national. As de Azcárate pointed out, the term ‘national minority’

---

could not be used at the time, because it was based on the indefinite and indefinable concept of nationality. Thus, the terms used in the peace treaties were ‘minorities of race, language or religion’. In addition, the negative representation of the ‘other’ as non-Muslim/Greek/traitor in contradistinction with the positive self-representation as Muslim/Turk/patriot, justified the Turkish argument of including the Constantinopolitan Greeks in the compulsory exchange of populations.

The suggestion of the Turkish delegation that the rights of any remaining minorities would be guaranteed by the laws of the country, demonstrated an attempt to ensure that this would be an issue of domestic and not international policy. İnönü’s doubts regarding the nature of international control for the protection of minorities, highlighted one of the most controversial clauses of the minorities treaties, the Right of Petition for Minorities. Adopted by the Council in Brussels on 22 October 1920, it was based on the following principle:

Evidently this right does not in any way exclude the right of minorities themselves, or even of States not represented on the Council, to call the attention of the League of Nations to any infraction or danger of infraction. But this act must retain the nature of a petition, or a report pure and simple; it cannot have the legal effect of putting the matter before the Council and calling upon it to intervene.856

As a result, any minority group or state could monitor the policies of the host state towards the minority and use the petitions as a means of intervention on behalf of the minority. In the case of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, it meant that Athens would have a legitimate right to call the attention of the LoN to any infraction carried out by the Turkish government. The Right of Petition, combined with the ‘guarantee clause’ contained in all the minorities treaties concluded under the auspices of the LoN, allowed a significant level of international control over the internal policy of the host state on minority issues. The latter stipulated that:

Any Member of the Council of the LoN shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. 856

---

854 de Azcárate 1945: 3.
855 Ibid., 102.
856 de Azcárate 1945: 94-5.
Furthermore, it acknowledged to any member of the Council the right to refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice, if any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arose out of the articles of the Minorities Treaties.

Turkey was not willing to provide Greece with the opportunity to interfere in its domestic affairs:

The elimination of an official intervention would still be ineffective in rendering certain minorities inaccessible to provocations from outside. The last campaign of devastation and carnage intermingled with all kinds of abominable crimes has demonstrated the aggressive designs of Greece on Turkish Asia Minor.\(^{857}\)

Curzon’s unsympathetic response demonstrated the determination of the Allied Powers to reach a solution along the lines of their policy regarding minorities. He stressed the fact that the ‘conference was assembled to […] prepare a treaty which would contain sufficient guarantees for the prevention of injustice and provide for the maintenance of security and order’.\(^{858}\) All of his suggestions and remarks were aimed at safeguarding stability in the Near East, which formed part of a more general British post-war foreign policy. For Britain, minorities treaties were employed as a means to promote the maintenance of the new status quo. According to Bloxham, ‘the final result of their application was supposed to be the peaceful absorption of the minorities into majority culture, towards the wider end of ensuring the stability of the post-war territorial settlement’.\(^{859}\) The exchange of populations, the application of the principle of reciprocity for the protection of the remaining minorities and the invitation to Turkey to become a member of the LoN had been suggested in that context.

Venizelos, who spoke after Curzon, refuted İnönü’s argument that Turkish laws could guarantee the protection of minorities in Turkey. He said that ‘Turkey cannot claim a privileged position in this respect as compared with all the Powers which have undertaken international engagements for the protection of minorities’.\(^{860}\) It seems that Venizelos was eager to place the protection of the Constantinopolitan

\(^{857}\) LCNEA 1923: 202-03.
\(^{858}\) Ibid., 183.
\(^{859}\) Bloxham 2007: 170-1.
\(^{860}\) LCNEA 1923: 185.
Greeks under the guarantee of the LoN and Turkey under international control. In that way Greece could have the opportunity to monitor the situation of the minority in Turkey and act when it believed its rights were violated. Athens and Ankara expressed two different stances on the issue. The former wanted to internationalize the protection of the minority in order to have a level of control over Turkish minority policy. The latter intended to keep the minority as an internal affair, in order to prevent foreign interference. Both stances could be justified by the different historical experience of the two countries.

At the meeting of 13 December 1922, İnönü continued the negative representation of the Greek element as disloyal and threatening to Turkey’s national sovereignty. He claimed that his statement the previous day was aimed at affirming Turkey’s ‘desire to prevent minorities […] becoming weapons in the hands of foreigners, capable of being utilized for subversive purposes’. Therefore, it was necessary to exchange the Greeks of Turkey with the Turks of Greece, because the former had become ‘aggressors against their own country’ during the war. Once again, the stigmatization of the Greek element in Turkey as an ‘aggressor’, a threatening out-group, was used to justify the exchange of populations. İnönü’s words also manifested the mistrust and hostility towards the Greek population, created by the nationalist activities of its lay and religious leadership in 1918-1922. According to İnönü the Constantinopolitan Greeks should be included in the exchange, ‘an operation which justice and equality required’. However, he was forced to compromise on this issue and consented to their exclusion from the exchange.  

In order to justify this decision İnönü stated in the newspaper Tanin of 28 December 1922 that this was a sign of goodwill towards the Allies. At the same time however, he pointed out that the Constantinopolitan Greeks could stay ‘under certain conditions which would prevent them from being a nuisance’. The fact that their presence was perceived as a necessary evil further emphasized their minority status.

İnönü insisted on claiming that the only way for the minorities to enjoy the rights of a Turkish citizen was to abstain from having relations with and taking directions

---

861 LCNEA 1923: 207; Alexandris 1992:86.
862 Cited in The Times: 5 January 1923.
from foreign powers. On these grounds he contested the suggestion of the LoN to form a committee that would deal with the issue of minorities excluded from the exchange of populations. He feared that such a committee could be used as a means of interference in Turkish domestic policy and would be ‘quite incompatible with the independence and even the existence of Turkey’. However, he confirmed that the rights of minorities would be guaranteed according to the laws laid down in the other peace treaties. At the same time, he expressed the hope that the protection of minorities would not be used as a means of threatening the existence and integrity of Turkey.  

Inonü’s misgivings brought to the surface another controversial issue deriving from the minorities treaties, which was the restriction of national sovereignty as a consequence of the application of international control for the protection of minorities. According to the SLoN, the Council should be careful not to give the impression of interfering in the domestic policy of countries that had obligations towards minorities or considering these countries as unable to fulfill these obligations. As de Azcárate pointed out, the ‘protection of minorities by the LoN is perhaps the best example of real and effective limitation of national sovereignty for the purpose of making possible international action’.  

The Greek delegation tried to challenge the arguments of the Turkish diplomats. Venizelos stood his ground and stressed once again the vital need for international control with regards to the execution of the clauses for the protection of minorities, while he rejected Turkey’s reservations regarding its national sovereignty. Curzon responded harshly to Inonü, adding that he did not want to say anything regarding the Constantinopolitan Greeks, because ‘their case was in the hands of M.Venizelos’. This was a semi-official recognition of the role of Greece as the national homeland of the minority. He also dismissed Turkish suspicions that the LoN intended to interfere with the sovereignty of Turkey, urging Ankara and the Turkish delegation to make clear their position regarding their membership in the LoN. This was one of his  

---

864 SLON 1938: 112.  
865 de Azcárate 1945: 98.  
866 LCNEA 1923: 210, 212-4.
main objectives, because it would secure the rights of the minorities and provide a level of stability in Turkey’s relations with the LoN. Although in the meeting of 14 December 1922 Inonü replied that Turkey was ready to enter the LoN as soon as peace was concluded, it did so as late as 1932. This was another sign of Turkey’s reluctance to allow foreign powers to interfere with its internal affairs. As Inonü explained, Turkey’s sovereignty had always been guaranteed by treaties, but had repeatedly been violated by foreign powers on the pretext of humanitarian reasons.\textsuperscript{867} This was the reason for its unwillingness to place the protection of minorities under international control. Furthermore, despite Curzon’s remarks the previous day, he claimed that ‘the minorities, by continual and persistent misuse of the privileges granted to them and by making themselves the instrument of foreigners, had brought about the deplorable results which had ensued’.\textsuperscript{868} Once more accusations of disloyalty and treason were made against the minorities as a means of stigmatizing them. However, at the end of his statement he confirmed that Turkey recognized the rights of non-Muslim minorities according to the principles stipulated in the other peace treaties.\textsuperscript{869} Inonü’s words reveal the discrepancy between official minority status and social and political minority status. On the one hand, he confirmed the protection of the Greek Orthodox minority according to international treaties, and, on the other, he employed negative representation and stigmatization in order to present the minority as a deviant out-group.

In any case Curzon was satisfied with the declaration of the Turkish delegation, because it meant that the protection of minorities would be placed under the protection of the LoN. Venizelos, in his statement, tried to dismiss Inonü’s accusations, maintaining that ‘after the armistice of Mudros […] the Greeks of those territories had sought to unite themselves with their fellow-Greeks. Surely this was a most natural thing’.\textsuperscript{870} Despite his reassurance that the remaining Greeks residing in Turkey after the treaty would be loyal subjects of the state, Venizelos’ argument stressed the national affiliation of the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Athens, thus

\textsuperscript{867} Ibid., 219.
\textsuperscript{868} Ibid., 217.
\textsuperscript{869} Ibid., 221.
\textsuperscript{870} Ibid., 223, 226.
legitimizing Turkish negative representations of the minority. This fact became evident in a communication of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with Athens in late December 1922.\textsuperscript{871} Referring to the negotiations of the Sub-Commission of Minorities regarding its future position, the Patriarchate maintained it did not consider it proper to be presented as depending on Athens on private matters. This is because it would give credence to Turkish Allegations that it was an ‘institution of Greek interests’, at a time when the leadership of the Constantinopolitan Greeks were also represented as serving the interests of the Greek state and not the Orthodox community. Additionally, the need for an official guarantee in the treaty regarding its position and rights was emphasized.

The negotiations at the Sub-Commission of Minorities regarding the issue of the Patriarchate had reached a deadlock. The Turkish delegation had demanded its removal on the grounds that it was a political institution.\textsuperscript{872} The Greek delegation had challenged Turkish claims and initially refused to participate in any discussion. However, on 4 January 1923, Riza Nur, claimed that the removal of the Patriarchate was a condition for the continued existence of the Greeks in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{873} The issue was discussed on 10 January 1923 at the main Commission. In his effort to secure the retention of the Patriarchate, Venizelos represented it as an institution under Turkish jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{874} Alexandris maintains that this argument provided the Turkish state with the opportunity to undermine the international character of the Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{875} The decision finally taken was that it could remain in Istanbul, but would have to confine itself to purely religious matters.\textsuperscript{876} However, this remained only a verbal obligation and was not included in the final terms of the treaty.\textsuperscript{877} In a sense the Greek delegation, instead of securing the international protection of the Patriarchate, allowed it to be considered an internal affair of the Turkish state, which made it vulnerable to nationalizing policies.

\textsuperscript{871} GMFA 1923 5/2: Ecumenical Patriarchate to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 December / 10 January 1923)
\textsuperscript{872} LCNEA 1923: 321, 323.
\textsuperscript{874} LCNEA 1923: 333.
\textsuperscript{875} Alexandris 1992: 90.
\textsuperscript{876} LCNEA 1923: 326.
\textsuperscript{877} Alexandris 1992: 93.
The policy of the Greek delegation on the issue of the military service of the Constantinopolitan Greeks was equally controversial. During the discussion of 9 January 1923 the Turkish delegation refused to exempt non-Muslims from military service, because that would be against the principle of equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law.\textsuperscript{878} Venizelos proposed to the Sub-Commission to deprive non-Muslim minorities of their political rights in exchange for not serving in the Turkish army, in order for equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law to be restored.\textsuperscript{879} This proposal was not logical, because it was contrary to the policy of securing the rights of the minority within the Turkish state. However, it seems that the recent experiences of the ‘labor battalions’ (‘amele taburlari’)\textsuperscript{880} and the inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Turkish army\textsuperscript{881} led him to this suggestion. Finally, it was decided that the non-Muslims would not be exempted from military service.\textsuperscript{882}

The negotiations were deemed successful by the Greek government, according to a letter communicated to the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 20 January 1923.\textsuperscript{883}

The Government however considers that the preservation of the Patriarchate and the Greek population in Constantinople is not a small success and hopes that once peace is established and the State regains in time its past strength and prestige, happier days will arise for Hellenism as a whole.

The Patriarchate did not share Athens’ optimism. In its letter to the Greek government on 19 January 1923,\textsuperscript{884} it argued that the withdrawal of the Greek proposal for the exemption from military service annulled the success on the issue of the retention of the Patriarchate and the Greek population in Istanbul. Furthermore, they were convinced ‘that military service means legal uprooting of Constantinopolitan Greeks’. The recent memories of the sufferings of the Ottoman Greeks in the labor battalions did not inspire confidence in the Turkish authorities for an equal treatment of the Greek Orthodox in the army. Thus, fears were expressed

\textsuperscript{878} LCNEA 1923: 291.
\textsuperscript{879} Ibid., 293.
\textsuperscript{880} Alexandris 1992: 99.
\textsuperscript{881} LCNEA 1923: 293.
\textsuperscript{882} Alexandris 1992: 100.
\textsuperscript{883} GMFA 1923 5/2: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ecumenical Patriarchate (20 January 1923); See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{884} GMFA 1923 5/2: Ecumenical Patriarchate to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (19 January 1923).
that the enlistment would be used as a means of pressure to force the Constantinopolitan Greeks to leave the country, in order to avoid serving in the military. The assessment of the Turkish delegation regarding the results of the negotiations was similar. According to Riza Nur, the compulsory military service would allow Turkey to get rid of the Greeks exempted from the exchange of populations. As he pointed out, ‘the successes on the question of military service and the Patriarchate had destroyed the Ottoman Greek identity’. 885

On 30 January 1923 the Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations was signed at Lausanne. 886 It defined as exchangeable the Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and the Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory (Article 1). The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople, Imvros and Tenedos and the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace were excluded from the exchange (Article 2). The rights for the protection of non-Muslim minorities were laid down in Articles 37-44 of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923. 887 According to Article 37 these articles should ‘be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations’. The Turkish Government undertook to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. It also recognized the right of free exercise of religion and full freedom of movement and emigration for non-Muslim minorities (Article 38). All the inhabitants of Turkey would have the same civil and political rights and Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities should enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals (Articles 39-40). The minorities had the right to establish, manage and control at their own expense any charitable, religious, educational and social institutions with the right to use their own language and exercise their own religion freely therein (Article 40). With regards to public instruction, in districts where a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals were resident, teaching in primary schools could be carried out in their own language.

885 Cited in Alexandris 1992: 100.
887 Ibid., 29-33.
At the same the Turkish Government reserved the right to make the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in these schools (Article 41). The Turkish government undertook to take the necessary measures in order to permit issues related to family law or personal status to be settled in accordance with the customs of the minorities. These measures would be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of the minority in equal number (Article 42). These provisions were placed under the guarantee of the LoN and provided any Member of the Council with the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations. From that point on, the Council could take such action and give such directions as it might deem proper and effective depending on the circumstances (Article 44).

The Treaty of Lausanne set the legal framework for the protection of the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. Turkey, determined to create a Turkish nation, employed nationalizing policies that gradually marginalized the non-Muslim minorities, including the Greek Orthodox. Greece, after managing to place the rights of the minority under international protection, continued to act as the minority’s national homeland monitoring the condition of its co-nationals and intervening on their behalf. The Greeks of Istanbul remained in the difficult position of balancing between their national affiliation with Greece and their civil membership of Turkey. This fact had an impact on the relations between Greece, Turkey and the minority and influenced several aspects of the life of the Constantinopolitan Greeks.

---

Dealing with and responding to Turkish nation-building

The secularization of the state was among the priorities of the new regime in Turkey. Together with nationalism and westernization, it became one leg in the ideological tripod of modern Turkey. Secularism was applied to all religious groups, including the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. Already since the peace negotiations, the Turkish government had agreed to allow the Ecumenical Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul, on the condition that it would confine itself to strictly religious matters. However, restricting the Church to its religious role was not an easy task, bearing in mind that the communal self-administration system during the Ottoman period was interwoven with the authority of the Patriarchate. Therefore, it was actually the Phanar that tried to carry out the normal transition of the community to the new regime.

From the beginning the Patriarchate encountered serious difficulties in achieving its goals. The refusal of Patriarch Meletios to officially resign from the patriarchal throne did not allow the Church to re-establish its relations with the Turkish government. Meletios had actively supported Venizelos and the irredentist policy of the Megali Idea during 1919-1922. In Lausanne the Turkish delegation had asked Venizelos to remove him from the Phanar, as a precondition for allowing the Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul. Demonstrating once again his political pragmatism the Greek statesman agreed, because he had realized that this would open the way for a rapprochement between the Patriarchate and the authorities. Thus, in an effort to put pressure on his former protégé and fervent supporter, Venizelos sent a personal telegram to Meletios urging him to resign and made statements along these lines to the press. On 7 July 1923, Meletios asked the Holy Synod for a three month convalescence leave and three days later he met with the two bodies for the final time. During this meeting it was decided that the powers and responsibilities of the patriarch would be entrusted to the Holy Synod, which was allowed to exercise its authority without any restrictions. The PNMC would continue to operate until the

890 LCNEA 1923: 326; Alexandris 1992: 93.
position of the church in the new state was clearly defined and a new communal administration system was set up according to the minority clauses of the treaty. As soon as the new communal authority was established, the PNMC would hand over its powers to them. Meletios also committed himself to resign, if the Holy Synod decided to go ahead with a patriarchal election. Furthermore, he stated that he would hold to his decision, even if a faction within the Holy Synod opposed his resignation. The same day he departed for Mount Athos, while a patriarchal encyclical was issued announcing his departure to the clergy and the people and informing them about the transfer of his powers to the Holy Synod. As a result, Meletios left Istanbul without officially resigning from his throne.892

After his departure, the Holy Synod tried to approach the Turkish government and contacted the vali (prefect) of Istanbul Ali Haydar through Vasilios Orfanidis.893 This was not the first time this influential Constantinopolitan Greek was called upon to play such a role. As a deputy of the Ottoman parliament elected with the CUP and a person trusted by the Turks, he had been the liaison between the Church and the Young Turk regime throughout World War I. However, the fall of his personal friend Patriarch Germanos V from the patriarchal throne and the return of the nationalists to power in October 1918, forced Orfanidis to withdraw from the forefront during the period 1919-1922. The new conditions created after the victory of the Kemalists and the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, allowed him to get involved once again in the affairs of the minority. Orfanidis would become one of the prominent figures of the minority in the immediate post-war period.894

Furthermore, in mid-July 1923 the Patriarchate issued a statement declaring that it was willing to abandon all its political and administrative privileges and restrict itself to purely religious affairs. It stressed that relations between the Turkish state and the church would follow the example of Britain, France and the USA, as Riza Nur had stated in Lausanne. Communal institutions would be administered by representatives elected by the community and religious issues such as marriage would be under

892 Ekklesiastiki Alithia, (14 July 1923, 13 October 1923).
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In addition, the patriarchal election would take place according to canon law. However, the Turkish government ignored the Patriarchate’s efforts for a rapprochement. Ali Haydar refused to discuss the issue of electing a new patriarch with the representatives of the Patriarchate, while Ankara ruled out any possibility of negotiation as long as Meletios officially remained patriarch.\textsuperscript{895}

Despite the government’s indifferent response, the Patriarchate did not give up. On 4 August 1923, the Holy Synod addressed an official letter to Kemal asking for assistance. Claiming that they represented the Patriarchate in its new form as a purely religious institution, the prelates offered a brief account of their attempts to approach the authorities and discuss the issues of the patriarchal election and the transfer of the Patriarchate’s administrative powers to the minority councils. They argued that the signing of the treaty made the settlement of these issues even more urgent and made an appeal to the government for guidance.\textsuperscript{896} A few days later, the secretary of the Holy Synod Germanos Athanasiadis and the patriarchal counsellor on political affairs Dimitrios Phytos welcomed İnönü when he arrived in Istanbul, in an effort to show the Patriarchate’s obedience to the state.\textsuperscript{897} In the same spirit, on 18 August the Holy Synod sent a congratulatory letter on behalf of the Patriarchate to Kemal for his re-election as president of the GNA. A similar letter was addressed to Fethi Okyar, who was elected Prime Minister by the GNA.\textsuperscript{898}

The next day the Holy Synod decided to form a committee, which undertook to examine the Treaty of Lausanne and the Holy Canons and prepare a memorandum for the establishment of the Patriarchate as a purely religious institution.\textsuperscript{899} At the same time, according to an encyclical issued by the Grand Chancellery on 25 August 1923, the PNMC would continue to operate, until the new communal system of administration was planned, ratified and put into effect. In other words, the

\textsuperscript{895} Alexandris 1992: 150-1.
\textsuperscript{896} AEP, Code A/93: p.395, no 3788 (4 August 1923).
\textsuperscript{897} Alexandris 1992: 150.
\textsuperscript{898} AEP, Code A/93: p.406, no 3982 (18 August 1923); Imerisia Nea (16 August 1923); Mango 2004: 389-90.
\textsuperscript{899} Imerisia Nea, (22 August 1923).
authorities of the communal and public welfare institutions would not change, in order to avoid the breakdown of the parishes.\textsuperscript{900}

The Constantinopolitan Greek newspaper \textit{Imerisia Nea}\textsuperscript{901} criticized the patriarchal committee for wasting precious time in planning the constitutional charter of the minority.\textsuperscript{902} However, the responsibility for this delay did not lie with the Patriarchate, but with the cautious and obstructive policy of the government, which did not provide the Phanar with clear instructions. On 15 September 1923, the Holy Synod addressed a letter to Fethi Okyar reminding him of their previous appeal of 4 August and asking once again for guidance, especially on the issue of the patriarchal election.\textsuperscript{903} \textit{Imerisia Nea} in a series of articles also stressed the need for the official resignation of the patriarch, which directly affected the process of planning a new communal administration system.\textsuperscript{904} The newspaper argued that this would restore the status of the Patriarchate as an institution and allow the establishment of relations between the government and the minority. In addition, the resignation of Meletios would dissipate the suspicion against the Constantinopolitan Greeks and prove that they were lawful citizens, caring for the interests of Turkey.\textsuperscript{905} It was obvious that the new conditions dictated the need to break their connection with the recent past and represent themselves as devoted Turkish citizens and not as supporters or instruments of Greek irredentism.

At the same time, the newspaper vehemently criticized the lay leadership and the Constantinopolitan Greek press of the period 1919-1922. It accused the former of stupidity, populism and erratic policies regarding the administration and guidance of the community and the press of corruption and immorality. \textit{Imerisia Nea} maintained that these two factors were responsible for the destruction of the community, because they misled the people in the wrong direction, implying Greek irredentism.

\textsuperscript{900} \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alithia}, (1 September 1923); \textit{Imerisia Nea} (26 August 1923).
\textsuperscript{901} \textit{Imerisia Nea} was first published on 15 August 1923. Director and publisher was Kleonymos Pallis, while on 29 October 1923 the former editor-in-chief of \textit{Tachydromos} K. Konstantinidis was employed as the newspaper’s editor-in-chief. See \textit{Imerisia Nea} (29 October 1923, 30 October 1923, 26 February 1924).
\textsuperscript{902} \textit{Imerisia Nea}, (24 August 1923, 26 August 1923, 30 August 1923)
\textsuperscript{903} AEP, Code A/93: p.447, no 4524 (15 September 1923).
\textsuperscript{904} \textit{Imerisia Nea}, (21 August 1923, 24 August 1923, 26 August 1923, 4 September 1923, 10 September 1923, 13 September 1923, 17 September 1923, 28 September 1923, 2 October 1923).
\textsuperscript{905} \textit{Imerisia Nea} (21 August 1923, 17 September 1923).
Therefore, it urged the Constantinopolitan Greeks to seek for new faces as leaders and avoid turning to individuals related to the previous communal authorities. Furthermore, the newspaper expressed its misgivings, as to whether allowing the PNMC to operate was actually beneficial, arguing that its presence obstructed the adjustment of the minority to the new conditions. Once again it accused its lay members of being representatives of a bygone generation, which led the community into a state of corruption, disrespect and destruction. In order to allow the minority to move forward, the PNMC should call for the formation of a committee composed of representatives elected from all the communities and turn the power over to them. Several times Imerisia Nea appealed publicly to the lay representatives of all the communities of Istanbul constituting the minority, asking them to examine the terms of the treaty instead of the patriarchal committee, and prepare a plan of communal administration that would delineate with accuracy the rights of the minority. Then they would be able to request from the government the appointment of state representatives in order to form a mixed commission, as the treaty of Lausanne stipulated, and draw up the minority’s new constitutional charter.

In October 1923 the situation regarding the patriarchal issue, which was directly connected with the communal self-administration system, started to change. Early in the month there were reports in the Constantinopolitan press that Athens wished to re-establish diplomatic relations with Ankara. Within this context, the Greek government tried to persuade Meletios, a persona non grata for the Turkish authorities, to officially resign. The fact that he was still holding the patriarchal office was considered a significant obstacle to the process of restoring Greek-Turkish relations. In addition, his resignation would create the circumstances for a rapprochement between the Patriarchate and the Turkish state and allow the Phanar to elect a new patriarch and resolve the problems related to the administration of the minority. As a result, the Archbishop of Athens Chrysostomos was sent to Thessaloniki with official instructions to convince Meletios to step down officially.

906 Imerisia Nea, (18 September 1923).
907 Imerisia Nea, (19 September 1923).
908 Imerisia Nea, (21 September 1923, 23 September 1923).
909 Imerisia Nea, (25 September/ 8 October 1923).
from the patriarchal throne.\textsuperscript{910} At the same time, several parties started to exert pressure on the Holy Synod to remove Meletios from his position. Apart from \textit{Imerisia Nea}'s ongoing anti-Meletios campaign, the Turkish press also criticized the Patriarchate for following a two-faced policy on the issue. \textit{Ikdam} argued that Meletios was only temporarily removed by receiving a three month leave, in an attempt to deceive the authorities. The Turkish newspaper pointed out that it would be naïve to expect the reestablishment of relations between the state and the Patriarchate, as long as the latter was still under Meletios’ spiritual leadership.\textsuperscript{911} This pressure culminated when Papa Eftim\textsuperscript{912} forced the Holy Synod with his intrusive methods to take some final decisions.

On 26 September/9 October 1923 Papa Eftim was received at the Phanar by Metropolitan Nikolaos of Kaisareia, after the Holy Synod accepted his request to express his views on the issue of the patriarch in person. Escorted by Saffet Arikan, an inspector of the department of interior, and Hilmi Fehmi, a Turkish officer, he claimed that he represented the government and demanded the immediate and official abdication of Meletios and the dismissal of six members of the Synod representing dioceses outside Turkey. He argued that his sole purpose was to help restore relations between the state and the Patriarchate. The same day the Holy Synod held an extraordinary meeting to discuss his demands. However, while addressing the Turkish press, Eftim undermined the status of the Patriarchate and doubted its loyalty to the state. He also falsely stated that the prelates of the Phanar had invited him in order to discuss the patriarchal problem.\textsuperscript{913} The response of the Synod was immediate. The next day Nikolaos publicly denied Eftim's claims, providing a full account of the events of the previous days. At the same time, \textit{Imerisia Nea} criticized Eftim for presenting himself as acting on behalf of the government and urged the members of the Synod to reject his demands and deal with the patriarchal issue

\textsuperscript{910} Mavropoulos 1960: 196; Alexandris 1992: 154.
\textsuperscript{911} Cited in \textit{Imerisia Nea} (25 September/8 October 1923).
\textsuperscript{912} Papa Eftim or Efthymios Karahissaridis was an Anatolian priest of Keskin and a fervent supporter of the establishment of a nationalist Turkish Orthodox church in Turkey. See Alexandris 1992: 151-2, 156-7.
\textsuperscript{913} \textit{Imerisia Nea} (26 September/9 October 1923); Alexandris 1992: 152-3.
separately and without being influenced by his actions. Although it seems that the Turkish authorities and press tolerated or even supported Eftim, his aggressive approach forced the government to disassociate itself from him. Facing the criticism of the Greek press, and advised by the authorities not to involve them in this matter, Eftim finally admitted that he had acted on his own initiative without receiving official instructions. On 28 September/11 October the Holy Synod decided to completely break off relations with him and continue the discussion of the patriarchal issue on 2/15 October. Justifying its initial willingness to exchange views with Eftim, the Holy Synod maintained that at the time it believed he was genuinely representing the Turkish government.

At the meeting of 2/15 October the Metropolitan of Dyrrachio Iakovos revealed that Meletios had sent him a letter dated 13/26 September, informing him that he would post his official resignation approximately eight days before the end of his leave, scheduled for 10/23 October. In addition, he asked Iakovos to announce the content of the letter to the prelates when the patriarchal issue was discussed. However, while the discussion was under way, Eftim interrupted the meeting and demanded the immediate dismissal of the patriarch. After managing to remove him, the Holy Synod continued and decided to accept the resignation of Meletios and declare the patriarchal throne vacant. Since the office of locum tenens was not in accordance with the new status of the church as a purely religious institution, they entrusted Nikolaos with the task of presiding over the synodical meetings and processing the matters of the Patriarchate. As soon as these decisions were taken, Eftim once again entered the room of the Holy Synod asking for the expulsion of the Metropolitans from dioceses outside Turkey and the appointment of the Metropolitan of Rodoupolis Kyrillos as locum tenens, an offer Kyrillos declined. This eventful meeting resulted in the resignation of Nikolaos from his synodical office and his replacement by the Metropolitan of Kyzikos Kallinikos. Two days later, the Holy Synod and the Metropolitans, at that time in Istanbul, decided to appoint Eftim as the

914 Imerisia Nea (27 September/10 October 1923).
representative of the Patriarchate in Ankara. However, this decision never materialized, because the government refused to recognize Eftim as a representative of an institution which was considered merely religious.

The account of this meeting is based mainly on secondary ecclesiastical sources such as *Ekklisiastiki Alithia* and Mavropoulos. Alexandris offers a slightly different version, drawing his material from the minutes of the meetings of the Holy Synod and Greek and British diplomatic documents. He argues that the Synod decided on the dismissal of Meletios after being terrorized by Eftim and his Turkish associates; that Meletios expelled six members of the Synod and Nikolaos; and that he appointed himself as representative of the Patriarchate in Ankara. Taking into account the fact that Alexandris used official primary sources, it seems that publicly the Patriarchate presented the whole process of Meletios’ dismissal as irrelevant to Eftim’s actions in an effort to protect its prestige. The Holy Synod tried to show that it had initiated the discussion on the patriarchal problem and had taken its decisions regardless of Eftim’s presence. A further point could also be made about the whole issue. Despite his violent methods and his disrespect towards the Phanar, there is no doubt that Eftim acted as a catalyst for the removal of the patriarch from the throne. His pressure precipitated the procedures for Meletios’ dismissal, a fact that *Imerisia Nea*, a newspaper constantly criticizing Eftim, was forced to admit.

In any case, Meletios’ official resignation allowed the Patriarchate to make some progress on the issue of the communal administration. On 11/24 October 1923, the Holy Synod decided on the dissolution of the PNMC, because its operation was incompatible with the new status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The next day it informed the lay members of the last PNMC about the dissolution of the council, thanking them at the same time for their services. Thus, the institution of the PNMC,

---

916 For an account of these events see: *Ekklisiastiki Alithia* (13/26 October 1923); Mavropoulos 1960: 197; *Imerisia Nea* (5/18 October 1923).
919 *Ekklisiastiki Alithia* (13/26 October 1923).
920 *Imerisia Nea* (5/18 October 1923, 9/22 October 1923).
which played the role of the central administrative body of the Greek Orthodox community for approximately 60 years, was finally abolished.922

A few days later, on 18/31 October, the Holy Synod issued the following encyclical.923

In accord with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Holy Synod, wished to transfer the rights and obligations of the former Permanent National Mixed Council, subordinate to the Patriarchate, to the Orthodox population of the region of Constantinople. To this end they decided to invite representatives of the Archbishopric of Constantinople and the adjacent provinces of Chalkidona and Derkon, all of these being Turkish citizens.

The procedure of electing the representatives of the Archdiocese depended completely upon the parishes. The representatives could be elected either directly by the parishioners or by the community’s institutions and church boards on 28 October 1923. The 28 elected representatives of the Archdiocese, along with the 5 and 4 representatives from Chalkidona and Derkon respectively, would gather on Sunday 4 November at the room of the National Charitable Institutions (‘Εθνικών Φιλανθρωπικών Καταστημάτων’), where they would vote for a president and an Administrative Council and discuss the issues of the minority without the participation of the Holy Synod. The initiative of the Church was enthusiastically accepted by the Greek press. The front page of Imerisia Νέα on 20 October was entitled ‘The Historical Meeting’ (‘Η Ιστορική Συνεδρία’). According to the newspaper:

The meeting will be historical because the Church, after five centuries of managing the affairs of the Rum (Ρωμαϊκής) Ethnicity as its National Authority, on December 4th will confine itself solely to its religious and edifying mission and emancipate the ‘now Christian community’, allowing it to deal freely with its issues in the future.924

Initially, the Turkish police permitted the holding of communal elections.925 Nevertheless, on 28 October 1923 the Police Headquarters forbade the meeting of

922 AEP, Code A/93: p.482, no 4969 (12 October 1923). The lay members of the last PNMC were N. Fermanoglou, A. Ioannidis, P. Karatheodoris, L. Kazanovas, V. Mystakidis, I. Papadopoulos, Ch. Kioseoglou and C.G. Ioannidis. See also: EIEA 1923.
923 Εκκλησιατική Αλήθia, (20 October 1923); AEP, Code A/93: p.489-90, no 4994 (18 October 1923); See Appendix 1.
924 Ιμερισία Νέα (20 October 1923). See Appendix 1.
925 Ιμερισία Νέα, (25 October 1923, 27 October 1923, 28 October 1923).
the parish assemblies, claiming that they had not received such instructions from Ankara and until they did, the elections would be postponed.\textsuperscript{926} Imerisia Nea maintained that the reason behind the prohibition of the elections was the omission on the Patriarchate’s part to inform the government regarding the purpose of the parish elections. According to the newspaper, the Church should have assured the authorities that its initiative was not an attempt to interfere in communal affairs, but that on the contrary it aimed at handing the Patriarchate’s power over to the community in a normal manner.\textsuperscript{927} This argument is partially correct. The decision of the Holy Synod to take the initiative and hold communal elections is to a great extent justified by the fact that Ankara had not sent any clear instructions on the issue of communal organization, despite the continuous appeals of the Phanar. The reason behind Turkish intransigence lies in the mistrust of the authorities towards the Patriarchate deriving from its role during the years 1919-1922. It was now paying the price of its overt support for Greek nationalism and the \textit{Megali Idea}. At the same time, the government’s decision was one more indication of the new centralized policy that the state would follow after 1923. In any case, the postponement of the communal meeting for the preparation of the minority’s constitutional charter continued indefinitely. On the one hand, the communal authorities did not take any further step to approach the government and request its official approval for the elections to take place. On the other hand, the government did not seem willing to deal with this matter any further, especially since the minority did not insist on holding the elections.\textsuperscript{928}

On 6 December 1923, Gregorios Zervoudakis, the Metropolitan of Chalkidona, was elected patriarch. His candidacy had been approved by the Turkish government, which considered Gregorios a trustworthy person. He belonged to the Germanos camp, which was on good terms with the government during 1913-1918. After Germanos’ fall from power in late 1918, Gregorios retained his moderate attitude and did not follow the nationalist policy of the Phanar. He even resigned from the Holy Synod over the termination of relations between the Patriarchate and the Porte, a

\textsuperscript{926} Imerisia Nea, (29 October 1923, 31 October 1923, 6 November 1923).
\textsuperscript{927} Imerisia Nea, (29 October 1923).
\textsuperscript{928} Imerisia Nea, (5 November 1923, 6 November 1923).
decision he had strongly opposed. Imerisia Nea, encouraged by the settlement of the patriarchal issue, resumed its campaign for the organization of the communal administration system. On 16 January 1924, it published an article on the issue arguing that the minority should not expect the Patriarchate to take the initiative as had happened in the past. Its involvement was considered unwise, since according to its newly acquired status it was a purely religious institution. Therefore, it was up to the communities to organize themselves with the assistance of the state. Two days later, the newspaper made a public appeal to Alexandros Pantziris, Vasilios Orfanidis, Nikolaos Sgouridis and Vladimiro Mirmiroglou to lead a committee that would take the necessary steps in order to secure the official permission of the government and call the assembly of the minority. Imerisia Nea, following the example of Gregorios, chose the laymen it addressed its appeal to very carefully. Orfanidis and Sgouridis had cooperated with the Turkish authorities before the Mudros armistice of 1918 and belonged to the anti-Ioakimist faction that had fallen from power after the resignation of Germanos V in October 1918. Pantziris and Mirmiroglou, as well as the other two men, had retained a moderate attitude during the crucial years 1919-1922. Therefore, they were not stigmatized as Greek nationalists and were trusted by the Turkish establishment. As the newspaper pointed out:

Their prudence, their common sense, their financial independence but above all their neutrality throughout the period following the armistice are invaluable qualifications that would guarantee the success of the task they would undertake.

As is apparent, after a three year spell in which the supporters of Greek nationalism were in power, the minority was becoming controlled by the conservative mixed lay/clerical faction. However, despite these appeals, the existing sources do not reveal any effort in this direction during 1924 and 1925. Two very important events

---

930 Regarding Orfanidis see Chapter 2, pp. 73, 86; Sgouridis had served as a director at the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and belonged to the lay councillors who replaced the Ioakimists at the PNMC in 1895. See Mavropoulos 1960: 29-30.
931 Mirmiroglou was a lawyer and from 1925 until his death in 1966 held an office (οφφικίαλος) at the Patriarchate, serving as a Grand Orator (Μέγας Ρήτωρ): http://www.megarevma.net/Ofikialoi.htm, last accessed 7 September 2007.
932 Imerisia Nea, (18 January 1924); See Appendix 1.
delayed the process of reorganizing the administration system of the minority. One was the death of Gregorios and the other one was the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI.  

As early as January 1924 the Turkish authorities began to investigate the past of the prelates at the Patriarchate. The status of some archbishops as exchangeable soon became a problem for the Phanar. In June 1924, Gregorios communicated a letter to Georgios Roussos, the Greek foreign minister, arguing that the article of the exchange convention regarding the *établis* (established) could not be applied to the case of the Metropolitans. Their inclusion in the exchange would result in the dissolution of the Holy Synod and obstruct the normal operation of the Patriarchate. In October 1924, the Turkish Ministry of Interior began to register the archbishops of the Phanar. On 17 October Kimon Diamantopoulos, the Greek consul in Istanbul, and Georgios Exindaris, the president of the Greek delegation in the MCEP, informed Athens that the two governments should reach an understanding on the exchange of the prelates, arguing that the Turkish government violated its international obligations towards the Patriarchate by demanding their inclusion in the exchange. A few days later, Roussos instructed the embassy in Paris to bring this issue to the Council of the LoN in order to prevent any undesirable developments. By November, Gregorios, who had been seriously ill since September, was in a critical condition. Facing the prospect of a patriarchal election, Athens requested from Kimon Diamantopoulos that he stress to the members of the Synod the necessity of electing candidates with qualifications approved by the Turkish government, in order to avoid an issue of non-recognition of the patriarch. Roussos pointed out that they should proceed with the election guided by a feeling of patriotism and leave aside any personal reasons that could jeopardise the status of the Patriarchate.

---

933 It should be pointed out in order to avoid possible confusion that in Alexandris’ article ‘The Expulsion of Constantine IV: The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Greek Turkish Relations, 1924-25’ there is an error. The correct name is Constantine VI.  
934 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Gregorios to Roussos (11 June 1924); Alexandris 1981: 335-6.  
935 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (17 October 1924).  
936 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Roussos to Greek Embassy in France (23 October 1924).  
937 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Roussos to Diamantopoulos (8 November 1924).
On 9 November 1924, Ioannis Politis, the Greek chargé d’affaires in Ankara, communicated to Roussos his views on the issue. First of all, Politis challenged the argument of the Greek consulate in Istanbul that the exclusion of the Metropolitans from the exchange was an obligation Turkey had undertaken in Lausanne. He argued that although the Turkish delegation had consented to allow the institution of the Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul, there was no mention whatsoever about the people representing it. In order to justify his argument he referred to the example of Meletios, who was ‘sacrificed’ by the Greek delegation at Lausanne in order to maintain the Patriarchate in Turkey.

Politis also refuted the claims of the Holy Synod that if nine of its members were exchanged the institution would not be able to function. He revealed that in January 1923, while the peace negotiations in Lausanne were under way, the Greek delegation held a meeting with a representative of the Patriarchate, at which Politis was also present. Venizelos, who headed the delegation, asked the patriarchal representative whether maintaining the Patriarchate in Turkey was feasible, both technically and practically, or whether it would be better to move it elsewhere. The Greek statesman based his doubts specifically on the lack of a sufficient number of Metropolitans. The patriarchal representative rejected the idea of moving the Patriarchate arguing that the holy canons, which would replace the National Regulations, did not stipulate a specific number of prelates for the formation of the Holy Synod. Furthermore, he proposed a new division of the prefectures of Constantinople exempted from the exchange and the appointment *in partibus* of Metropolitans who represented dioceses outside Constantinople, in an effort to deal with the problem.

Since the Phanar was aware of the fact that some prelates could be exchanged as exchangeable and had already thought of ways to resolve this issue, Politis rhetorically wondered why they did not apply the plan of dividing the existing prefectures and appoint non-exchangeable Metropolitans to them. In reply, he expressed the view that the institution itself was not under threat, but rather the interests of specific individuals. He maintained that the remaining prefectures were

---

938 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Politis to Roussos (9 November 1924).
represented by prelates who were exchangeable and were not willing to abandon their posts and the benefits that came with the office. He also accused them of creating the impression that their exclusion from the exchange was the only way to secure the position of the Patriarchate in the future.

After criticizing the attitude of the clergy, Politis put forward his own political proposal to overcome the crisis. He claimed that the reason Turkey despised the Patriarchate was its relations with the Greek state and the sense of solidarity between the two, recently expressed by the support of the Phanar for Greek nationalist policy. His overall approach on the issue of the Patriarchate was the following:

If the current policy of the Greek state is truly interested in convincing present-day Turkey that it abandoned its nationalist policy and wishes for the establishment of a new type of relations with Turkey on the basis of mutual trust, and that it does not aim to preserve nationalist organizations in Turkey, it is, I believe, to its advantage to limit its demonstrations of interest towards the Patriarchate as a religious institution only to the absolutely and imperatively necessary level. If, as I believe, we wish to maintain at the same time our hopes for the Patriarchate as a national center, as we can, then we should have above all as our main priority to mollify the hatred and suspicions of Turkey against it. We should act with a programme and make every effort so that the Patriarchate becomes something new as soon as possible; something unconnected, so to speak, with the prior, scheming one, and absolved from all negative attributes of its previous legacy. Only in this way, will we be able to protect the institution from implacable hatred, which inflames even the most moderate of Turkish official circles. [...] If today we manage to save the Patriarchate, then we will have accomplished a great work. Then perhaps tomorrow will be better.  

Therefore, he suggested the immediate division of the remaining prefectures and the appointment of new prelates as representatives. As he pointed out, it would be wise to remove from the Patriarchate people who had provoked the Turks in the past by supporting Greek nationalism, and thus alleviate Turkish suspicions. This renewal would also benefit the church internally, because the majority of the prelates currently in Istanbul had reached several compromises in order to protect their precarious position, and the clergy at the Phanar was deeply divided and fought each other with such hatred that Politis described it as a ‘disgusting spectacle’. The Greek diplomat also proposed to entrust the most important departments of the Patriarchate

939 Ibid; See Appendix 1.
to Metropolitans not holding a title, who would have the right to participate in the Synod. This way the institution would continue to function without any obstruction. Finally, he stressed the need to settle with a patriarchal volume (πατριαρχικός τόμος) the status of the prefectures under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate that had become part of Greece. According to Politis, this measure would legitimize the subsidy of the Greek government to the Patriarchate and dispel Turkish misgivings about the relations between Athens and the Phanar.

Politis’ account offered a valuable insight into the whole issue of the exchangeable Metropolitans, revealing the level of attachment of these people to power, as well as the deep divisions within the Holy Synod, a fact that Roussos had also pointed out. At the same time, his view on the status of the Patriarchate was a demonstration of sheer pragmatism. He placed the institution into the context created after the Treaty of Lausanne and offered solutions compatible with the international obligations Greece and Turkey had undertaken. Politis knew well that the Patriarchate retained its considerable political importance. The commitment declared publicly from all sides that it would become a purely religious institution was still largely inapplicable. Due to the recent events of the period 1919-22 and the fact that its status was not defined on paper, Turkish authorities were constantly suspicious of its relations with the Greek state. For the same reasons though, Athens knew that the Patriarchate could not continue to play its previous role. The times when it acted as a representative of Greek nationalism in the Near East were irrevocably gone. Politis’ approach provided the Patriarchate with the opportunity to strike a balance between its national affiliation with Greece and the establishment of good relations with the host state, Turkey. It would manage to retain its symbolic importance as the ‘national centre’ of Hellenism, keep the state out of its affairs and strengthen its position within Turkey, while restricting its interaction with Athens to a minimal level. This way it would not be perceived by the Turks as a mouthpiece of Greek policy in Turkey and its presence in Istanbul would be secured. In addition, such an arrangement would not create problems in Greek-Turkish relations in the future. In a sense, Politis’ proposal relieved the Greek government of its responsibilities as an external national homeland for the Phanar without putting its existence into danger.
Furthermore, it deprived Ankara of taking action against the Patriarchate based on the usual argument of it conspiring with the Greeks against the state.

The Turkish press also claimed that in Lausanne there was no mention of the people representing the Patriarchate and was hostile and suspicious of the exchangeable prelates and their role during the armistice, verifying Politis’ assessment of the situation.\textsuperscript{940} On 16 November 1924 Gregorios died and a few days later Diamantopoulos reported that, according to Turkish newspapers, the government would react only if an exchangeable or undesirable prelate was elected patriarch. Similar warnings were issued officially by the Turkish authorities to the prelates at the Patriarchate. Therefore, Diamantopoulos was consulting with Exindaris in order to avoid a Turkish veto before the elections. The reason was that the main candidate and leader of the conservative faction Metropolitan of Derkon Constantine was considered to be exchangeable.\textsuperscript{941} On 2 December Athens communicated its instructions to the Greek consulate regarding the forthcoming patriarchal elections. They pointed out that the main objective was the protection of the institution. Therefore, personal issues should be left out of the process. As for the exchangeable prelates, it was necessary to draw the attention of the Synod to the serious possibility of a Turkish veto. The request of the Greek government was very clear:

You should state that the government does not have specific individuals in mind and would favour the election of any suitable candidate, but just wishes the Synod to choose a person with all the necessary qualifications required by the Turkish government, in order to prevent providing even the slightest reason for the non-recognition of the elected prelate. For any opposite action the Synod will bear responsibility, because it now has absolute liberty to arrange such an election […] independently of any personal interests.\textsuperscript{942}

Diamantopoulos reported back to Roussos on 13 December informing him that he met twice with the president of the Holy Synod and its members, drawing their attention to the instructions of the Greek government. According to the Greek consul,

\textsuperscript{940} GMFA 1924 Γ/101/2: Cumhurriyet (11 November 1924), Tevhidi Efkar (11 November 1924).
\textsuperscript{941} GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 November 1924); Alexandris 1992: 160.
\textsuperscript{942} GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Greek Consulate (2 December 1924); See Appendix 1.
the Synod believed that they should not take into account whether the patriarch to be elected was exchangeable or not, because a decision based on these grounds would have negative rather than positive results for the whole issue of the exchange of the prelates. Once again they argued that if the final solution to the problem was against them, the existence of the Patriarchate would be endangered due to the small number of Metropolitans who would remain in Istanbul. Specifically about Constantine, who was the only candidate, they claimed that in case it was needed, they had evidence proving he was an *établis*. As Diamantopoulos pointed out, the Holy Synod bore sole responsibility for these opinions.943

On 16 December, one day before the election, Metropolitan Constantine or Constantine Arapoglou (as was his full name), was escorted along with two other prelates to the offices of the MCEP for the exchange of populations. The Turkish officials escorting him carried with them a document from the *vali* of Istanbul demanding the issue of a passport and the immediate deportation of Constantine as an exchangeable, based on the grounds that he had arrived in the city after 1918. The three prelates were finally released following the protests of Antonis Siotis, a Greek member of the MCEP, and the owners of *IMERISIA NEA* and *Fos*. At the same time however, Hamdi Bey, a member of the Turkish delegation in the MCEP, asked Mavridis, one of the Greek delegates, whether he could urge the prelates not to elect an exchangeable patriarch, because this action would create friction between the two states. Mavridis responded that this was a completely ecclesiastical matter and neither the Greek delegation nor the government could interfere. In any case it was obvious that Ankara would not tolerate the election of an exchangeable patriarch and had made this point clear both to the Patriarchate and the Greek authorities.944

Despite the warnings of the Greek and Turkish governments, as well as the Turkish press, the Holy Synod elected Constantine VI as the new patriarch on 17 December 1924.945 According to Alexandris, ‘in doing so the Phanar probably wished to clarify

---

943 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Roussos (13 December 1924).
944 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Mavridis to Roussos (16 December 1924); Alexandris 1981: 337-8; Alexandris 1992: 159-60.
945 Even on the day of the election, Diamantopoulos pointed out to a member of the Holy Synod the dangers of electing an exchangeable Patriarch. See GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (17 December 1924); Alexandris 1981: 338.
once and for all the ambiguity arising out of the exchange convention which did not specifically define the position of the prelates of the Patriarchate. However, this explanation is not really convincing. It touches the surface rather than the essence of the whole issue. The election of Constantine meant the prevalence of personal interests and ambitions over the protection of the institution. To be more precise, it meant that the conservative faction within the Phanar had won. The new patriarch had been the leader of the anti-Meletios group and had cooperated with the royalist regime during 1920-22. The Holy Synod had completely ignored the advice of Athens to put aside their differences and personal matters when deciding about the new patriarch and had elected a person who was considered exchangeable. This decision had serious consequences both for the Patriarchate and for Greek-Turkish relations.

Turkish public opinion reacted furiously at the result of the election, which put pressure on the Turkish members of the legal department of the MCEP to decide in favour of the exchange of the Metropolitans. At the same time, the Constantinopolitan Greek press refuted the accusations of the Turkish newspapers and defended the freedom to exercise their recognized minority rights. On 24 December Politis pointed out to Athens that the postponement of the discussion of the MCEP regarding the exchange of the prelates was necessary, due to the harsh criticism by the Turkish press that influenced the Turkish government and the neutral members of the committee. He also suggested the appointment of non-exchangeable Metropolitans in case some of the existing ones were exchanged. Roussos sent instructions to the Greek consulate along the lines of Politis’ suggestions, asking Mavridis to try and postpone the discussion at the MCEP and Diamantopoulos to contact the Patriarchate about appointing new prelates. During his meeting with Diamantopoulos on 25 December, Constantine recognized the need to elect non-exchangeable Metropolitans, but considered this measure inapplicable, arguing that

947 Ibid.
948 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Roussos (20 December 1924); GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Mavridis to Roussos (24 December 1924).
949 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Politis to Roussos (24 December 1924).
950 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Roussos to Diamantopoulos (No date available, but most probably 24 December 1924).
there were not enough non-exchangeable bishops in Constantinople. He repeated that if the Greek government was defeated on this issue, all the members of the Synod, including himself, would be deported and the Patriarchate would be crushed. As Diamantopoulos pointed out in his report, under these circumstances the institution would be subjected to the Turks.\footnote{GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Diamantopoulos to Roussos (26 December 1924).}

At the same time, Politis met with the Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Kaya and discussed the issue of the Patriarchate. Politis’ fears, expressed in his memorandum of 9 November, were coming true. The Turkish minister accused the Patriarchate of proceeding with the election of an exchangeable candidate in order to provoke and create incidents. He maintained that they should have contacted the government before the election and conformed to its demands.\footnote{GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Politis to Roussos (26 December 1924).} His argument, based on the Ottoman tradition of asking for the approval of the Porte with regards to the candidates for the patriarchal throne, shows that the state was going through a transitional period where Ottoman institutions and practices existed side by side with the secularization policies of the newly formed Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, Şükrü Kaya claimed that seized documents showed that the Patriarchate was an organization dependent on the Greek Ministry of Religion and recognized the authority of the GMFA on political questions. Therefore, it violated the main condition on which Turkey had allowed its presence in Constantinople.\footnote{Ibid.} In a sense, Turkish reactions were justified. The whole issue was very similar to the attitude of disregard and contempt that the Phanar had shown during the election of Patriarch Meletios a few years previously. As a result, it reinforced the suspicions of the Turkish authorities that the Patriarchate was a disloyal institution serving Greek interests.

Politis challenged all of Şükrü Kaya’s arguments. He maintained that the Patriarchate was managed according to canonical law and not a berat, therefore prior contact was not necessary.\footnote{Ibid.} The Greek diplomat was employing the Kemalists’ desire to break with the Ottoman past as a means to downplay the significance of the
pre-war rights of state intervention in the patriarchal election. He also pointed out that after the signing of the peace treaty, the Phanar did everything it could to get in touch with the government, but all its efforts were completely ignored. Regarding the minister’s accusations against the motives of the Patriarchate, Politis argued that an institution facing so many difficulties would not jeopardize its position in Turkey by creating problems for the country. Even if it was assumed that the Greek state exercised its influence over the Patriarchate, the latter would not cause trouble for the relations of the two states since this would be incompatible with the Greek policy of rapprochement. Politis attributed the election of an exchangeable patriarch to the hostile public opinion that forced prelates who met the requirements to withdraw their candidacy. He also mentioned the difficulties of electing a non-exchangeable candidate, since the Turkish government perceived all the members of the Synod as exchangeable. As for the seized documents allegedly incriminating the Patriarchate, the Greek diplomat claimed that nothing questionable could be found in them and that their importance had been amplified by the press. Furthermore, he explained that continuous wars had detached provinces from the Patriarchate, a fact that made necessary the communication between the Greek state and the Phanar on questions of ecclesiastical order.955

The Turkish Minister seemed to be convinced and assured Politis that the government did not intend to persecute the Patriarchate. He also promised to talk to the Minister of the Interior regarding the attitude of the authorities towards the Phanar. However, on the issue of the exchange of the Metropolitanans, he argued that this was an affair of the MCEP and that the Turkish delegation wished for the strict application of the convention. Politis rejected this argument, asserting that Turkey had undertaken the obligation to allow the Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul. However, the institution was composed of its members and by expelling the patriarch and the Holy Synod, the Patriarchate would not be able to function. This would mean a violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. Therefore, he urged the minister to instruct the Turkish delegates not to press for the exchange of the prelates. He added that the two

955 Ibid.

Dimitris Kamouzis
countries already faced serious issues and it would be regrettable to add one more. Şükrü Kaya agreed and reassured him that everything would be taken care of.956

Politis, who had foreseen the consequences of the Patriarchate’s policy, was forced to justify, and to a certain extent cover, the Holy Synod for its actions. Although in his communication with Athens he had made a clear distinction between the institution and its members – recognizing the right of Turkey to include the prelates in the exchange – he had no other choice, but to use the argument of the prelates in order to prevent their expulsion. In any case, he expressed his hope that his discussion with the Foreign Minister would have positive results.957

Momentarily, things seemed to improve. On 27 December Mavridis reported that he managed to postpone the discussion regarding the exchange of the prelates. He also convinced the MCEP to examine the issue in detail.958 Yet, despite numerous discussions between the Greek and Turkish delegations, no solution was found. As a result, on 30 January 1925 the Turkish authorities expelled Constantine, even though the MCEP had not issued a passport for him. This action caused the indignation of Greek public opinion. Demonstrations took place in Athens and Thessaloniki, the Greek press attacked the Turkish government and Exindaris resigned from the MCEP on 1 February.959 A few days later, the Greek government ‘officially protested against the attack on the head of Orthodoxy, which painfully hurt the religious conscience of the Hellenic Nation and the Orthodox world, and against the threat posed to the rights and liberties of the Greek minority in Constantinople’. As a result, it announced to Ankara its intention to bring the issue of the patriarch’s expulsion to the International Court of the Hague, according to Article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne.960 Athens, acting again on behalf of its co-nationals, seemed determined to internationalize the problem.

However, in private the Greek government disapproved of the Patriarchate’s policy. On 6 February, the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos

956 Ibid.
957 Ibid.
958 GMFA 1924 B/35/12: Mavridis to Roussos (27 December 1924); Alexandris 1981: 338.
960 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Greek Legation in Ankara to the Government of the Republic of Turkey (5 February 1925); Alexandris 1981: 348.
expressed his complaints to Venizelos and asked for his assistance in promoting Greek views in Europe. He asserted that several times he advised the Phanar not to elect an exchangeable prelate, but someone approved by the Turks. He also pleaded with the patriarch not to go to Thessaloniki, in order to avoid inflaming Greek public opinion. However, as he pointed out, all of his suggestions were ignored.  

Venizelos shared Michalakopoulos’ frustration and on two occasions refused to represent Greece at the Council of the LoN in relation to the expulsion of the patriarch:

I believe that the behaviour of the people in the Phanar is reprehensible, because despite the warning of the Turkish Government and the advice of the Greek one, they insisted on electing a person considered exchangeable by the Turks and created a serious crisis. Therefore, I am not able to successfully defend the Greek views, because if asked by the Council whether I do not consider the action of the Patriarchate reprehensible, I will be obliged to admit that I do consider it reprehensible.  

In any case, I am the least appropriate Greek representative, since after the official information, which I already have in my hands, that there are 8 non-exchangeable prelates in Constantinople, I find the action taken by Turkey completely justified after the warning it issued prior to the election.  

Meanwhile, Turkey assumed an uncompromising attitude on the issue. According to the statement of Şükrü Kaya to the press on 2 February, Constantine’s post as a patriarch followed the decision for his inclusion in the exchange. He argued that from the moment the MCEP verified Constantine’s status as an exchangeable, the government had the obligation to apply the clauses of the convention exchange. In addition, he claimed that the Patriarchate was a matter of Turkish domestic affairs and made insinuations about its relations with Greece: ‘The Republic of Turkey […] cannot allow a foreign power to use any religious institution as a political instrument within its borders’. Similar views were expressed by the Prime Minister Fethi Bey and the president of the Turkish delegation at the MCEP, Tevfik Rüştü Aras Bey.  

---

961 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Michalakopoulos to Venizelos (6 February 1925); Alexandris 1981: 352-3.  
962 GMFA 1925 B/35/3: Venizelos’ telegram transmitted by Melas to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12 February 1925); See Appendix 1.  
963 GMFA 1925 B/35/3: Venizelos’ telegram transmitted by Nikolaos Politis to Michalakopoulos (26 February 1925); See Appendix 1.  
964 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Politis to Michalakopoulos (2 February 1925).
Ankara’s grievances focused on two points: The election of an exchangeable patriarch despite their warnings; and the effort of Greece to internationalize the problem by appealing to the Hague. It could be argued that Turkey’s suspicions, created in the period 1919-22, and its reluctance to allow foreign powers to interfere in its affairs were still an essential element of Turkish policy. Their reservations regarding the level of international control for the protection of minorities, an issue strongly contested in Lausanne, were proven prophetic in this specific case. From Turkey’s point of view, Greece was given the opportunity to defend the Patriarchate within the international context provided by the clauses of minority treaties and intervene in a matter belonging to Turkish domestic policy.

At the same time however, the Turkish authorities tried to reach an agreement with the Holy Synod. On 2 February Şükrü Kaya had suggested that the patriarchal issue would be resolved if a non-exchangeable Turkish citizen was elected as patriarch. A few days later, Diamantopoulos reported that some prelates and lay members of the minority were pressing the Holy Synod on behalf of the Turkish authorities to dismiss the current patriarch and elect a new non-exchangeable one. In return, they promised to allow the members of the Holy Synod to remain in Istanbul. On 23 February, the vali of Istanbul Süleyman Sami called on these laymen and a member of the Synod in order to discuss the problem. Diamantopoulos argued that Turkey was afraid of the decision of the LoN on the issue of the expulsion and tried to promote the solution originating from the minority. The next day the Synod asked Diamantopoulos and Exindaris about the guarantees they should request from the Turkish government, in case the vali excluded them from the exchange. The Greek diplomats replied that Rüştü Bey should declare their exclusion to the MCEP. Later that day the Turkish delegation withdrew a document of the vali regarding the exclusion of three Metropolitans, due to the fact that they were members of the Synod. There was no doubt that the Metropolitans, supported by laymen of the minority who were on good terms with the authorities, were willing to compromise in

965 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Exindaris to Michalakopoulos (7 February 1925); GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Hakimet-ı Mille (5 February 1925).
966 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (10 February 1925).
967 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (23 February 1925).
968 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (24 February 1925).
order to remain in Istanbul. This solution would also be welcomed by Athens. On 25 February Michalakopoulos argued that the Greek authorities should retain strict neutrality and try to keep secret their communication with the members of the Synod. He instructed Diamantopoulos to advise a trustworthy member of the Synod to accept the Turkish proposal, only if they secured their definite exclusion and not just until the election of a new patriarch. In case the prelates reached an agreement with the government, they should find a way to replace Constantine, because Athens would not get involved.  

The same day Rüştü Bey suggested to Exindaris the following compromise. He would declare at the MCEP that he accepted the exemption of the Metropolitans of the Holy Synod from the exchange, if the Greek government withdrew its appeal to the LoN. Athens accepted Rüştü Bey’s proposal on the condition that the Turkish delegate would declare definitively all the Metropolitans present in Istanbul as excluded from the exchange and not only the members of the Holy Synod.  

However, Rüştü did not get in touch with the prelates regarding the proposed solution, leading Exindaris to believe that the plan had failed. Meanwhile, the vali of Istanbul held a meeting with a delegation of the Holy Synod, where he announced to them that they were excluded from the exchange and therefore they should request from the patriarch that he resign as they had agreed. The prelates responded that although the solution given was reasonable, it was necessary for Rüştü Bey to officially declare their exemption at the MCEP. The vali refuted their argument saying that the promises of the government should be sufficient. Supported by Diamantopoulos and Exindaris, the Holy Synod refused to proceed with the resignation of the patriarch, before official documents guaranteed their exclusion from the exchange. Therefore, the same people who had ignored the warnings and advice of the Turkish and Greek governments and had elected an exchangeable patriarch were now using him as a negotiating tool to secure their stay in Istanbul.

---

969 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Michalakopoulos to Diamantopoulos (25 February 1925).
970 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Exindaris to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (25 February 1925); GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Michalakopoulos to Diamantopoulos (25 February 1925); Alexandris 1981: 358.
971 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Exindaris to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (26 February 1925).
Nevertheless, Constantine had no intention of abdicating from his throne. While negotiations between Exindaris and Rüştü Bey on the one hand and the vali with the Holy Synod on the other continued, the patriarch resisted vigorously and complained both to the Synod and Michalakopoulos. The Greek government had realized that the internationalization of the problem would not bring any substantial results and was willing to come to an understanding with Turkey. Thus, they started putting pressure on the patriarch to resign. In April 1924 the vali offered that the Holy Synod arrange for a non-exchangeable status for the Metropolitans, and in return they should proceed immediately with a patriarchal election. Ironically, Constantine had found himself in the same position as his main opponent Meletios less than two years beforehand. Despite the efforts of his supporters both in Greece and at the Phanar, he was finally forced to resign on 22 May 1925. A few days later, the Turkish authorities confirmed that the exchangeable prelates could remain in Istanbul, while Greece agreed that the new patriarch should be approved by Ankara. Finally, on 1 June Greece withdrew its appeal to the LoN. Thus, the pre-war Ottoman practice of the state approving the candidate for the patriarchal throne or exempting the candidates it considered unsuitable, was incorporated into the policy of Ankara vis-à-vis the Phanar.

Alexandris argues that ‘during the Constantine affair the Turks successfully portrayed the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution without being seriously contradicted by any of the western powers. By not awaiting the pronouncement of the international court on the question of the competence of the LoN to discuss the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greece, too, implicitly undermined the international character of the Phanar’. Although this conclusion is correct, at the same time it is insufficient to assess fully the consequences of the Constantine affair, and is to a certain extent misleading. There is no mention of the responsibility of the prelates in this process. The Holy Synod completely ignored the advice of both governments and although it had alternative options, it elected an exchangeable patriarch knowing that

973 GMFA 1925 B/35/2: Kannavos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 February 1925).
this action would create problems for the Patriarchate. However, they preferred to compromise the status and safety of the institution in order to serve personal interests.

The Greek state, in an effort to protect the Patriarchate, tried to internationalize the issue, although significant members of the government had admitted in private the weaknesses of defending the prelates’ point of view. At the same time however, the Metropolitans entered into discussions with the authorities and used the expelled patriarch as a negotiating tool in order to remain in Istanbul. Thus, they were willing to reach a direct agreement with the Turkish authorities, rather than wait for an international decision with uncertain results. This policy was also supported by Athens. Political pragmatism demanded from the Greek government that it accept a compromise. Its efforts to internationalize the problem had reached a dead end and it could not allow the consequences of the Patriarchate’s actions to aggravate Greek-Turkish relations any longer. Venizelos’ assessment in February 1925 summarized the whole situation:

Unfortunately the Phanar does not seem to understand the deep changes that have taken place with respect to the Eastern question for the past four years and more. It also does not understand that its relations with the Porte depend completely on the latter, almost like after 1453. Since it is unable to adjust to the newly created situation, it is heading towards complete destruction. The duty of the Greek Government here is to restrict the national damages within the narrowest boundaries possible and to separate its responsibilities from the policies of the Phanar, which seem to be lacking the element of reality.  

Indeed, the decision of Greece to withdraw its appeal undermined the international character of the Patriarchate. But the Metropolitans were more than willing to take the opportunity to be excluded from the exchange, even if that meant compromising the status of the institution. Finally, if one accepts a defence of the Holy Synod that they elected an exchangeable Patriarch in an attempt to resolve once and for all the exchangeability issue, then it could be argued that they had succeeded. However, even if this was the case, the cost of their success was high, because it provided the

---

977 GMFA 1925 B/35/3: Venizelos’ telegram transmitted by Nikolaos Politis to Michalakopoulos (26 February 1925); See Appendix 1.
Turks with the opportunity to represent the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution and an issue of domestic rather than international affairs.

The patriarchal issue had brought the efforts of organizing the administration system of the minority to a standstill. The reason was that until recently the Patriarchate had been the administrative centre of the minority and had the appropriate mechanisms to coordinate this effort. However, the problems created by the expulsion of Constantine did not allow the Phanar to undertake such a task. At the same time, the lay element of the minority could not take any initiative in this direction for two reasons: The PNMC, their only channel to power, had been dissolved and had not been replaced by a similar administrative body; and more importantly they still depended on the Patriarchate, the only form of administration they knew. The situation began to change in mid-1925, when Ankara started to promote the incorporation of the religious minorities into the secularization and modernization programme of the Turkish state.

In 1925 Ankara decided to adopt the Swiss civil code, which was a set of regulations placing personal and family status in a unified secular context in contrast with the existing religious context, which was based on the pre-war division of the population into millets. Religious leaders, both Muslim and non-Muslim, were not supportive of the idea. However, especially in the case of the minorities, the new civil code contradicted Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty which clearly stipulated that issues related to family law or personal status would be settled in accordance with the customs of the minorities. Therefore, the application of the code on the minorities without their consent would be an outright violation of the treaty. In order to overcome the resistance of the religious leaders and the respective minorities, the government formed in late May 1925 three mixed committees composed of representatives of the state and of the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish minorities respectively. These committees would discuss and decide on the settlement of these issues as Article 42 stipulated.978

However, these representatives were not elected by the minorities. On the contrary they had been appointed by the Turkish authorities, which believed that these specific

persons would cooperate with them for the renunciation of Article 42. In the case of the Greek-Turkish committee the two appointed members were Orfanidis and Aristeidis Skouros Pasha, a former military doctor and at the time professor of medicine at the University of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{979} Both men belonged to the conservative faction of the minority’s leadership and had opposed the policy of the nationalists during 1919–22, while favouring an understanding with the Turks.\textsuperscript{980}

As soon as Orfanidis was selected, Diamantopoulos contacted Athens asking whether according to Article 42 the representatives of the minorities should be appointed by the state or elected by the minorities.\textsuperscript{981} On 9 July 1925, the Greek foreign minister Konstantinos Rentis informed the Greek embassy in Ankara and the Greek consulate in Istanbul that the Turkish government had violated the treaty of Lausanne, because the Greek representatives had been appointed by the government and not elected by the Constantinopolitan Greeks.\textsuperscript{982} Actually, during the first meeting of the committee Orfanidis and Skouros had expressed their reservations about their capacity as representatives, because they had not been authorized by the minority to assume this task. When Periklis Argyropoulos, the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, pointed out these facts to Rüştü Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister replied that this commission was doing all the preliminary work for the actual committee stipulated in Article 42.\textsuperscript{983}

Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities did not face serious resistance from the two other mixed committees and by mid-September managed to extract from both the Jewish and the Armenian minority an official renunciation of Article 42.\textsuperscript{984} After these renunciations the pressure on the Greek minority became greater. The Turkish press wanted to know what the attitude of the Constantinopolitan Greeks would be and whether they would imitate the patriotic gesture of the Jews. On 20 September

\textsuperscript{979} GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 May 1925); GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (22 June 1925).
\textsuperscript{980} Alexandris 1992: 68.
\textsuperscript{981} GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 May 1925).
\textsuperscript{982} GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Rentis to Greek Embassy and Greek consulate (9 July 1925).
\textsuperscript{983} GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Argyropoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4 August 1925).
\textsuperscript{984} Alexandris 1992: 137; GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Kanakaris Roufos (1 December 1925); According to Rodrigue (1995: 257 & 1990: 165), ‘there is considerable circumstantial evidence that the non-Muslims were in fact pressured to renounce the clauses of the treaty and were not acting on their own free will’. 
Argyropoulos expressed the fear that the minority could be divided over this issue. He argued that if the majority or even a part of the Greeks refused to comply with the Turkish demands, the Turks would follow a more preferential policy towards the Armenians and Jews, who had already renounced their rights. Therefore, he suggested avoiding sending instructions to Constantinople that only a part of the minority would follow, because it would divide the population into two factions: One resisting the renunciation, and one obeying the orders of the authorities. He also warned that the government was trying to put pressure on the Patriarchate to recommend to the Greek Orthodox population that they renounce their rights.\footnote{ GMFA 1927 B/92.2/3: Argyropoulos to Rentis (20 September 1925).}

Argyropoulos’ fears soon came true. In mid-October the president of the committee Fevzi Bey appointed four more Constantinopolitan Greeks, who he believed would cooperate for the renunciation of Article 42. These were Nikolaos Sgouridis, Vladimiros Mirmiroglou, Chrysanthos Thomaidis and S. Vallias. Thus, three of the laymen \textit{Imerisia Nea} had appealed to on 18 January 1924,\footnote{ See Chapter 5, p. 255.} for the communal organization of the minority, were now members of the committee. Following the example of Orfanidis and Skouros, the new members declared that they were not authorized to represent the minority. Thus, in an effort to legitimize the committee’s actions, Fevzi Bey instructed them to visit the newly elected Patriarch Vasilios III\footnote{ Vasilios III was elected Patriarch on 13 July 1925. See Alexandris 1992: 168.} and extract an official statement of his support for the renunciation that could be presented as an approval of the Greek Orthodox minority as a whole. It seems that despite their efforts at secularization, the Turkish authorities recognized the political importance of the Patriarchate and its strong influence on the Constantinopolitan Greeks. In this case, the Phanar did not compromise since the application of civil law also undermined its already curtailed authority over the minority. To the request of the Greek members, Vasilios responded that although the Church would respect any Turkish law, the issues of family law were regulated by the Holy Canons and only an Ecumenical Synod could alter them.\footnote{ GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Kanakaris Roufos (1 December 1925).}
Unable to present the Greek members as genuine representatives of the minority, Fevzi sent a personal letter on 18 October to 18 Constantinopolitan Greeks asking them to call the communities to elect their own representatives, who would renounce Article 42 in the name of the Greek Orthodox minority. The electoral process would be similar to the one followed for the election of the lay members of the dissolved PNMC. This solution was proposed by some of the appointed Greeks, causing the bitter comments of Diamantopoulos: ‘It is sad that this recommendation was the result of suggestions of certain individuals among the 22 [Constantinopolitan Greek members], who are trying to serve their personal interests through their obsequious course of action’. Therefore, there is no doubt that specific laymen were hoping to benefit from the whole renunciation affair. On 5 November 1925, the 22 Greek members issued an invitation to all the communities to elect representatives to decide on the issue of family law and personal status. In order to justify their involvement, they pointed out that they were ‘officially authorized’ (‘εξουσιοδοτηθέντες αρµοδίως’).

As Argyropoulos had foreseen, a group resisting the renunciation was soon formed, dividing the lay leadership of the minority into two opposing sides. This movement of resistance was expressed during the communal elections that took place on 20 November. The communities of Pera, Galata, Tatavla and Makriköy elected representatives who had declared their disapproval of the Turkish demands. Pera, the most important community, elected Avrilios Spatharis. Although an Ioakimist and a former member of the SC, Spatharis was a man of rare political pragmatism and legal experience and a genuine advocate for the interests of the minority. Representing the middle way of a higher degree of autonomy in communal affairs, Spatharis had assisted in the overthrow of Germanos in 1918, but had also refused to sign the telegram of the Holy Synod and the PNMC asking Constantine to abdicate.

989 GMFA 1927 B/92.2/1: Sakellaropoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (21 November 1927).
990 GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Kanakaris Roufou (1 December 1925); See Appendix 1.
992 GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Kanakaris Roufou (1 December 1925).
from his claim to the throne in 1920. He had also opposed the election of Meletios as a new Patriarch because he was worried about the consequences it would have on the minority.\textsuperscript{993} In this case also, he publicly opposed the renunciation of Article 42, arguing that Turkey would violate the Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, on 24 November, three days before the assembly of the representatives, Spatharis and the elected members of Galata and Phanar were arrested by the police, under the pretext that they wanted to organize a meeting without the consent of the authorities. On 27 November, the committee renounced Article 42. Fifty five out of seventy two of the assembly composed of the members of the committee and the communal representatives signed the petition. At the end of the meeting, the three arrested men were released and two days later the initial committee approved the renunciation of the Lausanne clauses regarding family law and personal status. As Diamantopoulos pointed out, the fact that the petition was not signed by the notables of Pera and Phanar, the most important communities both politically and in terms of population, was a proof of the state’s use of force and diminished its representative significance.\textsuperscript{994}

The irregularities followed during the procedure, and the questionable renunciation by the Greek Orthodox minority, forced the Greek state to officially complain to the LoN with no significant results.\textsuperscript{995} In any case, the government’s policy of including the minorities in the application of the Turkish civil code was an indication of its intentions to organize the minorities according to the principles and the laws of the modern secular Turkish state. Although this was a nationalizing policy violating the recognized rights of the minority, Turkey would not have succeeded without the cooperation of specific Constantinopolitan Greek notables. Before long this fact became evident.

In December 1925, less than a month after the renunciation of Article 42, the Turkish authorities allowed the community of Stavrodromi-Pera to hold elections in order to replace the local administrative boards. The granting of permission was

\textsuperscript{993} See Chapter 3, pp. 95, 123, 146.
\textsuperscript{994} GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Kanakaris Roufos (1 December 1925); Alexandris 1992: 137-8.
\textsuperscript{995} GMFA 1925 B/37/11: Argyropoulos to Drummond, (11 September 1926); Alexandris 1992: 138-139.
obtained by the notables who had cooperated with the Turks. The conservative faction hoped that this way they would manage to return to power almost eight years after the fall of Germanos.\(^{996}\) Thus, it can be safely assumed that some members of the committee had reached an agreement with the authorities to offer their support to the renunciation of Article 42 and in return to be allowed to hold elections and replace the existing communal authorities. Whether this agreement took place during the discussions of the committee or after the renunciation as a reward from the state cannot be verified. Nevertheless, the short period of time between the renunciation of Article 42 and the announcement of elections proves that the two events were definitely related.

On 1 January 1926 the organizing committee announced that the elections would take place on Sunday 3 January at Zografeion School.\(^{997}\) The elections were fought between two parties. The Red ticket party, headed by Orfanidis and Sgouridis, represented the conservatives who were on good terms with the Turkish authorities. The Green ticket, headed by Alexandros Pantziris and Georgios Naoum and supported by Spatharis, had a more moderate and autonomous approach regarding communal administration.\(^{998}\) Despite the fact that the conservatives were favoured by the state and the elections had taken place at such short notice, Pantziris and his followers won. On 5 January Diamantopoulos expressed his satisfaction, arguing that the ‘healthy elements dominated throughout and among them are some people whose actions were beneficial in the past’. However, he warned Athens that the failed party was scheming with the authorities for the invalidation of the elections’ result.\(^{999}\)

His information was correct, because on 26 January he reported that the elections were invalidated and they would be repeated on 12 February. Meanwhile the recently elected communal boards resigned and handed their powers over to their predecessors.\(^{1000}\) Once again though, Orfanidis and Sgouridis’ party was defeated at

\(^{996}\) GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5 January 1926); Apogevmatini (1 January 1926).
\(^{997}\) Apogevmatini (1 January 1926).
\(^{998}\) Apogevmatini (2 January 1926). For Spatharis’ support see also Apogevmatini (13 February 1926).
\(^{999}\) GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5 January 1926); Apogevmatini (4 January 1926).
\(^{1000}\) GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (26 January 1926); Apogevmatini (8 February 1926).
the elections of 12 February.\footnote{GMFA 1927 B/92.2/4: Diamantopoulos to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 February 1926); \textit{Apogevmatini} (10, 11, 12, 13 February 1926).} Despite all their efforts to return to power and the support of the Turkish authorities, the conservatives could not earn the trust of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The most probable explanation is that the people disapproved of their relations with the Turkish establishment both during 1914-18 and after 1923. However, as Eftim’s intervention precipitated the process for Meletios’ abdication, similarly the conservatives’ deal with the government opened the way not only for the elections at Pera, but also for the holding of elections in several communities of Istanbul. Thus, from February until July 1926 elections for the replacement of the local administrative boards took place at Kontoskali, Galata, Tsegkelköy, Mega Revma, Pasa Mahale, Diplokoni, Vlagka and Feriköy.\footnote{\textit{Apogevmatini}, (2, 6, 9, 23 February 1926; 10 March 1926; 1 April 1926; 6 July 1926).} The Patriarchal Central Ecclesiastical Committee (‘Πατριαρχική Κεντρική Εκκλησιαστική Επιτροπή’) validated the elections that were held at various parishes.\footnote{\textit{Apogevmatini}, (21 May 1926).} It becomes apparent that the Turkish government, despite its initial misgivings, had started an effort to secularize and incorporate the existing system of communal self-administration into the administrative structure of the state. The rationale behind this process was similar to the one the Ottoman state had followed regarding the millets, with the significant difference that in the case of the Turkish state the power was given absolutely to the lay and not the religious leadership of the minorities.

As a matter of fact, from June 1926 the effort of the Turkish state to organize the minorities assumed an official character. The Turkish deputy of Saruhan and president of the legislative committee of the GNA, Ferzi Bey, undertook the responsibility of drawing up constitutions that would replace the abolished privileges and rights of the religious leaders.\footnote{\textit{Konstantinopolis}, (10 April 1927).} In mid-June the lay council of the Armenian Patriarchate held a meeting, where it discussed the adjustments that had to be made to the regulations of the minority.\footnote{\textit{Apogevmatini}, (14 June 1926).} Similarly, on 1 August 1926 the Jewish communal meeting was held at the Great Chief Rabbinate of Pera in order to determine the
position of the Jewish minority of Istanbul. The assembly unanimously resigned from the minority rights recognized by the treaty of Lausanne and approved the improved constitution of the Jewish minority. Their decisions would be announced to the Turkish government, which would be responsible for ratifying the constitution. In February 1927 it was the turn of the Greek Orthodox minority to deal with the issue of its communal organization after the invitation of the Turkish government. The initiative was taken by the CCBS and on 11 February 1927 a committee composed of 25 communal representatives was formed. Its purpose was to examine two proposed plans for the constitutional charter of the minority, one concise and one more detailed.

At the meeting of the committee on 17 February 1927 all the different factions of the minority's leadership were represented: A. Pantziris, T. Agathopoulos, G. Ananiadis, A. Moschos and Chrysanthos Thomaidis, who had a more independent and non-compromising approach regarding the issues of the minority. The first three belonged to the party that had won the elections in February 1926; V. Orfanidis, N. Sgouridis, S. Sismanoglou, V. Mirmiroglou and L. Kazanovas, who favoured a policy of cooperation with the government. The first three belonged to the party that was defeated at the elections; P. Karatheodoris and A. Spatharis, who represented the rather moderate faction that followed a middle-of-the-road policy. The minutes of the meeting reveal three different stances within the minority regarding the issue of its communal administration. The first one, mainly expressed by Nikolaos Sgouridis, supported the proposal of a concise memorandum to the government. Sgouridis believed that this was the crux of the matter and he was worried about the government dismissing additional articles, which would prevent the minority from having any further requests on these issues in the future. Another less compromising side favoured the submission of a detailed plan. According to the main supporter of this proposal Chrysanthos Thomaidis:

1006 Apogevmatini, (2 August 1926).
1007 Apogevmatini, (14, 17 February 1927).
1008 Anthemion, M1 47-48: Meeting of the Special Committee for the composition of the constitutional charter of the Greek Orthodox community (17 February 1927).
We do not beg for the constitution of the minority. The government invites us. I believe that the plan which will be submitted to the government should be detailed, stipulating all the minority’s demands, because on the one hand I want to have my conscience clear and on the other hand I do not want to be held responsible by future generations. If today the 18 or the 48 (representatives of the minority) do not succeed in getting what they want from the government for their constitution, how will the 12 (representatives) composing the Administrative Council manage that in the future? If the detailed plan is rejected, we should insist. It is definite that it will be rejected by the government, but it is also our right to request it.\textsuperscript{1009}

Spatharis, who was responsible for drafting the final version of the constitution, followed a more diplomatic approach. He pointed out that they should take into consideration the reply of the Turkish government to the plan proposed by the Jewish minority. Ankara had approved the administration of the communal institutions and schools by the Jewish lay leadership. However, they had stricken off the article that provided for the establishment of a central administrative body which would represent the Jewish minority to the authorities. In that way the government had not recognized the minority as a legal entity. He added that a notable of the Jewish minority had informed him that the government would accept some of their demands, but on the other hand would ask them to resign the relevant minority rights recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne. Therefore, he proposed to decide on one of the two plans without any further delay and, in case the government asked them to renounce their rights, to leave the administration system in its current form.\textsuperscript{1010}

Finally, in March 1927 a plan of 14 articles was prepared and sent to Ankara for official approval. Article 2 stipulated that:\textsuperscript{1011}

The temples, the several charitable institutions, the schools and the other educational institutions of the Rum minority (Ρωμαϊκής Μειονότητος), as well as their land, their properties and the revenues deriving from them and the donations and endowments given to them will be administered and superintended by the lay authorities. The ones belonging to the parishes will be administered by the local church boards and the ones belonging to the minority as a whole by its Administrative Council.

\textsuperscript{1009} Ibid; See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{1010} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1011} Apogevmatini, (27 March 1927); Konstantinoupolis,(10 April 1927); Anthemion, M1 47-48; See Appendix 1.
Article 8 made the provision for the formation of a minority council, composed of 12 members with a 4 years term in office without pay. This council would be the central representative body of the whole minority.

However, on 16 August 1927 the Greek consul in Istanbul Konstantinos Sakellaropoulos reported that the preliminary work for the organization of the Greek Orthodox minority did not result in anything. The reason was that the minority did not agree to resign from its rights stipulated in the Treaty of Lausanne. As Sakellaropoulos pointed out, the majority of the Constantinopolitan Greeks believed that the Turkish government never really intended to organize the minority, but aimed at forcing them to renounce their rights. Furthermore, their refusal was used as an argument by the government to blame the members of the minority for the failure of the organization effort. According to the authorities, the members of the minority failed to recognize that the application of the clauses of the treaty was unnecessary, since the government provided for the welfare of the minority. The Greek consul also expressed his disappointment at the state of communal affairs. He argued that the minority’s non-existing organization, combined with the lack of a constitutional charter, made the holding of legal elections for communal administrative councils impossible. As a result, in some communities the councils continued their term illegitimately, whereas in others, people supported by the authorities were holding fictitious elections and replaced the existing councils. This situation was further aggravated by the political passions within the minority:

The situation becomes worse due to the fierce passions dividing the local Greek element, passions that always were a characteristic of our race and are naturally expressed in a more violent manner in times of decay, like the ones Hellenism in Turkey is undoubtedly experiencing right now.\(^{1012}\)

Even prior to Venizelos’ visit to Turkey in October 1930, Sakellaropoulos stressed to the Greek Prime Minister the need for the organization of the minority, but with no significant results.\(^{1013}\)

\(^{1012}\) GMFA 1927 B/92.3: Sakellaropoulos to Michalakopoulos (16 August 1927); See Appendix 1.
Despite the lack of a constitutional charter, state interference and internal divisions within the minority, this pre-war administration system operated properly throughout the interwar period. The material from the Anthemion archive clearly shows that the communal councils continued to manage the institutions of the minority. The major difference and problem at the same time was that the abolished PNMC was not replaced by a similar administrative body, preventing the minority from claiming its rights through the actions of a central authority. Thus, the government dealt directly with the local councils of every parish and avoided recognizing the minority as one legal entity. Although this thesis does not examine the history of the minority beyond 1930, a few facts should be mentioned for the purposes of this chapter. In 1935 the law regarding religious institutions placed the local church councils under the jurisdiction of the Department of Religious Institutions (Evkaf Genel Müdürlüğü) incorporating them officially into the state’s administrative structure. A year later the Turkish government applied the measure of appointing a trustee for communal establishments. However, the appointment of Istamat Zihni Özdamar at the Balikli hospital caused the reaction of the Greek government and Ankara did not appoint any other trustee. Finally, in 1949 the trustees system was officially abolished and it was decided that the community’s institutions would be managed by elected members of the minority.\footnote{Alexandris 1992: 201-3.}

Therefore, it could be argued that Ankara, instead of offering to the minority the opportunity of organizing itself in the context of a new constitution, preferred to secularize and incorporate the pre-war communal self-administration system into the administrative structure of the modern Turkish state. The mechanisms of the church became mechanisms of the state, but without the participation of the Patriarchate in lay communal affairs. The same could be claimed for the other non-Muslim minorities. As Sule Toktas points out, ‘with the passage of the Law on Secularism in 1928, the role of the Chief Rabbinate as a mediator between the Jewish community and the state was further weakened. As secularism became one of the cornerstones of
republican Turkey, any connotation of religious communal identification in the public sphere, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, was strictly forbidden’.1015

1015 Toktas 2005: 399.
Conclusions

The Treaty of Lausanne officially recognized the Constantinopolitan Greeks as a minority and set the framework for the protection of its rights. However, the Turkish policy of nation-building via secularization was not compatible with the minority clauses of the treaty. On several occasions the government and the Turkish press employed the argument of lack of loyalty to the state to exert pressure on the Constantinopolitan Greeks to renounce their rights. This mistrust, the result of the Greek nationalist policy followed by the Patriarchate and the lay leadership in 1919-1922, obstructed the normal transition and adjustment of the minority to the new circumstances.

The essential question of the organization of the communal administration remained unresolved, despite numerous efforts to draw up a new constitutional charter for the minority. At the same time however, this issue was used as a negotiating tool and means of pressure by the Turkish government in order to overpower the international safeguards of minorities’ rights and promote their secular changes. The patriarchal issue and the renunciation of Article 42 were two typical examples where the promise for communal elections and a new organization plan was used in this manner. Although the nationalizing policies followed by the state in these two cases violated the recognized rights of the minority, Turkey would not have succeeded without the cooperation of specific prelates and Constantinopolitan Greek notables.

The flight of the minority’s nationalist leadership in 1922 and the abdication of Meletios in 1923 created a void of power both on a lay and an ecclesiastical level. The people eager to fill this void belonged to the camp of Germanos, who had fallen from power in 1918. The new circumstances allowed them to resume an active role in communal affairs, due to the fact that they were on good terms with the Turkish establishment. This resulted in a power struggle within the minority between a faction that was willing to compromise with the Turks in order to ascend to power and a faction that favoured a more autonomous approach and was not willing to renounce the minority’s rights.
Both elites came out of this struggle defeated and the minority as a whole suffered a serious blow. On the one hand, the conservative faction did not manage to take control of the Patriarchate and the communal administration, despite their efforts and, in the case of the laymen, the support of the Turkish state. At the same time however, their compromising policies undermined the status of the Patriarchate and permitted the renunciation of Article 42. On the other hand, the uncompromising faction resisted the resignation of their rights regarding communal administration, but as a result Turkey refused to provide them with a new constitutional charter and more importantly a central administrative body similar to the abolished PNMC. Furthermore, the Patriarchate was not allowed to interfere in lay affairs. In this way Turkey incorporated the pre-war administration system into the administrative structure of the modern Turkish state, without recognizing the minority as a legal entity but dealing directly with the local councils. Thus, the minority was weakened because it could not claim its rights through a central authority.

Finally, the Greek state acted on all occasions as the external national homeland for the minority. However, its efforts depended on, and were to a great extent undermined by, the actions of the minority. Although on a public level Greece was still the political protector of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, on a private level the relationship between homeland and minority was going through a difficult phase. On the patriarchal issue the prelates ignored the warnings of Athens and elected an exchangeable patriarch, an action that aggravated Greek-Turkish relations. In the case of the renunciation of Article 42, Greek officials expressed their frustration regarding the compromising attitude of specific notables. As for the problems of communal administration, they were disappointed by the continuous and deep internal division of the minority.

In all three cases the Greek government pointed out the need to act with patriotism and put aside personal interests, and in all three cases the exact opposite happened. It could be argued that after the collapse of 1922 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Greek state abandoned its policy of irredentism and was genuinely interested in improving its relations with Turkey. Thus, its role as an external national homeland was definitely regulated by its policy of rapprochement.
However, an equally important factor, imposing a more moderate approach, was the occasionally erratic policy of the Patriarchate and specific elites within the lay leadership.
Chapter 6:

Conclusion
According to Hastings, ‘in reality every nation is a unique socio-historical construct. […] Nations grow out of ethnicities, out of wars and religious divisions, out of the emergence of literatures and nationalist propaganda and administrative pressures, but they do so bit by bit, so that at a given point of time one often cannot simply say ‘this is a nation’ or ‘this is not’.\textsuperscript{1016} In addition, as Moore points out, identities ‘are constructed over time, and these identities are continually shaped by social and political processes’.\textsuperscript{1017} This thesis sought to assess the role that the lay and religious elites played in the construction of Greek national identity in Constantinople and the gradual transformation of the Rum milleti from a religious community to a national minority from the mid-nineteenth century until 1930.

Initially, it examined the formation of a Greek ethnic community during the Tanzimat reforms. This process was conditioned by the intra and inter-communal antagonism created in the context of the secularization and modernization reform programme of the Ottoman Empire. The division of the leadership of the millet into a Helleno-Ottoman and a Hellenocentric party resulted in the cultural and political Hellenization of the Rum milleti. The upper class elite promoted, financed and incorporated Greek culture into its policy of Ottomanism in order to establish its social hegemony over the Greek Orthodox population. Unable to mount any patriotic agitation or express specific political goals, due to their political marginalization, the middle class instead led the effort for the cultural regeneration of the Greek ethnic group and laid the foundations for the subsequent formation and consolidation of Greek national identity.

The competition between different mixed lay/clerical power networks within the upper class elite played a significant role in the development of a Bulgarian nationalist movement. The reformist faction, led by the bankers, adopted the arguments of the Hellenocentric circles and followed a no-concessions policy towards the Bulgarians in an effort to isolate politically the Russophile conservative wing, represented mainly by the Neo-Phanariots and the clergy. This policy facilitated the establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church, the Bulgarian

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{1016}{Hastings 1997: 25-6.}
\footnotetext{1017}{Moore 2001: 15.}
\end{footnotes}
Exarchate. The transition from a religious to an ethnic group was reinforced by the development of Bulgarian nationalism. Orthodoxy had become a shared symbol of ethnic identity for both the Greeks and the Bulgarians. Therefore, the lay leadership of the millet was forced to identify a multiplicity of symbols that would stress the different ways the members of the group were similar to each other and collectively different from others. The ideological framework was provided by Athens and the concept of uninterrupted historical continuity of Zampelios-Paparrigopoulos. Ellinorthodoxia (‘Ελληνορθοδοξία’, Greek Orthodoxy) became the symbolic name of this multi-symbol congruence defining a Greek ethnic group, the Greek Orthodox community.

The inner upheaval created in the Rum millet by the reforms was not a unique phenomenon. Similar processes took place also within the Armenian and Jewish millets. In general, it could be argued that by the end of the Tanzimat period the Ottoman Empire no longer represented a multi-religious, but rather a multi-ethnic state. The Ottoman population was not reformed and homogenized as one entity, but in a fragmented manner. The secularization of communal and educational institutions of each millet separately resulted in the ethnic segmentation of Ottoman society, which was further reinforced by the absolutism of Sultan Abdül-Hamid II and the gradual involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of the millets. In the case of the Rums the involvement of Greece and the positive response of the nationalist circles, combined with the oppressive policies of Abdülhamid, further polarized the existing ethnic division and paved the way for their total politicization along national lines.

This politicization took place from 1908 until 1912. The restoration of the constitution of 1876 by the Young Turks brought to the foreground two competing political stances within the communal lay leadership, the ‘Nationalists’ (‘Εθνικόφρονες’) and the ‘Anti-nationals’ (‘Αντεθνικοί’). The former had ethnocentric orientations and their political instrument was the SC, established by Souliotis-Nikolaidis and Dragoumis with the support of Athens. The SC managed to mobilize support from members of the middle class, who were previously excluded from the political process and in a short period of time gained control over the
Patriarchate and the PNMC. Thus, for the first time the middle class elite assumed control over communal affairs and the traditional Helleno-Ottoman upper class elite became politically marginalized. The competition between the two different stances within the minority also assumed a mixed lay/clerical character, with the Nationalists and Ioakimists forming one group and the Anti-nationals and the Anti-Ioakimists the other.

The communal authorities, guided by the SC, began to respond to the nationalist policies of the CUP by making claims on the basis of their rights and their distinct ethnic identity. The organization coordinated its activities with the Greek state and tried to form an anti-Unionist coalition composed of deputies from the other non-Turkish ethnic groups. However, the defeat of the G PLC in the elections of 1912, combined with the outbreak of the First Balkan War and the death of Ioakim the same year, resulted in the fall of the nationalists from power.

The Anti-national/ Anti-Ioakimist faction took advantage of the new circumstances and managed to take over as the religious and lay leadership of the community until 1918. During this period Turkism replaced Ottomanism as the means to bring political unity and the CUP applied a programme of secularization via Turkification in an effort to transform the ethnic Turks into a Turkish nation. The response of the communal leadership to these severe nation-building policies was rather compliant. The dangerous conditions created during the war, combined with the good relations between the CUP and Patriarch Germanos V and his supporters, were the two reasons behind this political choice. Consequently, the people became alienated by the nationalist policies of the CUP and the passiveness of their leadership. In addition, they believed that Constantine’s Greece had left them helpless and unprotected. As a result, they championed Venizelos’ effort to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Entente. By the end of the war their transformation into a Greek national community was complete and they were ready for a change. The new range of activists who emerged under the political umbrella of the SC would try to convince them about the project of uniting with the rest of the Greek nation.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war and the collapse of the Young Turk regime signalled the return of the nationalists to power. Almost all of them belonged
to the Ioakimist faction and were former members of the SC. The new political context provided the conditions for the implementation of a full-scale nationalist programme. The nationalist lay leadership, realizing that the empire was collapsing, grasped the opportunity to fulfil its national aspirations and became determined to sever the community’s ties with the Ottoman past and openly express their alignment with Greece. The Patriarchate also entered the political fray as a faction supporting Greek nationalism. The dissolution of the empire, combined with the establishment of a nationalist lay leadership and the massive impact of Greek irredentism, meant that its authority over the Greek Orthodox could not be legitimized any longer by its incorporation into the Ottoman establishment, but by its alliance with the Greek state. At the same time, the Constantinopolitan Greek intelligentsia supported and reinforced Greek national feeling in the capital. The repetition of Greek national ideology via newspaper articles, speeches, announcements and public demonstrations influenced the larger masses of the population and solidified their support for the Greek nationalist movement. The leadership of the movement managed to shape the identity of the Rums. The public expressions of Greek national sentiments throughout this period showed that national consciousness was no longer restricted to the elites, but had become the concern of the majority of the population.

Venizelos’ loss in the elections of November 1920 was a turning point for the policy of the Constantinopolitan Greek leadership. Devoted to Venizelos, they established the CNDC in an effort to support the ‘Leader of the Nation’ in his dispute with King Constantine and the anti-Venizelists. From this moment, the national schism was transferred beyond the limits of the Greek state. Soon Constantinople became the centre of Venizelist opposition to royalist Athens.

The establishment of the CNDC completed the formation of a nationalist movement, which had been initiated by the policies of the SC in 1908-12. The CNDC had all the essential elements of an effective political organization. It did not just represent the Greek Orthodox community, but identified itself with it, since Venizelism and the Megali Idea had acquired a dominant position in the consciousness of the population. Therefore, it was able to withstand the external political pressure exercised by the government in Athens and the royalists in
Constantinople. At the same time, the CNDC commanded the community’s resources and was acting under the legitimizing umbrella of the Patriarchate, the highest authority within the Rum milleti. The CNDC also demonstrated signs of continuity. The methods, means and strategies employed by the CNDC revealed the experience its members had acquired during their active involvement with the SC.

Therefore, despite the changes in leadership, the main body of the movement, composed of members of the nationalist circles, had retained its coherence. The national aims of the movement had gone through different phases depending on the relations of the leadership of the group with the Greek state during each period. The founders of the SC, disappointed by the inability of the Greek state to implement the policy of the Megali Idea, set as their political programme to reform the Ottoman Empire into a great eastern state, where the Greeks would be the core element. The second phase was expressed with the popular demand for unification (enosis) with Venizelos’ Greece. Finally, after Venizelos’ fall from power the CNDC tried to create a separate state in the Near East for the unredeemed Greeks as a reaction to Constantinist Athens. Although none of these plans materialized, the political processes and the patriotic agitation they produced acted as a catalyst for the consolidation of the Rum milleti as a Greek national community.

On the other hand, the activities of the CNDC provoked the national feeling of the Turks. The Patriarchate, the members of the CNDC and the Greek population were exposed to the danger of retaliations by the Turks. Overwhelmed by their nationalist fervour and poisoned by the political fanaticism of the National Schism, the Venizelist leadership of the community did not make any provisions for the protection of the people they represented in case their policy failed. As a result, when the Asia Minor front collapsed and the news of the Smyrna events reached Constantinople, they were the first to leave the city and seek refuge in Greece.

After their flight to Athens, the Constantinopolitan elite who had supported Venizelos and the policy of Greek irredentism during 1919-22, found themselves in no man’s land. They could neither benefit from their status of non-exchangeability, since they were not allowed to return, nor from the refugee resettlement schemes, because officially they were not refugees. So from fugitives they had become
political exiles. This displaced community gradually assumed the role of an authority in exile for the minority. They established several organizations, the most important being ‘La Commission éxécutive plénipotentiaire soussignée, chargée de la defense des Grecs, sujets turcs, établis à Constantinople et séjournant provisoirement en Grèce’. All these organizations were composed of former members of the SC and the CNDC and represented the interests of the nationalist elite, who had dominated the lay leadership of the community in the years 1918-22. Their effort to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group was primarily employed as a means to state their case to the Greek government and the international community. Safeguarding the rights of their co-nationals in Turkey was also their aim, although a secondary one.

Their relationship vis-à-vis the Greek and Turkish states was framed by a triangular interacting configuration with the former acting as their external national homeland and the latter as a nationalizing state. The refusal of the Turkish authorities to allow these ‘absent’ Constantinopolitan Greeks, still an integral part of the minority, to return to Istanbul should be seen in the context of Ankara’s policy of building a state of and for the Turkish nation based on secular values. At the same time, although the failure of the ambitious Megali Idea plan in 1922 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 forced Athens to abandon its irredentist plans, it continued to monitor and assess the position of its remaining Greek co-nationals in Istanbul and to act on their behalf within the international context set by the treaty. The international recognition of specific rights for the minorities living in Turkey institutionalized the existing uneasy relationship of the Greek Orthodox with the host state and its external homeland. The claims of the ‘absent’ group were made on the grounds of this internationally recognized minority status.

However, the uncompromising attitude of the EC with regards to Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1925-1928 resulted in Ankara retaliating in an effort to defend the rights of their own co-nationals, the Muslims in Thrace. These reprisals took the form of property confiscations, which also included properties belonging to Constantinopolitan Greeks residing in Turkey. This fact created a rift in the relations
between the ‘absent’ Greeks and their ‘brothers’ in Istanbul and the geographical separation between the two groups gradually assumed a political character.

On a social level, the ‘absent’ elite tried to affirm its role as a transborder authority for the minority through the construction of a Constantinopolitan Greek public discourse. This identification with and responsibility for their co-nationals in Istanbul was articulated and propagated through the weekly newspaper *Konstantinoupolis* and the establishment of several voluntary associations and clubs. The elite that had dominated communal politics in Constantinople during 1918-22 had managed to reconstruct its social and political network in Athens. For them, the return of Venizelos to politics constituted a triumph. They expected the ‘Leader of the Nation’ to resume his expansionist policy against Turkey. However, Venizelos advocated a policy of moderation. He had realized that peace and stability was necessary for the rebuilding and modernization of Greece. Therefore, he was willing to sacrifice the internationally acknowledged rights of the ‘absent’ Greeks as part of a peace treaty that would secure the political stability and territorial integrity of Greece. Ironically, their hopes of returning to Istanbul and claiming their rights were crushed by the man they had supported with such great devotion. The signing of the Ankara accord of 1930 separated them officially from the minority of Istanbul and put an end to their role as a leadership in exile.

The Lausanne Treaty set the framework for the protection of the rights of the Greek Orthodox minority. However, the Turkish policy of nation-building via secularization was not compatible with the relevant minority clauses. On several occasions the government and the Turkish press employed the argument of lack of loyalty to the state to exert pressure on the Constantinopolitan Greeks to renounce their rights. This mistrust, the result of the Greek nationalist policy followed by the Patriarchate and the lay leadership in 1919-22, obstructed the normal transition and adjustment of the minority to the new circumstances.

The essential question of the organization of the communal administration remained unresolved, despite numerous efforts to draw up a new constitutional charter. At the same time however, this issue was used as a negotiating tool and a means of pressure by the Turkish government in order to overpower the international
safeguards of minority’s rights and promote its secular changes. The patriarchal issue and the renunciation of Article 42 were two typical examples where the promise of communal elections and a new organization plan was used in this manner. Although the nationalizing policies followed by the state in these two cases violated the recognized rights of the minority, Turkey would not have succeeded without the cooperation of specific prelates and Constantinopolitan Greek notables.

The power vacuum created by the flight of the nationalists allowed the supporters of Germanos to resume an active role in communal affairs, since they were always on good terms with the Turkish establishment. This resulted in a power struggle within the minority between a faction that was willing to compromise with the Turks in order to ascend to power and a faction that favoured a more autonomous approach and was not willing to renounce the minority’s rights.

Both elites came out of this struggle defeated and the minority as a whole suffered a serious blow. On the one hand, the conservative faction did not manage to take control of the Patriarchate and communal administration, despite their efforts and, in the case of the laymen, the support of the Turkish state. At the same time however, their compromising policies undermined the status of the Patriarchate and permitted the renunciation of Article 42. On the other hand, the uncompromising faction resisted the resignation of their rights regarding communal administration, but as a result Turkey refused to provide them with a new constitutional charter and more importantly a central administrative body similar to the abolished PNMC. Furthermore, the Patriarchate was not allowed to interfere in lay affairs. Thus, Turkey incorporated the pre-war administration system into the administrative structure of the modern Turkish state, without recognizing the minority as a legal entity. Rather it preferred to deal directly with the local boards. This meant that the minority was weakened, since it could not claim its rights through a central authority.

The efforts of the Greek state to act on behalf of its co-nationals were to a great extent undermined by the actions of the minority’s leadership. On the patriarchal issue the prelates ignored the warnings of Athens and elected an exchangeable patriarch, an action that aggravated Greek-Turkish relations. In the case of the renunciation of Article 42, Greek officials expressed their frustration regarding the
compromising attitude of specific notables. As for the problems of the communal administration they were disappointed by the continuous and deep internal division of the minority.

In all three cases the Greek government pointed out the need to act with patriotism and put aside personal interests, and in all three cases the exact opposite happened. It could be argued that after the collapse of 1922 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Greek state abandoned its policy of irredentism and was genuinely interested in improving its relations with Turkey. Thus, its role as an external national homeland was definitely regulated by its policy of rapprochement. However, an equally important factor imposing a more moderate approach was the occasionally erratic policy of the Patriarchate and specific elites within the lay leadership.

It could be argued that the Greeks who remained in Constantinople after 1922 faced a double challenge: to deal with the consequences of the political choices of its former leadership for the period 1918-1930; and to adjust to the new conditions created after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The policies of the different elites within their leadership and their responses to Turkish nation-building and Greek homeland nationalism in the years 1923-30 consolidated the group as a national minority in modern Turkey.
Primary Sources

List of Archives

Anthemion Archive
Department of Methodology, History and Theory of Science, University of Athens.
Athens.

AEP
Archive of Ecumenical Patriarchate. Istanbul.

DBFP 1952
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, vol. IV. London.

DBFP 1958
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, vol. VII. London.

DBFP 1962

DBFP 1970
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, vol. XVII. London.

DBFP 1972

GMFA
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Athens.

JSP
John Stavridis Papers, Oxford.

NA
National Archives. London.
List of Newspapers & Periodicals

Apogevmatini (Istanbul - Years: 1926, 1927, 1928)
Chronos (Istanbul - Years: 1920, 1921, 1922)
Ekklesiastiki Alithia (Istanbul - Years: 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923)
Imerisia Nea (Istanbul - Years: 1923, 1924)
Kathimerini (Athens - Year: 1925)
Konstantinoupolis (Athens - Years: 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1932, 1933)
The Times (London - Years: 1923, 1929)
Bibliography

Afthentopoulos, M. 1972
Λογοδοσίαι του Μηνά Αυθεντοπούλου, προέδρου του εν Κωνσταντινούπολει Ελληνικού Φιλολογικού Συλλόγου 1918-1922. Athens.

Ahmad, F. 1969

Ahmad, F. 1982

Akgönül, S. 2005

Aktar, A. 2003

Akşin, S. 2007
Turkey. From Empire to Revolutionary Republic. The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to Present. London.

Alexandris, A. 1980

Alexandris, A. 1981

Alexandris, A. 1992

Anagnostopoulou, S. 1997
Anagnostopoulou, S. 2007

Anastasiadou, I. 1980

Anestidis, S.T. 1998
‘Οθωμανικός πολιτικός σύνδεσμος και αρμενικό φιλοσυνταγματικό και φιλοδημοκρατικό κόμμα: Εθνοκεντρικά αιτήματα και πολιτικός φιλελευθερισμός’, Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon, 12, 189-201.

Anderson, B. 1991
Imagined Communities. London.

Argyropoulos, P.A. 1970
Απομνημονεύματα. Athens.

Armenian National Union of America 1919.

Barsoumian, H. 1982

Benbassa, E. 1994

Berkes, N. 1998
The Development of Secularism in Turkey. New York.

Bloxham, D. 2007

Boura, C. 1983
‘Οι βουλευτικές εκλογές στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία. Οι έλληνες βουλευτές 1908-1918’ Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon, 4, 69-158.
Boura, C. 1999

Bozi, S. 2002
Ο ελληνισμός της Κωνσταντινούπολης. Κοινότητα Σταυροδρομίου-Πέραν. Athens.

Brass, P.R. 1991

Braude, B. 1982

Braude, B. & Lewis, B. 1982

Breuilly, J. 1996

Brubaker, R. 1996

Cagaptay, S. 2006

CEIP 1924

Churchill, W.S. 1944
The Aftermath. A Sequel to the World Crisis. London.

Clogg, R. 1982
Clogg, R. 2004
*A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge.

Dagklis, P.G. 1965

Danforth, L.M. 1995

Davison, R.H. 1963
*Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*. Princeton.

Davison, R. H. 1982

Davison, R.H. 1990
*Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The Impact of the West*. Texas.

de Azcárate, P. 1945

Deringil, S. 1998

Dragoumis, I. 1911
*Όσοι ζωντανοί*. Athens.

Dumont, P. 1982

EIEA 1923
*Εγκόλπιον Ηµερολόγιον της ‘Εκκλησιαστικής Αληθείας’ του έτους 1923*. Constantinople.

Emmanouilidis, E. 1924
*Τα τελευταία έτη της Οθωµανικής Αυτοκρατορίας*. Athens.
Exertzoglou, H. 1989

Exertzoglou, H. 1996
Εθνική ταυτότητα στην Κωνσταντινούπολη τον 19ο αι. Ο Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινούπολεως 1861-1912. Athens.

Exertzoglou, H. 1997

Exertzoglou, H. 1998

Findley, C.V. 1982

Fink, C. 1998

Göçek, F.M. 1993

Gökalp, Z. 1959
Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, N. Berkes (ed.). London.

Hanioğlu, M. Ş. 1994

Hastings, A. 1997

Hirschon, R. 2003

Howard, H.N. 1931
*The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923.* Norman.

Hurewitz, J.C. 1987
*Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record.* Princeton.

Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A.D. (eds.) 1994
*Nationalism.* Oxford.

Issawi, C. 1982

IEE 1977
*Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Εθνος*, Γ. Athens.

IEE 1978
*Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Εθνος*, Ι. Athens.

Jackson-Preece, J. 1998

Kaligian, D.M. 2009

Kamouzis, D. 2008
‘Reciprocity or international intervention? Greek and Turkish minority policy, 1923-1930’, in: S. Akgönül (ed.), *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities Law, Religion and Politics.* İstanbul: 49-67

Kanner, E. 2004
*Φτώχεια και Φιλανθρωπία στην Ορθόδοξη κοινότητα της Κωνσταντινούπολης 1753-1912.* Athens.
Kane, A.E. 2000  

Karal, Z. 1982  

Karmi, I. 1996  
The Jewish Community of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century. Social, Legal and Administrative Transformations. Istanbul.

Karpat, K. 1978  

Karpat, K. 1985  

Katsiambas, K.A. 1982  

Kayalı, H. 1994  

Kechriotis, V. 2002  

Kechriotis, V. 2005  
‘Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution’, Études Balkaniques 1: 51-72.

Kemal, M. 1929  
A speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal. Leipzig.

Keyder, Ç. 2003  
Kitromilides, P.M. 1990

Kofos, E. 1986

Konortas, P. 1998
Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο, 17ος - αρχές 20ου αιώνα. Athens.

Konortas, P. 1999

Kornprobst, M. 2005

Kostis, K. 1991

Krikorian, M. K. 1978
Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1908. London.

Ladas, S.P. 1932

Landau, J. M. 1994

LCNEA 1923

Levy, A. 1994
Lewis, B. 1961
*The Emergence of Modern Turkey.* London.

Llewellyn–Smith, M. 1999

Lloyd George, D. 1938

Macfie, A.L. 1975

Malainos, E.I. 1963
*Ιστορία των ξένικων επεμβάσεων, τόμος ΣΤ.* Athens.

Malkki, L. 1992

Mamoni, K. 1990
‘Εισαγωγή στην Ιστορία των Συλλόγων Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1861-1922)’, *Mnimosini, Vol. 11*: 211-234.

Mamoni, K. 2001
*Μελετήματα από την ιστορία, παιδεία και εκκλησία Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1437-1922).* Athens.

Mango, A. 2004
*Atatürk.* London.

Mansel, P. 1997

Matalas, P. 2003
*Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία. Οι περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης. Από το «Ελλαδικό» στο Βουλγαρικό σχίσμα.* Crete.

Mavri Vivlos 1919
*Μαύρη Βίβλος διωγμών και μαρτυρίων του εν Τουρκία Ελληνισμού (1914-1918).* Constantinople.

Mavropoulos, D. 1960
*Πατριαρχικά σελίδες: Το Οικουμενικόν Πατριαρχείον από 1878-1949.* Athens.
Mazower, M. 1992
‘The messiah and the bourgeoisie: Venizelos and politics in Greece, 1900–1912’, *The Historical Journal* 35/4: 885–904

Montgomery, A.E. 1972

Moore, M. 2001
*The Ethics of Nationalism*. Oxford.

NEL
*Νεώτερον Εγκυκλοπαιδικόν Λεξικόν*, vol. IE.

NEL
*Νεώτερον Εγκυκλοπαιδικόν Λεξικόν*, vol. IZ.

Oran, B. 2003

Ortaylı, İ. 1994

Özkırımlı, U. 2000

Özkırımlı, U. & Sofos, S.A. 2008
*Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. London.

Palaskas, S. 2001
*Η ελληνική εκπαίδευση στην Κωνσταντινούπολη των αρχών του 20ου αιώνα: οι δημοτικές και αστικές σχολές αρρένων και οι αντίστοιχες μικτές (1900-1915)*. Thessaloniki.

Pallis, A.A. 1937

Papadopoulos, S. 1978
*Αναμνήσεις από την Πόλη*. Athens

Passas, I.D. 1925
*Η αγωνία ενός έθνους*, vol. 2. Athens.
PSV 1920

Πεντηκονταετηρίς Σταύρου Βουτυρά. Constantinople.

Pentzopoulos, D. 1962


Persecutions. 1919. Constantinople.

Petropoulos, J. 1976


Petsalis-Diomidis, N. 1978

Greece at the Paris Peace Conference.1919. Thessaloniki.

Petsalis-Diomidis, N. 1980


Psomiades, H.J. 1968

The Eastern Question, the Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy. Thessaloniki.

Rodrigue, A. 1990


Rodrigue, A. 1994


Rodrigue, A. 1995


Rozen, M. 2005

The Last Ottoman Century and Beyond: The Jews in Turkey and the Balkans 1808-1945. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol.I. Tel Aviv.

Sarioglou, I. 2004


Dimitris Kamouzis
Shaw, S.J. 1979

Shaw, S.J. & Shaw, E.K. 1997
*History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol.II. Cambridge.

Skalieris, G. 1997
Τα δίκαια των εθνοτήτων εν Τουρκία: 1453-1921. Athens.

Skopetea, E. 1988
Το ‘Πρότυπο Βασίλειο’ και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880). Athens.

Skopetea, E. 1999

SLON (Secretariat of the LoN), 1938

Smith, A.D. 1988

Smith, A. D. 1991

Smith, P. et al. (eds) 1991
*Ethnic Groups in International Relations*. New York.

Soteriadis, G. 1918
*An Ethnological Map Illustrating Hellenism in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor*. London.

Souliotis- Nikolaidis, A. 1984

Spanoudis, K. 1902
Ιστορικά Σελίδες. Ιωακείµ ο Γ’. Constantinople.

Stamatopoulos, D. 2003
Μεταφράσιμη και εκκοσμίκευση: Προς μια ανασύνθεση της ιστορίας του Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα. Athens.
Stamatopoulos, D. 2006

Svolopoulos, C. 1992

Svolopoulos, C. 2003
Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος, 12 μελετήματα. Athens:

Svolopoulos, C.1999

Thayer, L.E. 1923
‘The capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the question of their abrogation as it affects the United States’, The American Journal of International Law, 17/2, 207-233.

The LoN in Retrospect. 1983. Berlin

Thornberry, P. 1991

Toktas, S. 2005

ToS 1996
Η Δίκη των Ελλήνων στην Τουρκία: Τα εστενογραφημένα πρακτικά. 31 Οκτωβρίου-15 Νοεμβρίου 1922. Athens.

Treaty of Lausanne, 1923.
Trubeta, S. 2003
“‘Minorisation” and “Ethnicisation” in Greek society: Comparative perspectives on Muslim immigrants and the Thracian Muslim minority’, History and Culture of Southeastern Europe 5: 95-112.

Tsoukalas, K. 1992
Έξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή. Ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830-1922). Athens.

Ubicini, M.A. 1856

Van der Valk, I. 2003

Vassiadis, G.A. 2007
The Syllagos Movement of Constantinople and Ottoman Greek Education 1861-1923. Athens.

Venizelos, E. 1919

Venizelos, E. & Metaxas I. 2003
Η ιστορία του Εθνικού Διχασμού κατά την αρθρογραφία του Ελευθέριου Βενιζέλου και του Ιωάννου Μεταξά. Thessaloniki.

Veremis, T. 1977

Veremis, T. 1990

Veremis, T. 1999

Vovolinis, K. & Vovolinis S. 1961
Μέγα Ελληνικόν Βιογραφικόν Λεξικόν, vol. IV. Athens.
Vozikis, H.K. 1925
*Ai apologistai ton thymaton tis 15th Novermbriou 1922.* Athens.

Wood, W.B. 1994

Zafeiropoulos, T.G. 1984
*Ω Γεώργιος Κονδύλης και η εποχή του.* Athens.

Zarifis, G.L. 2002

Zavitsianos, K.G. 1947
*Ai anamnises tou ek tis istorikis diaphoniais Vasileios Kostantinou kai Eleftheriou Venizelou opoios tis ezhise (1914-1922), tombos deuterou.* Athens.

*Το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο, η Οθωμανική διοίκηση και η εκπαίδευση του γένους. Κείμενα-Πηγές: 1830-1914.* Thessaloniki.

Zürcher, E.J. 1998
*Turkey. A Modern History.* London.


http://www.hippocratio.gr/istoriko.html, last accessed on 10/05/2006

www.ackfc.gr, last accessed on 08/06/2006

www.paokfc.gr, last accessed on 08/06/2006

www.megarevma.net/Ofikialoi.htm, last accessed 7 September 2007

Chapter 2

Fn.97: ‘Ραδιουργικήν διάλυσιν της Συνόδου, και την αθέτησιν και κατάργησιν των προνοµίων και δικαιωµάτων της Εκκλησίας, και την ανατροπήν πάσης της τέως καθεστώσις διοικητικής τάξεως της Εκκλησίας’.

Fn.140: ‘Η εθνική λεγόµενη πολιτική υπερίσχυσε πάσης άλλης ειρηνικής ιδέας. Οι µεγάλοι πατριώτες, και οι δήθεν πρόµαχοι του Ελληνισµού είχον προπαρασκευάσει τα πάντα, έως και αυτάς τας απειλητικάς και απρεπές επιδείξεις του όχλου της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως’.

Fn.151: ‘Βυζάντιον λέγοντες, εννοούµεν το πνεύµα του ελληνισµού, όπερ, διά της εκκλησίας, διά της γλώσσης, διά των εθίµων, διά του λαού των Ελλήνων παλαιάν πρός την πολιτικήν κατάστασιν των βυζαντινών χρόνων, κατειργάσατο την εθνικήν ενότητα των Ελλήνων’.

Fn.167: ‘Η εξάπλωσις της ελληνικής παιδείας εις την Ανατολήν φέρει την παντελήν αυτής εξελλήνισιν, περιάγει πανταχού τόν θρίαµβον της διανοητικής του Ελληνισµού βασιλείας και κατακτήσεως, τους δε οµοδόξους λαούς της Ανατολής προπαρασκευάζει εις αδελφικήν ένωσιν και αποκατάστασιν ενιαίου και αδιασπάστου πολιτεύµατος’.

Fn.168: ‘Η ελληνική παιδεία...ήν ελληνισµόν καλούµεν, περιελθούσα την υφήλιον εξεπολίτισε και εξωογόνησε των εθνών τα βάρβαρα, έµ ελλε να σβεσθή εν αυτή τη εστία’.

Fn.174: ‘Ανάγνωσιν επιστηµονικών µελετών [...] αφορωσών την αρχαιότητα ής το πνεύµα, οι εµφορούµενοι τουτού, προσεπάθουν να αναζωογονήσωσι πρός αναζωπύρωσιν του εθνικού φρονήµατος ή την βυζαντινήν ιστορίαν ή µετά την άλωσιν παραχθέντα και διανοηθέντα’.

Fn.198: ‘Τό υπερφυές δένδρον του ελληνισµού εις το πνεύµα συναδέλφωσε των εθνών της Τουρκίας, όλων δε οι συνταγµατικές ελευθερίες ευκόλυναν τον Ελληνισµό της Τουρκίας να ορίση και να ακολουθήση φανερά ένα πολιτικό πρόγραµµα, ένα πολιτικό πρόγραµµα που τελικός σκοπός του θα ήταν ο συνασπισµός των εθνών και των κρατών της Ανατολής’.
Fn.239: ‘Δε συγκινεί πια τα πλήθη η μεγάλη ιδέα, γιατί έπαιζαν πολλές φορές απ’ αυτήν και δεν αλήθεψε […] Κάπως περισσότερο μπορούν να νοιώσουν τώρα ένα μεγάλο κράτος, που να ενώνει όλη την ελληνική φυλή’.

Fn.275: ‘Και οι μόνον τούτο, αλλά και εφαντάζθηκαν, ότι η Μεταπολίτευσις εγένετο αποκλειστικός χάριν των Τούρκων, ότι το Σύνταγμα απετέλετε επεροθαρές, χαριστικόν, συμβόλαιον, παρέχον οφελείαν και δικαιώματα μεν εις τους Τούρκους […] υποχρεώσεις δ’ εις τους λοιπούς, τους μη Τούρκους. Παραδόσεις, ήθη και έθιμα, γλώσσας, θρησκευτικά δοξασίαι, κοινοτικά περιουσία, εκκλησιαστικά ιδρύματα, δίκαια […] περιεφρονήθησαν, κατεπατήθησαν, παρεγνωρίσθησαν’.

Fn.277: ‘Δεν είχον να δείξουν άλλο δρόμο από την ραγιάδικη πολιτική των τερτιπιών, της πονηρίας, της κολακείας πρός τους Τούρκους, της κλάψας και της εγκαρτέρησης’.

Fn.278: ‘Ούτω ο Πολιτικός Σύνδεσµος είχε συγκεντρώση όλα τα θυρυβοποιια στοιχεία τα οποία δι’ ακαταλογίστων αξιώσεων ή δι’ ανάρθρων εκδηλώσεων εξήτουσαν να παρουσιασθούσαν εις τον λαόν ως φλογεροί πατριώται […] Δεν εσκέπτοντο ποίαν κατάστασιν κατεργάζοντο διά το Ελληνικόν στοιχείον εν Τουρκία και πόσον ακριβά επλήρωσαν οι πιστικές τάξεις […] την δριµύτητα της εσωτερικής παρεµπόδισης’.

Fn.281: ‘Ιδία το Οικουµενικόν Πατριαρχείον, ως θρησκευτικόν και εθνικόν κέντρον των εν Τουρκία Ελλήνων, ακράδαντον είχε την πεποίθησιν περί της ακεραίας προστασίας και περιφρούρησης, υπό το νέον πολίτευµα, των κεκτηµένων και ανεγνωρισµένων δικαίων και προνοµίων αυτού […] Η περιφρούρησης, άλλως τε, των κεκτηµένων δικαίων επισήµης αναγράφεται εις το νέον συνταγµατικόν Χάρτη ως νόµος θεµελιώδης, ρητού άρθρου διαλαµβάνοντος εις αυτόν ότι το Κράτος προστατεύει την ελευθέραν εξάσκησιν πάντων των εν τ Κυβερνήσεως ανεγνωρισµένων θρησκευµάτων και την, ως µέχρι τούδε, τήρησιν των εις τας διαφόρους πολιτικές χορηγηθέντων προνοµίων’.

Fn.283: ‘Όλα ταύτα εδραιούσιν εις την συνείδησιν του Ελλήν ικού Έθνους την βεβαιότητα, ότι όχι µόνον έχει και τώρα, όπως και επ’ απολυταρχίας, θέση και κατάσταση, του οποίου η εν ήσσονι µοίρα συγκράτησις είναι εις των σκοπών της εσωτερικής πολιτικής της Κυβερνήσεως, συνεπιφέρον […] την παρεµπόδιση της αναπτύξεως του, αλλά και ότι τώρα βαθύτερον ή πριν, υπάρχει τάσις να χρησιµοποιήθη τον συντάγµατα αναφερόµενον όρος «Οθωµανικός Εθνισµός», όπως επιβλητή εις αυτό τον Τουρκικόν Εθνισµόν’.

Fn.287: ‘Να τροποποιηθούσιν οι σχετικοί νόµοι και κανονισµοι, ώστε να λαµβάνονται εις αυτούς υπ’ όψει εν ίση µοίρα η θρησκεία, η παιδεία και τα ήθη και έθιμα όλων των στρατιωτών. […] Εις τον εσωτερικόν κανονισµόν του στρατού να τροποποιηθή η «εισαγωγή» κατά τρόπον, δεικνύοντα ότον ο Οθωµανικός Στρατός ανήκει εις τους χριστιανούς Οθωµανούς όσον και εις τους Μουσουλµάνους και […] διατάξεις υπέρ των χριστιανικών ήθων και εθίμων, όπου και όσουν και υπέρ των μουσουλµανικών’.

Dimitris Kamouzis Page 314 of 325
Fn.289: ‘Την εκπαιδευτικήν αυτού ταύτην αυτοδιοίκησιν, […], το Ρωμαϊκόν εθεώρησε και θεωρεί μετά της θρησκευτικής τουατής, ως ζήτημα υπάρξεως της διανοητικής και ηθικής αυτού υποστάσεως’.

Fn.290: ‘Εφαρμοζόμενα θέλουσιν άρη πάσαν δυσπιστίαν […] και το Ρωμαϊκόν Έθνος ήσυχον πλέον περί της αυτοδιοικήσεως αυτού εις την εκπαίδευσιν την ύσχετον πολιτικής, θα καταβάλη πάσαν δύναμιν όπως βοηθήση τους πολιτικούς της Κυβερνήσεως σκοπούς’.

Fn.291: ‘Αν η ιδέα του Πατριαρχείου συνίσταται επί της αξιώσεως, όπως ιδιαζόντως εν τοις ηθοποιοις της Παιδείας και των εις την Οθωμανικήν Κοινότητας νακουσάν σχολών αποκτήσει τώρα Κράτους αυτονόμου και ανεξαρτήτου εν τω θολωμανικό Κράτει, μίαν θεωρεί αξίωσιν ουδέναν από συπος της Κυβερνήσεως ολοκλήρου του Οθωμανικού Έθνους’.

Fn.294: ‘Η επιμονή μάλιστα, μεθ’ ής ο τεσκερές του Υπουργείου της Παιδείας συγχεει τον όρον «Οθωμανικόν Έθνος» εν ώ θέλει να συνεχεύσει όλς τις Εθνότητας της Ελληνικής Κοινότητας, όπου είναι δυνατόν να γίνη παραδεκτή αυτή από απόσιας της υπάρξεως ολοκλήρου του Οθωμανικού Έθνους’.
Chapter 3

Fn.324: ‘Χαίρε και αγάλλου, ο χριστοφόρε Λαέ, διότι κατά τον Ιερόν ψαλμοδιών ‘τόν τα αντίκουστα ηκούσθη’ εκ του στόματος του Εξοχωτάτου Αρμοστού της Μητρός Ελλάδος, ευσυγεγράφησθεν πρό ολίγου με τον επισημότερον τρόπον είς το Εθνικόν ημών τούτον Κέντρον την συντελεσθείσαν νικηφόρον ειρήνην! Νόν το αντίκουστον θεώμια της εθνικής ημών αποκαταστάσεως ηκόουσθη και εγένετο! Νόν μετά πάροδον πέντε σκληρών και παγχαλέπων αιώνων δο υλείας επέλαµψε κατά το πλείστον είς κατ’ ανατολάς πατρώα θέµατα η ροδοδάκτυλος της ελευθερίας η ώς, και η ψυχή, η μία και αδιαιρέτους Ελληνική ψυχή, ανακτήσασα το ηθικόν αυτής θάρρος, βάινει ολοταχώς υπό το μέγα και γενικόν πρόσταγμα του υπερόχου Πολιτικού της Αρχηγού, είς τα τελειοτικά πεπρωμένα της!’.

Fn.345: ‘Της πιο ρωμαϊκιάς λεβεντιάς χαροκαµένη γέννα. σας χαιρετώ! Το διάβα σας µου ξεγελάει το νου, κι απ' τα κορµιά σας µούρχεται τα µαρµαροχυµένα κυµατιστό κι ολόδροσο τ'αγέρι του βουνού. Μέσα σας έσµιξε η φωτιά του Ελληνικού υφανού κατά απ’ την παράπλης του Σπαρτιάτη φρένα, σαν κάτη απ’ τη θρησκόληπτη ψυχή Βυζαντινού και κατά απ’ την αστείρευτη πνοή του Εικοσιένα.

Θέτε φλογέρας λάληµα; θέτε γοργό παιάνα; θέτε για σας µοναστηριού καλογριά καµπάνα; ό,τι κι αν πάρη ο στίχος µου θάναι φτωχό, νεκρό, γιατί έχει το στις σφορούξι σας φήμης το φτερό, γιατί σε κάθε µια χυτή της φουστανέλας λές κη' ένα φως ανέςπερο σας έχει βάλ’ η ∆όξα’.

Fn.353: ‘Μας έκανε λυπηράν αίσθησιν το ότι το υπουργείον δε ν ωµίλησε περί των δικαιωµάτων των εθνικοτήτων. [...] Η αρχή των εθνικ οτήτων ενίκησεν ήδη. [...] Ο όρος «κοινοτικά δικαιώµατα» είναι λείψανον των χρόνων της απολυταρχίας και δεν είναι δυνατόν να αρκεσθώµεν µε τοιαύτα πράγµατα’.

Fn.407: ‘Τα Εθνικά Σωµατεία Κωνσταντινούπολεως εκπροσωπούντα τον λαόν της Ελληνικοτάτης Βασιλίδος συνελθόντα επέφεσαν υμόθιμος: Εκφράζουν την άπειρη αυτών χαράν δια τας µεγάλας εθνικάς επιτυχίας και την αίδιου ευγνωμοσύνην μετά του βαθυτάτου σεβαµίου τους προς τον ένδοξον πρωτεργάτη των απαραµµίλων τουτών θριάµβων Ελευθέριον Βενιζέλον. [...] Κατάπληκτα δια τήν αναστίησίαν της Αντιπολιτεύσεως των 16 πρός την θαυµαστήν ενσάρκωσην εθνικών προαιωνίων πόθων και τας συνεχιζόµενας υπ’ αυτής ανεξόµενας σκευωρίας κατά τας
µοναδικάς ταύτας στιγμάς της νεωτέρας ιστορίας του Ελληνισμού, αποδοκιμάζουσι 
μετά της σφοδροτέρας αγανακτήσεως την αντεθνική στάσιν των αστόργων τούτων 
και αναλγήτων τέκνων της μητρός Ελλάδος και της όλης Φυλής, της Φυλής της επί 
αιώνας ανηκούστως δοκιμασθείσης, αλλ' αείποτε κλείσθεις δια τον διάπυρον 
pατριωτισμόν Αυτής'.

Fn.417: 'Η πολυσήµαντος συνθήκη αποτελεί την επίσηµον πλέον παγκόσµιον 
καταδίκην αιώνων όλων καθεστώτος στυγερού και την κωδικοποίησιν και 
pανηγυρικήν καθιέρωσιν των δικαίων της Μαρτυρίας που Εκκλησίας των 
υποκλήσης των Ανατολής, των δικάιων όλων 

Fn.426: 'Ο μέγας ηγέτης, ο σωτήρ της φυλής, ο δηµιουργός της κραταιάς Ελλάδος 
έπεσε. [...] Η Παλαιά Ελλάς, η Ελλάς η εθνικώς οικουµενική του, τον κατεψήφισε γενικώς. Η 
Νέα απετέλεσε ενυψώσον την πλέον τιµητικήν αντίθεσιν [...] Η Παλαιά Ελλάς 
επανέλαβε το τερατώδεστον προηγούµενον του αλησµόνητου Τρικούπη, τόσο 
τερατωδέστερον εις την παρούσαν εποχήν όσω ο Βενιζέλος µυθωδώς 
eµεµεγαλούργησε'.
δεχθείς θερμότατα ευχάς διαβεβαιούντες ότι θέλομεν εργασθής παρά το πλευρόν υμόν και υπό τας εμπνεύσεις της ιμητέρας Σεβαστής υμίν Κυβερνήσεως πρός πραγματοποίησιν των εθνικών ιδεών δια της υφ'ημάς συνενώσεως των εθνικών δυνάμεων'.

Fn.505: 'Επιβολή δυνάμεων κράτους ενταύθα, άνευ υποχωρήσεων προς φανατικούς και εγωπαθείς, εκμηδενίση βενιζελικόν κύρος'.

Fn.529: 'Καθόσον σήμερον τόσον απέναντι των Συµµάχων, οι οποίοι θέλουν να βλέπουν το Εθνικόν Κέντρον μη υποδουλωµένον εις τον Κωνσταντίνον, όσον και απέναντι της Όθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας, της οποίας σκιά μόνον υπάρχει εν Κωνσταντινούπολεί, το Πατριαρχείον πρέπει να είναι περισσότερον παρά ποτέ υπό υπηρέτης και ανεξάρτητον και διά τον λόγον αυτόν θα επιμείνων ιν ας την ταχυτέραν εκλογήν του Πατριάρχου'.

Fn.584: 'Προτίστως, Κύριε Αρχιστράτηγε, οφείλοµεν να σας διαβεβαιώσωμεν ότι η Εθνική Άµυνα της Κων/πόλεως είναι απηλλαγµένη πάσης προκαταλήψεως υπέρ ή κατά προσώπων. Ούτε ο Βασιλεύς Κωνσταντίνος, ούτε ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος επηρέασαν ποτέ τα αισθήµατα µας ως πρόσωπα, ή ενέπνευσαν ταύτην ή εκείνην την πολιτικήν κατεύθυνσιν µας. Αν εξεδηλώθη πάντως ακράτης ο ενθουσιασµός της λαού της πόλεως ταύτης υπέρ του Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου κατά τα τελευταία έτη, τούτο οφείλεται εις το έργον το απελευθερωτικόν'.

Fn.586: 'Εις τας σηµερινάς κρισιµώτατας διά το Έθνος και ιδιαιτέρως διά την Ιωνιά και την την Κωνσταντινούπολιν περιστάσεις, ο αλύτρωτος Ελληνιςµός είναι διατεθειµένος νά αποθεώση εκείνον ο οποίος θ'αντιτα χθή εις τήν απόφασιν περί εγκαταλείψεως του είς χείρας των Τούρκων. [...] Εάν εις την βενιζελικήν µερίδα υπάρχωσιν άνδρες ανίκανοι να εννοήσωσι το αίσθηµα του ούτο της πατριωτικής αυταπαρνήσεως, ούτοι προκαταβολικώς αποκηρύσσονται παρ'ηµών µε το δικαίωµα το οποίον µας δίδει η παµψήφιση του λαού της Κωνσταντινούπολεως'.

Fn.591: 'Και εν τέλει, Κύριε Αρχιστράτηγε, η διαχείριση της υποθέσεως µας και πάλιν υπό της Κυβερνήσεως των Αθηνών πληροί τήν ψυχήν µας απογοητεύοµενος, διότι, επιτρέψατε µας να τό είπωµεν ειλικρινώς ουδέν πεποιθήσεις κατεύθυνσιν τοιαύτην κατεύθυνσιν της Κυβερνήσεως. [...] Κολοσιαία ἡ επομένως παρεξήγησιν των σκοπών, τούτοις υπηγόρευσαν εις την επιστολήν της Εθνικής Αμήνης τήν τοιαύτην κατεύθυνσιν'.

Dimitris Kamouzis  Page 318 of 325
Chapter 4

Fn.611: ‘Αι ηµέραι τας οποίας διερχόµεθα είναι εξαιρετικῆς σηµασίας διά την Εκκλησίαν και το Γένος. [...] Η μοναδικὴ εἰς τὴν θλιβέραν ιστορίαν των πολεµικῶν καταστροφῶν τραγωδία της Σµύρνης, επηρέασεν, ὡς ἦτο επόµενον τὴν ψυχικῆν ισορροπίαν ὅλην ηµέων. [...] Επιθυµούµεν να εἴπωµεν πρὸς τους χριστιανοὺς ηµέων, ὅτι εάν εἰς τινὰς στιγμὰς η κατάστασις τῶν περὶ ηµᾶς πραγµάτων προσέλαβε µορφὴν κριµιµτότητος κάπως ανησυχητικῆς διά την παγκόσµιον εἰρήνην, ουδὲπέτευ τόσον σοβαρά εν τῇ πραγµατικότητι, ὡστε νὰ δικαιολογῆται ο παρατηρηθεῖς πρὸς τοὺς Γραφείους εκδόσεως διαλεκτικῆαν συνωστισµοῦ καὶ η σπουδὴ πρὸς αποµάκρυνσιν εκ τῆς πόλεως ηµέων. Ἡδὲ οµοι καὶ αἱ στιγµαὶ εκεῖνα τῆς κριµιµτότητος ἀπὸ ηµερῶν τριῶν -τεσσάρων θεωροῦνται γενικῶς ὡς ανήκουσι εἰς τὸ παρελθὸν. Οἱ Σύµµαχοι συνεφώνησαν πλήρως πρὶς τὴν τηρητέαν στάσιν, οἱ εµπεπιστευµένοι τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν ασφάλειαν τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ τῶν Στενῶν δυνάµεις ενισχύτηκαν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ζήτημα ευρίσκεται εἰς ὁδὸν εἰρηνικῶν διαπραγµατεύσεων. Τούτων ὅλων ἔνεκα συνιστῶµεν πατρικῶς πρὸς τὰ τέκνα τῆς Εκκλησίας νὰ θέσωσι κατὰ µέρος πάντα φόβον πρὶς εἰς τὴν Κωνσταντινουπόλεως συµφορὰν, νὰ επιδοθῶσι δὲ µὲ ψυχικὴν γαλήνην εἰς τὰ συνήθη ἔργα τῶν, εγκαταλείποντες τὴν ιδέαν αναχωρήσεως. Κίνδυνος υπάρχει εἰς καὶ µόνον κατ' αυτοῦ πρέπει να στραφῇ ὅλων ἡ προσοχή. Εννοοῦµεν τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν εἰς τὸ πανικὸν’.

Fn.638: ‘Η Κεµαλικῆ κυβέρνησις όλων τῶν εκ Κωνσταντινούπολες αναχωρήσαντας ἀνέως διακρίσεως θεωρεῖ ως προδότας ή ὅτι αὐτοδικαίως ἀπώλεσαν τὴν οθωµανικῆν ιθαγένειαν’.

Fn.648: ‘Τὴν εξόντωσιν τοῦ οµογενοῦς εἰς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως στοιχείου καὶ τὴν λεηλασίαν τῆς περιουσίας αὐτοῦ’.

Fn.649: ‘Ἡ τε ανωτέρα τάξις καὶ η µεσαία τοιαύτη εἰς Κωνσταντινούπολεως κατά διαφόρους τρόπους ανεµίχθη εἰς τὰς εθνικὰς οργανώσεις καὶ µέχρι σήµερον τόσον εἰς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως όσον καὶ εἰς τὸ εξωτερικὸν δεν παρέχεται περιφρούρησιν τῶν εθνικῶν συµφερόντων’.

Fn.665: ‘Τὸ δράµα τῆς Σµύρνης αφάνταστα ελύπησε τὴν Ρωµιοσύνην, τὸν ελληνισμὸν τῆς Πόλης. Εξάλλου, τὸν ετρόµαξε. [...] Αρχίσαν νὰ φεύγουν οἱ Ρωµιοὶ. Με ελληνικὰ καὶ ξένα πλοία αναχωροῦσαν γιὰ τὸν Πειραιά. Παρακατέβησαν οἱ αναχωρησίες, ἕνα διάστηµα, που διήρκεσε περισσότερο απὸ ἕνα µήνα, τὸ ελληνικὸ Προμεταδότη χωρὶς νὰ κάµνει διάκρισις ιθαγένειας, ελληνικῆς ἢ τουρκικῆς, εφοδιάζοντος τοὺς αναχωροῦντας Ῥωµιοὺς µ’ένα σηµείοµα που εἶχε τὸν τύπο διαβατηρίου’.

Fn.672: ‘Σήµερον οµιλοῦµεν εἰς ὧν οἱ Ρωµιοὶ εἰς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ διατυπώκηµεν µίαν παράκλησιν πρὸς τὴν Κυβέρνησιν. Έχουµεν ἄλλοις γονεῖς, ἄλλοις αδελφοῖς, ἄλλοις συγγενεῖς εἰς τὴ ζητήσειν. Εἶναι καὶ αὐτοὶ Τούρκοι ὑπεκαύσαντες καὶ ἔχουσι καὶ αὐτοὶ στερεάν καὶ ἀμετάκλητον τὴν απόφασιν, εφόσον εἰναλλάθη προωρίζονταί να

Dimitris Kamouzis  Page 319 of 325
ζήσωσι, να καταβάλωσι πάσας τας πνευματικάς και σωματικάς αυτών δυνάμεις δια την πρόοδον του τόπου αυτού’.

Fn.704: ‘Η διασάλευσις μέρους του όλου αδιασπάστως συγκεκριμένου θεσμού των μειονότητων βεβαιώς θα επιφέρη την κατερείπωσιν ολοκλήρου του οικοδομήματος’.

Fn.706: ‘Εν εναντία περιστώσει [η Επιτροπή] αποκρούσασα πάσαν λύσιν θίγουσαν τα ουσιώδη και ζωτικά δικαιώματα του παρ’ αυτής αντιπροσωπευουμένου τμήματος της εν Κωνσταντινούπολει Ελληνικής Μειονότητος απεκδίδεται πάσης ευθύνης και όπως [...] επιδιώξει την ανάρθωσιν των δικαιωμάτων αυτής παρά τη Κοινωνία των Εθνών’.

Fn.715: ‘Νέκρωσιν και εξαφάνισιν της Ελληνικής Κωνσταντινούπολεως, ήτις, εις πολλό δυσχερέστερα δια το ‘Εθνός περιστάσεις δεν έπαινεν ούσα το χάρημα και το εγκαλλώσπισμα παντοτός Έλληνος’.

Fn.716: ‘Καθιστώσεις ασφαλέστερον τον Εθνικόν θάνατον µεγάλου και εκλεκτής µοίρας του Ελληνισμού, της µόνης υπολειφθείσην εν Ανατολή καί ήτις ανέκαθεν υπήρξεν ο πυρήνα και ο θεµατοφύλαξ των εθνικών παραδόσεων’.

Fn.727: ‘Αφορµήν εις την δηµιουργίαν της πνιγηράς ταύτης α τµόσφαιρας έδωκε η µη εφαρµογή των συµφωνιών της Άγκυρας, και η εκ ταύ της εκκρεµότης των συναφών πρός την ανταλλαγήν των πληθυσµών ζητηµάτων [...] Δεν είναι άπορον συνεπώς ότι το ηµέτερον ενταύθα στοιχείον έχει κατα ληφθή υπό συναισθήµατος απογνώσεως υφιστάµενον κατάστασιν, ής από τριετίας µαταίως αναµένει την έκβασιν’.

Fn.736: ‘Πρέπει ως ετόνισεν ο Σαράτσογλου Σουκρή Βέης να ε πιλυθώσι τελειωτικώς τα ελληνοτουρκικά ζητήµατα [...] καί η επίλυσιν των θα επιτεύχθη όχι διά της επιδιώξεως της ανεπτυξιότητος και απαγγελίας του επιθυµεί να αποζηµιωθούν εις ολόκληρο και ακέραιον [...] οι εκ ταύτης εκκρεµότης των συναφών πρός την ανταλλαγήν των πληθυσµών ζητηµάτων [...] Δεν είναι άπορον συνεπώς ότι το ηµέτερον ενταύθα στοιχείον έχει κατα ληφθή υπό συναισθήµατος απογνώσεως των δύο τούτων κρατών’.

Fn.740: ‘Την 1 ∆εκεµβρίου εσηµειώθη εις σταθµός εις τας το υρκοελληνικάς σχέσεις [...] Οι πληθυσµοί, οίτινες θα λάβουν [...] είτε τα κτήµατα των, είτε το τέλος αυτών εις χρήµα. Ανακουφίζονται οι δύο κυβέρνησις από φροντίδος ήτις χρονίσσα είχε καταντήσει οχληρά. Εξ οµαλύνεται η οδός προς επίτευξιν πολιτικής φιλίας. Οι εκ ταύτης εκκρεµότης μεθόδοι των µη ανταλλαξίµων αποκτώσι µίαν εδραίαν κατάστασιν και θα δύνανται απερίσπαστοι να επιδοθώσιν εις τα βιοτικά αυτών έργα’.

Fn.741: ‘Αποδοχή τέτοιων ατιµωτικών όρων την επαύριον της καταστροφής θα ήτο μέχρι τινος συγγνωστή. Γενοµένη όµως σήµερον, τέσσαρα δηλαδή έτη από τότε και τρία αφ’ ής τ’ αντιθέτα εθεσπηθήσαν διεθνώς εν το Συνεδρίῳ της Ειρήνης, αποτελεί

Dimitris Kamouzis  Page 320 of 325
γεγονός εμφαίνον όλην την αδυναμίαν μας απέναντι του µορµολύκειου, το οποίον ονοµάζεται ∆ηµοκρατία του Μουσταφά Κεµάλ και του οποίου η υπόσταση εξαρτάται από µίαν υστάτην προσπάθειαν του Ελληνισµού’.

Fn.754: ‘Η σηµερινή Τουρκία, εξακολουθούσα να καταδιώκη πάν το µή τουρκικόν και µετ’ ιδιαίτερας λύσης πάν το ελληνικόν, εγείρει µεταξύ εαυτής και ηµίν τείχος. [...] Η σηµερινή Τουρκία εξακολουθούσα το πρόγραµµα του εκτουρκισµού των εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει αδελφών µας, λύει αντί να συνδέση δεσµούς φιλίας µετά του ελληνικού κράτους και τίποτε δεν µπορεί να µας κάµ να αισθανθώµεν τον παραµικρότερον ενθουσιασµόν πρός την σύναψιν ελληνοτουρκικού συµφώνου’.

Fn.755: ‘Νέα εποχή ήρχισεν ανατέλλουσα διά τήν Εγγύς Ανατολήν. Η παλαιά περίοδος της καχυποψίας έδυσε. Αί δε γείτονες ∆ηµοκρατίαι, Τουρκία και Ελλάς, τας οποίας συνδέει κοινότης συµφερόντων [...] πέπρωται να παίξουν σπουδαιότατον ρόλον εις την γενικήν πολιτικήν ἑν συνεργασίας και αµοιβαίας εκτιµήσεως και σβασµού’.

Fn.756: ‘Αλλ’ ο Χριστιανικός αυτός Ελληνισµός σκορπισµένος στην νέα πατρίδα, χωρίς πατρίδα, χωρίς εστία, µακριά από τα ιερά του και µακριά από τους τάφους των προγόνων του, αισθάνεται την πληγή του ακόµη πε ιό (sic) βαθειά όταν οι κυβερνήται της Ελλάδος τολµούν και να σκεφθούν κάν πως µπορεί να συνάψουν φιλίες µε τους αιωνόνοις των Γενητσαραίων, µε τους σφαγείς των χριστιανών, µε τους αγρίους που σκόρπισαν το αίµα και την ατιµία της (sic) πανάρχαιες εστίες του’.

Fn.770: ‘Οι Τούρκοι έχουν κηρύξει πόλεµον εξοντώσεως των εν Κων/πόλει αδελφών µας. [...] Αλλ’ αυτό δεν πρέπει, δεν µπορεί νά γίνη ανεκτόν υπό της Ελλάδος. [...] Χρειάζεται πυγµή καί µόνη δύναµις. [...] Ο πόλεµος! Ιδού τό µόνον τουρκικόν δίκαιον. Καί πρός αυτόν αναποδράστως φερόµεθα, εφόσον οι εν Άγκυρα ούτε αλλάζουν, ούτε είναι δυνατόν ν’αλλάξουν νουτριτία’.

Fn.772: ‘Αποκατάστασις του ελληνισµού δεν δύναται να υπάρξ η, δεν δύναται να νοηθή άνευ τής Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καί άνευ του Σταυρού επί τού θόλου της Αγίας Σοφίας. [...] Η ανάκτησις αυτής δεν αποτελεί πλέον φρούδον όνειρον, ουδε ναινούρισµα του βρεφικού µας λίκνου. [...] Μία ακόµη ευγενῆς προσπάθεια, καί τό όνειρον που ενεκαρδίωνε τους κλέφτας και τους αρµατωλούς, τό ιδανικόν που εκίνει τους ήρωας του 21 θα γίνη πραγµατικότης. Το τουρκικόν µορµολύκειον, [...] είναι ανίσχυρον ν’αναστείλη την εθνικήν µας ορµήν’.

Fn.781: ‘Ο ελληνικός λαός όλος δεν είναι διατεθειµένος να ανεχθή επιπλέον τάς τουρκικάς ταύτας παρασπονδίας. Εννοεί τό Πατριαρχείον µας να ίσταται εν Φαναρίω ως σεβαστή θρησκευτική µας αρχή. Εννοεί καί τους εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει υπολειφθέντας αδελφούς µας να παραµένουν ελεύθεροι εν τη κοινοτική, εθνική και οικονοµική των ζωή. Τήν αξίωσιν δε ταύτην εντονώτερον διατυπούσιν οι πρόσφυγες, ως ἑχόντες ἱσως ζωπροτέραν τήν διαίσθησιν τής σηµασίας τής Κωνσταντινουπόλεως. [...] Δεν θέλουν να ξεχάσουν ὅτι ο κ. Βενιζέλος ἦτο καί δεν

Dimitris Kamouzis Page 321 of 325
μπορεί παρά να είναι και εν τω μέλλοντι εκείνος των πολιτικών όστις πλειότερον ἵσως τῶν άλλων ἔξυπνος το στρατόν πάγει Ἰσία στὴν Ἀγιασοφία’.

Fn.783: ‘Εχω επιφυλάξεις ὅσον αφορά ἐν σημείον τῶν εὐχῶν σας. Ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν μου δὲν θὰ γίνη πόλεμος. Εὐχηθήτε αποθάνω ἵνα ἐπὶ τὸν διαδόχον ἐκπληρώσετε τὰς εὐχὰς σας. [...] Οὐδὲποτε εἶχα τον πόλεμον ως πολιτικὴ μου. Ἡναγκάσθην τὸ να εκπληρώσω τὸ καθήκον του κράτους υπέρ τῆς ἀπελευθέρωσεως τῶν υποδούλων, ὅταν ὑπήρχαν πληθυσμοὶ ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγόν. Διὰ τούτου προβῆν καὶ εἰς θυσίας. Ἡδὲ επιβάλλεται νὰ ὀργανωθοῦμεν εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχον κράτος, ἵνα δῆμουργήσουμεν τὴν εὐημερίαν τοῦ λαοῦ. Δὲν συμφωνῶ ὅτι ἡ Ἑλλάς εἶναι μικρὰ. [...] Τὰ σημερινὰ σύνορά μας, τὰ μέχρις Ἐβρου εἶναι αρκετά’.

Fn.796: ‘Επρέπε να εἶχον κατανοήσει ὅτι ἦσαν εἰς μίαν χώραν ὅπου ακούεται μόνον ὁ φωνάζων καὶ ὅπου ὁ σιγῶν θᾶπτεται. Ὅταν γίνεται δεκτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπουργῶν οὐχὶ ὁ κροῦσαν εὐγενῶς τὴν θύραν ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰσπῆδον απὸ τοῦ παραθύρου. [...] Ας κινηθούν λοιπόν τὰ σωματεῖα τῶν, ὡς φωνάζουσιν, ὡς διαμαρτυρηθοῦσιν, ὡς κινητοποιήσουσιν τοὺς ενδιαφερομένους, διότι ἄλλως δὲν ἦσαν να ελπίζουσιν τίποτε’.

Fn.806: ‘Εάν όμως πραγματικῶς φρονή ο κ. Βενιζέλος ὅτι ὁ Ελληνισμὸς δύναται νὰ ἦση καὶ δύναται νὰ εὐημερήσῃ χωρὶς τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν ἢ τουλάχιστον χωρὶς τὸ ἱδανικὸν τῆς ανακτήσεως τῆς, ὅπως οἱ ἐπιτραπέναι νὰ μὴν ἴχνῃ σύμφωνος. [...] Εἶναι ἡ Κωνσταντινούπολις! Εἶναι τὸ χάρμα τῶν Ἐλλήνων, εἶναι τὸ ὅνειρο μας, εἶναι η Ἀγκυρα σοστηρίας καὶ ὑπάρξεως τῆς φυλῆς μας, καὶ ως φυλῆς καὶ ως κράτους’.

Fn.813: ‘Μετὰ μίαν συνθήκην, τῆς ὁποίας οἱ Κωνσταντινούπολιται, μὲ τὴν διακρίνουσαν αὐτοὺς οξύνοιαν καὶ αγνήν φιλοπατρίαν, διεἰδὸν τὴν εθνικὴν σκοπιμότηταν καὶ δὲν εγόγγυσαν, δὲν ἀπεδοκίµασαν τοὺς επιχεῖς διὰ τὰ ἀτομικὰ συμφέροντά τοῦ όρους, εἶνε, φρονοῦμεν καιρός ὁ αρχηγὸς τῶν Φιλελευθέρων ν’ἀναλάβῃ τὴν ἐπιβλέψειν τοῦ ὁριστικοῦ διακανονισμοῦ του ζητήματος. [...] Ας χωρήσῃ τὸ ὅλον ἔργον πρὸς τὴν συντέλειάν του διὰ νὰ ἔχουν οἱ ἀνθρώποι αὐτοῖς, ἐλλείψει τῆς ὑλῆς, τουλάχιστον ὦς τὴν ἥδην ὑποκατίστησιν ὅτι συνέβαλον καὶ τὴν φορὰν αὐτὴν μὲ σημαντικὰς θυσίας τοῖς νὰ ενισχύσουσι μίαν εθνικὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τῆς ὁποίας ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ ὑπήρξεν καὶ πάλιν ὁ εὐμυθοχῆς καὶ δημιουργός’.

Dimitris Kamouzis  Page 322 of 325
Chapter 5

Fn.832: ‘Λαμβάνω το θάρρος να σας παρακαλέσω επίμονα να επιτυγχάνετε, να αναγνωρίσετε διά πληθυσμόν πριν από την υπογραφή της ειρήνης’.

Fn.883: ‘Κυβέρνηση εν τούτοις θεωρεί ου µικράν επιτυχίαν παραµονήν Πατριαρχείου και ελληνικού πληθυσµών Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, ευελπιστεί ότι αποκαθιστήσειν ειρήνην και αναλαµβάνοντος Κράτους σύν τον χρόνο προέρχεται αυτού δυνάμεις και προηγούμενον γόνητον, θέλουσι ανατείλει ευηχέστεραι σοµπόντα ελληνισµών’.

Fn.923: ‘Η Ενδηµούσα Ιερά Σύνοδος, επιθυµούσα να µεταβιβάση, συµφώνως πρός την Συνθήκην της Λωζάνης, τα δικαιώµατα και καθήκοντα του εν τοίς Πατριαρχείοις υφισταµένου téos Δ.Ε.Μ. Συµβουλίου εις την περιοχή της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ορθόδοξων οµογενών και µειονότητα, ευελπιστεί ότι ανατείλει ευτυχέστεραι ηµέραι δια σύµπαντα ελληνισµόν’.

Fn.924: ‘Η συνεδρία θα είναι ιστορική διότι η Εκκλησία µετά πάροδον πέντε αιώνων καθ’όλον τον ανακοµβήκε, καθ’έλλον το από της ανακωχής και µετέπειτα διαρρεύσαν χρονικόν διάστηµα είναι προσόντα ανεκτίµητα, εγγυώµενα την επιτυχίαν του έργου, το οποίον θα ανελάµβανον’.

Fn.932: ‘Εάν η σηµερινή πολιτική του ελληνικού κράτους έχει πράγµατι συµφέρον να πείση την σηµερινήν Τουρκίαν ότι εγκατέλιπε την εθνικιστικήν πολιτικήν, ότι δεν αποβλέπει εις την διατήρησιν εθνικιστικών οργανώσεων εν Τουρκία έχει νοµίζω συµφέρον να περιορίση τας εκδηλώσεως του ενδιαφέροντος αυτής δια το Πατριαρχείον ως θρησκευτικού θεσµού εις µόνον τας απολύτως και επιτακτικώς αναγκαίας. Εάν ως πιστεύω επιθυµούµεν εκ παραλλήλου να διατηρήσουµεν όπως και δυνάµεθα να διατηρήσουµεν ελπίδας δια το Πατριαρχείον ως εθνικόν κέντρον, τότε κατά µείζονα έτι λόγον πρέπει  ως κύριον µέληµα την αποκοίµησιν του µίσους και τον υποψηφίον της Τουρκίας κατ’αυτού, προγραμματικός ενεργούντες και καταβάλλοντες πάσαν προσπάθειαν όπως ως τάγματα το Πατριαρχείον εµφανισθή ως τι νέον, άσχετων κατά µέρος το πρότερον, το πονηρόν το ισότο καταβάλλοντες πάσας των κακιών εκείνου κληρονοµιάς. Ωστόσον ως κύριον µέληµα να διατηρήσουµεν σώσων τον θεσµόν από το µίσος τον άσπονδον, το φλέγον εισέτι καταβάλλοντος πάσας των κακιών εκείνου κληρονοµιάς. Ούτω µόνον δυνάµεθα να σώσουµεν τον θεσµόν από το µίσος τον άσπονδον, το φλέγον εισέτι καταβάλλοντος πάσας των κακιών εκείνου κληρονοµιάς.

Dimitris Kamouzis
κύκλων. [...] Και αν σήμερον σώσωμεν το Πατριαρχείον, τότε μέγα επετελέσαμεν έργον, ταχ’ αύριον ἔσσετ’ ἁμείνον’.

Fn.942: ‘Δηλώσατε ότι η κυβέρνησις μη λαμβάνοντα υπ’όψει πρός εκλογή παντός καταλλήλου επιθυμεί αιλός σύνοδος αποβλέψει εις πρόσοπον το οποίον ἔχει πάντα απαιτούμενα προσόντα, άτινα τουρκική κυβέρνησις επιζητεί, ἵνα μη υπάρξῃ ὁδε γέλαση αφορμή μη αναγνωρίσεως εκλεχθόμενο. Αντίθετος ενέργεια θα ευθύνη την Σύνοδον, έχουσα πλήρη ελευθερίαν να κανονίση συνάντησιν εν πνεύματι αγάπης και επιθυμίας να στηριχθή καθεξής ανεξαρτήτως παντός προσωπικοῦ συμφερόντος’.

Fn.962: ‘Αλλά θεωρώ τοσούτον ἁξιοκατάκριτον συμπεριφοράν των εν Φαναρίω οίτινες παρά την προειδοποίησιν της Τουρκικής Κυβερνήσεως και την συμβουλή της Ελληνικής επέμειναν εις εκλογήν προσώπου θεωρούµενου υπό Τούρκων ανταλλάξιµοι και εδηµιούργησαν σοβαράν κρίσιν, ὅστε δεν δύναµαι αποτελεσµατικός να υπερασπίζω την Ελληνικήν άποψιν αφ’ ὧν έχει απαντήσει την Εθνικήν αυτήν αναγκασθόντως να οµολογήσω οτι θεωρώ αυτήν ἁξιοκατάκριτον’.

Fn.963: ‘Εν τοιαύτη περιπτώσει εἶμαι ο ἥκιστα κατάλληλος Ἑλλήναν αντιπρόσωπον αφ’ου μετά την επίσηµη πληροφορίαν την έχω ἕξις εις χείρας μου οτι εις Κωνσταντινούπολην ὑπάρχουσι 8 ἱεράρχαι μη ανταλλάξιµοι ευρίσκω την ενέργειαν της Τουρκίας απολύτως δικαιολογηµένην µετά την προειδοποίησιν ἡν έκαµε πρό της εκλογής’.

Fn.977: ‘Ατυχώς το Φανάριον φαίνεται µή αντιληφθέν ποίαι βαθείαι µεταβολαί επῆλθον εν ανατολικῷ ζήτηµατι απὸ τεσσάρων και πλέον ετῶν. δεν αντιλαµβάνεται οτι και σχέσεις του προς την Πύλην ευρίσκονται εἰς την απόλυτην διάκρισιν της τελευταίας σχεδίων όπως και µετά το 1453. Ἐφ’όσον εἶναι αδύνατον να προσαρµοσθῇ πρὸς την δηµιουργηθήσει µετά την προειδοποίησιν ἡ ἑκατέρα εὐθύνη της Ελληνικῆς κυβερνήσεως εἶναι να περιχαράξῃ εντός του παντελούς κατάστασιν τούτον οποία καταδεικνύεται στερούµενη τῆς πραγµατικότητος’.

Fn.990: ‘Είναι δε λυπηρόν ότι η υπόδειξις αυτή προήλθεν ως φαίνεται εξ εισηγήσεως προσώπων τινών εκ τῶν 22 επιδιωκόντων δια τῆς χαµερπού πολιτείας την εξυπηρέτησιν προσωπικῶν συµφερόντων’.
βέβαιον ότι θα διαγραφή παρά ταύτης, αλλά και το δικαίωμα μας είναι να το ξητήσωμεν'.

Fn.1011: 'Οι ναοί, τα αγιάσματα, τα παντός είδους φιλανθρωπικά και ευαγή
ιδρύματα, τα σχολεία και λοιπά μορφωτικά ιδρύματα της Ρωμαϊκής Μειονότητος, ως
και τα κτήματα, οι περιουσίες τους και οι πρόσωποι τους και υπέρ αυτών δωρεάν και
τα κληροδοτήματα, διοικώνται και εποπτεύονται λαϊκό συστήματι, τά μέν επι
μέρους υπό των οικείων εφορευτικών, τά δέ κοινοτικά, τα ανήκοντα εις την
ολότητα της Μειονότητος υπό του Διοικητικού αυτής Συμβουλίου'.

Fn.1012: 'Η κατάστασις επιδεικνύεται έτι μάλλον, λόγω των σφοδρών παθών άτινα
χωρίζουσι το ελληνικόν ενταύθα στοιχείον, παθών τα οποία εξαρκείσθησαν
ανέκαθεν την φυλήν μας και τα οποία φυσικά είναι να εκδηλούνται βιαιότερα εις
εποχάς παρακμής, οία, δια τον εν Τουρκία ελληνισμόν, είναι αναμφιβόλως η
παρούσα'.